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DIRECTOR’S PREFACE 
 
In 2014, the Delaware General Assembly adopted an epilogue in its Budget Act for fiscal year 
2015 that created the Criminal Justice Improvement Committee (“CJIC”). The CJIC was tasked generally 
with seeking opportunities for efficiencies, cost savings, and pursuing other improvements in the criminal 
justice system. One specific area of the CJIC’s legislative mandate reads: “The Committee shall review 
opportunities for efficiencies in the criminal justice system, including but not limited to the following 
areas:  
 statutes in the criminal code, identifying disproportionate, redundant, outdated, duplicative or 
inefficient statutes;  
 crimes that should or should not constitute potential jail time;. . . .” (“the Epilogue”).  
After the Epilogue was reauthorized in 2015, this Recodification Project was initiated under the 
CJIC as a comprehensive response to its mandate. As a practical matter, it is impossible to determine if a 
criminal statute is “disproportionate, redundant, outdated, duplicative or inefficient” until it is compared 
to all other criminal statutes. Additionally, since the General Assembly adopted the Delaware Criminal 
Code of 1973, new insights have emerged regarding what a criminal code should address, and how it 
should do so. Moreover, the broader legal landscape has changed greatly. This Recodification Project was 
predicated on the belief that — as was the case in 1973, and may well be the case again in another forty or 
fifty years — it was necessary to take a step back and conduct a panoramic review of the Delaware 
Criminal Code. The two volumes of this Final Report are the fruits of that review. 
Pursuant to the Epilogue’s legislative mandate, the Proposed Criminal Code seeks to replace the 
current code with a clear, concise, and comprehensive set of provisions. Specifically, the Proposed Code 
seeks to include necessary provisions not contained in the current code; to eliminate unnecessary or 
inconsistent provisions of the current code; to revise existing language and structure to make the law 
easier to understand and apply; and to ensure that criminal offenses and legal rules are cohesive and relate 
to one another in a consistent and rational manner. At the same time, the Proposed Code aims to preserve 
the substantive policy judgments reflected in the original code and its subsequent amendments. When the 
process of clarifying and reconciling current provisions made it necessary to make substantive choices, 
the drafters have sought to explain and justify the proposed changes with commentary designed to assist 
the enacters, and ultimately the users, of the Proposed Code. 
In developing the Proposed Code, the drafters were guided by five general drafting principles. 
First, the drafters have made an effort to use clear, accessible language and organization. One of the 
critical functions of a criminal code is to provide notice to citizens of what conduct is prohibited. Clear 
and accessible writing enables provision of true notice while also ensuring that no offender escapes 
liability because of an incomplete or ambiguous offense definition. More straightforward code provisions 
also promote development of clearer jury instructions, making it easier for jurors to fulfill their critical 
role. Even for members of the criminal justice system, who work with the criminal code every day and 
must be intimately familiar with its rules, plain-language expression is essential. 
Second, the Proposed Code endeavors to provide a comprehensive statement of rules. A criminal 
code must include all necessary rules governing liability. Comprehensiveness helps avoid inappropriate 
results. Courts, which decide individual cases and act independently of one another, cannot be as effective 
as a legislature in formulating coherent general doctrines that will work together as the provisions of a 
comprehensive code can and must. Moreover, an uncodified rule is more likely to be applied differently 
in similar cases than a codified rule, as the terms of the latter are fixed, explicit, and available to all 
officials at each stage in the process. 
 
 7 
Third, the drafters have aimed to consolidate offenses. Perhaps inevitably, four decades of 
piecemeal modification of the Criminal Code of 1973 have led to the addition of hundreds of new 
offenses, many of which cover the same conduct as previous offenses or appear in various other titles of 
the Delaware Code rather than in the criminal code. Consolidation ensures against the confusion that 
results when one encounters, and must make sense of, multiple provisions that overlap or contradict, and 
also against the mistakes that ensue when one fails to notice, or find, provisions that may apply to a given 
case. Consolidation also aids the task of proper grading, because it is nearly impossible to maintain 
consistent, proportional grading when offense definitions are based on insignificant, or incomprehensible, 
distinctions. 
Fourth, the drafters have striven to grade offenses rationally and proportionally. One virtue of a 
recodification project, relative to the usual piecemeal legislative additions and alterations to the criminal 
code, is the opportunity it provides for a general review of the system of grading offenses, considering 
how all offenses relate to one another rather than considering individual offenses in a vacuum. For a 
system of criminal justice to be fair, liability must be assigned according to the relative seriousness of the 
offense(s) committed. The drafters have sought to recognize all, and only, suitable distinctions among the 
relative severity of offenses and develop a scheme to grade each offense proportionally to its gravity in 
light of those distinctions. 
Finally, the Proposed Code seeks to retain all (but only) reasonable policy decisions embodied in 
current law. Because substantive policy decisions about the rules of the criminal law reflect value 
judgments properly left to the General Assembly, the Proposed Code aims to follow the substance of 
current law wherever possible. In some places, however, current law contains multiple contradictory rules 
— and therefore no clear rule — on a subject. Other rules may have been sound when enacted, but no 
longer reflect current realities or sensibilities and require expansion, alteration, or deletion. In those 
situations where the existing legal rule seems clearly at odds with the Epilogue’s mandate of producing a 
rational, coherent criminal code, the drafters have had little choice but to modify the existing rule, using 
supporting commentary to the Proposed Code to describe and justify the proposed change. 
A few words are in order regarding issues that the Proposed Code does not address. The Proposed 
Code addresses substantive criminal law rules only. It excludes numerous provisions in the current code 
governing procedural, sentencing, and regulatory issues, retaining only the ones necessary to elaborate or 
explain the criminal code’s substantive prohibitions and rules. This does not mean, however, that the 
Proposed Code would eliminate those provisions. Rather, the Proposed Code was drafted with the 
understanding that such provisions would be retained, in Title 11 or other titles of the Delaware Code, by 
means of a “conforming amendments” bill to be enacted by the General Assembly contemporaneously 
with the new criminal code. 
 It is our expectation that in the years ahead, subsequent reforms of Delaware’s procedural and 
regulatory law will organize these provisions differently or transfer them to other Titles of the Delaware 
Code. In many instances, the Code’s commentary provides recommendations that may assist these future 
reform efforts, by highlighting such provisions and explicitly stating that a particular current offense, 
procedural or sentencing rule, or civil or regulatory provision should be preserved outside the Proposed 
Code. Yet the commentary’s failure to include such a clear statement with respect to any particular 
provision — especially one that does not address an issue relating to substantive criminal law — should 
not be understood to indicate a recommendation that the provision in question should be eliminated. In 
the event that the General Assembly decides to adopt the Proposed Code, the drafters have prepared more 
detailed instructions (excluded, due to considerations of length, from these volumes) concerning the 
necessary conforming amendments. 
In other instances, language in the Proposed Code itself makes clear its intent to retain current 
law as to an issue. For example, the proposed provisions governing abortion (Section 1106) and driving 
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under the influence (Section 1205) explicitly incorporate by reference the complicated regulatory schemes 
currently set forth in Subchapter IX of the Medical Practice Act and Section 4177 of Title 21, 
respectively. Similarly, many of the proposed drug offenses (Chapter 5200) explicitly rely upon 
definitions contained in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Incorporating those rules and definitions 
by reference, but preserving their regulatory content outside Title 11, avoids cluttering the Code with 
technical regulatory provisions. At the same time, it is necessary to overtly incorporate the relevant 
offenses within the Proposed Code both in order to promote the comprehensiveness of the code and to 
exclude them from the scope of the rule (stated in proposed Section 801) that non-Code offenses can be 
graded no higher than Class A misdemeanors. 
As discussed above, the drafters have sought to retain reasonable policy decisions embodied in 
current law where possible. In recognition that such value judgments are best left to the legislature, the 
Proposed Code includes footnotes identifying several substantive policy issues for the General Assembly 
to resolve. Each footnote presents the arguments on both sides of the issue.  
As a final matter, it is important to note that proposed Chapter 800 is not intended to address all 
issues (or indeed, any issues) regarding the sentencing and disposition of offenders. Rather, Chapter 800 
deals only with those basic issues necessary to make clear the meaning of the Proposed Code’s general 
scheme of liability — for example, that offense grades define a certain hierarchy; and that the Code 
contemplates certain broad factors that will operate to aggravate an offense’s grade, and addresses those 
factors by imposing general aggravations rather than applying them to specific offenses. The Proposed 
Code’s silence as to other, more complex sentencing issues does not indicate a lack of awareness or 
concern about such issues, but an understanding that they were beyond the scope of the present project. 
Moreover, the “authorized” terms of imprisonment and fines appearing in Chapter 800 are themselves 
tentative. The primary focus of the drafters’ work has been to ensure that the grading of different offenses 
is rational and proportional, and not to determine the appropriate absolute severity of punishment 
attaching to a grade. Accordingly, the proposed offense grades are intended only to convey the relative 
seriousness of offenses, and not the sentencing consequences of a conviction for any offense.   
On a personal note, I would like to thank the Recodification Project’s Staff Director, Matthew 
Kussmaul, for his excellent and invaluable work, often under difficult circumstances. We owe Matthew a 
great debt for his inspired leadership. His contributions to this work have been enormous and unheralded. 
In closing, I would like to commend Delaware State officials for their foresight and commitment 
to explore the development of a new criminal code. The serious problems in the current Delaware 
Criminal Code are no worse than those existing in other American jurisdictions, and less serious than 
those in many. With no new national model in sight, such as a Model Penal Code Second, it was 
courageous of the Delaware General Assembly to take the lead in at least exploring how a “second wave” 
of American criminal law recodifications might be stimulated. 
 
Paul H. Robinson 
Director, Delaware Criminal Code Recodification Project 
Wilmington, September 2016 
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HISTORY OF THE DELAWARE CRIMINAL CODE RECODIFICATION 
PROJECT 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The current Delaware Criminal Code was developed beginning in 1967, in direct response to the 
American Law Institute publishing its landmark Model Penal Code in 1962. In the words of Judge Joseph 
T. Walsh, Chairman of the Governor’s Committee for Revision of the Criminal Law: 
[t]he criminal law of Delaware consisted at that time of a large number of unconnected 
criminal statutes. The offenses were not codified, and the sections defining them were 
phrased in widely different styles of language. Penalties were inconsistent, language was 
archaic and worst of all, many offenses were left to be defined by the common law without 
any statutory assistance. General principles of criminal liability, such as definitions of the 
requisite states of mind for criminal guilt and defenses to criminal prosecution, were also 
left to common-law development.1 
After eight public hearings and a four-year revision process, the current code was passed and received the 
Governor’s approval in 1972, and was enacted in 1973.  
The Criminal Code of 1973 was short, clean, and comprehensive — a dramatic improvement over 
the law it replaced. In the years since 1973, however, numerous amendments have greatly reduced the 
utility and clarity of the original criminal code. The sheer volume of the code has increased from less than 
95 pages as originally enacted, to over 407 pages today. Nearly all of these amendments and additions 
were made on an ad hoc basis and without a comprehensive review of the code as a whole. As a result, 
several fundamental problems plague the code, much as they plagued Delaware criminal law prior to 
1973. Provisions overlap with or contradict other provisions. Offenses have become obsolete or out of 
touch with current societal norms. Penalties are disproportionate to the harm caused or in comparison 
with other provisions. Numerous major criminal offenses are defined in statutes outside the criminal code. 
Conversely, various procedural, sentencing, and regulatory provisions that properly belong elsewhere — 
in the Code of Criminal Procedure, or another title related to the provision’s subject matter — appear 
within the criminal code.  
 
FORMING THE RECODIFICATION PROJECT 
 
In 2014, the Delaware General Assembly passed a law creating the Criminal Justice Improvement 
Committee (“CJIC”) (FY 15 Budget Act of the 147th General Assembly (SB 255, Sect. 111 as amended 
by SB 266))2. Part of the mandate of that group was to focus on reforming the Delaware Criminal Code. 
To that end, the epilogue language required that the CJIC: 
                                                             
1 Frank B. Baldwin, III, DELAWARE CRIMINAL CODE WITH COMMENTARY iii (1973) (introductory material 
by Judge Walsh) 
2 Section 111 provides as follows:  
 “Recognizing funding and policy challenges in the criminal justice system, the General Assembly hereby 
establishes the Criminal Justice Improvement Committee.  The Committee shall suggest efficiencies, improvements 
and cost savings to the criminal justice system.  The Chair and the Co-Chair of the Joint Finance Committee shall 
appoint a Committee Chair.  The Committee shall also include the following membership: 
 The Attorney General or designees; 
 The Chief Public Defender or designee; 
 The Commissioner of Correction or designee; 
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“review opportunities for efficiencies in the criminal justice system, including but not limited to 
the following areas: 
 Statutes in the criminal code, identifying disproportionate, redundant, outdated, 
duplicative or inefficient statutes; 
 Crimes that should or should not constitute potential jail time; . . .” 
 
During the following year, discussions were had among members of the CJIC established by the 
epilogue as to how best to move the epilogue’s mandated mission forward. By mandate of the epilogue, 
the Chief Justice and his designee were required to serve on the CJIC. To aid the CJIC, the Chief Justice 
selected Superior Court Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr. as his designee, because Judge Carpenter is not 
only highly experienced as a criminal law judge and a former U.S. Attorney for the District of Delaware, 
but also the head of the General Assembly-mandated Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission 
(SENTAC).3   
In discussions with the General Assembly’s Joint Finance Committee (JFC), the Judiciary 
suggested that the code reform tasks in the epilogue be assigned to SENTAC, because that body was 
established by statute to create a coherent sentencing scheme under the existing code, was expert in the 
criminal law of Delaware, and contained key stakeholders such as the police, corrections officials, and 
prosecutors and defense attorneys. Ultimately, the General Assembly elected to continue with the 
mandate for code reform under the CJIC, and to continue with its existing membership.4   
                                                             
 The Governor’s criminal justice policy advisor; 
 A member of the Joint Finance Committee representing each caucus, as appointed by the Chair 
and Co-Chair of the Joint Finance Committee; 
 Two representatives of the Judicial Branch, as appointed by the Chief Justice; 
  A representative from the Delaware Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; 
 A representative from the Delaware Bar Association; and 
 The Director of Substance Abuse and Mental Health or designee. 
The Committee shall review opportunities for efficiencies in the criminal justice system, including but not limited to 
the following areas: 
 Statutes in the criminal code, identifying disproportionate, redundant, outdated, duplicative or 
inefficient statutes; 
 Crimes that should or should not constitute potential jail time; 
 Judicial access to adequate information prior to sentencing; 
 Court decisions and rules related to Rule 61; 
 The charging and plea bargaining process, including cases where charges may overlap; 
 Bail and alternatives to incarceration including new technologies; and 
 Action plans related to the identified areas outlined in the Sixth Amendment Center’s report, 
published in February 2013. 
 
The Committee shall work in consultation with other governmental committee and bodies which have overlapping 
authority in the criminal justice areas that it will be reviewing, in order to support coordination, and avoid 
duplication, of efforts.  Those bodies include, but are not limited to, the Delaware Sentencing Accountability 
Commission, Delaware Justice Reinvestment Oversight Group, and the Supreme Court’s Access to Justice 
Commission.  In recognition that many important criminal justice issues fall within overlapping jurisdictions of 
various commissions, task forces, and other bodies overseeing criminal justice areas, and that this overlap creates a 
strain on scarce staff resources, risks inefficiency and potential inconsistency in policies, the Committee shall also 
recommend steps to reduce the number of bodies dealing with common criminal justices issues, so that fewer, but 
more effective, bodies develop and help implement criminal justices policies.  The Committee shall recommend 
appropriate funding or policy changes by May 1, 2015.” 
3 11 Del. C. § 6580. 
4 FY 16 Budget Act of the 148th General Assembly, HB 225, Sect. 112. 
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As it had in 2014, the General Assembly again directed the CJIC to “review opportunities for 
efficiencies in the criminal justice system, including but not limited to the following areas: 
 statutes in the criminal code, identifying disproportionate, redundant, outdated, 
duplicative or inefficient statutes; 
 crimes that should or should not constitute potential jail time; . . .” 
 
Using that authority, the Judiciary offered funding it received in the FY 2016 Budget Act of the 148th 
General Assembly (HS No. 1 for HB 225, Sect. 49) to support judicial branch initiatives and hired the 
Director, Paul H. Robinson, an internationally renowned expert in crafting modern criminal codes, to aid 
the legislatively established CJIC.5   
During the CJIC’s November 17, 2015 initial meeting, the committee discussed working with the 
Director to guide an independent and comprehensive review of Delaware’s criminal code to meet their 
goals specified in budget epilogue. A working group of lawyers and judges involved in the Delaware 
criminal justice system was formed to provide oversight, which initially included: Judge William 
Carpenter, SENTAC Chair; Judge Ferris Wharton; Judge Charles Butler; Judge Paul Wallace; Lisa 
Minutola, Chief of Legal Services for the Office of Defense Services; Robert Goff, Office of Defense 
Services; Steve Wood, Deputy Attorney General; and Kathleen Jennings, Chief State Prosecutor.  During 
the first portion of the drafting and revision process that followed, Steve Wood and Kathleen Jennings 
received all the materials distributed to the working group. But before the working group deliberations 
began, the Attorney General declined the invitation for his attorneys to participate in the process and 
eventually would not permit them to comment on the Report. As a result of this decision by the Attorney 
General, no one in the Department of Justice contributed to this Preliminary Report. Nonetheless, the 
Working Group’s members included two judges who were former prosecutors. 
On January 21, 2016, the Director appeared before the CJIC to present some preliminary work 
and answer questions about the Project’s approach and process. The CJIC agreed that the Project should 
continue its work. On June 8, 2016 at the request of the CJIC Chair, the Director appeared before the full 
Joint Finance Committee to update members of the General Assembly about the Project’s progress. In the 
interests of transparency, the Director has also invited commentary and questions from other stakeholders 
in the criminal justice system, to be incorporated before the Report is finalized including: 
 
 leaders of the Delaware police unions,6  
                                                             
5 Section 49 provides: 
“Notwithstanding anything contained in 12 Del.C. c. 11 Subchapter IV, or any other rule or law to the 
contrary, 50 percent of the funds held pursuant to former Supeior Court Rule 16.1 shall be deposited in the 
General Fund and the remained authorized to be used, on a one-time basis as determined by the Chief 
Justice, for operation needs in Fiscal Year 2016 related to the work of SENTAC, the Access to Justice 
Commission, and the Criminal Justice Council for the Judiciary.” 
6 On April 22, 2016, the Director, Staff Director, and Chief Justice Strine met with: Thomas Brackin, 
President of the Delaware State Troopers Association; and Fred Calhoun, President of the Delaware State Lodge of 
the Fraternal Order of Police. 
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 police chiefs from across the state,7 and  
 victims’ rights advocates.8 
 
The working group continues to solicit input from all who have interest in commenting.  Additionally, a 
series of hearings will be held across the state during which public comment will be solicited and be 
incorporated into the working groups’ Final Report to the CJIC.  
 
 
THE DRAFTING PROCESS 
 
The Director and Staff Director, assisted by distinguished law students in the Criminal Law 
Research Group of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, prepared a preliminary draft of the 
Proposed Code throughout the Fall of 2015. The work occurred in several stages. First, the drafting team 
combed through not only Title 11, but the entire Delaware Code, to identify every criminal offense in 
current law and corresponding substantive criminal law provisions. These provisions were collected in a 
database and organized in logical groups that would eventually become the Chapters of the Proposed 
Code. Each group of provisions was carefully scrutinized with an eye to the Epilogue’s mandate, 
identifying provisions that: conflicted with each other; were redundant with each other; were outmoded 
and unnecessary; were located in the Criminal Code, but belonged in another part of the Delaware Code; 
or were located outside the Criminal Code, but belonged within it.  The provisions remaining for 
inclusion in the Proposed Code were consolidated and drafted into a concise but comprehensive Chapter, 
utilizing all available techniques of modern code drafting to make the Chapter as simple and approachable 
as possible. After substantive review by the Director, a preliminary version of each Chapter was prepared 
for the working group. The drafting team also prepared thorough commentaries to accompany each draft 
Chapter. These commentaries perform several important functions. They explain the meaning of each 
Section of every Chapter, give a roadmap of how each Section was developed from current law, explain 
the Epilogue justification for every deviation from current law, and make recommendations for the 
relocation of provisions currently within the Criminal Code that the Proposed Code does not include.   
By January 2016, the drafting team had completed every preliminary draft Chapter and 
commentary. Over the next several months, drafts of the Special Part of the Proposed Code were 
submitted to the entire working group in subject-based stages for substantive comments and suggestions. 
Each member first received the draft Chapters and commentaries for the Offenses Against the Person 
(Chapters 1100–1400), followed by the Offenses Against Property (Chapters 2100–2400), Offenses 
Against Public Administration (Chapters 3100–3300), Offenses Against Public Health and Safety 
(Chapters 4100–4500), and finally the Crime Control Offenses (Chapters 5100–5300). For each group of 
chapters, each working group member individually worked through the materials supplied and provided 
                                                             
7 On July 21, 2016, the Director and Staff Director met with the following representatives from the 
Delaware Police Chiefs Council: Jeff Horvath, Executive Director of the Council; Wayne Kline, Chief of 
Enforcement for the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control; Paul Bernat, Chief of 
the Dover Police Department; R.L. Hughes, Chief of the Georgetown Police Department; John Horsman, Chief of 
the Delaware Capitol Police; and Peggy Bell, Executive Director of the Delaware Criminal Justice Information 
System. On August 15, 2016,  the Director, Staff Director, Chief Justice Strine, and Judges Carpenter and Wharton 
met with: Colonel Nathaniel McQueen, Jr., Chief of the Delaware State Police; Colonel Elmer M. Setting, Chief of 
the New Castle County Police Department; and Fred Calhoun, President of the Delaware State Lodge of the 
Fraternal Order of Police. 
8 By way of example, on August 30, 2016, the Director, Staff Director, Consultant and Judge Wharton met 
with representatives from various victims’ rights advocacy organizations.  
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detailed, written comments, questions, and suggestions. These written comments formed the basis of a 
dialogue with the Director to surface areas in which the drafts could be improved, and highlighting 
broader policy issues that became “pro-con” footnotes, thereby reserving them for public debate and 
legislative resolution. Many of the working group’s suggested changes proved invaluable, and the 
Director would suggest to incorporate them into the Proposed Code. Ultimately, any changes the Director 
sought to make to the Proposed Code as a result of the dialogue process had to be approved by the 
working group member who raised the issue.  However, these dialogues also raised issues so substantial 
that any changes to the Proposed Code resulting from their resolution required consensus of the entire 
working group. Therefore, once all five rounds of dialogue and revisions were complete, those remaining 
issues formed the agenda for the working group’s first meeting. 
The full working group first met for a two-day-long retreat on June 1–2, 2015 at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. Prior to that meeting, the working group was provided with an annotated 
version of the then-current draft of the Proposed Code, containing 42 footnotes—including 9 “pro-con” 
footnotes—that formed the agenda for the first day of the retreat. The first day consisted of a series of 
discussions through which the working group decided by consensus how to resolve all outstanding issues 
with the Special Part of the Proposed Code.  The second day of the retreat focused primarily on the 
relative grading of offenses as shown in a complete grading table prepared by the Director and submitted 
to the working group members in advance of the retreat. Tracking the Epilogue mandate to address 
disproportionate punishment in the current Criminal Code, the working group identified offenses that did 
not fit comfortably among other offenses of the same grade. Offense grades could be either 
disproportionately high or low.  For each of these disproportionately graded offenses, the working group 
reached consensus about how to address the problem, either by raising or lowering the offense’s grade. 
Following the meeting, the Director revised the grades of several offenses to reflect the working group’s 
directives. A final version of the Special Part was developed for this Final Report out of the working 
group’s vital contributions at the June retreat. 
At the June retreat, the working group also scheduled a second retreat for August 31, 2016 to 
finalize the General Part of the Proposed Code (Chapters 100–800). Later in June 2016, the Director sent 
a revised grading table to the working group along with revised drafts of all Chapters and their 
corresponding commentaries. Between the two retreats, the working group members engaged in the same 
written comment-and-dialogue process for the General Part Chapters that was described above for the 
Special Part Chapters. As before, the remaining unresolved issues and “pro-con” footnotes in the drafts 
formed the basis of the agenda for discussion at the August retreat. In addition, prior to the August 31 
meeting, the Director provided the working group with memoranda on the current code’s piecemeal 
approach to the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences and the punishment of repeat offenders, in 
which he outlined the provisions of the Proposed Code intended to rationalize the treatment of these 
subjects. On August 31, the working group met again at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and 
discussed the remaining unresolved issues in the General and Special Parts of the Proposed Code, as well 
as the suggested provisions pertaining to mandatory minimums and repeat offenders. The working group 
members reached a consensus with regard to the majority of the matters discussed, though some issues 
remained unsettled. The Director incorporated into the Proposed Code all changes that the working group 
decided upon with certainty at the August 31 retreat. In addition, some new issues, which were not part of 
the written comment-and-dialogue process were raised during the meeting.  
Following the meeting, the Director provided the members of the working group with the revised 
draft of the Proposed Code’s text and commentary reflecting the decisions made during the meeting and a 
revised grading table, illustrating the implications of the Proposed Code’s mandatory minimum 
provisions. In addition, the Director provided the working group members with comments concerning the 
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matters that remained unresolved, and expressed his reservations from some of the decisions made during 
the meeting on matters that had not previously been raised or briefed by the staff.  
This two-volume Criminal Law Research Group Report  (“CLRG Report)” reflects all of those 
decisions made under the process described above: written comments by working group members on the 
staff’s draft text and commentary, to which the staff replied in writing continuing a dialogue until each 
issue was either resolved or set for decision by the full working group. (At the August 31 meeting, the 
process going forward was changed.) 
This CLRG Report contains several “pro-con” footnotes that emerged from the dialogues 
between working group members and the Director, as well as the working group’s discussions at the June 
and August retreats. These are policy issues the Director and working group think ought to be submitted 
to public comment and ultimately resolved by the people of Delaware, rather than by the working group.  
In addition to such “pro-con footnotes,” the CLRG Report seeks to facilitate the debate on 
Delaware’s criminal law, and assist the people of Delaware and various actors within its criminal justice 
system in several ways. In addition to the text of the draft Code, Volume 1 of the CLRG Report contains 
a Summary Grading Table (that was previously provided to the working group members), which groups 
all offenses covered by the Proposed Code according to their grade, and assists in the evaluation the 
Proposed Code’s grading judgments. A just and fair penal code authorizes more serious punishment for 
more serious offenses. Thus the grade of each offense ought to be compared to the grade of each other 
offense in the Proposed Code and, all other things being equal, more serious offenses ought to be graded 
more seriously than less serious offenses. Because the Proposed Code attempts to be comprehensive, it 
contains a large number of offenses, making it a challenge to assure proportionality among all offenses. 
The Summary Grading Table facilitates this difficult but essential task.9 In addition, Volume 1 contains 
two Conversion Tables. The first Conversion Table lists each current law provision and identifies the 
Proposed Code provision(s) that address its content; the second Conversion Table lists each Proposed 
Code provision and identifies the current law provision(s) that it addresses or replaces. These tables ease 
the comparison between current law and the Proposed Code 
Volume 2 of the CLRG Report contains the official commentary, which describes how each 
section of the Proposed Code works. Where the Proposed Code suggests a change in current law, the 
commentary notes this fact and identifies the suggested change and the reasoning behind it.   
Of note, following the completion and submission of the CLRG Report to the working group, the 
working group continued its work in a manner that differs from the comment-and-dialogue process which 
had been used for the CLRG Report’s drafting. As a result of that process, many subsequent changes were 
made by the working group in the Proposed Code’s text and commentary, which are not reflected in this 
CLRG Report.   
 
 
  
                                                             
9  The Summary Grading Table lists all of the offenses in the Proposed Code and provides a fair 
representation of the various sub-offenses contained within these offenses. This level of generality, optimizes the 
reader’s ability to evaluate the Proposed Code’s grading judgements. Importantly, the table does not contain all the 
possible variations of each offense, since such granularity would hinder, rather than facilitate the evaluation task.   
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WHY A NEW CRIMINAL CODE? 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In the forty years since the General Assembly adopted the Criminal Code of 1973, thousands of 
individual changes to the law have led to numerous inconsistencies, redundancies, ambiguities, and 
contradictions in the code. As was the case in 1973, the time is ripe to take a step back and conduct a 
more panoramic review of the Delaware Criminal Code. 
The Proposed Code seeks to replace the current code with a clear, concise, and comprehensive set 
of provisions. Specifically, the Proposed Code seeks to include necessary provisions not contained in the 
current code; to eliminate unnecessary or inconsistent provisions of the current code; to revise existing 
language and structure to make the code easier to understand and apply; and to ensure that the offenses 
and rules contained in the code are cohesive and relate to one another in a consistent and rational manner. 
In developing the Proposed Code, the drafters were guided by five general drafting principles, set 
forth below. The first three principles relate to the form of the Code; the final two principles relate to its 
content. 
 
1. Use clear, accessible language and organization 
 
One of the critical functions of a criminal code is to provide notice to citizens of what conduct is 
prohibited. Clear and accessible writing enables provision of true notice while also ensuring that no 
offender escapes liability because of an incomplete or ambiguous offense definition. More 
straightforward code provisions also promote development of clearer jury instructions, making it easier 
for jurors to fulfill their critical role. Even for members of the criminal justice system, who work with the 
code every day and must be intimately familiar with its rules, plain-language expression is essential. 
Current Delaware law, however, is often less clear than it could, and should, be. 
 Various current provisions, such as “use, possession, manufacture, distribution and sale of 
unlawful telecommunication and access devices,” use undefined terms whose meaning is not 
obvious, and frequently employ legal terms of art without explaining their meaning. In such 
cases, users of the criminal code (including judges, lawyers, law enforcement officials, and jury 
members) must guess at the General Assembly’s intended meaning. 
 The current provisions regarding invasion of privacy provide an example of poor structure, as 
they create a complicated maze of offenses, exceptions, provision-specific definitions, 
aggravating factors, and sentencing considerations. Some acceptable conduct is noted within the 
offense definitions; some falls under a separate list of what the provisions “do not apply to.” 
These various exclusions frequently overlap with defenses provided in the current code’s General 
Part. 
 Current Delaware law contains numerous offenses that unnecessarily reiterate, or even 
undermine, General Part provisions. For example, many offenses are defined to prohibit certain 
conduct and “attempting” such conduct. This approach to defining offenses short-circuits the 
general rules for attempts set forth in the General Part, under which attempts are distinguished 
from completed crimes for grading purposes. 
 Current law fails to properly categorize general defenses into justifications, excuses, and 
nonexculpatory defenses, or to consistently define who bears the burden of proving those 
different kinds of defenses, or by what standard. As a result, the burden is on the defendant to 
prove some excuse defenses by the preponderance of the evidence, such as the insanity defense, 
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while setting only an evidentiary burden as to others, such as involuntary intoxication. Yet all 
excuses — and especially insanity and involuntary intoxication — are inherently similar, in that 
they prevent liability for an admitted violation of the law by a blameworthy defendant. 
 
2. Provide a comprehensive statement of rules 
 
A criminal code must include all necessary rules governing liability. Comprehensiveness helps avoid 
inappropriate results. Courts, which decide individual cases and act independently of one another, cannot 
be as effective as a legislature in formulating coherent general doctrines that will work together as the 
provisions of a comprehensive code can and must. Moreover, an uncodified rule is more likely to be 
applied differently in similar cases than a codified rule, as the terms of the latter are fixed, explicit, and 
available to all officials at each stage in the process. A few examples of significant provisions current law 
omits follow: 
 Current Title 11 contains no general provision dealing with de minimis infractions and customary 
license, which ought not result in criminal liability, instead leaving the decision to prosecute such 
cases up to the discretion of the State. 
 Current Title 11 lacks general provisions explaining the practical effects of categorizing a defense 
as a justification, excuse, or nonexculpatory defense. As a result, it is unclear whether bystanders 
would be permitted to assist in conduct that is excused, or whether an aggressor would be 
permitted to resist justified force used in self-defense — both undesirable outcomes. 
 Current Title 11 does not include a comprehensive offense for resisting or obstructing law 
enforcement officers, fire fighters, and emergency personnel. Instead, it contains a few specific 
offenses that deal with some, but by no means all, of the situations in which interference with first 
responders merits punishment. As a result, many blameworthy offenders are arbitrarily saved 
from prosecution. Current law also does not contain a comprehensive offense for obstructing 
administration of law, instead taking a similarly piecemeal approach.  
 Current law fails to criminalize causing or risking catastrophe, a very serious offense contained in 
the overwhelming majority of U.S. criminal codes. This omission leaves terrorist-like attacks to 
be prosecuted using offenses with unsuitably low grades, such as criminal mischief or reckless 
endangerment. 
 Current law fails to define an offense for reckless injuring that is separate from assault. Instead, 
all reckless, knowing, or intentional injuries are graded the same. As a result, intentionally and 
knowingly causing injury, which are materially more blameworthy acts, are not punished more 
seriously than recklessly causing injury. 
 
3. Consolidate offenses 
 
The criminal code recodification project provides a valuable opportunity to consolidate multiple 
offenses that overlap, contradict, or narrowly focus on particular instances of a general category of 
improper conduct. Consolidation also aids the task of proper grading, because it is nearly impossible to 
maintain consistent, proportional grading when offense definitions are based on insignificant, or 
incomprehensible, distinctions. The following are a few examples of the numerous problems that suggest 
enormous potential to consolidate offenses more effectively: 
 The sheer verbiage of current law is one indication of its failure to consolidate similar offenses. 
To take just one example, the current criminal code uses 16,229 words to define its fraud 
offenses, while the Proposed Code requires only 2,654 words to do so. Overall, the Proposed 
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Code’s Special Part uses only 26.6  percent — roughly 1/4 — of the words in the current code’s 
Special Part, plus other, non-criminal code statutory felonies. 
 Current Delaware law defines numerous serious crimes outside the criminal code. Over one 
hundred misdemeanors and nearly one hundred felonies are scattered throughout the Delaware 
Code, and more than fifty offenses appearing outside Title 11 — many of which overlap, or 
simply restate, prohibitions in current Title 11 — are graded as Class E felonies or higher. 
 Current law frequently includes numerous narrow offenses in addition to, or instead of, a single, 
more general offense. In the area of theft, for example, in addition to the current general offense, 
there are separate offenses for stealing from a cemetery, shoplifting retail goods, or stealing a 
motor vehicle, prescription pad, rented property, livestock, computer services, or firearms, to 
name just a few. Even more exaggerated examples of needless multiplicity of offenses exist for 
such offense categories as property damage, assault, and perjury. In many cases, these multiple 
offenses will impose varying sentencing grades without any apparent basis for the variation. 
 
4. Grade offenses rationally and proportionally 
 
One virtue of a recodification project, relative to the usual piecemeal legislative additions and 
alterations to the criminal code, is the opportunity it provides for a general review of the system of 
grading offenses, considering how all offenses relate to one another rather than considering individual 
offenses in a vacuum. The necessarily ad hoc process that has generated current law makes consistent 
grading difficult, if not impossible. An overall review reveals a great variety of grading problems and 
inconsistencies, of which the following are merely a few examples: 
 The current sexual assault provisions fail to take the offender’s age into account, but the rape 
provisions do take it into account, in many different ways. But there is no clear reason why it 
would only matter for one provision, but not the other. 
 Current law treats many forms of fraud as a single-grade misdemeanor, regardless of the amount 
of money involved in the fraud. Other forms of fraud provide a felony grade for offenses 
involving an amount above a certain threshold (usually $1,500), while any amount below that 
threshold is a misdemeanor. As a result, for example, defrauding secured creditors in the amount 
of $10 million is treated the same as defrauding them for $100. 
 Some unexplained grading anomalies reflect current law’s lack of clarity and failure to 
consolidate similar offenses. For example, current law defines the offense of bribery as a Class E 
felony, but also defines a separate offense covering “unlawful gratuities” and grades that offense 
as a Class A misdemeanor. However, giving an unlawful gratuity is simply a specific form of 
bribery. 
 Current law grades sexual harassment much less harshly than non-sexual harassment, despite the 
fact that the former can involve threatening to rape another person. 
 Current law grades thefts involving more than $100,000 the same as manslaughter and aggravated 
kidnapping, while grading petty thefts (for example, stealing a sandwich) the same as assault and 
sexual assault. 
 Current law uses a single felony grade for damaging property; as a result, destroying a famous 
work of art valued at $10 million would be subject to the same punishment as stealing $1,500 or 
selling drug paraphernalia. 
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5. Retain all (but only) reasonable policy decisions embodied in current law 
 
Because substantive policy decisions about the rules of the criminal law reflect value judgments 
properly left to the General Assembly, the Proposed Code seeks to follow the substance of current law 
wherever possible. In some places, however, current law contains multiple contradictory rules — and 
therefore no clear rule — on a subject. Some rules may have been sound when enacted, but no longer 
reflect current realities or sensibilities and require expansion, alteration, or deletion. For instance, Title 11 
contains a number of outdated offenses that do not belong in a modern criminal code, such as the offenses 
of larceny of livestock, smoking on trolleys, and advertising marriage in another state. Maintenance of 
dead-letter statutes of this kind only tends to invite abuse and to undermine the authority of the criminal 
law as a reflection of the governed community’s sensibilities. 
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WHY A NEW CRIMINAL CODE? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been more than forty years since the General Assembly adopted the Criminal Code of 1973. 
In that time, the code has been expanded and amended in numerous ways. Those subsequent alterations, 
however, have each sought to address the specific matter at hand, with little attention to the general 
effects of the change on the criminal code’s overall structure, its terminology, or its application. 
Meanwhile, four decades have passed without an overarching review of the criminal code as a whole to 
determine what modifications should, or must, be made to reflect changing times, developing insights, 
and changes in the broader legal landscape. As a result, the current criminal code has numerous 
inconsistencies, redundancies, ambiguities, and contradictions. As was the case in 1973 — and may well 
be the case again in another forty or fifty years — the time is ripe to take a step back and conduct a more 
panoramic review of the criminal code. 
The Proposed Code attempts to eliminate these problems and replace the current code with a 
clear, concise, and comprehensive set of provisions. Specifically, the Proposed Code seeks to include 
necessary provisions not contained in the current code; to eliminate unnecessary or inconsistent 
provisions of the current code; to revise existing language and structure to make the code easier to 
understand and apply; and to ensure that the offenses and rules contained in the code are cohesive and 
relate to one another in a consistent and rational manner. At the same time, the Proposed Code aims to 
track the substantive policy judgments reflected in the original code and its subsequent amendments. 
When the process of clarifying and reconciling current provisions made such substantive choices 
necessary, the drafters have sought to explain and justify the proposed changes with commentary 
designed to assist the enacters, and ultimately the users, of the Proposed Code. 
In developing the Proposed Code, the drafters were guided by five general drafting principles, set 
forth below. The first three principles relate to the form of the Code. Experience shows that proper form 
can aid, and poor form can hinder, a code’s ability to achieve its substantive functions. The final two 
principles concern the Code’s content. 
 
1.  USE CLEAR, ACCESSIBLE LANGUAGE AND ORGANIZATION 
 
One of the critical functions of a criminal code is to provide notice to citizens of what conduct is 
prohibited. Indeed, the fundamental principle of legality — the requirement of a clear prior written 
prohibition as a prerequisite to criminal liability — underlies numerous constitutional and other core 
criminal-law rules, such as the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws and the constitutional 
invalidation of vague offenses. Providing notice also has obvious practical value, for citizens can hardly 
be expected to obey the law’s commands if they are unaware of them, or cannot understand them. 
Accordingly, clear and accessible writing enables provision of true notice and ensures that no judgment is 
imposed that was not clearly intended and expressed by the General Assembly, and that no offender who 
violates the rules will escape liability because of an incomplete or ambiguous declaration of the law’s 
commands. 
The virtues of plain-language drafting extend beyond the direct imposition of liability. The 
criminal code serves functions beyond notifying the general public in advance of the law’s commands of 
them. The code is also the ultimate basis of guidance for lay juries, who must decide after the fact 
whether a criminal offense has been committed in a particular situation. More straightforward code 
provisions promote development of clearer jury instructions, making it easier for jurors to fulfill their 
role. Even (perhaps especially) for members of the criminal justice system, who work with the code every 
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day, plain-language expression is essential. Law enforcement officers, for example, are charged with 
implementing the code’s rules fully and fairly. Yet these officers are not lawyers. No less than the general 
populace, their ability to perform their legal role is enhanced by clarity in the criminal law’s written 
expression. 
Further explanation of this goal follows, along with a representative, but by no means exhaustive, 
collection of examples of current Delaware law’s shortcomings in this area.10 
 
A.  Clear Language 
 
Several drafting methods promote the goal of clarity. First, effective communication calls for 
short, commonly used words, and avoidance of legal terms of art where possible. When such legal terms 
are used, they should be defined, and it should be apparent that the terms’ use is to be guided by the 
definition and not left to unguided speculation. One difficulty with current law is that numerous important 
terms, many of which have no commonly understood meaning or are complex legal terms, are left 
undefined. In such cases, users of the criminal code (including judges, lawyers, law enforcement officials, 
and jury members) must guess at the General Assembly’s intended meaning. To avoid this problem, the 
Proposed Code includes a provision at the end of each Section that lists all defined terms used in that 
Section. 
Current law also sometimes impedes clear understanding by using undefined terms where similar 
defined terms exist. For example, current 11 Del. C. § 231 clearly defines the culpability levels of intent, 
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. Nevertheless, numerous current Delaware provisions employ 
other culpability requirements, such as “having reason to believe,”11 “reasonable ground to believe,”12 
“would lead a reasonable person to believe,”13 “having reason to know,”14 “should know,”15 “reasonably 
should know,”16 “should have known,”17 “wil[l]fully,”18 “fraudulently,”19 “purposely,”20 or a combination 
of the foregoing and others.21 The Proposed Code rejects the use of such outmoded, and statutorily 
undefined,22 culpability terms in defining offenses. Rather, the Proposed Code exclusively uses the 
                                                             
10 For example, numerous other provisions use unclear language. See, e.g., 11 Del.C. §§ 463, 616, 840, 
850, 933, 1102, 1106, 1112A, 1112B, 1326, 1327, 1403, 1404, 4214. 
11 See 11 Del.C. § 850(a)(3)a. 
12 See 11 Del.C. §§ 802(b)(3), 811(c), 1002(2). 
13 See 11 Del.C. §§ 1114(d)(2), 1114A(d). 
14 See 11 Del.C. §§ 1339(a)(2), 1458(a)(1). 
15 See 11 Del.C. §§ 204(a)(5), 424(2), 464(d). 
16 See 11 Del.C. §§ 1303(a)(1); 16 Del.C. § 4774(e). 
17 See 11 Del.C. §§ 1326(d), 1335(a)(9). 
18 See 7 Del.C § 724(a); 11 Del.C. §§ 840(b); 850(d)(3)b., 1325; 12 Del.C. § 210; 14 Del.C. § 9302; 21 
Del.C. § 6705. 
19 See 6 Del.C. § 4903A(b); 11 Del.C. § 841(b); 16 Del.C. § 4798(r); 21 Del.C. § 2751. 
20 See 11 Del.C. § 471(a). 
21 See 3 Del.C. §§ 1041 (“wilfully or maliciously”), 1045 (“wilfully, negligently or maliciously”); 7 Del.C. 
§ 6013 (“wilfully or negligently”); 11 Del.C. §§ 903A (knowingly, wilfully, and with the intent to defraud”), 941(c) 
(“wilful and malicious”), 1448A (“wilfully and intentionally”); 16 Del.C. § 2209(b) (“wilful and wanton”); 21 
Del.C. § 6701 (“wilfully or maliciously”). 
22 “Wanton” conduct is only defined in case law.  See Eustic v. Rupert, 460 A.2d 507, 509 (Del. 1983).  
“Fraudulently” is only defined in pattern jury instructions.  See, e.g., Delaware Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 
11.841(b) (current through 77 Del. Laws, June 30, 2010).  Otherwise, there are no pattern jury instructions defining 
culpability levels other than intent, knowledge, recklessness, and criminal negligence — despite the fact that 
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culpability levels of intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, which are the nearly universal norm 
for modern criminal codes. 
As an example of the type of legalese the Proposed Code seeks to avoid, current law defines the 
offense of “use, possession, manufacture, distribution and sale of unlawful telecommunication and access 
devices” as follows: 
(a) Prohibited acts--A person is guilty of a violation of this section if the person 
knowingly: 
(1) Manufactures, assembles, distributes, possesses with intent to distribute, 
transfers, sells, promotes, offers or advertises for sale, use or distribution any unlawful 
telecommunication device or modifies, alters, programs or reprograms a 
telecommunication device: 
a. For the unauthorized acquisition or theft of any telecommunication 
service or to receive, disrupt, transmit, decrypt, acquire or facilitate the receipt, 
disruption, transmission, decryption or acquisition of any telecommunication 
service without the express consent or express authorization of the 
telecommunication service provider; or 
b. To conceal, or to assist another to conceal from any 
telecommunication service provider or from any lawful authority, the existence 
or place of origin or destination, or the originating and receiving telephone 
numbers, of any telecommunication under circumstances evincing an intent to 
use the same in the commission of any offense.  
(2) Manufacturers, assembles, distributes, possesses with intent to distribute, 
transfers, sells, offers, promotes or advertises for sale, use or distribution any unlawful 
access device;  
(3) Prepares, distributes, possesses with intent to distribute, sells, gives, transfers, 
offers, promotes or advertises for sale, use or distribution:  
a. Plans or instructions for the manufacture or assembly of an unlawful 
telecommunication or access or device under circumstances evincing an intent to 
use or employ the unlawful telecommunication access device, or to allow the 
unlawful telecommunication or access device to be used, for a purpose prohibited 
by this section, or knowing or having reason to believe that the unlawful 
telecommunication or access device is intended to be so used, or that the plan or 
instruction is intended to be used for the manufacture of assembly of the 
unlawful telecommunication or access device; or  
b. Material, including hardware, cables, tools, data, computer software or 
other information or equipment, knowing that the purchaser or a third person 
intends to use the material in the manufacture of an unlawful telecommunication 
or access device.23 
On one hand, this offense uses many broad, yet undefined terms — such as “transmit,” “disrupt,” 
“facilitate,” “prepares,” and “promotes” — inhibiting this offense’s ability to communicate its 
prohibitions clearly to the public, to members of the criminal justice system, or perhaps even to 
experienced attorneys and judges. On the other hand, this offense also relies upon numerous verbose, 
offense-specific definitions — such as “manufacture or assembly of any unlawful access device,” 
                                                             
ordinary negligence is occasionally used in the current criminal code as a culpability level.  See 11 Del.C. §§ 231(d), 
628A(2), 629, 630(a)(2), 938(a), 1107, 1114(a), 1448(e)(2). 
23 11 Del.C. § 850. 
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“telecommunication service provider,” and “unlawful telecommunication device” — that, rather than 
increasing clarity, further obscure the criminal prohibition the offense intends to communicate. The 
Proposed Code defines a corresponding, but briefer and clearer, generalized offense to punish one who 
“obtains without consent services that the person knows are available only for compensation.”24 
Similarly, the current destruction of computer equipment provision imposes liability on one who 
“without authorization, intentionally or recklessly tampers with, takes, transfers, conceals, alters, damages 
or destroys any equipment used in a computer system or intentionally or recklessly causes any of the 
foregoing to occur.”25 The current provision was designed to serve as a comprehensive catchall offense, 
but its vague and overlapping terms, and its confusing statement of required culpability and conduct, 
serve only to make its scope less clear. In fact, when the destruction of computer equipment provision’s 
language is analyzed and considered in light of other current code provisions, it becomes clear that the 
provision is redundant. The Proposed Code does not include a specific offense for “destruction of 
computer equipment,” in recognition that other general offenses (such as criminal damage or attempted 
criminal damage) already cover such conduct.26 
Additionally, the organization of individual provisions, as well as the overall organization of the 
code (discussed below), affects a criminal code’s comprehensibility. For example, the current provisions 
regarding invasion of privacy —set out in the margin — create a complicated maze of offenses, 
exceptions, provision-specific definitions, aggravating factors, and sentencing considerations.27 Some 
                                                             
24 Section 2106(a)(1). 
25 11 Del.C. § 936. 
26 See, e.g., Section 2304 (criminal damage). 
27 The relevant provisions (11 Del.C. § 1335) reads as follows: 
Section 1335. Violation of privacy; class A misdemeanor; class G felony 
(a) A person is guilty of violation of privacy when, except as authorized by law, the person: 
(1) Trespasses on property intending to subject anyone to eavesdropping or other surveillance in a 
private place; or  
(2) Installs in any private place, without consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy there, 
any device for observing, photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events in that 
place; or 
(3) Installs or uses outside a private place any device for hearing, recording, amplifying or 
broadcasting sounds originating in that place which would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible 
outside, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy there; or 
(4) Intercepts without the consent of all parties thereto a message by telephone, telegraph, letter or 
other means of communicating privately, including private conversation; or 
(5) Divulges without the consent of the sender and the receiver the existence or contents of any 
message by telephone, telegraph, letter or other means of communicating privately if the accused knows 
that the message was unlawfully intercepted or if the accused learned of the message in the course of 
employment with an agency engaged in transmitting it. 
(6) Tape records, photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise reproduces the image of another 
person who is getting dressed or undressed or has that person’s genitals, buttocks or her breasts exposed, 
without consent, in any place where persons normally disrobe including but not limited to a fitting room, 
dressing room, locker room or bathroom, where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. This 
paragraph shall not apply to any acts done by a parent or guardian inside of that person’s dwelling, or upon 
that person’s real property, when a subject of victim of such acts is intended to be any child of such parent 
or guardian who has not yet reached that child’s eighteenth birthday and whose primary residence is in or 
upon the dwelling or real property of the parent or guardian, unless the acts done by the parent or guardian 
are intended to produce sexual gratification for any person in which case this paragraph shall apply; or 
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(7) Secretly or surreptitiously videotapes, films, photographs or otherwise records another person 
under or through that person’s clothing for the purpose of viewing the body of or the undergarments worn 
by that other person; or 
(8) Knowingly installs an electronic or mechanical location tracking device in or on a motor 
vehicle without the consent of the registered owner, lessor or lessee of said vehicle. This paragraph shall 
not apply to the lawful use of an electronic tracking device by a law enforcement officer, nor shall it apply 
to a parent or legal guardian who installs such a device for the purpose of tracking the location of a minor 
child thereof; or 
(9) Knowingly reproduces, distributes, exhibits, publishes, transmits, or otherwise disseminates a 
visual depiction of a person who is nude, or who is engaging in sexual conduct, when the person knows or 
should have known that the reproduction, distribution, exhibition, publication, transmission, or other 
dissemination was without the consent of the person depicted and that the visual depiction was created or 
provided to the person under circumstances in which the person depicted has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
a. For the purposes of the introductory paragraph of this paragraph (a)(9), paragraphs 
(a)(9), (a)(9)b., and (a)(9)d. of this section:  
1. “Nude” means any 1 or more of the following uncovered parts of the human 
body, or parts of the human body visible through less than opaque clothing:  
A. The genitals;  
B. The pubic area;  
C. The buttocks;  
D. Any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola.  
2. “Personally identifiable information” means any information about a person 
that permits the physical or online identifying or contacting of a person. The term 
includes either a person's face or a person's first and last name or first initial and last 
name in combination with any 1 or more of the following:  
A. A home or other physical address, including street name and name 
of a city or town;  
B. An e-mail address;  
C. A tele phone number;  
D. Geolocation data;  
E. Any other identifier that permits the physical or online identifying or 
contacting of a person.  
3. “Sexual conduct” means actual or simulated:  
A. Sexual contact;  
B. Sexual intercourse;  
C. Sexual penetration;  
D. Masturbation;  
E. Bestiality;  
F. Sadism;  
G. Masochism; or  
H. Explicit representations of the defecation or urination functions.  
4. “Sexual contact” means any touching by one person of the uncovered anus, 
breast, buttocks, or genitalia of another person or any touching of a person with the 
uncovered anus, breasts, buttocks or genitalia of another person.  
5. “Sexual intercourse” means any act of physical union of the genitalia or anus 
of a person with the mouth, anus, or genitalia of another person.  
6. “Sexual penetration” means the placement of an object inside the anus or 
vagina of a person or the placement of a sexual device inside the mouth of a person.  
7. “Visual depiction” shall have the meaning as used in § 1100 of this title.  
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b. A person who has, within the context of a private or confidential relationship, 
consented to the capture or possession of a visual depiction of the person when nude or when 
engaging in sexual conduct retains a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the 
reproduction, distribution, exhibition, publication, transmission, or other dissemination of the 
visual depiction beyond that relationship.  
c. For the purposes of this paragraph (a)(9), each of the following shall be an aggravating 
factor and shall be alleged in the charging information or indictment and constitute an element of 
the offense:  
1. The actor knowingly obtains such visual depictions without the consent of the 
person depicted.  
A. A violation of this paragraph (a)(9)c.1. occurs when a person 
commits a theft as provided for in § 841, § 842, § 843, or § 844 of this title or 
obtains such visual depictions by committing unauthorized access to a computer 
system as provided for in § 932 of this title or by unauthorized access to 
electronic mail or an electronic mail service provider as defined in § 931 of this 
title.  
B. A violation of this paragraph (a)(9)c.1. consistent with § 932 of this 
title is subject to the venue provision in § 940 of this title.  
2. The actor knowingly reproduces, distributes, exhibits, publishes, transmits, or 
otherwise disseminates such visual depictions for profit.  
3. The actor knowingly maintains an Internet website, online service, online 
application, or mobile application for the purpose of reproducing, distributing, exhibiting, 
publishing, transmitting, or otherwise disseminating such visual depictions.  
4. The actor knowingly reproduces, distributes, exhibits, publishes, transmits, or 
otherwise disseminates such visual depictions with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm 
the person depicted and such conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
significant mental anguish or distress.  
5. The actor pairs such visual depiction with personally identifiable information 
of the person depicted.  
d. For purposes of this paragraph (a)(9), the fact the actor committed this offense within 5 
years of a prior conviction for a violation of this paragraph (a)(9) shall be an aggravating factor for 
sentencing purposes only and, therefore, this fact is not to be alleged in the charging information 
or indictment and does not constitute an element of the offense.  
e. In addition to when the consent of the person depicted is given, the introductory 
paragraph of this paragraph (a)(9) and paragraph (a)(9)b. of this section do not apply to any of the 
following:  
1. When the visual depiction is of an individual less than 18 years of age and 
does not violate § 1108, § 1109, or § 1111 of this title, or any similar provision of this 
title, and the reproduction, distribution, exhibition, publication, transmission, or other 
dissemination is not for commercial purposes.  
2. When the visual depiction is reproduced, distributed, exhibited, published, 
transmitted, or otherwise disseminated in the course of lawful and common practices of a 
law-enforcement officer, the reporting of unlawful conduct, legal proceedings, and 
medical treatment procedures.  
3. When the person depicted has consented to the reproduction, distribution, 
exhibition, transmission, or other dissemination of the visual depiction for commercial 
purposes.  
4. When the person depicted has voluntarily appeared nude in public or 
voluntarily engages in sexual conduct in public.  
5. When the reproduction, distribution, exhibition, publication, transmission, or 
other dissemination serves a legitimate public purpose.  
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acceptable conduct is noted within the offense definition (“except as authorized . . .”); some activity is 
protected by lengthy statements of what the section or provisions of the section “do not apply to.” Some 
of these exclusions overlap defenses provided in the current code’s General Part. Some of the definitions 
are redundant with generally-applicable definitions contained elsewhere in the current criminal code.  The 
proposed Chapter dealing with privacy violations covers the same substantive ground as the current law’s 
single section utilizing numerous offenses, definitions, and exceptions, but does so in less space and 
clearer fashion by defining separate offenses for conceptually distinct criminal conduct.28 
In some cases, the current code’s language, though it may not represent the clearest or simplest 
method of expressing a rule, has been “defined” and clarified over time by judicial decisions. For this 
reason and for the mere sake of stability, the drafters have sought to maintain the language of current law 
whenever that language would give a reader adequate notice of the provision’s intended meaning. Where 
modification of existing language is considered necessary, the drafters have prepared commentary to 
explain the relation between the proposed language and existing statutory language, as explicated by 
current precedent. 
 
B.  Clear Organization 
 
A criminal code, and each of its provisions, must be effectively organized so that each 
component’s meaning and function are plain and all provisions are easily found. For example, it invites 
confusion when issues for which there are rules of general application are addressed a second time in 
specific offense provisions. Current Delaware law contains numerous offenses that unnecessarily 
reiterate, or even undermine, General Part provisions. For example, many offenses are defined to prohibit 
certain conduct and “attempting” such conduct.29 This approach to defining offenses short-circuits the 
general rules for attempts set forth in current law, under which attempts are distinguished from completed 
crimes (though not for grading purposes).30 Similarly, several current offenses are defined to include 
                                                             
f. Nothing within this paragraph (a)(9) shall be construed to impose liability on an 
interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), or an information service or 
telecommunications service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 153, for content provided by the actor or 
another person.  
(b) This section does not apply to:  
(1) Overhearing of messages through a regularly installed instrument on a telephone party line or 
an extension or any other regularly installed instrument or equipment; or  
(2) Acts done by the telephone company or subscribers incident to the enforcement of telephone 
company regulations or subscriber rules relating to the use of facilities; or  
(3) Acts done by personnel of any telephone or telegraph carrier in the performance of their duties 
in connection with the construction, maintenance or operation of a telephone or telegraph system; or  
(4) The divulgence of the existence of any message in response to a subpoena issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction or a governmental body having subpoena powers; or  
(5) Acts done by police officers as provided in §§ 1336 [Repealed] and 1431 of this title.  
(c) Any violation of paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(8), or (a)(9) of this section shall be a 
class A misdemeanor. Any violation of paragraph (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(9)c., or (a)(9)d. of this section shall be a class G 
felony.  
28 See Chapter 4300. 
29 See, e.g., 11 Del.C. §§ 617(b)(1), 763(2), 778A(3), 906(3), 1105(a), 1112A(a)(1), 1112B(a)(1), 
1257(a)(1), 1257(b), 1304(a), 1458(a), 1471, 3532; 16 Del.C. §§ 4744(e)(1), 4757(a), 4758(a), 4760A(a); 18 Del.C. 
§ 4354(a); 21 Del.C. § 4112; 24 Del.C. § 1790(a); 31 Del.C. § 1003. 
30 See 11 Del.C. § 531. 
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anyone who aids, solicits, or conspires with another in planning or committing the offense,31 even though 
general rules covering accomplice liability, solicitations, and conspiracies are defined in the General Part 
or elsewhere in current law.32 The Proposed Code ensures consistency by avoiding offense definitions that 
revisit, or revise, rules already included in its General Part. 
Finally, a criminal code’s various rules should be classified sensibly, to ensure that meaningfully 
different rules are distinguished and similar rules are treated alike. For example, the Proposed Code’s 
organization separates justifications, excuses, and nonexculpatory defenses.33 Recognizing such 
distinctions is important because a defense’s function as a justification, an excuse, or a nonexculpatory 
defense has significant legal implications.34 Current Delaware law, however, is not organized to 
accurately distinguish between these three defense types.35 
The failure to properly establish such distinctions has resulted in inconsistent rules, such as the 
rules involving the burdens of proof for general defenses. For example, some excuse defenses are 
classified as “affirmative defenses”36 while others are classified simply as “defenses.”37 The defendant 
bears the burden of proving affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence,38 but bears only an 
evidentiary burden as to simple defenses.39 Current law requires that the defendant prove the mental 
                                                             
31 See, e.g., 11 Del.C. §§ 617(b)(1), 913(a)(2), 1212(3), 1244(a)(6), 1249(b), 1471(f), 1503(d); 16 Del.C. 
§§ 2209(a), 4757(c). 
32 See 11 Del.C. §§ 271–73 (complicity), 501–03 (solicitation), 511–13 (conspiracy). 
33 Justification defenses, such as self-defense and use of force in defense of property, immunize conduct 
that avoids a harm or evil that is objectively worse than the offense itself. Excuse defenses, such as insanity and 
immaturity, operate to exculpate persons who cannot properly be held responsible for objectively harmful conduct. 
Finally, nonexculpatory defenses, such as entrapment and the statute-of-limitations defense, provide exemptions for 
liability because — even though the actor’s conduct is objectively harmful and the actor is responsible for it — some 
alternative societal interest is deemed to be more important than the assessment of criminal liability. 
34 For example, a person enjoying a self-defense justification may be assisted by others, and may not 
legally be interfered with. On the other hand, an aggressor is entitled to resist a person who enjoys an excuse 
because he mistakenly believes himself to be acting in self-defense; such a person, even if excused, is not justified. 
Moreover, because justifications recognize conduct that is socially acceptable, and often desirable, it is sensible to 
require the prosecution to prove that conduct was not justified. Excuses and nonexculpatory defenses, in contrast, 
operate to prevent liability for harmful conduct that would ordinarily constitute an offense. Accordingly, and 
because the state-of-mind or other evidence relevant to an excuse or nonexculpatory defense is frequently within the 
control of the defendant, it is sensible to shift the burden of proof to the defendant for those defenses, as the 
Proposed Code does. 
35 By defining several justifications to protect one who “believes” himself to be justified, Title 11 
improperly treats mistake as to a justification as though it were a justification.  See 11 Del.C. §§ 462(b)(2), 464(a)–
(c), 465(a), 466, 467, 468(2) & (4)–(7), 470(a).  The Proposed Code categorizes this defense as an excuse, since it 
relates to the actor’s mental state rather than to whether the act itself is objectively justified. 
Current Delaware law also does not recognize excuses or nonexculpatory defenses as distinct classes of 
defenses.  As a result, current law treats the statute-of-limitations defense as an element of the offense that must be 
proven accordingly, while organizing all general defenses together in the same chapter as justification defenses.  See 
11 Del.C. § 232 (limitations period as an element); see generally Chapter 4 (defenses to criminal liability) of Part I 
of Title 11. 
36 See 11 Del.C. §§ 401(mental illness or psychiatric disorder), 431 (duress). 
37 See 11 Del.C. §§ 423 (involuntary intoxication), 441 (ignorance or mistake of fact). 
38 11 Del.C. § 304. 
39 11 Del.C. § 303; see also Hamilton v. State, 343 A.2d 594, 596 (Del. 1975) (“[T]he importance of 
[§ 303(c)] is that it requires only that the defense raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, not that the jury 
be persuaded that the defense is more probably true than not.”).  
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illness or psychiatric disorder defense by a preponderance of the evidence, but not the involuntary 
intoxication defense—two defenses that are inherently similar. The evidentiary rules for these defenses 
differ for no obvious reason.40 Since excuse defenses are all the same in terms of their underlying 
principles and their central issue (the defendant’s blameworthiness for an admitted violation), they should 
be treated similarly in terms of the burden of proof, as is done in the Proposed Code.41 
Similarly, current law fails to articulate whether the State or the defendant bears the burden of 
proving or disproving several nonexculpatory defenses, and by what standard.42 This omission is plainly 
inconsistent with the rule shifting the burden of proof to the defendant for the mental illness excuse. If 
such a burden-shifting rule is appropriate for an excuse defense — under which the defendant would be 
considered blameless in committing the offense — it should also apply to nonexculpatory defenses, which 
involve no claim of blamelessness. The Proposed Code employs such a rule.43 
 
2.  PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF RULES 
 
It is critical not only that a criminal code say things clearly, but that it say everything that needs to 
be said. A criminal code must be comprehensive as well as comprehensible. Failure to provide all 
necessary provisions will inevitably lead to either or both of two results: (1) failures of justice, as the 
code’s omissions and “loopholes” lead to liability where none is deserved or allow an offender to avoid 
deserved punishment; or (2) a de facto delegation of authority to the courts (or usurpation of authority by 
the courts), as judicial interpretations try to fill in the gaps left by the legislature. The costs of the first 
result are obvious. Yet the alternative of judicial intervention, however necessary to achieve sensible or 
just results in individual cases, may ultimately impose costs as well. The interests of advance notice 
(discussed above), democracy, and legal consistency and coherence suggest that the legislature, rather 
than the courts, must bear the primary responsibility for creating criminal law rules. 
Insisting on comprehensiveness leads to several important benefits. First, comprehensiveness 
helps avoid inappropriate results. Courts, which decide individual cases and act independently of one 
another, cannot be as effective as a legislature in formulating coherent general doctrines that will work 
together as the provisions of a comprehensive code can and must. Second, an uncodified rule is more 
likely to be applied differently in similar cases than a codified rule, as the terms of the latter are fixed, 
explicit, and available to all officials at each stage in the process. 
Further explanation of this goal follows, along with a representative, but by no means exhaustive, 
collection of examples of current Delaware law’s shortcomings in this area.44 
                                                             
40 Current Delaware law does not make it clear who bears the burden of persuasion for statutory defenses, 
or by what standard they must be proven or disproven. Section 106(b) avoids ambiguity by explicitly placing the 
burden of persuasion on the State and the defendant as appropriate.  
41 Rather than defining excuse defenses as affirmative defenses or simple defenses, proposed Section 
401(d) places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove any excuse defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence. More generally, the term "affirmative defense" has been dropped from the Proposed Code’s language in 
favor of general formulas and more explicit language defining the burden of persuasion. 
42 See 11 Del.C. §§ 205 (defining statute of limitations as an element of the offense, and not as a defense at 
all), 207–10. 
43 Proposed Section 501(c) provides that, as with excuses, the defendant must prove a nonexculpatory 
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
44 For example, in the General Part, the Proposed Code introduces several other currently omitted 
provisions that govern important common issues and make clear the relationships between various parts of the Code. 
See, e.g., Sections 104 (preserving civil remedies), 108(h) (defining “property”), 201 (making clear bases of 
liability), 202 (categorizing and defining offense elements), 207 (mental illness or disorder negating required 
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A.  General Part Rules 
 
Current Title 11 contains no general provision dealing with technical violations that ought not 
result in criminal liability. Most jurisdictions, following the Model Penal Code on which Delaware’s 
current Criminal Code is based,45 contain a “safety net” provision that allows a defendant to avoid 
liability in proper situations, despite technically satisfying the objective elements of an offense. These are 
situations where: the defendant and “victim” had a customary practice that the victim suddenly decides to 
deny (for example, where using an understood shortcut across private property is charged as trespass); or 
the violation is so minor that it does not warrant the condemnation of criminal conviction (for example, a 
person shoplifts a pack of gum and is charged with theft); or the person’s conduct technically satisfies the 
objective elements of an offense, but the conduct does not inflict the kind of harm contemplated by the 
General Assembly when creating the offense. To illustrate this third situation, consider Delaware’s 
current laws dealing with criminal impersonation.46 Delaware law makes it a Class A misdemeanor to 
impersonate another and act in that capacity “with intent to obtain a benefit, to injure or defraud another 
person.”47 Including a distinct impersonation offense in a criminal code makes good sense. Although 
impersonation is often used to achieve theft, it is not always the case. A separate criminal prohibition on 
impersonation complements the prohibitions against theft. For instance, it can punish injury to 
impersonated persons, such as injury to reputation, which theft offenses do not address. Yet, the offense 
can apply to cases not envisioned by the General Assembly as prohibited. For example, a person seeking 
to secretly help his friend and therefore making – and paying for – a large order from his friend’s business 
under an assumed name, technically satisfies the offense definition. It seems obvious that the General 
Assembly, when enacting the criminal impersonation offense, did not intend to criminalize this conduct. 
But without a safety net provision, the only thing preventing from charging the offense is prosecutorial 
discretion. Because of the importance of fair notice and predictable outcomes in criminal law, the 
Proposed Code includes a provision that provides a mechanism for avoiding liability in situations as the 
one described above.48 
Current Title 11 contains no provisions explaining the practical effects of justification, excuse, 
and nonexculpatory defenses. The central distinction between the three groups of general defenses is that 
justified conduct—conduct technically satisfying an offense’s objective elements, but is subject to a 
justification defense—is socially desirable conduct that citizens are encouraged to take when necessary. 
Therefore, it is also desirable that other people assist a person’s justified conduct, and it is not desirable 
for the person against whom justified conduct is used to be allowed to resist it. For example, a person who 
                                                             
culpability), 214(f)–(h) (defining different kinds of mistakes), 300 (clarifying that justification, excuse, and 
nonexculpatory defenses bar liability), 402 (specifying an excuse defense for involuntary acts and omissions), 406–
08 (codifying mistake of law excuse defenses currently established only in case law), 502 (defining statute of 
limitations as an excuse defense, rather than as an element of an offense), 705 (defense to certain inchoate offenses 
for defendants who are victims or whose conduct is inevitably incident to the offense), 708 (general inchoate offense 
for possessing instruments of crime). 
The proposed Special Part also includes several offenses not recognized in current law. See, e.g., Sections 
1203 (recklessly causing injury), 2108 (unauthorized distribution of protected works), 2203 (fraudulent treatment of 
public records), 2305 (causing or risking catastrophe; ecological catastrophe), 3302 (resisting or obstructing a law 
enforcement officer), 3303 (obstructing administration of law or other government function), 4305 (unlawful 
dissemination of personal pornography). 
45 See Model Penal Code Section 2.12. 
46 11 Del. C. § 907. 
47 The Proposed Code incorporates this prohibition, including the quoted language, in Section 2212(a).  
48 See Section [209]. 
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is attacked is justified in using self-defense; other people are allowed to assist in defending the victim; 
and the attacker is not justified in resisting the victim’s proper use of force. On the other hand, excuse 
defenses prevent liability for socially undesirable acts, but in situations where the defendant is 
nevertheless not blameworthy. In that case, it is not desirable for other people to assist (for example) a 
person who commits theft under duress, and the victim of such a theft must be allowed to resist it. The 
same is true for conduct subject to a nonexculpatory defense, which is both socially undesirable and 
blameworthy. However, without a clear categorization of general defenses into justifications, excuses, and 
nonexculpatory defenses—and without provisions explaining the less-than-intuitive consequences of 
those categorizations—inconsistent and improper liability can result for people who assist and resist 
conduct subject to those defenses. Because consistency and predictability is an essential trait of a 
comprehensive criminal code, the Proposed Code both carefully organizes general defenses and provides 
thorough provisions explaining their effects.49 
 
B.  Special Part Offenses 
 
The current code sometimes fails to criminalize conduct that merits criminal liability. For 
example, Title 11 does not provide a comprehensive offense for resisting or obstructing law enforcement 
officers, fire fighters, and emergency personnel. Instead, Title 11 contains a few overly specific offenses 
that prohibit resisting arrest by using force or violence,50 disarming a law enforcement officer,51 or 
obstructing a firefighter from extinguishing a fire.52 As a result, a person who interferes with the 
discharge of a law enforcement officer’s duties unrelated to an arrest—or a firefighter’s duties unrelated 
to extinguishing a fire (for example, rescuing someone trapped inside a burning building)—may entirely 
escape liability under current law. Additionally, interference with the duties of emergency medical 
personnel is not addressed at all in current law, despite its close relationship with law enforcement and 
fire fighters and the disastrous results of obstructing their efforts. The Proposed Code fills these 
unjustified gaps in liability by imposing liability for obstruction or interference with any duties of first 
responders.53  
Similarly, Title 11 does not provide a comprehensive offense for obstructing administration of 
law and other government functions, instead taking a piecemeal approach across multiple titles that leaves 
unnecessary gaps in liability.54 The Proposed Code joins the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions with 
modern criminal codes by creating a comprehensive offense that addresses any obstruction or interference 
with the administration of law.55 
In other cases, the current code’s failure to define suitable offenses means prosecution is only 
possible for less serious offenses, resulting in punishment that falls short of the relative gravity of the 
offense. For example, Title 11 fails to criminalize causing or risking a catastrophe, standard offenses 
adopted by many jurisdictions from the Model Penal Code.56 Although these offenses overlap with 
assault, endangerment, and property damage offenses, their magnitude signals a different kind of harm—
                                                             
49 See proposed Sections 301, 401, and 501. 
50 11 Del.C. § 1257. 
51 11 Del.C. § 1458. 
52 11 Del.C. § 1243. 
53 See proposed Section 3302. 
54 See 6 Del.C. § 5132 (hindering inspections by the Department of Agriculture); 11 Del.C. §§ .1248 
(obstructing the control and suppression of rabies), 1267 (misconduct by a juror), 1273 (unlawful grand jury 
disclosure); 16 Del.C. § 4759 (obstructing inspection of a pharmacy under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act). 
55 See proposed Section 3303. 
56 See Model Penal Code Section 220.2. 
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one to social stability and infrastructure that is more immediate in the wake of the September 11 attacks 
and the War on Terror than perhaps it was in 1973 when the current code was enacted. Knowingly 
causing a catastrophe would normally be graded the equivalent of a current Class A felony; recklessly 
causing a catastrophe would be a Class B felony; and recklessly creating a substantial risk of a 
catastrophe would be a Class E felony. Under current law, however the act of causing a catastrophe would 
count only as criminal mischief (at most, a Class G felony),57 while risking catastrophe would not be an 
offense at all unless it involved a risk of physical injury.58  
Similarly, and unlike most jurisdictions, current Delaware law does not provide an offense for 
reckless injuring that is separate from assault. The basic form of assault in Title 11 is defined as 
“intentionally or recklessly” causing either physical injury or serious physical injury.59 By implication, 
that definition also includes knowingly causing injury. As a result, a person who injures another person 
by accident, though recklessly, commits the same offense as both the person who is aware that his 
conduct is likely to result in injury, and the person who subjectively desires to cause injury. However, 
intentionally or knowingly causing injury is materially more blameworthy than doing so recklessly, and 
ought to be punished more severely. The Proposed Code avoids this problem by defining assault as an 
offense separate from, and graded more harshly than, reckless injuring.60 
 
3.  CONSOLIDATE OFFENSES 
 
A third goal is consolidation of all criminal offenses. Perhaps inevitably, four decades of 
piecemeal modification of the 1973 Code have led to the addition of hundreds of new offenses, many of 
which cover the same conduct as previous offenses (but, in some cases, provide for conflicting levels of 
punishment) or appear in various other Titles of the Delaware Code rather than in the criminal code. 
It is not only redundant, but potentially counterproductive or self-contradictory, to add extra 
offenses whose prohibitions are identical to an existing offense; or to add prohibitions against narrow, 
specific forms of conduct in addition to (or in lieu of) a more general prohibition against all such relevant 
conduct; or to scatter serious crimes throughout the State’s statutory code instead of ensuring that all 
relevant offenses appear within the criminal code, where their significance and relation to one another is 
clear. Consolidation ensures against the confusion that results when one encounters, and must make sense 
of, multiple provisions that overlap61 or contradict, and also against the mistakes that ensue when one fails 
to notice, or find, provisions that may apply to a given case. Consolidation ensures the briefest, clearest 
statement of the criminal law’s rules, while also exposing and eliminating inadvertent omissions, 
duplications, and inconsistencies in the statutory scheme. The consolidation goal has two aspects. First, 
all criminal offenses must be defined within the criminal code itself, and not elsewhere. Second, 
superfluous specific offenses must be eliminated in favor of a reduced number of offenses that are defined 
as broadly as is feasible. 
As to the first element, a statutory scheme in which a significant number of important offenses 
are defined outside of the criminal code will have at least three shortcomings. First, and most obviously, 
the likelihood of notice to the public diminishes as the dispersion of criminal provisions in the state’s laws 
                                                             
57 See 11 Del.C. § 811(b). 
58 See 11 Del.C. §§ 603–04 (defining reckless endangering). 
59 See 11 Del.C. §§ 611(1), 612(a)(1). 
60 See proposed Sections 1202–03. 
61 According to interpretive canons, such overlapping provisions must be read so that none renders any 
other superfluous — a task which frequently requires courts to distort the meaning of one provision in order to 
accommodate another. 
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increases. It is simply much easier for the layperson to educate herself about the state’s criminal law if 
that law can be found in one place. A second, and subtler, “notice” problem will affect the legislature 
itself. If crimes are spread throughout the state statutory code, the legislature will be less likely to view 
the criminal law as a consistent, unified scheme. A new offense may be placed outside the code, making it 
less likely that the legislature will consider how that offense fits within the existing matrix of criminal 
offenses. Additionally, the criminal code itself may be amended without consideration of the 
amendment’s impact on offenses outside the code. Third, the existence of criminal offenses outside the 
code will generate problems of statutory construction. For example, it may not be clear whether the 
legislature expected the criminal code’s “default” culpability provision to apply to offenses in other 
Titles. In short, the possibility of criminal offenses appearing outside the criminal code undermines the 
entire project of setting aside a separate criminal code within the overall state code scheme. 
Current Delaware law defines numerous serious crimes outside the criminal code. Over one 
hundred misdemeanors and nearly one hundred felonies are scattered throughout the Delaware Code, and 
more than fifty offenses appearing outside Title 11 — many of which overlap, or simply restate, 
prohibitions in current Title 11 — are graded as Class E felonies or higher. For example, Chapter 10 of 
Title 31 (Welfare) defines several offenses “instituted to regulate abuses in the payment of funds under 
the State’s public assistance programs.”62 These offenses — graded as high as Class C felonies —overlap 
substantially with several Title 11 offenses, such as (among others) theft by deception, bribery, 
solicitation, and tampering with public records.63 Similarly, Chapter 67 of Title 21 (Motor Vehicles) 
defines several vehicle theft, fraud, unauthorized use, and criminal damage offenses that are principally 
aimed at “chop shops” in the business of receiving stolen vehicles. Most of these offenses are graded as 
Class E felonies — even though all of the relevant conduct (vehicle theft, receiving stolen vehicles, 
criminal mischief, unauthorized use of a vehicle) is covered and graded differently by provisions in Title 
11.64 
Within the criminal code itself, consolidation is no less important. Formulation of an offense in 
one provision, rather than many, reduces uncertainty as to the nature and scope of the banned conduct. A 
general prohibition avoids confusion and grading inconsistency. At the same time, it reduces the need for 
the legislature to enact additional prohibitions in the future, because a more general provision is more 
easily adapted to changing circumstances. 
Current Delaware offenses often fail to realize this goal of consolidation within a single, general 
offense. This failure occurs in two ways. In some cases, Title 11 criminalizes specific forms of conduct in 
lieu of a broader prohibition against such conduct generally. For example, Title 11 contains a number of 
offenses prohibiting possession of instruments tailored for the commission of individual crimes, but none 
of them apply to more than a single target offense. Without a comprehensive general offense for 
possession of instruments of crime, the General Assembly must pass a new law for every situation that 
arises, leading to inconsistent punishment when some situations are inevitable missed.65 Similarly, current 
Delaware law contains no general offense prohibiting the failure to make an entry in public records when 
                                                             
62 31 Del.C. § 1001. 
63 Compare 31 Del.C. § 1003 et seq. (public assistance fraud), with, e.g., 11 Del.C. §§ 843–44 (theft by 
false pretense or promise); 1201–03 (bribery and receiving a bribe); 501–03 (solicitation); 873 (tampering with 
public records). 
64 Compare, e.g., 21 Del.C. §§ 6701–10 (vehicle code provisions), with 11 Del.C. §§ 841(b) (defining 
offense of theft by taking); 851 (defining offense of receiving stolen property). 
65 See, e.g., 11 Del.C. §§ 812(b) (possession of graffiti implements), 828 (possession of burglar’s tools or 
instruments facilitating theft), 860 (possession of shoplifter’s tools or instruments facilitating theft), 862 (possession 
of forgery devices). 
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such a duty is imposed by law, but instead contains various offenses prohibiting the failure to make 
required records in specific contexts.66 
In other cases, Title 11 includes narrow, specific offenses in addition to a broader prohibition 
against such conduct generally. For example, although one provision in current Title 11 covers theft 
generally, a number of other provisions in Title 11 prohibit the same underlying conduct — theft by 
taking (or its attempt or conspiracy) — in the context of specific circumstances or forms of property.67 
The same situation exists for assault offenses68 and property damage offenses.69 Similarly, in addition to 
its general perjury offense,70 current Delaware law contains numerous offenses criminalizing false 
statements made under oath or affirmation about particular matters, in particular documents, and in 
particular proceedings.71 
One useful way to get a rudimentary sense of current law’s failure to consolidate offenses is to 
assess its sheer verbiage. The Proposed Code manages to criminalize the same substantive conduct as 
current law while using far fewer offense definitions to do so. For example, the Proposed Code chapter on 
fraud offenses (Chapter 2200) uses only 16 percent of the words making up the corresponding offenses in 
current law (2,654 versus 16,229 words). Similarly, the chapter covering robbery and assault offenses 
(Chapter 1200) uses only 20 percent of the words in corresponding current law offenses (2,093 versus 
10,545). Overall, the Special Part of the Proposed Code uses only 26.6 percent — or roughly one-quarter 
— of the words in the current offenses (29,413 versus 110,637). If anything, however, this figure 
understates the discrepancy, as many misdemeanors outside Title 11 have not been considered, and the 
provisions outside Title 11 frequently use one section to impose criminal liability for any violation of an 
entire set of regulations. 
The above examples of current Delaware law’s shortcomings in this area are representative, but 
by no means exhaustive.72 
                                                             
66 See, e.g., 16 Del.C. § 4740(g) (knowing failure to keep records of sales of pseudoephedrine or 
ephedrine); 21 Del.C. § 4603 (knowing failure to submit a record of possession of a vehicle master key). 
67 Compare 11 Del.C. §  841 (general theft offense), with, e.g., 813 (theft of property from a cemetery), 840 
(shoplifting), 841A (theft of a motor vehicle), 841B (organized retail crime), 841C (theft of a prescription form or 
pad), 849 (theft of rented property), 859 (larceny of livestock), 933 (theft of computer services), 1451 (theft of a 
firearm). 
68 Compare 11 Del.C. §§ 611–13 (general assault offenses) with, e.g., 605–06 (abuse of a pregnant female), 
607 (strangulation), 614 (abuse of a sports official), 628–29 (vehicular assault), 1254 (assault in a detention facility), 
1339 (adulteration). 
69 Compare 11 Del.C. § 811 (general property damage offense), with, e.g., 3 Del.C. §§ 1041 (wilfully or 
maliciously starting fires), 1045 (cutting down trees in state forests); 11 Del.C. §§ 805 (cross or religious symbol 
burning), 812 (graffiti), 936 (destruction of computer equipment); 21 Del.C. §§ 6701 (injuring vehicle or obstructing 
its operation), 6703 (tampering with vehicle). 
70 See 11 Del.C. §§ 1221–23. 
71 These overlapping perjury offenses create unnecessary and undesirable confusion. For example, 
some offenses do not explicitly impose 11 Del.C. §§ 1222–23’s requirement that a false statement be material, but 
then confusingly proclaim that those who commit them are liable for “perjury.” See, e.g., 21 Del.C. § 2620(b) (false 
statements related to drivers’ licensing). 
72 Including the examples discussed in the text, there are at least 22 offenses outside Title 11 that are 
graded as Class A, Class B, or Class C felonies. See 16 Del.C. §§ 1136(a) (causing death by abuse, mistreatment, or 
neglect of a patient at a nursing or similar facility), 4744 (prohibited practices under the Safe Internet Pharmacy 
Act), 4752–53 (drug dealing—aggravated possession), 4757 (miscellaneous drug crimes), 4760A (operating or 
attempting to operate clandestine laboratories), 7113 (violation of any one of a group of regulations relating to 
explosive materials, resulting in injury or death); 31 Del.C. §§ 1007 (welfare fraud in amount of $10,000 or more), 
3913 (causing death by abuse, neglect, or mistreatment of an impaired adult). 
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4.  GRADE OFFENSES RATIONALLY AND PROPORTIONALLY 
 
For a system of criminal justice to be fair, liability must be assigned according to the relative 
seriousness of the offense(s) committed. It is critical that a criminal code’s system of grading offenses 
recognize all, and only, suitable distinctions among the relative severity of offenses and develop a scheme 
to grade each offense proportionally to its gravity in light of those distinctions. 
In most cases, determinations of “seriousness” reflect value judgments as to which reasonable 
people might differ, and as to which the legislature (as the most direct political voice of the people) 
should have the ultimate authority. Accordingly, the drafters of the Proposed Code have sought to defer to 
the grading determinations exemplified in existing Delaware law where possible. In some cases, however, 
broad examination of current grading determinations reveals logical inconsistencies that, it is presumed, 
the General Assembly would have sought to avoid had it been aware of them. Such inconsistencies may 
develop for several reasons. As new offenses are added to a criminal code, the General Assembly may 
neglect to consider how the grade of each new offense relates to the grades for other, preexisting offenses. 
As noted earlier, the sheer increase in the number of offenses, especially offenses outside the criminal 
code itself, makes it difficult to maintain consistency — assuming one even manages to locate and 
consider all relevant offenses. In any event, the shared experience of various jurisdictions is that over 
time, proportionality in the grading of offenses diminishes. 
One of the virtues of a broad recodification effort is the opportunity it provides to review the 
grading system as a whole, considering how all offenses relate to one another rather than considering 
individual offenses in a vacuum. Following such a review, the drafters have altered the grades of certain 
offenses where doing so seems necessary to maintain any legitimate sense of proportionality. In addition, 
a “change” in grading in the Proposed Code has sometimes been necessitated by the consolidation of 
offenses. Because current law often contains multiple offenses that overlap and prohibit the same conduct 
(as discussed in Section 3 above), but might impose different grades for that conduct, it is simply 
                                                             
In addition to the examples discussed in the text, the Proposed Code also introduces several other offenses 
generally criminalizing conduct that current Delaware law criminalizes only in particular contexts. Compare 
proposed Section 2108 (unauthorized distribution of protected works) with, e.g., 11 Del.C. §§ 858 (unlawful 
operation of a recording device), 920 (transfer of recorded sounds). Compare proposed Section 2202 (fraudulent 
tampering with records) with, e.g., 11 Del.C. §§ 840A(a) (fraudulent creation or alteration of retail sales receipts), 
871 (falsifying business records), 876 (tampering with public records in the first degree), 877 (offering a false 
instrument for filing), 878 (issuing a false certificate), 909 (securing execution of documents by deception); 31 
Del.C. § 1004 (tampering with documents to be filed with public assistance program).  
Overlapping offenses are also a recurring problem in current law. Compare 11 Del.C. § 853 (unauthorized 
use of a vehicle) with 21 Del.C. § 6702 (driving vehicle without consent of owner). Compare 11 Del.C. § 843–44 
(theft by false pretense or false promise) with, e.g., 6 Del.C. § 4903A (automobile repair fraud); 11 Del.C. 
§§ 840(a)(2) (charging retail goods to a fictitious person), 908 (unlawfully concealing a will), 913 (insurance fraud), 
913A (health care fraud), 916 (home improvement fraud), 917 (new home construction fraud); 12 Del.C. § 210 
(alteration, theft, or destruction of a will); 31 Del.C. § 1003 (welfare fraud). Compare 11 Del.C. § 845 (theft of 
services) with 11 Del.C. §§ 850 (use, possession, manufacture, distribution and sale of unlawful telecommunication 
and access devices), 933 (theft of computer services). Compare 11 Del.C. § 861 (forgery) with, e.g., 21 Del.C. 
§§ 2316 (forgery or fraudulent alteration of vehicle identification documents), 2751 and 2760 (forgery or fraudulent 
alteration of driver’s licenses or identification cards). Compare 11 Del.C. §§ 821–23 (criminal trespass) with, e.g., 7 
Del.C. § 714 (trespass while hunting); 11 Del.C. § 820 (trespass with intent to peer or peep into another’s window). 
Compare 11 Del.C. §§ 1201 (bribing a public servant), 1203 (receiving a bribe as a public servant), 1209(4) 
(defining “public servant” to include jurors) with 11 Del.C. §§ 1264 (bribing a juror), 1265 (bribe receiving by a 
juror). 
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impossible to follow “current law” on the matter, and it becomes necessary to choose a single, consistent 
grade for the prohibited conduct. 
The task of grading offenses has three goals: each offense’s grading scheme must recognize all 
relevant distinctions between degrees of the offense; that scheme must avoid introduction of irrelevant 
distinctions; and the overall grading scheme must maintain proportionality across offenses. We discuss 
each of these three goals in turn. 
Further explanation of this goal follows, along with a representative, but by no means exhaustive, 
collection of examples of current Delaware law’s shortcomings in this area.73 
 
A.  Consistently Recognize Appropriate Distinctions 
 
The Proposed Code seeks to ensure that the grading for each offense recognizes all relevant 
distinctions in the relative seriousness of various forms of an offense. In most cases, current law reflects 
such distinctions, and the proposed offenses’ grading distinctions will tend to track existing distinctions. 
In a few cases, however, current law’s grading for offenses seems too crude, failing to recognize 
legitimate distinctions of degree. 
For example, the four degrees of rape in current law draw many useful distinctions between 
circumstances for grading purposes, including the relative ages of the victim and offender.74 However, 
although the three degrees of unlawful sexual contact take the victim’s age into account, the defendant’s 
relative age is not considered.75 Under this scheme, a person who sexually assaults a 12-year-old child is 
treated the same regardless of whether the offender is another 12-year-old, or an adult; but an adult rapist 
in the same situation would be treated more harshly than a child rapist — a sensible distinction.76 The 
Proposed Code refines the grading of sexual assault by adjusting the grade of the offense based on the 
same factors as rape.77 
                                                             
73 To list just a few more examples, current law grades conspiracy and solicitation to commit Class B and 
unclassified misdemeanors more seriously than the target offense, but grades conspiracy and solicitation to commit 
Class A, B, C, and D felonies much less seriously than the target offense. See 11 Del.C. §§ 501–03 (solicitation), 
511–13 (conspiracy). Cf. proposed Section 707 (grading all conspiracies and solicitations one grade lower than the 
target offense). 
Current law grades various specific offenses for possessing instruments tailored for commission of other 
specific offenses as anything from an unclassified misdemeanor to a Class E felony. See 11 Del.C. §§ 850 (a)(1)a. & 
(b)(1) (possession of unlawful telecommunication devices for theft of telecommunication services, unclassified 
misdemeanor), 812(b) (possession of graffiti instruments, Class B misdemeanor), 1401 (possession of tickets for 
illegal lotteries, Class A misdemeanor), 862 (possession of forgery devices, Class G felony), 828 (possession of 
burglar’s tools, Class F felony); 21 Del.C. § 4604 (illegal possession of motor vehicle master keys, Class E felony). 
Cf. proposed Section 708 (establishing a single offense for possessing instruments of crime, graded the same in all 
cases). 
74 See 11 Del.C. §§ 770–73. 
75 Compare id. with 11 Del.C. §§ 767–69.  
76 Compare 11 Del.C. §§ 771(a)(1) (providing a higher grade of rape where the victim is less than 14 years 
of age, and the offender is at least 19 years of age), 773(a)(5) (providing an even higher grade of rape where victim 
is less than 12 years of age, and the offender is at least 18 years of age) with 11 Del.C. § 769(a)(3) (providing a 
higher grade of unlawful sexual assault where the victim is less than 13 years of age, regardless of the offender’s 
age). Note also that the relevant age of the victim — less than 12 or less than 13 years of age — varies between the 
two sets of offenses, but it is not clear that these different distinctions are meaningful, or that the General Assembly 
was aware of the apparent discrepancy. 
77 See proposed Section 1301(d) (grading sexual assault at three grades lower than it would be for rape 
under the same circumstances). 
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Likewise, current law grades many forms of fraud as a single class of misdemeanor, regardless of 
the amount involved in the fraud.78 Other forms of fraud are graded as either a Class G felony or Class A 
misdemeanor, depending upon the amount involved.79 Fraud is fundamentally a form of theft by 
deception, so it makes sense to grade frauds and thefts similarly. However, neither of these schemes 
reflects the more nuanced value-based grading for current theft offenses, which utilizes four different 
grades.80 The Proposed Code —in addition to raising the number of value-based grades for theft from four 
to seven — grades all frauds and other property-based offenses using the same scheme.81 
 
B.  Avoid Irrelevant or Unclear Distinctions 
 
Another goal of the Proposed Code is to avoid the inconsistency that results when seemingly 
similar offenses are graded differently. This goal represents the other side of the offense-degree coin from 
the goal discussed immediately above: in addition to recognizing all relevant distinctions, the Code must 
refuse to recognize “distinctions” that do not or should not exist. 
For example, current law defines the offense of bribery as a Class E felony, but also defines a 
separate offense to cover “unlawful gratuities” and grades that offense as a Class A misdemeanor.82 
Although current law defines an unlawful gratuity slightly differently than a bribe, it appears to be 
nothing more than a particular form of bribe, and there is no clear reason to suppose that it merits a 
different punishment from that for other forms of bribery. This offense is an example of a situation where, 
as discussed above, current law is internally inconsistent, or at least ambiguous, thereby complicating any 
effort to track to its stated policy judgments. The Proposed Code creates only one bribery offense and 
ordinarily grades it as the equivalent to a Class E felony.83 
Similarly, current law grades harassment as a Class A misdemeanor, while grading sexual 
harassment as an “unclassified misdemeanor” (subject to a maximum sentence of 30 days’ 
imprisonment).84 However, some of the conduct that constitutes sexual harassment — “threaten[ing] to 
engage in conduct likely to result in the commission of a sexual offense” — seems much more serious 
than an unclassified misdemeanor, being more similar to non-sexual harassment. The Proposed Code 
grades harassment and the quoted portion of sexual harassment the same.85 
 
C.  Maintain Proportionality Between Various Offenses 
 
The two goals discussed above relate to decisions about grading specific offenses or degrees of 
offenses. A third objective in grading criminal offenses is to ensure that grading remains rational when 
the grades of different offenses are compared with one another. In other words, a criminal code must 
                                                             
78 See 11 Del.C. §§ 853(4) (defrauding creditors secured on an automobile), 891 (defrauding secured 
creditors), 892 (fraud in insolvency), 893 (interference with levied-upon property), 906 (deceptive business 
practices), 910 (debt adjusting).  
79 See 11 Del.C. §§ 900 (issuing a bad check), 903 (unlawful use of payment card). 
80 See 11 Del.C. § 841(c). 
81 See proposed Sections 2101 (theft), 2204 (issuing a bad check), 2205 (unlawful use of a payment card), 
2206 (deceptive business practices), 2207 (defrauding secured creditors), 2208 (fraud in insolvency), 2304 (criminal 
damage), 4502 (unfair wagering) and their corresponding commentaries.  
82 See 11 Del.C. §§ 1201–02, 1205–06. 
83 See proposed Section 3101 and corresponding commentary. 
84 See 11 Del.C. §§ 763, 1311. 
85 See proposed Sections 1305(b)(2)(A) and 4103(b)(2). 
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maintain proportionality of grading across offenses and make certain that the relative level of liability for 
different offenses parallels the relative harm or wrong they reflect. 
Although the drafters of the Proposed Code have deferred, where possible, to the apparent 
legislative determinations regarding the relative harm of each offense that current grading levels reflect, 
in a few instances a comparison of different offenses reveals grading discrepancies contrary to any sense 
of proportionality. For example, consider current law’s grading of the theft offenses. The current scheme 
properly provides different grades depending on the amount stolen. A theft in valued from $1,500 to 
$50,000 is a Class G felony. However, a theft valued from $50,000.01 to $100,000 jumps up three grades 
to a Class D felony, and a theft valued higher than $100,000 jumps up another two grades to a Class B 
felony.86 As a result, taking $100,000.01 in property is subject to the same punishment as manslaughter, 
assault by amputation, second degree rape, and kidnapping without releasing the victim alive and 
unharmed.87 At the same time, theft of any amount less than $1,500 is a Class A misdemeanor. As a 
result, stealing a sandwich is subject to the same punishment as unlawful sexual contact, simple assault, 
and highly sophisticated frauds like defrauding secured creditors and fraud in insolvency.88 The Proposed 
Code makes theft grading more proportional compared to other offenses by creating additional grade 
thresholds and lowering the highest available grade of theft to the equivalent of a Class D felony.89 
Similarly, the current code’s general offense for property damage, criminal mischief, has only one 
felony grade: a Class G felony for $5,000 or more in resulting damage.90 As a result, intentionally 
destroying the Statue of Liberty (were it located in Delaware) would be subject to the same punishment as 
issuing a bad check in the amount of $1,500, failure to await law enforcement’s arrival following a motor 
vehicle accident, and selling drug paraphernalia.91 The Proposed Code makes grading property damage 
offenses more proportional compared to other offenses by utilizing the same nuanced grading scheme it 
proposes to use for theft.92 
Other examples of disproportionate grading are plentiful. For example, current law assigns higher 
grades to criminally negligent homicide and manslaughter than intentionally causing another person to 
commit suicide, despite the fact that the latter offense has essentially the same conduct and culpability 
requirements as first-degree murder.93 The Proposed Code allows a defendant who causes another’s 
suicide to be convicted of any homicide offense for which the defendant meets the proper culpability 
requirements.94 Likewise, current law contains an offense for wearing body armor during commission of a 
felony that is graded the same as negligent homicide of a child by abuse or neglect, aggravated assault 
                                                             
86 See 11 Del.C. § 841(c). In addition to the problems described in this paragraph, note also that a single 
dollar difference in value generates a four-fold increase in maximum punishment at each threshold. Creating 
irrational distinctions between different thefts leads to disproportional punishment. See Section 4.B above. 
87 See 11 Del.C. §§ 613(a)(2) (assault by amputation), 632 (manslaughter), 772 (rape in the second degree), 
783A (kidnapping in the first degree). 
88 See 11 Del.C. §§ 611 (assault in the third degree), 767 (unlawful sexual contact in the third degree), 891 
(defrauding secured creditors), 892 (fraud in insolvency). 
89 See proposed Section 2101 and corresponding commentary.  
90 See 11 Del.C. § 811(b)(1). 
91 See 11 Del.C. § 900 (issuing a bad check); 16 Del.C. § 4774(c) (manufacture and sale of drug 
paraphernalia); 21 Del.C. § 4202(b) (failure to await law enforcement following a motor vehicle accident). 
92 See proposed Section 2304(b) and corresponding commentary. 
93 Compare 11 Del.C. § 645 (grading promoting suicide as a Class F felony) with 11 Del.C. §§ 631 
(grading criminally negligent homicide as a Class D felony), 632 (grading manslaughter as a Class B felony), (636 
(first degree murder). 
94 See proposed Section 1105(c). Note, however, that due to the problems presented by proving causation 
in these cases, the proposed provision also requires that the defendant cause suicide “by force, threat, or coercion.” 
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with a deadly weapon, and creating child pornography.95 The body armor offense also creates liability in 
addition to the underlying felony that will, in most cases, be more severe than the underlying felony itself. 
The Proposed Code avoids both of these problems by converting the body armor-wearing provision into a 
general grade adjustment that increases the grade of the underlying felony, but does not result in 
conviction for a second, disproportionately graded offense.96 
 
5.  RETAIN ALL — BUT ONLY — RATIONAL, DEFENSIBLE POLICY DECISIONS EMBODIED IN 
CURRENT LAW 
 
Substantive policy decisions about the rules of the criminal law — such as what conduct should 
be criminalized and what adjudicative rules should govern the imposition of criminal liability97 — reflect 
value judgments that are properly made by the General Assembly rather than a group of drafters. For this 
reason, the Proposed Code seeks to follow the substance of current law wherever possible. 
In some places, however, current law contains multiple contradictory rules — and therefore no 
clear rule — on a subject. Other rules may have been sound when enacted, but no longer reflect current 
realities or sensibilities and require expansion, alteration, or deletion. In those situations where the 
existing legal rule seems clearly at odds with the goal of producing a rational, coherent criminal code, the 
drafters have been forced to modify the existing rule, using supporting commentary to the Proposed Code 
to describe and justify the proposed change. 
Further explanation of this goal follows, along with a representative, but by no means exhaustive, 
collection of examples of current Delaware law’s shortcomings in this area.98 
                                                             
95 Compare 11 Del.C. §§ 1449 (wearing body armor during commission of felony; class B felony) with 11 
Del.C. §§ 613(a)(1) (assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument), 633 (murder by abuse or neglect in the 
second degree), 1108 (sexual exploitation of a child). 
96 See proposed Section 804(e). 
97 A third substantive category, offense grading, is discussed in Section 4 above. 
98 Included here are other examples of current policies that are difficult to reconcile with the existing 
statutory scheme. First, current Delaware law improperly uses ordinary, tort negligence as a basis of criminal 
liability. Criminal negligence and recklessness differ from tort negligence and recklessness by requiring that the risk 
the person takes, or the person’s failure to be aware of such a risk, be “a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” See 11 Del.C. § 231(a) & (e) (emphasis added). 
Fundamentally, this heightened “gross deviation” standard is what justifies holding a person criminally liable for the 
accidental effects of that person’s conduct. However, in a few cases, Delaware currently makes tort negligence 
(which contains no heightened standard) the basis of criminal liability, including some serious felonies. See 11 
Del.C. §§ 231(d) (defining “negligence” as a culpability requirement separate from criminal negligence), 628A(2) 
(second degree vehicular assault), 629 (first degree vehicular assault, Class F felony), 630(a)(2) (second degree 
vehicular homicide, Class D felony), 632(2) (manslaughter, Class B felony); 7 Del.C. § 6074(a) (negligent ocean 
dumping). Note that current law embraces tort negligence, but not tort recklessness, though there is no obvious 
reason why one should be incorporated, but not the other. The Proposed Code eliminates tort negligence as a 
culpable state of mind that can support criminal liability. See proposed Section 205(b) and corresponding 
commentary. 
Second, the current scheme of inchoate offenses contains an ambiguity that makes it possible to improperly 
elevate their culpability requirements relative to completed offenses. The current formulation of attempt requires the 
defendant to “intentionally engage in conduct,” and conspiracy and solicitation each establish a general culpability 
requirement of intent. See 11 Del.C. §§ 501–03, 511–13, 531. However, none of these provisions are explicit about 
what the defendant’s culpability must be as to the result or circumstance elements of the completed offense. Reading 
the explicit “intent” requirements to apply to other elements of the target offense may cause improper results or 
confusion. For example, 11 Del.C. § 607(a)(1) requires that the defendant “knowingly . . . impede[] the breathing” 
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A.  Reserving the Death Penalty for Intentional Killings 
 
Current Delaware law provides several alternative definitions for murder in the first degree.99 The 
main, classic definition of first-degree murder is intentionally causing the death of another person. This 
offense combines the most egregious harm—killing another human being—with the most culpable state 
of mind—subjective desire to kill. For that reason, first-degree murder is universally considered the most 
serious offense, and is why it is the only offense in Delaware eligible for capital punishment. However, 
the remaining alternative definitions of first-degree murder do not require the defendant to intentionally 
cause death. Instead, they require mere recklessness.100 These definitions elevate killings that would 
otherwise be manslaughter to capital murder. This violates the general principle reflected throughout the 
current code that more culpable states of mind make an offender more blameworthy, and therefore 
deserving of greater punishment. Put simply, no matter how harmful a defendant’s conduct may be, 
recklessness is not blameworthy enough to merit capital punishment.  
The current death penalty sentencing procedures for first-degree murder add another layer of 
inconsistency and disproportionality to this situation. Before a defendant can be sentenced to death, 
Delaware requires that a jury independently find the existence of an aggravating factor, enumerated in the 
procedures, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.101 However, if the offense is committed in one 
of the alternative, reckless ways, the required aggravating factor is automatically established, bypassing 
the jury’s usual finding.102 This double counting produces an irrational result, making it more difficult to 
execute a person who deserves the death penalty for intentional killing, than a person who does not. 
                                                             
of a strangulation victim. The strangler need only know that the victim’s breathing will be impeded as a result of his 
conduct. However, under the current inchoate offenses, the culpability requirement might be raised, and the person 
might need to intend that result before being subjected to inchoate liability. To avoid this problem, proposed Chapter 
700 requires that for each inchoate offense, the person need act intentionally only with respect to the conduct that 
would bring about the underlying offense, but act with the culpability required by the underlying offense for all 
other elements. See proposed Sections 701 to 703 and their corresponding commentaries. 
99 11 Del.C. § 636(a) reads: 
A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:  
(1) The person intentionally causes the death of another person;  
(2) While engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit any felony, the person recklessly causes the death of another person.  
(3) The person intentionally causes another person to commit suicide by force or duress;  
(4) The person recklessly causes the death of a law-enforcement officer, corrections employee, fire 
fighter, paramedic, emergency medical technician, fire marshal or fire police officer while such officer is in 
the lawful performance of duties;  
(5) The person causes the death of another person by the use of or detonation of any bomb or 
similar destructive device;  
(6) The person causes the death of another person in order to avoid or prevent the lawful arrest of 
any person, or in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of escape in 
the second degree or escape after conviction.  
100 11 Del.C. § 636(2) and (4) have explicit culpability requirements of recklessness. Subsections (5) and 
(6) do not contain explicit culpability requirements; however, under § 251(b), recklessness is read in as the lowest 
level of culpability that need be proven. Subsection (3)—intentionally causing another person to commit suicide by 
force or duress—is not considered here because the Proposed Code maintains this provision (and its eligibility for 
the death penalty) through a new offense for causing suicide. See proposed Section 1105(c). 
101 See 11 Del.C. § 4209(c)(3)b.1. 
102 See 11 Del.C. § 4209(e)(2). 
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On the other hand, the kinds of reckless killings currently eligible for the death penalty are 
objectively more serious than ordinary manslaughter. The Proposed Code recognizes this distinction, but 
avoids the proportionality and consistency problems described above, by treating those reckless killings 
as forms of second-degree murder instead of first-degree murder.103 Thus, the death penalty is reserved 
for the only conduct truly blameworthy enough to deserve it—intentionally killing another human 
being.104 
 
B.  Restoring Imputation of Recklessness for Voluntary Intoxication 
 
When the Criminal Code of 1973 was enacted, 11 Del.C. § 421 codified a rule that was already 
being followed by the Delaware courts regarding the effects of voluntary intoxication upon a defendant’s 
culpability. That rule provided: 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, voluntary intoxication is an 
affirmative defense in a prosecution for a criminal offense only if it negatives [sic] the 
element of specific intent required by the crime charged. 
(2) When recklessness is an element of an offense, and the defendant, as a result of 
voluntary intoxication, is unaware of a risk, his unawareness does not negative [sic] the 
mental state of recklessness if he would have been aware of the risk had he not been 
intoxicated.105 
Other than confusedly relying upon the common law notion of specific intent, this newly codified rule 
was taken directly from Section 2.08(1)–(2) of the Model Penal Code, on which the 1973 Criminal Code 
was based. This rule of voluntary intoxication strikes a sensible balance between two competing 
concerns: on one hand, the new criminal code eschewed strict liability, requiring proof of a culpable state 
of mind that an intoxicated person may not be able to form; but on the other hand, a defendant’s 
unawareness of risk due to self-intoxication is the defendant’s own fault. The original § 421 recognized 
that while an intoxicated person may not be able to form the intent or have the knowledge required for 
some offenses, the defendant’s recklessness in becoming voluntarily intoxicated should be sufficient to 
convict a defendant for offenses requiring only recklessness.  
However, within a few short years, the General Assembly replaced the original § 421 with the 
current provision, which provides that voluntary intoxication “is no defense to any criminal charge.”106 As 
a result, “the State is not required to prove that a [voluntarily] intoxicated defendant possessed a particular 
state of mind . . . .”107 The General Assembly was no doubt concerned that opening the door to a statutory 
involuntary intoxication defense would result in defendants raising the issue of intoxication in every case. 
But as a consequence, the ultimate liability of some defendants rests entirely upon the discretion of the 
prosecutor bringing charges. For example, imagine a defendant who killed another person while drunk. 
The prosecutor charges the defendant with murder in the first degree, which requires that the defendant 
intend to cause the other person’s death.108 Because he was drunk at the time, the defendant was unable to 
form the required intent to cause death. However, the current version of § 421 prevents the defendant 
from raising the issue of intoxication to explain why he did not have culpability required for murder. 
Unable to make a colorable defense, the defendant is much more likely to be convicted of murder, in 
                                                             
103 See proposed Section 1102(a)(2)(B)–(a)(3). 
104 See proposed Section 1101. 
105 11 Del.C. § 421 (1973). 
106 11 Del.C. § 421 (1976). 
107 Wyant v. State, 519 A.2d 649, 655 (Del. 1986). 
108 See 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(1). 
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which case the defendant may be sentenced to death.109 Under the original version of § 421, the defendant 
would still have been found guilty of manslaughter (a Class B felony), or perhaps even murder in the 
second degree (a Class A felony) — both very serious offenses, but each more proportionate to the 
defendant’s reckless self-intoxication.110  
Fundamentally, 11 Del.C. § 421 as it currently stands holds a defendant strictly liable for 
anything she does while voluntarily intoxicated, no matter how serious the offense may be. In contrast, 
the current criminal code establishes a principle of only imposing strict liability for violations (which are 
not subject to any term of imprisonment) and regulatory offenses — but only if “a legislative purpose to 
impose strict liability . . . plainly appears.”111 This extremely limited role of strict liability is consistent 
with the code’s general scheme of both requiring a culpable state of mind and imposing harsher penalties 
for more culpable states of mind;112 however, it is utterly incompatible with § 421. 
To return to a consistent application of the current code’s general principles, the Proposed Code 
reestablishes voluntary intoxication as a defense capable of negating intentional or knowing culpability, 
but imputing recklessness to such a defendant due to his fault in becoming intoxicated.113 
 
C.  Returning to the Classic Intent Requirement for Burglary 
 
Burglary is a compound crime composed of two different offenses: a trespass, and any other 
offense committed during the trespass (usually theft). Before burglary was recognized as an offense, the 
State could convict a defendant of both offenses based on the two separate harms involved. Burglary 
exists as a separate offense for only one reason: to recognize an additional harm that occurs when a 
defendant’s trespass is motivated by the desire to commit a further offense. As a result, a defendant need 
not actually succeed in committing the offense motivating the trespass to commit burglary: trespassing 
because of a preexisting intent is sufficient.114 
In 2008, the General Assembly dramatically redefined the intent requirement for burglary, 
amending the offense definition so that “[t]he ‘intent to commit a crime therein’ may be formed . . . 
concurrent with the unlawful entry or . . . after the entry while the person remains unlawfully.”115 As 
discussed above, however, forming intent prior to the trespass is the only harm that burglary uniquely 
addresses, thereby justifying its existence. Now, any offense committed during a trespass automatically 
generates liability for burglary, despite the State’s ability to charge and convict the defendant of both that 
offense and the trespass. In that case, the defendant is subject to liability for multiple offenses for causing 
the same harm.  
This result is inconsistent with two basic principles of the current code that are also legislative 
mandates for this Recodification Project under the Epilogue: comprehensiveness and proportionality. The 
                                                             
109 See 11 Del.C. §§ 636(b)(1), 4209. 
110 See 11 Del.C. §§ 632(1) (requiring recklessness for manslaughter), 635(1) (requiring recklessness and 
“a cruel, wicked and depraved indifference to human life” for murder in the second degree). 
111 11 Del.C. § 251(c) (emphasis added). 
112 See 11 Del.C. § 251(a) (“No person may be found guilty of a criminal offense without proof that the 
person had the state of mind required by the law defining the offense . . . .”). Cf., e.g., 11 Del.C. § 631 with 11 
Del.C. §§ 632, 635–636 (grading causing another person’s death more harshly as the culpable state of mind as to 
causing death rises). 
113 See proposed Section 212. 
114 See 11 Del.C. § 824 (“A person is guilty of burglary . . . when the person knowingly enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.” 
115 See 2008 Delaware Laws Ch. 267 (H.B. 208) (amending 11 Del.C. § 829 (definitions relating to 
criminal trespass, burglary and home invasion)). 
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comprehensive definition of offenses allows each harm or injury caused by a defendant to be punished as 
a separate offense — but only one offense. Punishing one harm or injury with multiple offenses always 
results in disproportionate punishment. The Proposed Code returns to a consistent application of these 
principles in burglary prosecutions by undoing the recent, novel reinterpretation of its intent 
requirement.116 Beyond burglary, the Proposed Code helps reinforce the principle of “one harm, one 
offense” by explicitly placing that limitation upon conviction for multiple offenses.117 
 
D.  Revising the Mental Illness or Psychiatric Disorder Defense 
 
Since the 1973 Code was adopted, the General Assembly has adopted provisions that limit the 
scope of the mental illness or psychiatric disorder (“insanity”) defense, largely due to a perception that the 
insanity defense has been subject to abuse. However, various studies strongly suggest this assumption is 
empirically unsound.118 Meanwhile, additional policy concerns call these limitations into question. 
                                                             
116 See proposed Section 2401 and corresponding commentary. 
117 See proposed Section 210(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
118 It has been well documented that the lay public has an exaggerated sense of how often the insanity plea 
is used as well as how often verdicts of “not guilty by reason of insanity” (NGRI) are granted. For example, people 
generally believe, wrongly, that the insanity defense is a common issue in criminal trials. One study found that 
people thought that thirty-eight percent of all defendants charged with a crime pleaded NGRI. See Valerie P. Hans, 
An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 393, 406 (1986); see also Eric Silver 
et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 67-68 (1994). 
In reality, an insanity plea is exceedingly rare, raised in only a fraction of a percent of felony cases. See, e.g., Lisa A. 
Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 334 (1991). (Note that this is less than one percent of all felony cases, while the lay 
subjects estimated insanity pleas for 38% of all persons charged with any crime). See also Richard A. Pasewark & 
Hugh McGinley, Insanity Plea: National Survey of Frequency and Success, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 101 (1985) 
(reporting median rate of one plea per 873 reported crimes). Also contrary to popular belief, more than half of the 
few cases where an insanity plea is introduced involve nonviolent offenses. See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., 
BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 111 (1993); see also Callahan et al., 
supra, at 336. 
In addition, it has been reported that even in the rare cases in which the insanity defense is sought, it is 
usually not granted, yet the public perceives that it is commonly granted. See, e.g., Callahan et al., supra, at 334 
(reporting average acquittal rate of 26% on NGRI pleas); Pasewark & McGinley, supra, at 106 (reporting success 
rate of 15% of pleas); Hans, supra, at 406 (reporting study indicating that public believes over 36% of all NGRI 
claims, constituting perceived 14% of all criminal cases, result in NGRI verdict); Mary Frain, Professor Says 
Insanity Defense Seldom Works, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, MA), Jan. 19, 1996, at B1 (quoting chair of 
psychiatry at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center as saying that general public believes the insanity 
defense is used in 20 to 50 percent of all criminal cases). 
Claims that the defense is abused and employed to manipulate juries are also belied by the fact that most 
NGRI pleas are not contested, and the vast majority of NGRI verdicts — 93%, in one study — are reached through 
negotiated pleas or rendered by judges in bench trials, rather than by juries. See Michael L. Perlin, A Law of 
Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 425 (2000) (“Nearly 90% of all insanity defense cases are ‘walkthroughs’ — 
stipulated on the papers.”); Callahan et al., supra, at 334. Another refutation of the abuse concern is the fact that 
most NGRI acquittees have significant histories of treatment for mental illness. See, e.g., Michael R. Hawkins & 
Richard A. Pasewark, Characteristics of Persons Utilizing the Insanity Plea, 53 PSYCHOL. REP. 191, 194 (1983); 
Steadman et al., supra, at 56. 
These massive misconceptions regarding the practical significance of the insanity defense fuel the general 
sense that the insanity defense is being abused and that something must be done to limit the abuse. See Michael L. 
Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You From Me”: The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear 
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For example, current law provides for a “guilty but mentally ill” verdict (“GBMI”) as a supposed 
compromise between a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and a conviction.119 Although 
this verdict was meant to reduce NGRI acquittals, the number of NGRI verdicts in some states where such 
data has been collected actually increased after the GBMI verdict was enacted.120 The GBMI verdict is 
troublesome because it has no legal significance,121 yet distracts the jury into considering the technical 
clinical issue of whether an offender needs psychiatric treatment, although the determination of guilt 
should be the jury’s sole responsibility. Moreover, because current rules do not require a trial court to 
inform a jury that an NGRI verdict does not result in the defendant’s release from custody,122 there is a 
significant likelihood that juries will erroneously conclude that the GBMI verdict is either necessary to 
ensure that the defendant is not unconditionally released, or the only appropriate way to guarantee needed 
psychological treatment for the defendant, or both. Another counterintuitive, and troubling, aspect of the 
GBMI verdict is that although mental illness is normally thought to mitigate culpability, offenders found 
GBMI receive longer average sentences than offenders who are simply found guilty.123 This strongly hints 
that GBMI is being used to usurp the role of civil commitment (protecting society from persons who 
present a danger for the future) rather than to fulfill the role of criminal liability (sanctioning offenders for 
their blameworthy conduct in the past). 
Likewise, at the same time that it instated the GBMI verdict, the General Assembly eliminated 
the “volitional” rule of the insanity excuse.124 This standard merits re-inclusion, as it covers persons who 
are clearly not blameworthy, and there is no demonstrated risk that inclusion of such a standard in the 
insanity defense will lead to inappropriate acquittals — or, indeed, that it will change the outcome of 
insanity defense cases at all.125 Further, current Delaware law recognizes a volitional-impairment defense 
where the impairment results from involuntary intoxication.126 There is no obvious explanation for why 
substantial control impairment should excuse in that context, but the same impairment should not excuse 
when it results from mental illness. 
The Proposed Code reflects these policy concerns in rejecting the GBMI verdict and reinstating 
the volitional rule.127 
 
E.  Eliminating Archaic and/or Obsolete Offenses 
 
                                                             
of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1375 & nn.5-6 (1997) (citing polls suggesting that 
“ninety percent [of Americans] believe that the insanity plea is overused”). 
119 See 11 Del.C. §§ 401(b), 408–09. 
120 See Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have 
Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 506–07 (1985). 
121 GBMI is not a “middle position” in terms of its consequences. It has the same effect as a guilty verdict, 
see 11 Del.C. § 408(c), even in terms of the defendant’s receiving a psychological evaluation, which is required for 
all convicts. See 11 Del.C. § 408(b); cf. 11 Del.C. § 6523 (requiring the Department of Corrections to make 
psychological “studies and investigations” of inmates “for the purpose of rehabilitation.”). 
122 See 11 Del.C. § 403 (providing that NGRI acquittee shall be committed to the Delaware Psychiatric 
Center); Aizupitis v. State, 699 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Del. 1997) (upholding Delaware rule that trial court is not required 
to inform jury of the consequences of NGRI verdict). 
123 See Steadman et al., supra note 115, at 117-19. 
124 See 1982 Delaware Laws Ch. 328 (H.B. 567). 
125 See Callahan et al., supra note 115.  
126 See 11 Del.C. §§ 423 (involuntary intoxication as a defense). 
127 See proposed Section 403 and corresponding commentary. 
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Title 11 contains a number of outdated offenses that do not belong in a modern criminal code. 
The Proposed Code attempts to identify and eliminate these offenses. For example, the proposed Chapter 
covering theft offenses removes the current offense of larceny of livestock, transfer of recorded sounds, 
and operation of a recording device in a movie theater.128 All evidence indicates that these offenses are 
currently unenforced, despite the fact that there is no special difficulty in identifying people who commit 
them. Such non-enforcement can only reflect a conscious decision that imposition of criminal liability for 
these offenses is improper, or at least a waste of State resources. Maintenance of dead-letter statutes of 
this kind only tends to invite abuse and to undermine the authority of the criminal law as a comprehensive 
and accurate reflection of the governed community’s sense of what behavior is sufficiently improper to 
merit imposition of punishment.129 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The creation of the Delaware Criminal Code Recodification Project represents a rare and 
profound opportunity to eradicate the numerous inconsistencies and contradictions that currently plague 
Delaware criminal law. In nearly all cases, the needed corrections are significant, but should not be at all 
controversial, for it is usually possible to clean up the form and structure of the law without altering its 
fundamental goals or rules. The Proposed Code both simplifies and rationalizes the statutory criminal law 
of Delaware. It is rooted in the values and policy judgments of the present, but its language, organization, 
and comprehensive scope promise to better serve those interests in the future. 
 
  
                                                             
128 See 11 Del.C. § 859. 
129 For other specific offenses eliminated by the Proposed Code, see, for example, 11 Del.C. §§ 614 (abuse 
of a sports official), 627 (prohibited acts as to substances releasing vapors or fumes), 823 (portion of criminal 
trespass in the first degree relating to “a building used to shelter, house, milk, raise, feed, breed, study or exhibit 
animals.”), 918 (ticket scalping), 1004 (advertising marriage in another state), 1327 (maintaining a dangerous 
animal), 1365 (obscene literature harmful to minors), and 1366 (outdoor motion picture theaters). Where the conduct 
prohibited by these offenses is genuinely harmful and blameworthy, it should fall within the more general 
prohibitions of another proposed provision. For example, maintaining a dangerous animal is only an offense where 
the animal actually causes injury or death to a person or other animal. Any of those cases could be prosecuted as a 
form of homicide, reckless injuring, or property damage, and one can imagine other proper offenses that could be 
charged due to maintaining a dangerous animal, such as reckless endangerment. 
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PART I:  THE GENERAL PART 
 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
 
CHAPTER 100.  PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
 
Section 101.  Short Title and Effective Date 
Section 102.  Principle of Construction; General Purposes 
Section 103.  Abolition of Non-Statutory Offenses; Applicability 
Section 104.  Civil Remedies Preserved; No Merger with Civil Injury 
Section 105.  State Criminal Jurisdiction 
Section 106.  Burdens of Proof; Permissive Inferences 
Section 107.  Words of Gender or Number 
Section 108.  Definitions; General Definitions 
Section 109.  Definitions Index 
 
 
Section 101.  Short Title and Effective Date 
(a) This Act shall be known and may be cited as the “Delaware Criminal Code of 
2017.” 
(b) This Code shall take effect on [A DATE ONE YEAR FROM ENACTMENT].   
(c) Prosecutions for offenses committed before [ABOVE DATE] shall be 
generally governed by the prior law.  But in any case pending on or commenced after 
[ABOVE DATE] involving an offense committed before that date, provisions of this 
Code that provide a defense or mitigation shall apply, with the defendant’s consent. 
 
Section 102.  Principle of Construction; General Purposes 
(a) Principle of Construction.  The provisions of this Code shall be interpreted 
according to the fair import of their terms.  But when the language is susceptible to 
differing interpretations, and remains ambiguous after applying general principles of 
statutory interpretation and available signs of legislative intent, it shall be construed to 
further these general purposes: 
(1) to prohibit conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or 
threatens harm to individual or public interests, 
(2) to give fair warning of the nature of the conduct prohibited and of the 
sentences authorized upon conviction, 
(3) to define the act or omission and the accompanying culpability that 
constitute each offense, and 
(4) to prescribe penalties that are proportionate to the seriousness of the 
offense and the blameworthiness of the offender. 
(b) Effect of Commentary.  The commentary accompanying this Code should be 
used as an aid in interpreting the provisions of this Code. 
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(c) Effect of Heading.  No heading contained in this Code shall exclusively 
govern, limit, modify, or affect the scope, meaning, or intent of a provision. Nevertheless, 
headings may be used as an aid in interpreting the provisions of this Code. 
(d) Partial Repeal.  Unless the repealing act expressly provides, the repeal of any 
criminal offense set forth under the laws of this State shall not affect: 
(1) the validity of the remainder of this Code; or 
(2) any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under the repealed 
provision; or 
(3) any prosecution or other legal proceeding in progress under the repealed 
provision. 
 
Section 103.  All Offenses Defined by Statute; Applicability 
(a) No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is made an offense by this Code or 
another statute of this State. 
(b) The provisions of Part I of this Code are applicable to all offenses defined by 
this Code and by other statutes, unless this Code provides otherwise. 
(c) This Section does not affect the power of a court to punish for civil contempt, 
or to employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order, civil 
judgment, or decree. 
(d) The punishments prescribed by this Code, or by any other statute of this State, 
may be inflicted only after a judgment of conviction by a court having jurisdiction over 
the person of the defendant and over the subject matter. 
 
Section 104.  Civil Remedies Preserved; No Merger with Civil Injury 
(a) This Code does not bar, suspend, or negatively affect any right or liability to 
damages, penalty, forfeiture, or other right to recovery in a non-criminal proceeding, and 
the civil injury is not merged in the offense. 
(b) Unless this Code or another statute provides otherwise, civil proceedings in a 
court or administrative agency do not affect criminal liability under this Code for the 
same conduct. 
 
Section 105.  State Criminal Jurisdiction 
(a) A person is subject to prosecution in this State for an offense that he or she 
commits, while either within or outside this State, by his or her own conduct or that of 
another for which the person is legally accountable, if: 
(1) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within this State; or 
(2) the conduct outside the State constitutes an attempt to commit an 
offense within this State; or 
(3) the conduct outside the State constitutes a conspiracy to commit an 
offense within this State, and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs 
in this State; or 
(4) the conduct violates a law of this State that expressly prohibits conduct 
outside this State, and 
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(A) the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of 
this State, and 
(B) the person is reckless as to his or her conduct affecting that 
interest; or 
(5) the conduct within this State constitutes aid, or an attempt, solicitation, 
or conspiracy, to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of both 
this State and the other jurisdiction. 
(6) the conduct is an omission to perform a legal duty imposed by the law 
of this State. 
(7) Conduct Partly Within State.  Conduct is committed partly within this 
state if: 
(A) conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs 
within this State; or 
(B) (i) the offense definition includes: 
(aa) telephone or electronic communication; or 
(bb) digital information or recordings; and 
(ii) the communication, information, or recording is stored on 
or received by a computer or facility located within this State. 
(b) Exception to Jurisdiction: Result of Lawful Conduct Outside State.  Unless the 
defendant recklessly caused the prohibited result while reckless as to that result occurring 
within this State, Subsection (a)(1) does not apply when: 
(1) causing a particular result is an element of the offense, and 
(2) the result is caused by conduct occurring outside this State, and 
(3) the result is not prohibited by the jurisdiction where the conduct 
occurred. 
(c) Permissive Inference.  If the body of a homicide victim is found within this 
State, there is a rebuttable presumption that the death occurred within this State. 
 
Section 106.  Burdens of Proof; Permissive Inferences 
(a) Presumption of Innocence.  A defendant is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty.   
(b) Burden of Persuasion.   
(1) Burden on the State.  The burden is on the State: 
(A) to prove all elements of an offense, grade provision, and the 
absence of an exception to liability, as applicable, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, 
(B) to disprove all justification defenses by a preponderance of the 
evidence, as provided in Section 301(f), unless this Code expressly 
provides otherwise, and 
(C) to prove by a preponderance of the evidence all other facts 
required for liability, unless this Code expressly provides otherwise. 
(2) Burden on the Defendant.  Unless this Code expressly provides 
otherwise, the burden is on the defendant to prove all elements of a defense or 
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mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence, including excuse defenses, as 
provided in Section 401(d), and nonexculpatory defenses, as provided in Section 
501(c).   
(3) Preponderance of the Evidence: Meaning.  An element is proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence if the evidence makes it more likely than not that 
the element existed at the required time. 
(c) Burden of Production.   
(1) Burden on the State.   
(A) Generally.  An offense shall be presented to the trier or fact only 
if: 
(i) the State has presented sufficient evidence: 
(aa) considered in the light most favorable to the State, 
and 
(bb) considering all reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn from that evidence, 
(ii) to allow a rational trier of fact to find that all required 
elements of the offense have been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(B) Felony Murder.  In a prosecution for Murder under Section 
1102(a)(3), the prosecution may meet its burden of production even if the 
only evidence of the underlying felony is the defendant’s extrajudicial 
statement. 
(2) Burden on the Defendant.  Unless this Code expressly provides 
otherwise, an exception to liability, defense, or mitigation shall be presented to the 
trier of fact only if: 
(A) there exists sufficient evidence: 
(i) considered in the light most favorable to the defendant, 
and 
(ii) considering all reasonable inferences that may be drawn 
from that evidence, 
(B) to allow a rational trier of fact to find that all requirements of the 
exception, defense, or mitigation are proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
(d) Effects of Permissive Inferences.  When this Code establishes a permissive 
inference as to any fact, it has the following consequences: 
(1) when there is evidence of the facts that give rise to the inference, the 
issue of the existence of the inferred fact must be submitted to the trier of fact, 
unless the Court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negates the 
inferred fact, and 
(2) when the issue of the existence of the inferred fact is submitted to the 
trier of fact, the Court shall charge that while the inferred fact must, on all the 
evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the law declares that the trier of 
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fact may regard the facts giving rise to the inference – if duly proven – as 
sufficient evidence of the inferred fact. 
 
Section 107.  Words of Gender or Number 
Unless the context requires otherwise: 
(a) singular and plural words may, and where necessary shall, be treated as 
interchangeable, and 
(b) words indicating gender may, and where necessary shall, be treated as 
interchangeable. 
 
Section 108.  Definitions; General Definitions 
(a) “Defense” means any provision of this Code that explicitly uses the word 
“defense,” other than a general defense provision.  A defense negates potential liability 
for an offense.  
(b) “Exception to Liability” means any provision of this Code stipulating a 
modification or refinement of a single offense or a related group of offenses, other than a 
defense or a general defense provision. An exception to liability negates potential liability 
for an offense. 
(c) “General Defense” means the provisions of Chapters 300, 400, and 500. 
(d) “Includes” or “including” means that the definition is not limited to the 
meaning given, but may be defined in a way not inconsistent with that meaning. 
(e) When “means” is employed to define a word or term, the definition is limited 
to the meaning given in this Code. 
(f) “Mitigation” means a provision in this Code stipulating the conditions for 
decreasing the punishment for an offense. A mitigation establishes a partial reduction of 
potential liability for an offense. 
(g) “Person” means: 
(1) a human being who has been born and is alive; or 
(2) where appropriate, a public or private corporation, trust, firm, joint 
stock company, union, unincorporated association, partnership, government, or 
governmental instrumentality. 
(h) “Property” means anything of value, including: real estate; tangible and 
intangible personal property; contract rights; choses-in-action and other interests in or 
claims to wealth; admission or transportation tickets; pet, captured, or domestic animals, 
including livestock; food and drink; electric or other power; personal services; telephone 
service; access to electronic services, programs, or data; recorded sounds or images; 
private personal data or information; and lottery tickets.  
 
Section 109.  Definitions Index 
A word not defined in this Code has its commonly accepted meaning, and may be 
defined as appropriate to fulfill the general purposes listed in Section 102.  Unless a 
particular context clearly requires a different meaning: 
“Abortion” has the meaning given in Section 1107(a). 
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“Abuse of a child” has the meaning given in 10 Del.C. § 901(1). 
“Accomplice” has the meaning given in Section 5210(a). 
“Acquittal” has the meaning given in Section 509(a). 
“Adulterated” has the meaning given in Section 2213(a). 
“Agent of the organization” has the meaning given in Section 603(a). 
“Attempt” or “attempting” has the meaning given in Section 1107(b). 
“Authorized prescription” has the meaning given in Section 5210(b). 
“Catastrophe” has the meaning given in Section 2306(a). 
“Catastrophic agent” has the meaning given in Section 2306(b). 
“Chemically impaired” has the meaning given in Section 1210(a). 
“Child pornography” has the meaning given in Section 4208(a). 
“Circumstance element” has the meaning given in Section 214(a). 
“Co-conspirator” has the meaning given in Section 5210(c). 
“Coercion” has the meaning given in Section 1107(c). 
“Combat event” has the meaning given in Section 4208(b). 
“Commercial animals” has the meaning given in Section 4208(c). 
“Commercial electronic mail” has the meaning given in Section 4307(a). 
“Computer services” has the meaning given in Section 806(a). 
“Computer system” has the meaning given in Section 4307(b). 
“Conduct element” has the meaning given in Section 214(b). 
“Consequence” has the meaning given in Section 214(c). 
“Contents of a communication” has the meaning given in Section 4307(c). 
“Contraband” has the meaning given in Section 3309(a). 
“Controlled substance” has the meaning given in Section 5210(d). 
“Conviction” has the meaning given in Section 509(b). 
“Correctional officer” has the meaning given in Section 308(a). 
“Counterfeit mark” has the meaning given in Section 2213(b). 
“Criminal street gang” has the meaning given in Section 5304(a). 
“Cruelty” has the meaning given in Section 4208(d). 
“Damage” has the meaning given in Section 2306(c). 
“Dangerous instrument” has the meaning given in Section 5109(a). 
“Data” has the meaning given in Section 4307(d). 
“Deadly force” has the meaning given in Section 308(b). 
“Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
“Deadly weapon designed for the defense of one’s person” has the meaning given 
in Section 5109(c). 
“Dealer” has the meaning given in Section 2110(a). 
“Deceiving,” “deceive,” or “deception” has the meaning given in Section 2110(b). 
“Defense” has the meaning given in Section 108(a). 
“Defraud” has the meaning given in Section 2213(c). 
“Deliver” or “delivery” has the meaning given in Section 5210(e). 
“Dependent child” has the meaning given in Section 4408. 
“Deprive” has the meaning given in Section 2110(c). 
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“Destructive weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(d). 
“Drug paraphernalia” has the meaning given in Section 5210(f). 
“Dwelling” has the meaning given in Section 2403(a). 
“Ecological catastrophe” has the meaning given in Section 2306(d). 
“Electronic communication” has the meaning given in Section 4307(e). 
“Electronic mail” has the meaning given in Section 4307(f). 
“Enterprise” has the meaning given in Section 5304(b). 
“Excuse defense” has the meaning given in Section 410(a). 
“Exception to liability” has the meaning given in Section 108(b). 
“Entry” upon premises has the meaning given in Section 2403(b). 
“Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 5109(e). 
“Force” has the meaning given in Section 308(c). 
“Funerary object associated with interment” has the meaning given in Section 
4208(e). 
“Gambling device” has the meaning given in Section 4503(a). 
“Gender identity” has the meaning given in Section 806(b). 
“General Defense” has the meaning given in Section 108(c). 
“Genitalia” has the meaning given in Section 1307(a) 
“Handgun” has the meaning given in Section 5109(f). 
“Harm to another person” has the meaning given in Section 3104(a). 
“High managerial agent” has the meaning given in Section 603(b). 
“Human remains” has the meaning given in Section 4108(f). 
“Improperly terminated” has the meaning given in Section 509(c). 
“Incendiary device” has the meaning given in Section 2306(e). 
“Inchoate offense” has the meaning given in Section 214(d). 
“Includes” or “including” has the meaning given in Section 108(d). 
“Intercepts” has the meaning given in Section 4307(g). 
“Internet pharmacy” has the meaning given in Section 5210(g). 
“Intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 214(e). 
“Involuntary intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 410(b). 
To “issue” a check has the meaning given in Section 2213(d). 
“Juror” has the meaning given in Section 3309(b). 
“Justification defense” has the meaning given in Section 308(d). 
“Law enforcement officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(c). 
“Leaf marijuana” has the meaning given in Section 5210(h). 
“Loiters” has the meaning given in Section 4108(a). 
“Lottery ticket” has the meaning given in Section 4503(b). 
“Means” has the meaning given in Section 108(e). 
“Mental illness or serious mental disorder” has the meaning given in Section 
410(c). 
“Mislabeled” has the meaning given in Section 2213(e). 
“Mitigation” has the meaning given in Section 108(f). 
“Motor vehicle” has the meaning given in Section 2110(d). 
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“Neglect of a child” has the meaning given in 10 Del.C. § 901(18). 
“Negligent mistake” has the meaning given in Section 214(f). 
“Night” has the meaning given in Section 2403(c) 
“Nonexculpatory defense” has the meaning given in Section 509(d). 
“Oath” has the meaning given in Section 3205(a). 
“Obscene” has the meaning given in Section 4208(g). 
“Obtain” has the meaning given in Section 2110(e). 
“Oral or object penetration” has the meaning given in Section 1307(b). 
“Organization” has the meaning given in Section 603(c). 
“Originating address” or “originating account” has the meaning given in Section 
4307(h). 
“Overdose” has the meaning given in Section 5210(i). 
“Owner” has the meaning given in Section 2110(f). 
“Party officer” has the meaning given in Section 3104(b). 
To “pass” a check has the meaning given in Section 2213(f). 
“Pattern of criminal gang activity” has the meaning given in Section 5304(c). 
“Pattern of racketeering activity” has the meaning given in Section 5304(d). 
“Payment card” has the meaning given in Section 2213(g). 
“Peace officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(d). 
“Penal custody” has the meaning given in Section 3309(e). 
“Person” has the meaning given in Section 108(g). 
“Personal benefit” has the meaning given in Section 3104(c). 
“Personal identifying information” has the meaning given in Section 2213(h). 
“Physical evidence” has the meaning given in Section 3309(f). 
“Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
“Place open to public view” has the meaning given in Section 4208(h). 
“Position of trust, authority, or supervision” has the meaning given in Section 
1307(c). 
“Practitioner” has the meaning given in Section 2110(g). 
“Private communication” has the meaning given in Section 4307(i). 
“Private personal data” has the meaning given in Section 806(c). 
“Private place” has the meaning given in Section 4307(j). 
“Private wire” has the meaning given in Section 4503(c). 
“Proceeds” has the meaning given in Section 5304(e). 
“Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
“Property of another” has the meaning given in Section 2110(h). 
“Public passage” has the meaning given in Section 4108(b). 
“Public place” has the meaning given in Section 4108(c). 
“Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 3104(d). 
“Public service” has the meaning given in Section 2306(f). 
“Put forward” has the meaning given in Section 2213(i). 
“Real property” has the meaning given in Section 2403(d). 
“Reasonable mistake” has the meaning given in Section 214(g). 
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“Receive” has the meaning given in Section 2110(i). 
“Receiving address” or “receiving account” has the meaning given in Section 
4307(k). 
“Reckless mistake” has the meaning given in Section 214(h). 
“Reencoder” has the meaning given in Section 2213(j). 
“Registrant” has the meaning given in Section 5210(j). 
“Relative” has the meaning given in Section 1404. 
“Reside” has the meaning given in Section [1307(d)]. 
“Result element” has the meaning given in Section 214(i). 
“Scanning device” has the meaning given in Section 2213(k). 
“Security” has the meaning given in 6 Del.C. § 73-103(a)(20). 
“Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
“Services” has the meaning given in Section 2110(j). 
“Sexual conduct” has the meaning given in Section 4208(i). 
“Sexual contact” has the meaning given in Section 1307(e). 
“Sexual intercourse” has the meaning given in Section 1307(f). 
“Sexual orientation” has the meaning given in Section 806(d). 
“Statement is material” has the meaning given in Section 3205(b). 
“Stolen” has the meaning given in Section 2110(k). 
“Substantive offense” has the meaning given in Section 214(j). 
“Suicide” has the meaning given in Section 1107(d). 
“Table game” has the meaning given in Section 4503(d). 
“Therapeutic abortion” has the meaning given in Section 1107(e) 
“Tier 1 quantity” has the meaning given in Section 5210(k). 
“Tier 2 quantity” has the meaning given in Section 5210(l). 
“Tier 3 quantity” has the meaning given in Section 5210(m). 
“Tier 4 quantity” has the meaning given in Section 5210(n). 
“Tier 5 quantity” has the meaning given in Section 5210(o). 
“Trespass on real property” has the meaning given in Section 4307(m). 
“Trial or contest” has the meaning given in Section 4503(e). 
“Unjustified” conduct has the meaning given in Section 308(e). 
“Unlawful debt” has the meaning given in Section 5304(f). 
“Unmarked burial” has the meaning given in Section 4208(j). 
“Value” has the meaning given in Section 2110(l). 
“Vessel” has the meaning given in Section 308(f). 
“Video lottery machine” has the meaning given in Section 4503(f). 
“Voluntary act” has the meaning given in Section 214(k). 
“Voluntary intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 214(l). 
“Voluntary and complete renunciation” has the meaning given in Section 706(b). 
“Vulnerable person” has the meaning given in Section 806(e). 
“Witness” has the meaning given in Section 3309(g). 
“Written instrument” has the meaning given in Section 806(f). 
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REQUIREMENTS OF OFFENSE LIABILITY 
 
CHAPTER 200.  BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF OFFENSE LIABILITY 
 
Section 201.  Basis of Liability 
Section 202.  Offense Elements Defined 
Section 203.  Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result 
Section 204.  Requirement of a Voluntary Act; Omission Liability; Possession Liability 
Section 205.  Culpability Requirements 
Section 206.  Ignorance or Mistake Negating Required Culpability 
Section 207.  Mental Illness or Disorder Negating Required Culpability 
Section 208.  Consent 
Section 209.  Customary License; De Minimis Infractions; Conduct Not Envisaged by 
General Assembly as Prohibited by the Offense 
Section 210.  Conviction When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements of More than 
One Offense or Grade 
Section 211.  Accountability for the Conduct of Another 
Section 212.  Voluntary Intoxication 
Section 213.  Divergence Between Consequences Intended or Risked and Actual 
Consequences 
Section 214.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 201.  Basis of Liability 
Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, a person is liable for an offense if the 
person: 
(a) (1) satisfies all the objective and culpability elements of an offense, and 
does not satisfy the requirements of any exception to liability or defense; or 
(2) if an element of the offense is missing, it is imputed to the person by a 
provision of Section 211 through 214; and 
(b) does not satisfy the requirements of any defense provided in Chapters 300, 
400, or 500 of this Code. 
 
Section 202.  Offense Elements Defined 
(a) The “elements” of an offense refer to: 
(1) both: 
(A) objective elements, meaning: 
(i) conduct; or 
(ii) attendant circumstances; or 
(iii) the result of conduct; and 
(B) culpability requirements, as defined in Section 205, 
(2) that are contained in the offense definition or in the provisions 
establishing the offense grade or the severity of the punishment. 
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(b) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Circumstance element” has the meaning given in Section 214(a).  
(2) “Conduct element” has the meaning given in Section 214(b). 
(3) “Result element” has the meaning given in Section 214(i). 
 
Section 203.  Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result 
(a) Generally.  Conduct is the cause of a result if: 
(1) the conduct is an antecedent but for which the result in question would 
not have occurred, and 
(2) the result is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just 
bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity of his or her offense, and 
(3) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional 
causal requirements imposed by the Code or by the law defining the offense. 
(b) Concurrent Sufficient Causes.  Where the conduct of two or more persons each 
causally contributes to a result, and each alone would have been sufficient to cause the 
result, the requirement of Subsection (a) is satisfied as to each person. 
 
Section 204.  Requirement of a Voluntary Act; Omission Liability; Possession 
Liability 
(a) Voluntary Act or Omission Required.  A person is not guilty of an offense 
unless liability is based upon a voluntary act or a voluntary failure to perform an act that 
the person is physically capable of performing. 
(b) Omission to Perform Legal Duty as an Act.  Liability for the commission of an 
offense may be based on an omission unaccompanied by action if a legal duty to perform 
the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.  
(c) Possession as a Voluntary Act.  Possession is a voluntary act, as required by 
Subsection (a), if the person: 
(1) knowingly procured or received the thing possessed; or 
(2) was aware of his or her control over the thing possessed for a sufficient 
time to have been able to terminate possession. 
(d) Defined Term.  “Voluntary act” has the meaning given in Section 214(k). 
 
Section 205.  Culpability Requirements 
(a) To be guilty of an offense, a person must have some level of culpability, as 
defined in Subsection (b), as to every objective element of the offense, except as provided 
in Subsection (e). 
(b) Culpability Requirements Defined.   
(1) Intentionally.  A person acts intentionally or with intent: 
(A) as to conduct, if it is the person’s conscious object to engage in 
the conduct or to have another engage in the conduct; 
(B) as to a circumstance, if the person hopes or believes that there is 
a high probability the circumstance exists; and 
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(C) as to a result, if it is the person’s conscious object to cause such 
result. 
(D) Requirement of Intention Satisfied if Intention is Conditional.  
When a particular intention is required by an offense, the requirement is 
satisfied even if the intention is conditional, unless the condition negates 
the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. 
(2) Knowingly.  A person acts knowingly or with knowledge: 
(A) as to conduct, if the person is aware that the conduct is being or 
will be engaged in by the person or another person; 
(B) as to a circumstance, if the person believes there is a high 
probability that the circumstance exists; and 
(C) as to a result, if the person is practically certain that the conduct 
will cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly.  A person acts recklessly: 
(A) as to conduct, if the person consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the person or another person is engaging in or 
will engage in the conduct; 
(B) as to a circumstance, if the person consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstance exists; and 
(C) as to a result, if the person consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the conduct will cause the result. 
(D) Disregard Must be a Gross Deviation.  The person’s disregard of 
the risk must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would exercise in the person’s situation. 
(4) Negligently.  A person acts negligently: 
(A) as to conduct, if the person is unaware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the person or another person is engaging in or will 
engage in the conduct; 
(B) as to a circumstance, if the person is unaware of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstance exists; and 
(C) as to a result, if the person is unaware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the conduct will cause the result. 
(D) Failure to be Aware Must be a Gross Deviation.  The person’s 
failure to be aware of the risk must constitute a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the person’s 
situation. 
(c) Application to Stated Culpability Requirement.  When an offense contains a 
stated culpability requirement, that requirement shall apply to all later objective elements 
within the grammatical clause in which it appears and any subsequent objective elements 
to which common usage would suggest the General Assembly intended it to apply. 
(d) Absence of a Stated Culpability Requirement.  When no culpability 
requirement is specified as to an objective element, a requirement of recklessness applies, 
except as provided in Subsection (e).  
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(e) Strict Liability.  When no culpability requirement is specified with regard to an 
objective element, no culpability is required as to that element if: 
(1) the offense is a violation, unless the offense states a particular 
culpability requirement; or 
(2) the offense: 
(A) is in a statute outside of this Code; and 
(B) clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose strict liability as 
to that objective element. 
(f) Culpability as to Criminality Not Required.  No level of culpability as to: 
(1) whether conduct constitutes an offense; or 
(2) the existence, meaning, or application of the law defining an offense; 
is required by an offense, unless the offense expressly provides that it is required. 
(g) Proof of Greater Culpability Satisfies Stated Requirement for Lower.  When, 
as to an objective element, the law requires: 
(1) negligence, the requirement is also satisfied by proof of intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness. 
(2) recklessness, the requirement is also satisfied by proof of intent or 
knowledge. 
(3) knowledge, the requirement is also satisfied by proof of intent. 
(h) Culpable State of Mind: Permissive Inference.  The finder of fact may infer 
from the facts of the case that a defendant had the culpable state of mind required for 
commission of an offense. 
 
Section 206.  Ignorance or Mistake Negating Required Culpability 
(a) A required culpable mental state is not satisfied if it is negated by a person’s 
ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law.  Ignorance or mistake also will provide 
a defense if the statute defining the offense or a related statute expressly so provides. 
(b) Correspondence Between Mistake Defenses and Culpability Requirements.   
(1) Any mistake as to an element of an offense, including a reckless 
mistake, will negate the existence of intention or knowledge as to that element.   
(2) A negligent mistake as to an element of an offense will negate the 
existence of intention, knowledge, or recklessness as to that element.   
(3) A reasonable mistake as to an element of an offense will negate 
intention, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence as to that element. 
(c) Mistaken Belief Consistent with a Different Offense.  Although ignorance or 
mistake would otherwise provide a defense under this Section, the defense is not 
available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as the 
person supposed.  However, if the offense that the person thought he was committing is 
of a lower grade or degree than the offense charged, the ignorance or mistake of the 
defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted 
to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed. 
(d) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Negligent mistake” has the meaning given in Section 214(f). 
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(2) “Reasonable mistake” has the meaning given in Section 214(g). 
(3) “Reckless mistake” has the meaning given in Section 214(h). 
  
Section 207.  Mental Illness or Disorder Negating Required Culpability 
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental illness or disorder is 
admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a 
required culpable mental state. 
 
Section 208.  Consent 
(a) In General.  In any prosecution, it is a defense that the victim consented to the 
conduct constituting the offense if the consent negates an element of the offense. 
(b) Consent to Physical Injury.  In any prosecution for an offense causing or 
threatening physical injury, it is a defense that the victim consented to infliction of 
physical injury of the kind caused or threatened, provided that the physical injury caused 
or threatened by the conduct consented to: 
(1) is not serious physical injury; or 
(2) is a reasonably foreseeable hazard of joint participation in any concerted 
activity, athletic contest, or sport not prohibited by law. 
(c) Ineffective Consent.  Unless otherwise provided by this Code or by the law 
defining the offense, consent by the victim is not a defense if: 
(1) it is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the 
conduct charged to constitute the offense; or 
(2) it is given by a person who:  
(A) because of youth, mental illness or disorder, or intoxication,  
(B) is manifestly unable or known by the defendant to be unable to 
make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct 
charged to constitute the offense; or 
(3) it is given by a person whose improvident consent is sought to be 
prevented by the law defining the offense; or 
(4) it is induced by force, coercion, threats, or deception; or 
(5) it is given to a surgical procedure that is not performed by a person who 
is licensed to perform it. 
 
Section 209.  Customary License; De Minimis Infractions; Conduct Not Envisaged 
by General Assembly as Prohibited by the Offense 
Pre-Trial Dismissal.  The court shall dismiss a charged offense if, having regard to 
the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant 
circumstances, it finds that the defendant’s conduct: 
(a) was within a customary license, neither expressly negated by the person 
whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining 
the offense; 
(b) caused a harm or evil too trivial to warrant the condemnation of 
criminal conviction; or 
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(c) did not actually cause the harm or evil sought to be prohibited by the 
law defining the offense. 
 
Section 210.  Conviction When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements of More 
than One Offense or Grade 
(a) Limitations on Conviction for Multiple Related Offenses.  The trier of fact may 
find a defendant guilty of any offense, or grade of an offense, for which he or she 
satisfies the requirements for liability, but the court shall not enter a judgment of 
conviction for more than one of any two offenses or grades of offenses if: 
(1) they are based on the same conduct and: 
(A) the harm or evil of one is: 
(i) entirely accounted for by the other; or 
(ii) of the same kind, but lesser degree, than that of the other; 
or 
(B) they differ only in that: 
(i) one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct 
generally, and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such 
conduct; or 
(ii) one requires a lesser kind of culpability than the other; or 
(C) they are defined as a continuing course of conduct and the 
defendant’s course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless the law provides 
that specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses; or 
(2) one offense consists only of an attempt or solicitation toward 
commission of: 
(A) the other offense; or 
(B) a substantive offense that is related to the other offense in the 
manner described in Subsection (a)(1); or 
(3) each offense is an inchoate offense toward commission of a single 
substantive offense; or 
(4) the two differ only in that one is based upon the defendant’s own 
conduct, and another is based upon the defendant’s accountability, under Section 
211, for another person’s conduct; or 
(5) inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of 
the offenses or grades. 
(b) Conspiracy.  A judgment of conviction may be entered for both conspiracy and 
the offense that is the target of the conspiracy, but the two offenses merge for sentencing 
purposes.  
(c) Effect of Multiple Offenses Contained Within the Same Section.  If a person is 
convicted of any two offenses based upon the same conduct, and those offenses are 
contained within the same Section of this Code, that fact should be considered by the 
court as a factor weighing against entry of conviction for both offenses under Subsection 
(a)(1). 
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(d) Entry of Judgment.  Where Subsection (a) prohibits multiple judgments of 
conviction, the court shall enter a judgment of conviction for the most serious offense 
among the offenses in question, including different grades of an offense, of which the 
defendant has been found guilty. 
(e) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Inchoate offense” has the meaning given in Section 214(d). 
(2) “Substantive offense” has the meaning given in Section 214(j).  
 
Section 211.  Accountability for the Conduct of Another 
(a) Accountability.  A person is legally accountable for conduct of another person 
if: 
(1) (A) having the culpability required by the offense,  
(B) he or she: 
(i) causes the other person to perform the conduct constituting 
the offense; or 
(ii) intentionally: 
(aa) aids, solicits, or conspires with the other person in 
the planning or commission of the offense; or 
(bb) fails to make a proper effort to prevent the 
commission of the offense, having a legal duty to do so; or 
(2) the statute defining the offense makes the person accountable. 
(b) Exception to Accountability.  Unless the statute defining the offense provides 
otherwise, a person is not so accountable for the conduct of another, notwithstanding 
Subsection (a), if: 
(1) the person is a victim of the offense committed; or 
(2) the person’s conduct is inevitably incident to commission of the 
offense; or 
(3) before commission of the offense, the person terminates his or her 
efforts to promote or facilitate its commission, and 
(A) wholly deprives his or her prior efforts of their effectiveness; or 
(B) gives timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities; 
or 
(C) otherwise makes proper efforts to prevent the commission of the 
offense; or 
(4) the person’s conduct independently constitutes a separate offense. 
(c) Exemption from Offense Lost Through Complicity.  A person who is legally 
incapable of personally committing a particular offense may be convicted of the offense 
based on his or her accountability for the conduct of another person who commits the 
offense, unless that liability would be inconsistent with the purpose of the provision 
establishing the person’s incapacity. 
(d) Unconvicted Principal or Confederate No Defense.  A person who is legally 
accountable for the conduct of another may be convicted upon proof that the objective 
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elements of the offense are satisfied, even if the other person, claimed to have committed 
the offense: 
(1) has not been prosecuted or convicted; or 
(2) has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense; or 
(3) has been acquitted. 
(e) Convictions for Different Grades of an Offense.  A person who is legally 
accountable for the conduct of another may only be convicted of the grade of an offense 
that is consistent with: 
(1) the person’s own culpability, and 
(2) the person’s personal accountability for bringing about an aggravating 
fact or circumstance. 
(f) Indictment as Principal or Accomplice Irrelevant.  A person indicted for 
committing an offense may be convicted as an accomplice to another person, and a 
person indicted as an accomplice to an offense committed by another person may be 
convicted as a principal. 
(g) Complicity in Uncommitted Offense.  A person who would have been 
accountable for the offense conduct of another under Subsection (a) if the other had 
committed the offense is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense. 
(h) Attempted Complicity.  A person who attempts to aid, solicit, or conspire with 
another in the planning or commission of an offense under Subsection (a) is guilty of an 
attempt to commit the offense, whether or not the offense is attempted or committed by 
the other person. 
 
Section 212.  Voluntary Intoxication 
(a) Generally.  Except as provided in Section 404 [involuntary intoxication 
defense], a person’s intoxication at the time of committing an offense is not a defense 
unless it negates a required culpability element of the offense.   
(b) Imputation of Reckless Culpability.  When recklessness is a required element 
of the offense, if the person, due to voluntary intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which 
he or she would have been aware had the person had been sober, such unawareness is 
immaterial. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 214(e). 
(2) “Voluntary intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 214(l). 
 
Section 213.  Divergence Between Consequences Intended or Risked and Actual 
Consequences 
(a)Notwithstanding Section 206(a), when: 
(1) culpability as to a particular consequence of a person’s conduct is 
required by an offense, and  
(2) a consequence that actually occurs is not one intended, contemplated, or 
within the scope of unlawful risk the person was or should have been aware of,  
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(3) the required culpability nonetheless is established if the actual 
consequence differs from the consequence intended, contemplated, or risked only 
in that: 
(A) a different person or different property is injured or affected; or 
(B) the consequence intended, contemplated, or risked would have 
had an injury or harm that is as serious or more serious than the actual 
consequence. 
(b) Defined Term.  “Consequence” has the meaning given in Section 214(c). 
 
Section 214. Definitions 
(a) A “circumstance element” is any objective element that is not a conduct or 
result element.  
(b) A “conduct element” is that part of an offense that requires a person’s act or 
failure to perform a legal duty.  
(c) “Consequence” means a result element of an offense and the attendant 
circumstance elements that characterize the result.  
(d) “Inchoate offense” means any offense defined in Chapter 700 of this Code.  
(e) “Intoxication” means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting 
from the introduction of substances into the body.  
(f) A “negligent mistake” is an erroneous belief that the actor is negligent in 
forming or holding.  
(g) A “reasonable mistake” is an erroneous belief that the actor is non-negligent in 
forming or holding.  
(h) A “reckless mistake” is an erroneous belief that the actor is reckless in forming 
or holding  
(i) A “result element” is any change in the state of the world required to have been 
caused by the person’s conduct.  
(j) “Substantive offense” means any offense other than an inchoate offense.  
(k) “Voluntary act” means a bodily movement performed consciously or 
habitually as a result of effort or determination.  
(l) “Voluntary intoxication” means intoxication: 
(A) caused by substances that the person knowingly introduces into his or 
her own body,  
(B) the tendency of which to cause intoxication the person knows or ought 
to know;  
(C) unless the person introduces them:  
(i) under medical advice; or 
(ii) under circumstances that would afford a defense to prosecution 
for an offense.  
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GENERAL DEFENSES 
 
CHAPTER 300.  JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES 
 
Section 300.  General Defenses 
 
Section 301.  General Provisions Governing Justification Defenses 
Section 302.  Choice of Evils 
Section 303.  Execution of Public Duty 
Section 304.  Law Enforcement Authority 
Section 305.  Conduct of Persons with Special Responsibility for Care, Discipline, or 
Safety of Others 
Section 306.  Defense of Person 
Section 307.  Defense of Property 
Section 308.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 300.  General Defenses 
The defenses provided in Chapters 300, 400, and 500 bar conviction even if all 
elements of the offense charged have been satisfied. 
 
Section 301.  General Provisions Governing Justification Defenses 
(a) Superiority of More Specific Justifications.  The justifications provided in 
Section 302 (Lesser Evil) or Section 303 (Execution of Public Duty) are not available if 
the factual circumstances of a claimed justification are described in one of the other 
provisions of this Chapter. 
(b) Multiple Justifications.  Except as provided in Subsection (a), if a person’s 
conduct satisfies the requirements of more than one justification defense, all of those 
justification defenses are available. 
(c) Assistance To, Resistance To, and Interference With Justified Conduct.  Except 
as otherwise provided by law, conduct that is justified may not lawfully be resisted or 
interfered with, and lawfully may be assisted. 
(d) Causing Justifying Circumstances. 
(1) Not Automatic Bar to a Justification Defense.  Although a person causes 
the justifying circumstances, his or her offense conduct may be justified if it 
satisfies the requirements of a justification defense. 
(2) Liability for Culpably Causing Justifying Circumstances.  But the 
person’s conduct in causing the justifying circumstances may be an offense if he 
or she causes the justifying circumstances with the culpability required by the 
offense. 
(3) Defense.  A person may have a general defense to liability under 
Subsection (d)(2) if the person satisfies the requirements of a defense for his or her 
conduct in causing the justifying circumstances. 
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(e) Risk of Injury to Innocent Persons Not Justified.  A justification under this 
Chapter to use force upon another person does not extend to injury or risk of injury to 
innocent persons created by that use of force.   
(f) Burden of Persuasion.  Unless expressly provided otherwise by this Chapter, 
the State carries the burden of persuasion to disprove all justification defenses by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
(g) Defined Term.  “Force” has the meaning given in Section 308(c). 
 
Section 302.  Choice of Evils 
Defense Defined.  Conduct is justified if: 
(a) it is immediately necessary to avoid a harm or evil, and 
(b) the harm or evil to be avoided by the defendant’s conduct is greater than 
that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged, and 
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not 
otherwise plainly appear. 
 
Section 303.  Execution of Public Duty 
(a) Defense Defined.  Conduct is justified if it is required or authorized by: 
(1) the law defining the duties or functions of a public servant or the 
assistance to be rendered to a public servant in the performance of his or her 
duties; or 
(2) the law governing the execution of legal process; or 
(3) the judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal; or 
(4) any other provision of law imposing a public duty. 
(b) Defective Jurisdiction or Process No Exception.  The justification under 
Subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3) is available even if, unknown to the defendant: 
(1) there is a defect in legal process; or 
(2) the court lacks jurisdiction. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 3104(d). 
 
Section 304.  Law Enforcement Authority 
(a) Peace Officer’s Use of Force in Making an Arrest or Detention.   
(1) Defense Defined.  The conduct of a peace officer, or of any person 
whom the officer has summoned or directed to assist him or her, is justified if it is 
necessary to effect a lawful arrest or detention.   
(2) Limitation: Use of Force.  Use of force is not justified under Subsection 
(a)(1) unless the arrestee or detainee has been made aware of the purpose of the 
arrest or detention, unless it is unreasonable to do so. 
(3) Limitation: Use of Deadly Force.  In addition to the limitation in 
Subsection (a)(2), use of deadly force is justified under Subsection (a)(1) only if: 
(A) the force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated 
by resistance or escape, and 
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(B) the force employed does not create a substantial risk of injury to 
innocent persons, and 
(C) the person to be arrested has committed or attempted a felony 
involving actual or threatened physical injury, and 
(D) unless the person is arrested without delay, the person to be 
arrested either: 
(i) will create a substantial risk of serious physical injury or 
death; or 
(ii) is not likely to ever be captured. 
(4) Invalid Warrant.  Conduct by a peace officer making an arrest under an 
invalid warrant is justified if the conduct would have been justified had the 
warrant been valid, unless the officer knows the warrant is invalid.   
(b) Use of Force to Prevent an Escape. 
(1) Escape from Custody.  The use of force by a peace officer or other 
person who has an arrested or lawfully detained person in his or her custody or 
presence is justified if: 
(A) it is necessary to prevent the escape of the person from custody, 
and 
(B) it would be justified if performed to arrest the person. 
(2) Escape from a Correctional Institution.  The conduct of a correctional 
officer or peace officer, including the use of deadly force, is justified if it is 
immediately necessary to prevent the escape from a correctional institution of a 
person lawfully detained in the institution. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Correctional officer” has the meaning given in Section 308(a). 
(2) “Deadly force” has the meaning given in Section 308(b). 
(3) “Force” has the meaning given in Section 308(c). 
(4) “Peace officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(d). 
(5) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(6) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
(7) “Vessel” has the meaning given in Section 308(f). 
 
Section 305.  Conduct of Persons with Special Responsibility for Care, Discipline, or 
Safety of Others 
(a) The use of force upon or toward another person is justified if the defendant is: 
(1) either: 
(A) a: 
(i) parent, guardian, or other person similarly responsible for 
the general care and supervision of a person less than 18 years of 
age, or the defendant is a person acting at the request of a person so 
responsible, and the force is necessary: 
(aa) to safeguard or promote the welfare of the person; 
or  
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(bb) to further any of the purposes for which force may 
be used by any other actor specified in this Subsection; or 
(ii) guardian or other person similarly responsible for the 
general care and supervision of a person entrusted by authority of 
law to the custody of another person or to an institution, and the 
force used is necessary: 
(aa) to safeguard or promote the welfare of the person; 
or 
(bb) if the person is in a hospital or other institution for 
care and custody, to maintain reasonable discipline in the 
institution; and 
(B) the force used does not: 
(i) cause physical injury, mental distress, or unnecessary 
degradation; or 
(ii) create a substantial risk of serious physical injury or 
death; or 
(2) a teacher or person otherwise entrusted with the care or supervision of a 
person less than 18 years of age for a special purpose, and the force used: 
(A) is necessary to further that special purpose, including the 
maintenance of reasonable discipline in a school, class, or other group, and 
(B) is consistent with the person’s welfare, and 
(C) does not: 
(i) cause physical injury, mental distress, or unnecessary 
degradation; or 
(ii) create a substantial risk of serious physical injury or 
death; or 
(3) a doctor or therapist, or a person assisting at the doctor or therapist’s 
direction, and: 
(A) the force is necessary to administer a recognized form of 
treatment that is adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the 
patient, and 
(B) the treatment is administered either: 
(i) with the consent of the patient, or, if the patient is a person 
less than 18 years of age or entrusted by authority of law to the 
custody of another person or to an institution, with the consent of a 
parent, guardian, or other person legally competent to consent on the 
patient’s behalf; or 
(ii) in an emergency, when no one competent to consent can 
be consulted and a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the 
welfare of the patient, would consent; or 
(4) a correctional officer, and the force used is necessary to enforce the 
lawful rules or procedures of the institution; or 
 
 73 
(5) a person responsible for the safety of an aircraft, train, vehicle, vessel, 
or other carrier, or a person acting at the responsible person’s direction, and the 
force used is necessary to prevent: 
(A) interference with the operation of the carrier; or 
(B) obstruction of the execution of a lawful order; or 
(6) a person who is authorized or required by law to maintain order or 
decorum in an aircraft, train, vehicle, vessel, or other carrier, or in any place where 
persons are assembled, and the force used: 
(A) is necessary for that purposed, and 
(B) does not create a substantial risk of causing death, physical 
injury, or extreme mental distress. 
(b) When Use of Deadly Force Not Justified.  While the use of deadly force is not 
justified under this Section, it may nevertheless be justified under Section 306 [defense of 
person]. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Correctional officer” has the meaning given in Section 308(a). 
(2) “Deadly force” has the meaning given in Section 308(b). 
(3) “Force” has the meaning given in Section 308(c). 
(4) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
(5) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(d). 
(6) “Vessel” has the meaning given in Section 308(f). 
 
Section 306.  Defense of Person 
(a) Use of Force.  The use of force against an aggressor is justified when and to 
the extent the force is immediately necessary to defend oneself or another person against 
the aggressor’s use of unjustified force. 
(b) Limitations.   
(1) Defense of Another.  The use of force in defense of another person 
under Subsection (a) is justified only if: 
(A) the person would have been justified in using the force if he or 
she had been the object of aggression, and 
(B) the other person would have been justified in using the force on 
his or her own behalf.   
(2) Resisting Arrest.  The use of force is not justified under Subsection (a) 
to resist, or assist another in resisting, an arrest that is being made by a peace 
officer, regardless of whether the arrest is lawful. 
(c) Use of Deadly Force.   
(1) Justified in Limited Circumstances.  The use of deadly force is justified 
under this Section only if it is necessary to protect the person or another person 
against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, or sexual intercourse compelled 
by force or threat of force. 
(2) Retreat, Surrendering Possession, or Complying with Aggressor’s 
Demands. 
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(A) Generally.  The use of deadly force is not justified if the 
necessity of using deadly force can be avoided, thereby securing the 
complete safety of any person in danger, by: 
(i) retreating; or 
(ii) surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a 
claim of right to the thing; or 
(iii) complying with a demand that the defendant abstain from 
performing an act that the defendant is not legally obligated to 
perform. 
(B) Exceptions.   
(i) A person is not obligated to retreat in or from his or her 
dwelling or, if the person acts to protect another person, that 
person’s dwelling. 
(ii) A person is not obligated to retreat in or from his or her 
place of work or, if the person acts to protect another person, that 
person’s place of work, unless the person was the initial aggressor. 
(iii) The limitation in this Subsection does not apply to a 
peace officer justified in using deadly force under Section 304 [Law 
Enforcement Authority]. 
(d) Use of Force to Prevent Suicide.  The use of force upon or toward another 
person is justified when and to the extent the force is immediately necessary to prevent 
the other person from committing suicide or inflicting serious physical injury upon 
himself or herself. 
(e) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Dwelling” has the meaning given in Section 2403(a). 
(2) “Peace officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(d). 
(3) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(d). 
(4) “Sexual intercourse” has the meaning given in Section 1306(e). 
(5) “Unjustified” conduct has the meaning given in Section 308(e). 
(6) “Vessel” has the meaning given in Section 308(f). 
 
Section 307.  Defense of Property 
(a) The use of force against an aggressor is justified when and to the extent that: 
(1) the force is immediately necessary to prevent the aggressor’s unjustified 
trespass upon, or other unjustified interference with, real or personal property, and 
(2) the property is lawfully in the possession of the person, or another 
person on whose behalf the person acts, and 
(3) before employing force, the person first requests that the aggressor 
cease trespassing upon or interfering with the property. 
(b) When Request to Cease Not Required.  Subsection (a)(3) is inapplicable if: 
(1) the request would be useless; or 
(2) the request would endanger the person or another person; or 
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(3) material harm would be done to the physical condition of the property 
to be protected before the person’s request could be effectively made. 
(c) Justified Detention by Special Parties.  The conduct of a merchant or an 
operator of a lawful gambling facility, or an agent or employee of those persons, is 
justified if it is necessary to detain a person who has intentionally concealed unpurchased 
merchandise, committed theft, or cheated in a manner described in Section 4502, 
provided that: 
(1) the detainer is 18 years of age or older, and 
(2) the detention only lasts long enough for the defendant to promptly 
summon a law enforcement officer. 
(d) When Use of Deadly Force Not Justified.  While the use of deadly force is not 
justified under this Section, it may nevertheless be justified under Section 306 [defense of 
person]. 
(e) No Civil Liability for Justified Conduct.  A person whose conduct is justified 
under this Section shall not, due to that conduct, be civilly liable to the person against 
whom the force is used. 
(f) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Deadly force” has the meaning given in Section 308(b). 
(2) “Force” has the meaning given in Section 308(c). 
(3) “Law enforcement officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(c). 
(4) “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
(5) “Real property” has the meaning given in Section 2403(d). 
(6) “Unjustified” conduct has the meaning given in Section 308(e). 
 
Section 308.  Definitions 
(a) “Correctional officer” means a person employed to supervise and control 
persons incarcerated in, or in the custody of, a correctional institution or the Division of 
Youth Rehabilitative Services. 
(b) “Deadly force”: 
(1) means force that the defendant intends to cause, or knows creates a 
substantial risk of causing, death or serious physical injury, and 
(2) includes intentionally firing a firearm: 
(A) in the direction of another person; or 
(B) at a vehicle in which the defendant believes another person to be 
riding. 
(c) “Force,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes confinement or restraint. 
(d) A “justification defense” is any defense described in Chapter 300. 
(e) “Unjustified” conduct is conduct that satisfies the objective elements of an 
offense, and is not justified by this Chapter. 
(f) “Vessel” means any device in, upon, or by which a person may be transported 
upon water.  But the term does not include devices moved solely by human power. 
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CHAPTER 400.  EXCUSE DEFENSES 
 
Section 401.  General Provisions Governing Excuse Defenses 
Section 402.  Involuntary Act; Involuntary Omission 
Section 403.  Mental Illness 
Section 404.  Involuntary Intoxication 
Section 405.  Duress  
Section 406.  Ignorance Due to Unavailable Law 
Section 407.  Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law 
Section 408.  Reasonable Mistake of Law Unavoidable by Due Diligence 
Section 409.  Mistake as to a Justification 
Section 410.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 401.  General Provisions Governing Excuse Defenses 
(a) Conduct for Which a Person is Excused is Not Necessarily Justified. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, conduct for which a person is 
excused is not justified, and may be resisted and interfered with as justified by 
law.   
(2) A person who assists conduct for which another is excused, is not 
excused for his or her assistance solely because the principal actor is excused. 
(b) Causing the Excusing Conditions Not Automatic Bar to Excuse Defense.   
(1) The fact that a person has caused the conditions giving rise to an excuse 
defense under this Chapter shall not prevent the person from being excused for his 
or her offense. 
(2) Liability for Culpably Causing Excusing Conditions.  Nevertheless, a 
person commits an offense if, acting with the culpability required by the offense, 
he or she causes the conditions that excuse the person or another person for 
engaging in the offense. 
(3) Defense to Causing Conditions.  A person may have a general defense 
to his or her conduct that gives rise to liability under Subsection (b)(2). 
(c) Mistake as to an Excuse is No Defense.  Except as otherwise provided by law, 
it is no defense that a person mistakenly believes that he or she satisfies the requirements 
of an excuse defense. 
(d) Burden of Persuasion.  Unless expressly provided otherwise by this Chapter, 
the defendant carries the burden of persuasion on all excuse defenses by a preponderance 
of the evidence.   
 
Section 402.  Involuntary Act; Involuntary Omission 
(a) Involuntary Act.  A person is excused for his or her offense if liability is based 
upon an act, and the act is not a product of the person’s effort or determination.   
(b) Involuntary Omission.  A person is excused for his or her offense if liability is 
based upon an omission, and the person is physically incapable of performing, or 
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otherwise cannot reasonably be expected under the circumstances to perform, the omitted 
act. 
 
Section 403.  Mental Illness 
(a) Excuse Defined.  A person is excused for his or her offense if, at the time of the 
offense: 
(1) the person suffers from a mental illness or serious mental disorder, and 
(2) as a result, the person: 
(A) does not perceive the physical nature or foresee the physical 
consequences of his or her conduct; or 
(B) lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
or her conduct; or 
(C) lacks substantial capacity to choose whether to engage in or 
refrain from the conduct constituting the offense.1 
                                                             
1 Issue:  Should Section 403 preserve Delaware’s current alternative verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” 
(GBMI) for a defendant with a control dysfunction?  Here is an example of what the GBMI provision could look 
like in Section 403: 
(b) Guilty, But Mentally Ill.   
(1) No Excuse.  A person is not excused for his or her offense, and the trier of fact may return a 
verdict of “guilty, but mentally ill,” if, at the time of the offense: 
(A) the defendant suffers from a mental illness or serious mental disorder, and 
(B) as a result, either: 
(i) the defendant’s thinking, feeling, or behavior is substantially disturbed; or 
(ii) the defendant lacks sufficient willpower to choose whether to engage in or 
refrain from the criminal conduct. 
(2) Verdict Option at the Request of the Defendant.  The jury shall be given the verdict option 
described in this Subsection only upon the request of the defendant. 
(3) Additional Procedures.  A person found “guilty, but mentally ill” is subject to the procedures 
set forth in [current 11 Del.C. §§ 408–09]. 
Pro:  The GBMI verdict is necessary to avoid a false dichotomy facing juries that hear mentally ill 
defendants’ cases.  Some defendants’ mental illnesses do not sufficiently affect their ability to obey the law.  
Without GBMI, a jury can either convict such a defendant, which means the defendant may not receive the 
psychiatric treatment he needs; or a jury can find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, which results in the 
defendant improperly avoiding criminal punishment altogether.  This system reaches capricious results, since the 
ultimate outcome hinges on jurors’ sympathies.  GBMI provides a third option for jurors that more accurately and 
reliably ensures the correct outcome. 
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(b) Modified Verdict and Additional Procedures.  If a defendant is excused under 
Subsection (a), the trier of fact shall return a verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity,” 
and the defendant is subject to the procedures set forth in [current 11 Del.C. § 403]. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Mental illness or serious mental disorder” has the meaning 
given in Section 410(c). 
 
Section 404.  Involuntary Intoxication 
(a) Excuse Defined.  A person is excused for his or her offense if, at the time of the 
offense: 
(1) the person is involuntarily intoxicated, and 
(2) as a result, the person: 
(A) does not perceive the physical nature or foresee the physical 
consequences of his or her conduct; or 
(B) lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the 
person’s conduct; or 
(C) lacks substantial capacity to choose whether to engage in or 
refrain from the conduct constituting the offense. 
(b) Causing Excusing Conditions.  Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to 
preclude liability under Section 401(b)(2). 
(c) Defined Term.  “Involuntary intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 
410(b). 
 
Section 405.  Duress 
Excuse Defined.  A person is excused for his or her offense if, at the time of the 
offense: 
(a) the person is coerced to perform the offense conduct by means of force 
or threat, which a person of reasonable firmness in the person’s situation would 
have been unable to resist, and 
(b) as a result, the person is not sufficiently able to resist committing the 
offense conduct so as to be justly held accountable for it. 
                                                             
Con:  Where a seriously mentally ill offender is aware that his or her conduct is criminal but is unable to 
refrain from doing it, the offender should receive an insanity defense that acknowledges the offender’s 
blamelessness and subjects him or her to civil, not criminal, commitment.  The underlying basis for the GBMI 
verdict—that the insanity defense has been subject to abuse—is empirically unsound.  Contrary to the claims of 
those who invented and promoted the GBMI verdict, the number of successful insanity acquittals was and is near 
trivial, especially for serious offenses.  Furthermore, even without a GBMI finding, prison authorities will assess a 
mentally ill offender to determine if he or she needs special treatment as a prisoner, thus claims that GBMI benefits 
the defendant (which only support providing GBMI as an alternative upon the defendant’s request), are also 
unfounded.  In other words, the verdict accomplishes nothing, other than to distract jurors from giving an insanity 
defense where it is deserved by misleading them into believing that the GBMI verdict takes account of the offender's 
mental illness in a significant way, when in fact it ignores the illness.  The GBMI verdict plays upon the erroneous 
fear that dangerous, mentally ill offenders acquitted at trial under an insanity defense are simply released back into 
society without supervision or restraint.  Insane, blameless-but-dangerous offenders should be dealt with through the 
civil commitment process rather than by subverting the criminal justice system's moral obligation to acquit 
blameless offenders. 
Director’s Recommendation:  Opposes the use of the GBMI verdict. 
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Section 406.  Ignorance Due to Unavailable Law 
Excuse Defined.  A person is excused for his or her offense if: 
(a) before the conduct constituting the offense was committed, the law 
relating to the offense was not made available in a way that would give notice to 
the reasonable person, and 
(b) as a result, at the time of the offense, the person does not know his or 
her conduct is criminal. 
 
Section 407.  Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law 
Excuse Defined.  A person is excused for his or her offense if: 
(a) he or she reasonably relies upon an official misstatement of law 
contained in: 
(1) a statute or other enactment; 
(2) a judicial decision, opinion, or judgment; 
(3) an administrative order; or 
(4) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by 
law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration, or 
enforcement of the law defining the offense; and 
(b) as a result, at the time of the offense, the person does not know his or 
her conduct is criminal. 
 
Section 408.  Reasonable Mistake of Law Unavoidable by Due Diligence 
Excuse Defined.  A person is excused for his or her offense if: 
(a) the person pursues with due diligence all reasonably viable means 
available to ascertain the meaning and application of the offense to his or her 
conduct, and 
(b) the person honestly and in good faith concludes that his or her conduct 
is lawful in circumstances where a law-abiding and prudent person would also so 
conclude, and 
(c) as a result, at the time of the offense, the person does not know his or 
her conduct is criminal.  
 
Section 409.  Mistake as to a Justification 
(a) Excuse Defined.  A person is excused for his or her offense if  
(1) under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, his or her 
conduct satisfies the requirements of a justification defense defined in Chapter 
300, and 
(2) the person’s mistake is: 
(A) reasonable, or 
(B) less culpable than the culpability required by: 
(i) the result element of the offense charged; or 
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(ii) if no result element exists, the circumstance element most 
central to the offense charged. 
(b) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Circumstance element” has the meaning given in Section 214(a). 
(2) “Reasonable mistake” has the meaning given in Section 214(g). 
(3) “Result element” has the meaning given in Section 214(i). 
 
Section 410.  Definitions 
(a) An “excuse defense” is any defense described in Chapter 400. 
(b) “Involuntary intoxication” means any intoxication that is not voluntary 
intoxication.  “Voluntary intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 214(l). 
(c) “Mental illness or serious mental disorder”: 
(1) means either: 
(A) mental illness, meaning any condition of the brain or nervous 
system recognized as a mental disease by a substantial part of the medical 
profession; or 
(B) serious mental disorder, meaning any condition of the brain or 
nervous system recognized as defective, as compared with an average or 
normal condition, by a substantial part of the medical profession; and 
(2) does not include: 
(A) an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise 
antisocial conduct; or 
(B) intoxication. 
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CHAPTER 500.  NONEXCULPATORY DEFENSES 
 
Section 501.  General Provisions Governing Nonexculpatory Defenses 
Section 502.  Prosecution Barred if Not Commenced Within Time Limitation Period 
Section 503.  Entrapment 
Section 504.  Prior Prosecution for Same Offense as a Bar to Present Prosecution 
Section 505.  Prior Prosecution for Different Offense as a Bar to Present Prosecution 
Section 506.  Prior Prosecution by Another Jurisdiction as a Bar to Present Prosecution 
Section 507.  Prosecution Not Barred Where Prior Prosecution Was Before a Court 
Lacking Jurisdiction, or Was Fraudulently Procured by Defendant, or 
Resulted in Conviction Held Invalid 
Section 508.  Prosecutorial Grant of Immunity 
Section 509.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 501.  General Provisions Governing Nonexculpatory Defenses 
(a) Assistance of, Resistance To, and Interference With Conduct Subject to a 
Nonexculpatory Defense.  Except as otherwise provided by law, conduct for which a 
person has a nonexculpatory defense is not justified, and may be resisted and interfered 
with as authorized by law.  A person who assists conduct for which another has a 
nonexculpatory defense, does not have a defense based solely upon the nonexculpatory 
defense of the other person.   
(b) Mistake as to a Nonexculpatory Defense is No Defense.  Except as otherwise 
provided by this Code, it is no defense that a person mistakenly believes he or she has a 
nonexculpatory defense. 
(c) Burden of Persuasion on Defendant.  Unless expressly provided otherwise, the 
defendant has the burden of persuasion for a nonexculpatory defense and must prove the 
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(d) Determination by Court.  Unless expressly provided otherwise, the defenses in 
this Chapter are to be determined by the court. 
(e) Defined Term.  “Nonexculpatory defense” has the meaning given in Section 
509(d). 
 
Section 502.  Prosecution Barred if Not Commenced Within Time Limitation Period 
(a) Time Limitations.  A prosecution is barred unless commenced within the 
following time period from the time the offense is committed: 
(1) a prosecution for a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, or a sexual offense 
constituting a felony, may be commenced at any time; 
(2) a prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within 5 years; 
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(3) a prosecution for a sexual offense constituting a misdemeanor must be 
commenced within 5 years;2 
(4) a prosecution for a Class A misdemeanor must be commenced within 3 
years;  
(5) a prosecution for any other offense must be commenced within 2 years. 
(b) Extended Periods.  If the period prescribed in Subsection (a) has expired, a 
prosecution nevertheless may be commenced: 
(1) within 2 years after the offense has been discovered or should 
reasonably have been discovered, but in no case shall this provision extend the 
period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years; 
(2) for any offense based upon misconduct of a public servant in office, 
within 2 years of the end of the time the defendant holds office; 
(3) for any offense for which the alleged victim is less than 18 years of age, 
within 2 years of the alleged victim attaining the age of 18 years; 
(4) for a prosecution based upon forensic DNA testing, within 10 years 
from the time the offense is committed. 
(c) Period of Limitation Tolled.  The period of limitation does not run during any 
period of time: 
(1) during which the defendant is fleeing or hiding from justice, so that the 
defendant’s identity or whereabouts cannot be ascertained, despite a diligent 
search; 
(2) after the defendant has failed to appear for any scheduled court 
proceeding related to the prosecution, for which lawful notice was provided or 
properly attempted; or 
(3) during which a prosecution against the defendant for the same conduct 
is pending in this State, even if the information or indictment was defective. 
(d) State’s Burden to Prove Extension or Tolling.  In any prosecution in which 
Subsection (b) or (c) is sought to be invoked to avoid or extend the limitation period of 
Subsection (a), the state must prove its applicability by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(e) Start of the Limitation Period.  The period of limitation starts to run on the day 
after the offense is committed.  An offense is committed either: 
                                                             
2 Issue:  Should misdemeanor sexual offenses have an unlimited limitations period? 
Pro:  Current law allows prosecution for a misdemeanor sexual offense to be brought at any time.  See 
11 Del.C. § 205(e).  Sexual offenses cause unique trauma that makes it difficult for victims to face their attackers 
and bring criminal charges, especially given the pain of reliving that trauma by testifying and being subjected to 
rigorous cross-examination.  Victims of sexual offenses may require many years before they are prepared to undergo 
this process.  They should not be prevented from seeking justice because of the time needed to heal first. 
Con:  Conceding that sexual offenses require unique treatment, the draft retains the unlimited limitation 
period for sexual felonies, and sets a 5-year limitation period for sexual misdemeanors.  This compromise for 
misdemeanors is appropriate because misdemeanors as a class are categorically less serious than felony offenses.  
Very few sexual offenses are misdemeanors, because most sexual offenses are too serious to be graded that low. If 
an offense—even a sexual offense—is graded as a misdemeanor, its relative severity is too low to justify having a 
completely open-ended limitation period.  No other misdemeanors are given longer than a 3-year limitation period in 
current law.  Note that victims of sexual misdemeanors who are minors can still have the limitation period extended 
under Section 502(b)(3). 
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(1) when every element of the offense occurs; or 
(2) if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct 
plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant’s 
complicity in it is terminated. 
(f) Commencement of Prosecution.  A prosecution is commenced when either an 
indictment is returned or an information is filed. 
(g) Period During Which Prosecution is Pending.  A prosecution is pending from 
the time it is commenced through the final disposition of the case, including the final 
disposition of the case upon appeal. 
(h) Defined Term.  “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 3104(d). 
 
Section 503.  Entrapment 
(a) Defense Defined.  A person has a defense if: 
(1) the person engages in an offense because he or she is induced to do so 
by a law enforcement officer, or an agent acting in knowing cooperation with the 
officer, and 
(2) the officer’s or agent’s conduct creates a substantial risk that a 
reasonable, law-abiding citizen would have been induced to commit the offense, 
and 
(3) the person is not predisposed to commit the offense. 
(b) Defense Unavailable for Causing or Threatening Physical Injury.  The defense 
afforded by Subsection (a) is unavailable when causing or threatening physical injury is 
an element of the offense charged. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Law enforcement officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(c). 
(2) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
 
Section 504.  Prior Prosecution for Same Offense as a Bar to Present Prosecution 
(a) Bar to Prosecution Defined.  When a prosecution is for a violation of the same 
statutory provision and is based upon the same facts as a prior prosecution, it is barred by 
the prior prosecution if: 
(1) the prior prosecution resulted in an acquittal that was not later set aside.   
(2) the prior prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or 
the indictment was returned, by a final order or judgment in favor of the 
defendant, which has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated, and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition that must 
be established for conviction of the present offense. 
(3) the prior prosecution resulted in a conviction.  
(4) the prior prosecution was improperly terminated.   
(b) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Acquittal” has the meaning given in Section 509(a). 
(2) “Conviction” has the meaning given in Section 509(b). 
(3) “Improperly terminated” has the meaning given in Section 509(c). 
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Section 505.  Prior Prosecution for Different Offense as a Bar to Present Prosecution 
(a) Bar to Prosecution Defined.  Although a prosecution is for a violation of a 
different statutory provision or is based on different facts, it is barred by a prior 
prosecution in a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present 
prosecution if: 
(1) the prior prosecution resulted in either an acquittal that was not later set 
aside, or a conviction, and the present prosecution is for: 
(A) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted in 
the prior prosecution; or 
(B) the same conduct, unless: 
(i) the offense for which the defendant is presently being 
prosecuted requires proof of a fact not required by the prior offense, 
and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a 
substantially different harm or evil; or 
(ii) the presently prosecuted offense was not consummated 
when the prior trial began. 
(2) the prior prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final order 
or judgment for the defendant that has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated, and 
the acquittal, final order, or judgment necessarily required a determination 
inconsistent with a fact that must be established for conviction of the present 
offense. 
(3) the prior prosecution was improperly terminated and the present 
prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted 
had the prior prosecution not been improperly terminated. 
(b) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Acquittal” has the meaning given in Section 509(a). 
(2) “Conviction” has the meaning given in Section 509(b). 
(3) “Improperly terminated” has the meaning given in Section 509(c). 
 
Section 506.  Prior Prosecution by Another Jurisdiction as a Bar to Present 
Prosecution 
(a) Bar to Prosecution Defined.  When conduct constitutes an offense within the 
concurrent jurisdiction of this State and of the United States or another State, a 
prosecution in one of those jurisdictions is a bar to the present prosecution in this State if: 
(1) the prior prosecution resulted in either an acquittal that was not later set 
aside, or in a conviction, and the present prosecution is based on the same conduct, 
unless: 
(A) the offense for which the defendant is presently being 
prosecuted requires proof of a fact not required by the offense in the prior 
prosecution, and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to 
prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or 
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(B) the presently prosecuted offense was not consummated when the 
prior trial began. 
(2) the prior prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or 
the indictment returned, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the 
defendant that has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated, and the acquittal, final 
order, or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact 
that must be established for conviction of the offense for which the defendant is 
presently being prosecuted. 
(3) the prior prosecution was improperly terminated and the present 
prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted 
had the prior prosecution not been improperly terminated. 
(b) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Acquittal” has the meaning given in Section 509(a). 
(2) “Conviction” has the meaning given in Section 509(b). 
(3) “Improperly terminated” has the meaning given in Section 509(c). 
 
Section 507.  Prosecution Not Barred Where Prior Prosecution Was Before a Court 
Lacking Jurisdiction, or Was Fraudulently Procured by Defendant, or 
Resulted in Conviction Held Invalid 
(a) A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of Sections 504 to 506 if: 
(1) the prior prosecution was before a court that lacked jurisdiction over the 
defendant or the offense; or 
(2) the prior prosecution was procured by the defendant without the 
knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting officer and with intent to avoid the 
sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or 
(3) the prior prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction that was held 
invalid on appeal or in a later proceeding. 
(b) Defined Term.  “Conviction” has the meaning given in Section 509(b). 
 
Section 508.  Prosecutorial Grant of Immunity 
(a) Defense Defined.  A person has a defense if he or she was granted immunity 
from prosecution by the Attorney General or his or her designee, or otherwise by 
operation of law, for: 
(1) the offense being prosecuted; or 
(2) a different offense, if the offense presently charged would have been 
barred under Section 506 by prosecution for the offense for which immunity was 
granted.   
(b) Exception: Attorney General’s Stipulation.  At the time immunity is granted, 
the Attorney General may stipulate that immunity only applies to a specific offense.  In 
that case, Subsection (a)(2) does not apply.   
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Section 509.  Definitions 
(a) “Acquittal” means the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the 
trier of fact or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a 
conviction.  A finding of guilty of an included offense is an acquittal of the inclusive 
offense, even if the conviction is later set aside. 
(b) “Conviction” means the prosecution resulted in: 
(1) a judgment of conviction that has not been reversed or vacated; or 
(2) a verdict of guilty that has not been set aside and is capable of 
supporting a judgment; or 
(3) a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court.   
(c) A prosecution is “improperly terminated” if the termination is for reasons not 
amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the first witness is sworn but before the 
verdict.  Termination under the following circumstances is not improper: 
(1) The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by motion to 
dismiss or otherwise, the right to object to the termination. 
(2) The trial court declares a mistrial in accordance with law. 
(d) A “nonexculpatory defense” is any defense, bar to prosecution, or bar to 
pleading, trial, or sentencing described in Chapter 500. 
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LIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 
CHAPTER 600.  LIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Section 601.  Criminal Liability of Organizations 
Section 602.  Criminal Liability of an Individual for Organizational Conduct 
Section 603.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 601.  Criminal Liability of Organizations 
(a) An organization may be prosecuted for the commission of an offense if the 
conduct constituting the offense: 
(1) consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative 
performance imposed upon the organization by law; or 
(2) is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or 
recklessly tolerated by: 
(A) the board of directors; or 
(B) a high managerial agent acting within the scope of employment 
and on behalf of the organization; or 
(3) is engaged in by an agent of the organization while acting within the 
scope of employment and on behalf of the organization, and: 
(A) the offense is a misdemeanor or a violation; or 
(B) the offense is defined by a statute that clearly indicates a 
legislative intent to impose criminal liability on an organization. 
(b) Impermissible Organizational Activity No Defense.  In a prosecution of an 
organization for an offense, it is no defense that the conduct charged to constitute the 
offense was an activity prohibited by the organization’s bylaws, policies, procedures, 
rules, or other standards of conduct. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Agent of the organization” has the meaning given in Section 603(a). 
(2) “High managerial agent” has the meaning given in Section 603(b). 
(3) “Organization” has the meaning given in Section 603(c). 
 
Section 602.  Criminal Liability of an Individual for Organizational Conduct 
(a) Membership in Organization No Shield from Liability.   
(1) An individual is legally accountable for conduct constituting an offense 
that the person performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf of 
an organization to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in the 
person’s own name or behalf. 
(2) Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon an organization, any 
high managerial agent of the organization having primary responsibility for the 
discharge of that duty is legally accountable for an omission to perform the 
required act to the same extent as if the duty were imposed by law directly upon 
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the agent, provided that the agent is aware of a substantial risk that he or she has 
primary responsibility for the discharge of that duty. 
(b) Punishment for Individuals Applies.  An individual who has been convicted of 
an offense by reason of his or her legal accountability for the conduct of an organization 
is subject to the punishment authorized by law for an individual upon conviction of the 
offense, even if a lesser or different punishment is authorized for the organization. 
(c) Defined Terms.  
(1) “Organization” has the meaning given in Section 603(c). 
(2) “High managerial agent” has the meaning given in Section 603(c). 
 
Section 603.  Definitions 
(a) “Agent of the organization” means a director, officer, or employee of an 
organization, or any other person who is authorized to act on behalf of the organization. 
(b) “High managerial agent” means an officer of an organization, or any other 
organizational agent in a position of comparable authority as to the formulation of 
organizational policy or the managerial supervision of subordinate employees. 
(c) “Organization” means any person other than an individual human being.   
(d) “Person” has the meaning given in Section 108(g). 
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INCHOATE OFFENSES 
 
CHAPTER 700.  INCHOATE OFFENSES 
 
Section 701.  Criminal Attempt 
Section 702.  Criminal Solicitation 
Section 703.  Criminal Conspiracy 
Section 704.  Unconvictable Confederate No Defense 
Section 705.  Defense for Victims and for Conduct Inevitably Incident 
Section 706.  Defense for Renunciation Preventing Commission of the Offense 
Section 707.  Grading of Criminal Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy 
Section 708.  Possessing Instruments of Crime 
 
 
Section 701.  Criminal Attempt 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person is guilty of attempt to commit an offense if: 
(1) acting with the culpability required for commission of the offense, and 
(2) intending to engage in the conduct that would constitute the offense 
under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, 
(3) the person takes a substantial step toward commission of the offense. 
(b) Conduct Constituting a Substantial Step. 
(1) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense under Subsection (a) unless it is strongly corroborative 
of the defendant’s intention to engage in the offense conduct. 
(2) The requirement of a substantial step in Subsection (a)(3) is satisfied if 
the person has completed, or believes he or she has completed: 
(A) the conduct constituting the offense; or 
(B) the last act needed to cause the result element of the offense. 
 (c) Defined Term.  “Result element” has the meaning given in Section 216(i). 
 
Section 702.  Criminal Solicitation 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person is guilty of solicitation to commit an offense if: 
(1) acting with the culpability required for commission of the offense, and 
(2) intending to bring about the conduct that would constitute the offense 
under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, 
(3) the person intentionally commands, encourages, or requests another 
person to engage in: 
(A) the conduct; or 
(B) an attempt to commit the conduct. 
(b) Uncommunicated Solicitation.  It is immaterial under Subsection (a) that the 
person fails to communicate with the person he or she solicits to commit an offense, if the 
person’s conduct is designed to effect the communication. 
 
 
 90 
Section 703.  Criminal Conspiracy 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit an offense if: 
(1) acting with the culpability required for commission of the offense, and 
(2) intending to bring about the conduct that would constitute the offense 
under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, 
(3) the person agrees with another person or persons that one or more of 
them will engage in: 
(A) the conduct; or 
(B) an attempt or solicitation to commit the conduct; and 
(4) an overt act in support of the conspiracy is performed by: 
(A) the defendant; or 
(B) a person with whom the defendant conspired. 
(b) Knowledge of Co-Conspirator’s Identity Not Required.  A defendant may be 
found to have conspired with a third person, even if the defendant is unaware of the third 
person’s identity, if: 
(1) the defendant has conspired with another person to commit an offense, 
and 
(2) the defendant knows the other person has conspired with the third 
person to commit the same offense. 
(c) Joinder and Venue in Conspiracy Prosecutions.   
(1) Joinder.  Subject to the provisions in Subsection (2), 2 or more persons 
charged with conspiracy to commit an offense may be prosecuted jointly if: 
(A) they are charged with conspiring with one another; or 
(B) the conspiracies alleged, whether they involve the same or 
different parties, are so related that they constitute different aspects of a 
scheme of organized criminal conduct. 
(2) Venue, Severance, and Fairness.  In any joint prosecution under 
Subsection (1): 
(A) no defendant shall be charged with conspiracy in any county 
other than: 
(i) the one in which the defendant entered into the conspiracy; 
or 
(ii) one in which an overt act under Subsection (a)(4) was 
performed; and 
(B) neither the criminal liability of any defendant, nor the 
admissibility against a defendant of evidence of acts or declarations of 
another, shall be enlarged by the joinder, and 
(C) the court may: 
(i) order a severance or take a special verdict as to any 
defendant who requests it; or 
(ii) take any other proper measures to protect the fairness of 
the trial; 
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 if the court deems the action necessary or appropriate to promote the fair 
determination of guilt or innocence. 
 
Section 704.  Unconvictable Confederate No Defense 
It is no defense for a person who solicits or conspires with another to commit an 
offense that the other person: 
(a) has not been prosecuted or convicted; or 
(b) has been convicted of a different offense or grade of offense; or 
(c) lacked the capacity to commit an offense; or 
(d) has been acquitted. 
 
Section 705.  Defense for Victims and Conduct Inevitably Incident 
Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, it is a 
defense to soliciting or conspiring to commit an offense that: 
(a) the person is the victim of the offense; or 
(b) the offense is defined in such a way that the person’s conduct is 
inevitably incident to its commission. 
 
Section 706.  Defense for Renunciation Preventing Commission of the Offense 
(a) In a prosecution for attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy in which the offense 
contemplated was not in fact committed, it is a defense that: 
(1) the defendant prevented the commission of the offense 
(2) under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation 
of his or her criminal purpose. 
(b) Voluntary and Complete Renunciation Defined.  A renunciation is not 
“voluntary and complete” within the meaning of Subsection (a) when it is motivated in 
whole or in part by: 
(1) a belief that circumstances exist that: 
(A) increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the 
defendant or another participant in the criminal enterprise; or 
(B) render accomplishment of the criminal purpose more difficult; or 
(2) a decision to: 
(A) postpone the criminal conduct until another time; or 
(B) transfer the criminal effort to: 
(i) another victim; or 
(ii) another but similar objective. 
 
Section 707.  Grading of Criminal Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy 
Attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy are offenses of one grade lower than the most 
serious offense that is attempted or solicited, or is an object of the conspiracy. 
 
Section 708.  Possessing Instruments of Crime 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
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(1) with intent to employ it criminally, 
(2) he or she possesses anything: 
(A) specially made or specially adapted for criminal use; or 
(B) commonly used for criminal purposes and possessed by the 
person under circumstances consistent with unlawful intent. 
 (b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
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OFFENSE GRADES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
 
CHAPTER 800.  OFFENSE GRADES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
 
Section 801.  Offense Grades 
Section 802.  Authorized Terms of Imprisonment 
Section 803.  Authorized Fines; Restitution 
Section 804.  General Adjustments to Offense Grade 
Section 805.  Valuation of Property for the Purposes of Grading 
Section 806.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 801.  Offense Grades 
(a) Classified Offenses.  Each offense in this Code is classified as: 
(1) a Class 1 felony; or 
(2) a Class 2 felony; or 
(3) a Class 3 felony; or 
(4) a Class 4 felony; or 
(5) a Class 5 felony; or 
(6) a Class 6 felony; or 
(7) a Class 7 felony; or 
(8) a Class 8 felony; or 
(9) a Class A misdemeanor; or 
(10) a Class B misdemeanor; or 
(11) a Class C misdemeanor; or 
(12) a Class D misdemeanor;  
(13) a violation. 
(b) Unclassified Offenses.  An offense outside of the Code: 
(1) that provides a term of imprisonment of: 
(A) more than 6 months is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(B) 6 months or less but more than 3 months is a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
(C) 3 months or less but more than 30 days is a Class C 
misdemeanor.  
(D) 30 days or less is a Class D misdemeanor. 
(2) that otherwise declares itself to be: 
(A) a felony shall be treated in all respects as though it were a Class 
A misdemeanor. 
(B) a misdemeanor is a Class D misdemeanor. 
(3) that does not declare itself to be a felony or misdemeanor, and does not 
provide a sentence of imprisonment, is a Class D misdemeanor. 
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Section 802.  Authorized Terms of Imprisonment 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the authorized term of imprisonment for: 
(1) a Class 1 felony is [life, and capital punishment is authorized]; 
(2) a Class 2 felony is a maximum of [life], but no less than [15] years; 
(3) a Class 3 felony is no more than [35] years, and if: 
(A) an element of the offense or grade provision includes causing 
physical injury, engaging in sexual conduct, or use of a deadly weapon, and 
(B) the defendant knowingly commits the elements of the offense, 
then the authorized term is no less than [5] years; 
(4) a Class 4 felony is no more than [25] years, and if: 
(A) an element of the offense or grade provision includes causing 
physical injury, engaging in sexual conduct, or use of a deadly weapon, and 
(B) the defendant knowingly commits the elements of the offense, 
then the authorized term is no less than [3] years;3 
(5) a Class 5 felony is no more than [15] years; 
(6) a Class 6 felony is no more than [8] years; 
(7) a Class 7 felony is no more than [4] years; 
(8) a Class 8 felony is no more than [2] years; 
(9) a Class A misdemeanor is no more than [1] year; 
(10) a Class B misdemeanor is no more than [6] months; 
(11) a Class C misdemeanor is no more than [3] months;  
(12) a Class D misdemeanor is no more than [30] days. 
(13) No term of imprisonment is authorized for a violation. 
(b) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
(2) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(3) “Sexual conduct” has the meaning given in Section 4208(i). 
 
Section 803.  Authorized Fines; Restitution 
(a) Authorized Fines.  Except as otherwise provided, the maximum authorized fine 
for: 
(1) a Class 1 felony is $[1,000,000]; 
(2) a Class 2 felony is $[600,000]; 
                                                             
3 Issue:  Should the Proposed Code include mandatory minimum sentencing provisions? 
   Pro:  Current law contains multiple disparate provisions utilizing mandatory minimums. Section 802 
rationalizes current law by distilling the principles underlying these provisions and integrating them into a coherent 
scheme. Yet, it does not, and should not modify the general mechanism of mandatory minimums. The prevalence of 
mandatory minimums in current law clearly demonstrates General Assembly’s assessment that such mechanism is 
necessary, and should be retained.  
   Con:  There is a considerable disagreement within the working group about the value of mandatory 
minimums. Because mandatory minimums’ rigidity might lead to the imposition of disproportional punishment, the 
General Assembly may want to consider moving away from mandatory minimums towards presumptive sentencing 
ranges. These ranges could be set as part of strong sentencing guidelines requiring the Judiciary to provide 
explanations upon any departure from such ranges.  
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(3) a Class 3 felony is $[300,000]; 
(4) a Class 4 felony is $[150,000]; 
(5) a Class 5 felony is $[80,000]; 
(6) a Class 6 felony is $[40,000]; 
(7) a Class 7 felony is $[20,000]; 
(8) a Class 8 felony is $[10,000]; 
(9) a Class A misdemeanor is $[4,000];  
(10) a Class B misdemeanor is $[2,000]; 
(11) a Class C or D misdemeanor is $[1,000]; 
(12) a violation is $[500]. 
(b) Fines for Organizations.  When imposed upon an organization, except as 
otherwise provided, the maximum authorized fine is the greatest of the following 
amounts: 
(1) for an offense resulting in death or serious physical injury, any amount 
the court deems reasonable and appropriate; or 
(2) three times the pecuniary loss or damage caused, or the gain derived; or 
(3) for: 
(A) a felony, $[1,000,000]. 
(B) a Class A misdemeanor that: 
(i) results in physical injury, $[250,000]. 
(ii) does not result in physical injury, $[100,000]. 
(C) a Class B, C, or D misdemeanor that: 
(i) results in physical injury, $[75,000]. 
(ii) does not result in physical injury, $[50,000]. 
(D) a violation, $[10,000.] 
(c) Restitution.  If the criminal conduct constituting an offense results in monetary 
loss to a victim of the offense, the defendant must make payment of restitution to the 
victim equal to the value of the loss sustained. 
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
(2) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(d). 
 
Section 804.  General Adjustments to Offense Grade 
(a) Repeat Felon. The grade of a felony shall be increased by one grade if: 
(1) the defendant has previously been convicted of two felonies and has 
served time in prison for one of them during the past 10 years, and  
(2) the grade of each of the prior felonies was equal to or greater than the 
grade of the present felony. 
(b) Vulnerable Victim.  The grade of an offense shall be increased by one grade if 
the victim is a vulnerable person. 
(c) Hate Crime.  The grade of an offense shall be increased by one grade if the 
defendant: 
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(1) committed the offense with intent to interfere with the victim’s free 
exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, or immunity protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; or 
(2) selected the victim because of the victim’s race, religion, color, 
disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, or ancestry. 
(d) Criminal Street Gangs.  The grade of an offense shall be increased by one 
grade if the defendant committed the offense: 
(1) with intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by 
members of a criminal street gang, and 
(2) for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal 
street gang. 
(e) Wearing a Disguise or Body Armor During Commission of a Felony.  The 
grade of a felony shall be increased by one grade if, during its commission, the defendant 
wears: 
(1) a hood, mask, or other article with intent to obscure the person’s 
identifying features; or 
(2) any material designed to provide bullet penetration resistance. 
(f) Limitations. 
(1) Specific Provision Controls.  No grade adjustment in this Section 
applies if a relevant specific provision of the Code has already taken into account 
the facts that must be proven to establish the grade adjustment. 
(2) Ceiling on Grade Adjustments.   
(A) General Grade Adjustments.  Subsections (b)–(e) are 
inapplicable if the unadjusted offense grade is a Class 1, 2, 3, or 4 felony. 
(B) No Adjustments to Certain Felonies.  No upward grade 
adjustment, whether contained in this Section or a specific offense 
provision, may be made to a Class 1 or 2 felony. 
(3) Cumulative Grade Adjustments.  Unless a specific offense provision 
states otherwise, only one upward adjustment may be applied to the grade of an 
offense. 
(g) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Criminal street gang” has the meaning given in Section 5304(a). 
(2) “Gender identity” has the meaning given in Section 806(b). 
(3) “Sexual orientation” has the meaning given in Section 806(e). 
(4) “Vulnerable person” has the meaning given in Section 806(f). 
 
Section 805.  Valuation of Property for the Purposes of Grading 
(a) Generally.  Except as provided under Subsection (b), whenever the value of 
property determines the grade of an offense, the value is: 
(1) the market value of the property at the time and place of the offense; or 
(2) if that amount cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty, then the 
cost of replacing, reproducing, or recovering the property within a reasonable time 
after the offense. 
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(b) Written Instruments.  Whenever the value of a written instrument determines 
the grade of an offense, and such instrument: 
(1) is evidence of a debt, such as a check, draft, or promissory note, value 
of the instrument is the amount due or collectible on the debt, taking into account 
any amount already satisfied. 
(2) creates, releases, discharges, or otherwise affects any valuable legal 
right, privilege or obligation, the value of the instrument is the greatest amount of 
economic loss that the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue 
of the loss of the instrument. 
(c) Default.  When the value of property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained under 
Subsection (a) or (b), and the property is: 
(1) private personal data, its value is $500. 
(2) electronic or computer equipment, or computer services, its value is 
$250. 
(3) any other property, its value is less than $100. 
(d) Aggregation for Theft and Related Offenses.  When theft, as defined in Section 
2101, or any offense contained in Chapter 2200 [forgery and fraudulent practices], is 
committed in a single scheme or continuous course of conduct, whether from the same or 
several sources, the conduct may be considered a single offense, and the value of the 
property or services aggregated for grading purposes. 
(e) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Computer services” has the meaning given in Section 806(a). 
(2) “Owner” has the meaning given in Section 2110(f). 
(3) “Private personal data” has the meaning given in Section 806(c). 
(4) “Written instrument” has the meaning given in Section 806(f). 
 
Section 806.  Definitions 
(a) “Computer services” include computer access to computer networks, data 
processing, and data storage.  
(b) “Gender identity” means a gender-related identity, appearance, expression, or 
behavior of a person, regardless of the person’s assigned sex at birth. 
(c) “Private personal data” means data concerning a natural person that a 
reasonable person would want to keep private, and that is protectable under law.  
(d) “Sexual orientation” means heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality. 
(e) “Vulnerable person” means: 
(1) a person who, by reason of isolation, sickness, debilitation, mental 
illness or physical, mental, or cognitive disability, or being 62 years of age or 
older, is easily susceptible to abuse, neglect, mistreatment, intimidation, 
manipulation, coercion, or exploitation; or 
(2) any adult for whom a guardian of the person or property has been 
appointed; or 
(3) an adult who is impaired, as defined in Section 3902(2) of Title 31; or 
(4) a person with a disability, as defined in Section 3901(a)(2) of Title 12. 
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(f) “Written instrument” means any instrument or article containing written or 
printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying, 
conveying or recording information or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, 
privilege or identification.  
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PART II:  THE SPECIAL PART 
 
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
 
CHAPTER 1100.  HOMICIDE OFFENSES 
 
Section 1101. Aggravated Murder 
Section 1102. Murder 
Section 1103. Manslaughter 
Section 1104. Negligent Homicide 
Section 1105. Causing or Aiding Suicide  
Section 1106. Unlawful Abortion  
Section 1107. Definitions  
Section 1108. Procedures and Standards in Adjudication of Sentence for a Capital 
Offense  
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Section 1101.  Aggravated Murder 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she intentionally4 
causes the death of another person.5  
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class 1 felony.  The death penalty may be imposed, 
subject to the procedures and standards of Section 1108, but only if the offense was 
committed after the person reached 18 years of age. 
 
Section 1102.  Murder 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she causes the death of 
another person: 
(1) knowingly; or 
(2) recklessly, and 
(A) under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the 
value of human life; or 
(B) the victim is a law enforcement officer, corrections employee, 
fire fighter, paramedic, emergency medical technician, fire marshal, or fire 
                                                             
4 Issue:  Should the culpability requirement for aggravated murder be changed to “knowingly” causing 
death?  In current law, Delaware does not distinguish between knowingly and recklessly causing death—both are 
punished as manslaughter.  But a reckless killing is materially less blameworthy than a knowing one.  There two 
options to create a distinction.  First, as raised above, the culpability requirement for aggravated murder could be 
changed.  Second, as reflected in the current draft of Section 1102, knowingly causing death could be treated as a 
form of murder.   
  Pro:  Most jurisdictions do not distinguish between intentional and knowing culpability for aggravated 
murder because the difference in blameworthiness between a person killing intentionally and knowingly is slight.  
Consider a defendant who blows up a building, knowing there is a person inside who will almost certainly be killed 
in the explosion.  The defendant does not want or intend that the person die; the defendant simply does not care.  
This defendant is not materially less blameworthy just because she does not subjectively desire the victim’s death.  
The alternative is to follow current law and treat reckless and knowing killings as though they were equally 
blameworthy.  But recklessly causing death—in our example, blowing up the building while aware of a risk that a 
person is inside, but not knowing one way or the other—is materially less blameworthy than doing so knowingly.   
  Con:  Aggravated murder is the only offense eligible for the death penalty.  Only the most demanding 
culpability requirement—subjective intentionality—makes homicide blameworthy enough support use of capital 
punishment.  Furthermore, requiring the prosecution to furnish evidence sufficient to prove intent, rather than 
merely knowledge, helps avoid a wrongful conviction for aggravated murder.  Wrongful convictions are always 
tragic, but never more so than when one can result in erroneous application of the death penalty.   
5 Issue:  Should a few purely reckless killings, specifically the ones in 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(2) & (4)–(6), be 
added to this Section, and therefore be eligible for the death penalty?  
  Pro:  Killing law enforcement officers, using bombs, reckless felony murder, and killing during escape 
from detainment, as enumerated in 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(2) & (4)–(6), are worse than other reckless killings.  
Heightened punishment for these reckless killings expresses society’s abhorrence for the particular harms they seek 
to prevent.  
  Con:  These sorts of reckless killings are, admittedly, particularly condemnable, and ought to be punished 
as murder rather than manslaughter.  However, they ought not be subject to the death penalty.  For especially 
heinous reckless killings, including the situations enumerated in § 636(a), Section 1102(a) of the proposed Code 
explicitly makes such reckless killings a form of murder.  Furthermore, applying the death penalty to such reckless 
killings is an anomaly in the current Delaware code.  For a given harm, recklessly causing the harm is never 
punished as harshly as intentionally or knowingly causing the same harm.  Different culpability levels typically 
produce different grades.  Applying the death penalty in these instances would equate recklessness with intentional 
action and violate the Delaware code’s general principle. 
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police officer, while the victim is engaged in the lawful performance of his 
or her duties; or 
(C) death is caused by the use or detonation of a bomb or similar 
destructive device; or 
(D) the offense is committed with intent to avoid or prevent the 
lawful arrest of any person; or 
(3) negligently, while committing, fleeing from, or attempting any felony, 
apart from the conduct causing death. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class 2 felony. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Attempt” or “attempting” has the meaning given in Section 1107(c). 
(2) “Law enforcement officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(d). 
 
Section 1103.  Manslaughter 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person: 
(1) recklessly causes the death of another person; or 
(2) causes the death of another person under circumstances that would be 
murder under Section 1101 or 1102, but is committed: 
(A) under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
(B) for which there is a reasonable explanation, the reasonableness 
of which is to be determined: 
(i) from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s situation, 
(ii) under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to 
be. 
(b) Provisions Relating to Murder Mitigation Under Subsection (a)(2). 
(1) Burden of Persuasion.  The defendant carries the burden of persuasion 
on the mitigation provided in Subsections (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B), and must prove 
those elements by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(2) Knowingly Causing Mitigating Conditions.  The murder mitigation in 
Subsection (a)(2) is not available to a defendant who knowingly causes the 
conditions constituting the mitigation. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class 4 felony. 
 
Section 1104.  Negligent Homicide 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person negligently causes 
the death of another person. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 4 felony if death is: 
(A) caused by use of a firearm 
(B) that the defendant possessed in violation of Section 5104 
[possessing a firearm by a prohibited person]. 
 
 102 
(2) a Class 5 felony if death is caused by the person’s abuse or neglect of a 
child less than 14 years of age. 
(3) a Class 6 felony in all other cases. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Abuse of a child” has the meaning given in 10 Del.C. § 901(1). 
(2) “Neglect of a child” has the meaning given in 10 Del.C. § 901(18). 
 
Section 1105.  Aiding Suicide; Committing Homicide by Causing Suicide 
(a) Aiding Suicide: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person 
knowingly aids another in committing suicide. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 6 felony if the suicide is committed. 
(2) a Class 7 felony if the suicide is attempted. 
(3) a Class 8 felony if the person attempts to aid another person in 
committing suicide, but the suicide is not attempted. 
(c) Committing Homicide by Causing Suicide.  A person may be convicted of an 
offense under Sections 1101 through 1104 for causing another person to commit suicide 
if, and only if, the person causes the suicide by force, threat, or coercion.   
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Attempt” has the meaning given in Section 1107(b). 
(2) “Coercion” has the meaning given in Section 1107(c). 
(3) “Suicide” has the meaning given in Section 1107(d). 
 
Section 1106.  Unlawful Abortion 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person:  
(1) performs an abortion upon a woman or has an abortion performed upon 
herself, and 
(2) the woman’s pregnancy is in fact terminated and does not result in a live 
birth, and 
(3) the abortion is not a therapeutic abortion. 
(b) Instruments of Unlawful Abortion: Offense Defined.  A person commits an 
offense if the person: 
(1) manufactures, sells, or delivers any instrument, article, medicine, drug, 
or substance,  
(2) with intent that the item be used to perform an abortion in violation of 
Subsection (a). 
(c) Grading.   
(1) The offense under Subsection (a) is: 
(A) a Class A misdemeanor if the person is a pregnant woman who 
has an abortion performed upon herself. 
(B) a Class 8 felony in all other cases. 
(2) The offense under Subsection (b) is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(d) Defined Terms. 
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(1) “Abortion” has the meaning given in Section 1107(a). 
(2) “Therapeutic abortion” has the meaning given in Section 1107(e). 
 
Section 1107.  Definitions 
(a) “Abortion” means terminating the pregnancy of a woman known to be 
pregnant, intending that the fetus not live afterwards. 
(b) “Attempt” or “attempting” means any act that satisfies the definition of an 
attempt in Section 701. 
(c) “Coercion” means any act that satisfies the definition of coercion in Section 
1404. 
(d) “Suicide” means intentionally causing one’s own death. 
(e) “Therapeutic abortion” means an abortion authorized by subchapter IX of 
Chapter 17 of Title 24. 
 
 
Section 1108.  Procedures and Standards in Adjudication of Sentence for a Capital 
Offense 
 [This Section reflects a rationalized version of Delaware law and has been revised 
to conform with the requirements, as we understand them, of the recent US Supreme 
Court decision in Hurst v. State, 577 U.S. ____ (2016),  and the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s answers to the certified questions in Rauf v. State, No. 39, 2016, 2016 WL 
4224252 (Del. Aug. 2, 2016). The recommendation to adopt the procedures described in 
this Section is reserved, awaiting ongoing decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court and 
General Assembly.] 
(a) Punishment for Aggravated Murder.  Any person whose conviction is subject 
to sentencing under this Section shall be punished either by: 
(1) death; or 
(2) imprisonment for the remainder of the person's natural life without 
benefit of probation, parole, or any other reduction. 
(b) Separate Punishment Hearing.  Upon a conviction of guilt, the Superior Court 
shall conduct a separate hearing, solely to determine whether the defendant should be 
sentenced to death or to life imprisonment as authorized by Subsection (a).   
(1) Conviction by Jury.  If a jury convicted the defendant, this hearing shall 
be conducted by the trial judge before that jury as soon as practicable after the 
return of the verdict of guilty.  Alternate jurors shall not be excused from the case 
prior to submission of the issue of guilt to the trial jury and may, but need not be, 
separately sequestered until a verdict on guilt is entered.  The alternates shall also 
sit as alternate jurors on the issue of punishment.  If, for any reason satisfactory to 
the Court, any member of the trial jury is excused from participation in the hearing 
on punishment, the trial judge shall replace such juror or jurors with alternate juror 
or jurors.  If a jury of 12 jurors cannot participate in the hearing a separate and 
new jury, plus alternates, shall be selected for the hearing in accordance with the 
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applicable rules of the Superior Court and laws of Delaware, unless the defendant 
or defendants and the State stipulate to the use of a lesser number of jurors.  
(2) Conviction without Jury.  If the defendant was convicted by the Court 
by trial without a jury, or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the hearing 
shall be conducted by the trial judge before a jury, plus alternates, empaneled for 
that purpose and selected in accordance with the applicable rules of the Superior 
Court and laws of Delaware.  But the jury may be waived by the State and the 
defendant, in which case the hearing shall be conducted, if possible, by and before 
the trial judge who entered the finding of guilty or accepted the plea.  
(c) Procedure for Punishment Hearing. 
(1) Evidence.  Evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court 
deems relevant and admissible to the penalty to be imposed.  The evidence shall 
include matters relating to any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, including 
the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection (f).  The defendant’s 
record of any prior criminal convictions, including pleas of guilty or nolo 
contendere, or the absence of any prior criminal convictions or pleas, is admissible 
in evidence. 
(2) Notice.  Notice of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances must be 
given: 
(A) in writing to the other side by the party seeking to introduce 
evidence of those circumstances 
(B) before the punishment hearing but after the verdict on guilt, 
unless the Court decides that advance notice is impracticable.   
(3) Argument.  The Court shall permit argument by the State, the defendant, 
or the defendant's counsel, on the punishment to be imposed.  The argument shall 
consist of: 
(A) opening statements by each, unless waived, 
(B) opening summation by the State,  
(C) rebuttal summation by the defendant and/or the defendant's 
counsel, and 
(D) closing summation by the State.  
(4) Deliberation and Proof. 
(A) Upon the conclusion of the evidence and arguments, the judge 
shall dismiss any alternate jurors whose participation is no longer needed. 
(B) The judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions under 
Subsection (c)(4)(D), and the jury shall retire to deliberate and report to the 
Court an answer to the following questions:  
(i) whether the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the existence of at least 1 aggravating circumstance enumerated in 
Subsection (f), and  
(ii) whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances found to exist.  
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(C) The jury must be unanimous as to a particular aggravating 
circumstance under Subsection (c)(4)(B)(i) for an aggravating circumstance 
enumerated in Subsection (f) to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.  
For any enumerating aggravating circumstances that were alleged, but for 
which the jury is not unanimous, the jury shall report the number of 
affirmative and negative votes on each circumstance.  
(D) The jury shall report, by the number of affirmative and negative 
votes, its finding on the question presented in Subsection (c)(4)(B)(ii).  
(E) The Court shall instruct the jury to: 
(i) consider all mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and 
not merely the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection 
(f), that may be raised by the evidence, and 
(ii) weigh the mitigating factors against the aggravating 
factors.  
(d) Determination of Sentence. 
(1) A sentence of death may only be imposed if the unanimous jury: 
(A) finds the existence of an aggravating circumstance enumerated 
in Subsection (f) beyond a reasonable doubt, and then 
(B) finds beyond a reasonable doubt that all aggravating factors 
found to exist outweigh all mitigating factors found to exist. 
(2) Otherwise, the Court shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for the 
remainder of the defendant's natural life without benefit of probation, parole, or any other 
reduction.  
(e) Exception to Sentence of Death: Serious Intellectual Development Disorder. 
(1) Exception and Burden.  Notwithstanding Subsection (d)(1), a defendant 
may not be sentenced to death if the Court finds that the defendant had a serious 
intellectual developmental disorder when the offense was committed.  The 
defendant has the burden of proving the existence of that disorder by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
(2) Pretrial Motion.  For the question of the existence of a disorder under 
Subsection (e)(1) to be considered by the Court, the defendant must file a motion 
at least 90 days before trial alleging its existence.   
(3) Mandatory Evaluation.  Upon the filing of the motion under Subsection 
(e)(2), the Court shall order an evaluation of the defendant for the purpose of 
providing evidence of the following:  
(A) whether the defendant has a significantly subaverage level of 
intellectual functioning, 
(B) whether the defendant's adaptive behavior is substantially 
impaired, and  
(C) whether the conditions described in Subsections (e)(6)(A) and 
(e)(6)(B) existed before the defendant became 18 years of age.  
(4) Presentation of Evidence.  During the hearing authorized by 
Subsections (b) and (c), the defendant and the State may present relevant and 
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admissible evidence on the issue of the defendant's alleged serious intellectual 
developmental disorder, or in rebuttal thereof.   
(A) The jury must consider evidence of the alleged disorder when 
making its recommendation to the Court under Subsection (c)(4)(C). 
(B) The jury shall not make any recommendation to the Court on the 
question of whether the defendant had a serious intellectual developmental 
disorder at the time the offense was committed.  
(5) Determination of Sentence.  In determining the sentence to be imposed, 
the Court shall make specific findings as to the existence of a serious intellectual 
developmental disorder when the offense was committed.   
(A) If the Court finds that the defendant has met her burden under 
Subsection (e)(1), the Court shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for 
the remainder of the defendant's natural life without benefit of probation, 
parole, or any other reduction. 
(B) Otherwise, the Court shall proceed to determine the sentence to 
be imposed under Subsection (d)(1).  But, evidence on the question of the 
defendant's alleged serious intellectual developmental disorder presented 
during the hearing shall be weighed with other factors found to exist under 
Subsection (d)(1)(B).  
(6) Definitions.  For the purposes of Subsection (e) only: 
(A) “adaptive behavior” is substantially impaired when the 
individual does not meet the standards of personal independence expected 
of the individual's age group, sociocultural background, and community 
setting, as evidenced by significant limitations in at least 2 of the following 
adaptive skill areas: communication; self-care; home living; social skills; 
use of community resources; self-direction; functional academic skills; 
work; leisure; health; or safety. 
(B) “serious intellectual developmental disorder” means: 
(i) an individual has significantly subaverage intellectual 
functioning  
(ii) that exists concurrently with substantial deficits in 
adaptive behavior, and  
(iii) both Subsections (e)(6)(B)(i) and (ii) were manifested 
before the individual became 18 years of age. 
(C) “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” means an 
intelligence quotient of 70 or below obtained by assessment with 1 or more 
of the standardized, individually administered general intelligence tests 
developed to assess intellectual functioning.  
(f) Aggravating circumstances.  The following is an exclusive list of the 
aggravating factors that may be established under Subsection (d)(1)(A): 
(1) Victims Performing a Public Service.  The murder was committed 
against: 
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(A) any law-enforcement officer, corrections employee, firefighter, 
paramedic, emergency medical technician, fire marshal, or fire police 
officer while the victim was engaged in the performance of official duties; 
or 
(B) a judicial officer, a former judicial officer, Attorney General, 
former Attorney General, Assistant or Deputy Attorney General or former 
Assistant or Deputy Attorney General, State Detective or former State 
Detective, Special Investigator or former Special Investigator, during, or 
because of, the exercise of an official duty; or 
(C) a person who was a witness to a crime and who was killed for 
the purpose of preventing the witness's appearance or testimony in any 
grand jury, criminal or civil proceeding involving such crime, or in 
retaliation for the witness's appearance or testimony in any grand jury, 
criminal or civil proceeding involving such crime; or 
(D)  (i) a person who had been a nongovernmental informant or 
had otherwise provided any investigative, law enforcement, or police 
agency with information concerning criminal activity, and  
(ii) the killing was in retaliation for the victim's activities 
under Subsection (f)(3)(D)(i). 
(2) Vulnerable Victim.  The murder was committed against: 
(A) a pregnant woman; or 
(B) a vulnerable person, as defined in Section 804(d); or 
(C) a child 14 years of age or younger, and the murder was 
committed by an individual who is at least 4 years older than the victim.  
(3) Escape and Obstruction.  The murder was committed: 
(A) by a person in, or who has escaped from, the custody of a law-
enforcement officer or place of confinement; or 
(B) with intent to avoid or prevent an arrest, or to escape from 
custody; or 
(C) against a person who was held or otherwise detained as a shield 
or hostage.  
(5) Criminal History.  The defendant: 
(A) was previously convicted of another murder or manslaughter or 
of a felony involving the use of, or threat of, force or violence upon another 
person; or  
(B) the defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment, 
whether for natural life or otherwise, at the time of the commission of the 
murder.  
(6) Multiple Harms.   
(A) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in 
the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit any degree of rape, arson, kidnapping, robbery, 
burglary, or home invasion; or 
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(B) the murder was committed against a person who was held or 
detained by the defendant for ransom or reward; or 
(C) the defendant's course of conduct resulted in the deaths of 2 or 
more persons where the deaths are a probable consequence of the 
defendant's conduct; or 
(D) the murder involved torture, use of an explosive device, or 
poison; or the defendant used such means on the victim before murdering 
the victim; or 
(E) the murder was premeditated, and the result of substantial 
planning.  The planning under this Subsection must be as to the 
commission of the murder itself, and not simply as to the commission or 
attempted commission of another felony. 
(7) Murder Through an Agent.  The defendant: 
(A) in exchange for the killing of the victim: 
(i) paid or was paid by another person; or 
(ii) agreed to pay or be paid by another person; or 
(iii) conspired to pay or be paid by another person; or 
(B) caused or directed another to commit murder or committed 
murder as an agent or employee of another person.  
(8) Hate Motivation.  The murder was committed: 
(A) with intent to interfere with the victim's free exercise or 
enjoyment of any right, privilege or immunity protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; or 
(B) because the victim has exercised or enjoyed those rights; or 
(C) because of the victim's race, religion, color, disability, national 
origin, or ancestry.  
(9) Financial Gain.  The murder was committed for financial gain. 
(g) Method and Imposition of Sentence of Death.   
(1) The imposition of a sentence of death shall be upon such terms and 
conditions as the trial court may impose in its discretion, including: 
(A) the place,  
(B) the number of witnesses, which shall not exceed 10, and 
(C) conditions of privacy. 
The trial court shall permit one adult member of the immediate family of the 
victim, as defined in § 4350(e) of this Title, or the victim's designee, to witness the 
execution of a sentence of death pursuant to the rules of the court, if the family 
provides reasonable notice of its desire to be so represented. 
(2) Conditions of Execution.   
(A) The execution of punishment of death shall take place between 
the hours of 12:01 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on the date set by the trial court.  
(B) Punishment of death shall, in all cases, be inflicted by 
intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity 
sufficient to cause death and until such person sentenced to death is dead, 
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and such execution procedure shall be determined and supervised by the 
Commissioner of the Department of Correction.  The administration of the 
required lethal substance or substances required by this Subsection shall not 
be construed to be the practice of medicine, and any pharmacist or 
pharmaceutical supplier is authorized to dispense drugs to the 
Commissioner or the Commissioner's designee, without prescription, for 
carrying out the provisions of this Subsection, notwithstanding any other 
provision of law.   
(C) Such sentence may not be carried out until final review thereof is 
had by the Delaware Supreme Court as provided for in Subsection (h). The 
Court or the Governor may suspend the execution of the sentence until a 
later date to be specified, solely to permit completion of the process of 
judicial review of the conviction.  
(3) Alternative Execution Method: Constitutional Challenge.  If the 
execution of the sentence of death as provided in Subsection (g)(2)(B) is held 
unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, then punishment of death 
shall, in all cases, be inflicted by hanging by the neck.  
(h) Automatic Review by Delaware Supreme Court.  Whenever the death penalty 
is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the recommendation 
on and imposition of that penalty shall be reviewed on the record by the Delaware 
Supreme Court.  
(1) Review Procedures.  A defendant may appeal her sentence of death 
immediately.  But, if an appeal is not taken by the defendant, the following steps 
shall be taken once 30 days have passed following the imposition of sentence of 
death.   
(A) Transmission of Transcript.  The clerk of the Superior Court 
shall have a complete transcript of the punishment hearing prepared 
promptly.  Within 10 days after receipt of that transcript, the clerk shall 
transmit the transcript, together with a notice prepared by the clerk, to the 
Delaware Supreme Court.  
(B) Content of Notice.  The notice shall set forth the title and docket 
number of the case, the name of the defendant, the name and address of any 
attorney, and a narrative statement of the judgment, the offense, and the 
punishment prescribed.   
(C) Appointment of Counsel.  The Court shall, if necessary, appoint 
counsel to respond to the State's positions in the review proceedings.  
(D) Briefs and Oral Argument.  The Supreme Court shall permit 
counsel for the defendant and the State to submit briefs within the time 
provided by the Court, and permit them to present oral argument to the 
Court.  
(2) Content of Review.  The Supreme Court shall limit its review under this 
Subsection to the recommendation on and imposition of the penalty of death, and 
shall determine:  
 
 110 
(A) whether, considering the totality of evidence in aggravation and 
mitigation which bears upon the particular circumstances or details of the 
offense and the character and propensities of the offender, the death penalty 
was either arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended, or 
disproportionate to the penalty recommended or imposed in similar cases 
arising under this Section, and 
(B) whether the evidence supports the jury's or the judge's finding of 
a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in Subsection (f). 
(3) Disposition and Findings.  The Court shall:  
(A) either: 
(i) affirm the sentence of death; or 
(ii) set aside the sentence of death and remand for correction 
of any errors occurring during the hearing and for imposition of the 
appropriate penalty; and 
(B) set forth in writing its findings as to the reasons for its actions.  
(4) No Effect on Ordinary Review.   
(1) Any error in the guilt phase of the trial may be raised as provided 
by law and rules of court, and shall be in addition to the review of 
punishment provided by this Section.  
(2) Any errors found under Subsection (h)(3)(A)(ii) shall not affect 
the determination of guilt, and shall not preclude the reimposition of death 
where appropriately determined after a new hearing on punishment. 
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CHAPTER 1200.  ROBBERY, ASSAULT, ENDANGERMENT, AND THREAT OFFENSES 
 
Section 1201.  Robbery and Carjacking 
Section 1202.  Assault 
Section 1203.  Reckless Injuring 
Section 1204.  Reckless Endangerment 
Section 1205.  Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol 
Section 1206.  Genital Mutilation of a Female Minor 
Section 1207.  Terroristic Threats and Hoaxes 
Section 1208.  Unlawfully Administering Drugs 
Section 1209.  Reckless Infliction of Mental or Emotional Harm 
Section 1210.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 1201.  Robbery and Carjacking 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) knowingly and unlawfully takes property from the person or presence of 
another, 
(2) by using force or threat of force during the taking, attempted taking, or 
flight from the taking or attempted taking. 
(b) Grading. 
(1) Carjacking.  If the person takes possession of a motor vehicle, airplane, 
vessel, or other vehicle, the offense is: 
(A) a Class 4 felony if an occupant or passenger of the vehicle is 14 
years of age or younger. 
(B) a Class 5 felony if, while in possession or control of the vehicle, 
the person: 
(i) commits or attempts to commit a felony that is Class 6 or 
greater; or 
(ii) commits an offense under Section 1205 [driving under the 
influence]; or 
(iii) commits an offense under Chapter 5200 [drugs]. 
(C) a Class 6 felony if, while in possession or control of the vehicle, 
the person: 
(i) commits an offense under Section 1204 [reckless 
endangerment]; or 
(ii) compels a lawful occupant of the vehicle to leave the 
vehicle; or 
(D) a Class 7 felony in all other cases. 
(2) Aggravated Robbery.  The offense is a Class 4 felony if, in the course of 
attempting, committing, or flight from attempting or committing the offense, the 
person: 
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(A) causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in 
the offense; or 
(B) displays a deadly weapon or an objected intended to appear to be 
a deadly weapon; or 
(C) represents by word or conduct that he or she is in possession or 
control of a deadly weapon. 
(3) Robbery.  Otherwise, the offense is a Class 7 felony. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
(2) “Motor vehicle” has the meaning given in Section 2110(d). 
(3) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(4) “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
(5) “Vessel” has the meaning given in Section 308(f). 
 
Section 1202.  Assault 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person knowingly6: 
(1) causes physical injury to another person; or 
(2) makes physical contact of an offensive or alarming nature with another 
person. 
(b) Grading. 
(1) Enhanced Aggravated Assault.  The offense is a Class 4 felony if the 
person knowingly: 
(A) amputates or otherwise removes a part of the victim’s body; or 
(B) causes serious physical injury to another person while engaged 
in commission of or flight from any felony; or 
(C) causes serious physical injury by abuse or neglect of a child less 
than 14 years of age. 
(2) Aggravated Assault.  The offense is: 
(A) a Class 5 felony if the person causes serious physical injury by 
means of a firearm or other deadly weapon. 
(B) a Class 6 felony if the person: 
(i) causes serious physical injury; or 
(ii) causes physical injury to a pregnant female. 
                                                             
6 Issue:  Should the “intentional” culpability requirement for assault in current law be used instead of 
“knowing”?  Current assault statutes sometimes require intentional causation, and sometimes require only reckless 
causation.  Proposed Section 1203 comprehensively deals with recklessly causing injury, so the only issue is 
whether knowing or intentional culpability is a more appropriate threshold for imposing greater criminal liability 
than Section 1203. 
  Pro:  Assault is a serious offense that should not be charged lightly, and Delaware law has historically 
required intentional causation to support a conviction.  Lowering the culpability requirement would result in more 
people being charged with and convicted of assault than under current law. 
  Con:  The difference in blameworthiness between “knowing” and “intentional” causation is limited in this 
context.  A person who knows her conduct is practically certain to cause physical injury—but chooses to act anyway 
—is not significantly less blameworthy than the person who acts with an intention to cause the physical injury. 
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(3) Assault.  Otherwise, the offense: 
(A) under Subsection (a)(1) is: 
(i) a Class 7 felony if: 
(aa) the offense is committed by means of a firearm or 
other deadly weapon; or 
(bb) the person knowingly causes the breathing or 
blood circulation of another person to be impeded by 
applying pressure on the throat or neck of the other person; or 
(ii) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(B) under Subsection (a)(2) is: 
(i) a Class B misdemeanor if the defendant makes contact 
with the person using urine, feces, or vomit; or 
(ii) a Class D misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(4) Special Victims: Grade Adjustment.   The grade of Assault or 
Aggravated Assault under Subsection (b)(2) or (b)(3) shall be increased by one 
grade7 if the victim is: 
(A) a law enforcement officer, firefighter, emergency medical 
technician, paramedic, fire marshal, public transit operator, or code 
enforcement officer, who is acting in the lawful performance of duty; or 
(B) any person, while that person is rendering emergency medical 
care; or 
(C) a state employee or officer when that person is discharging a 
duty of employment or office; or 
(D) a person under 6 years old, and the defendant is 18 years of age 
or older; or 
(E) located in a detention facility, and the defendant is confined in 
that detention facility. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Abuse of a child” has the meaning given in 10 Del.C. § 901(1). 
(2) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
(3) “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 5109(e). 
(4) “Law enforcement officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(d). 
(5) “Neglect of a child” has the meaning given in 10 Del.C. § 901(18). 
                                                             
7 Issue:  Is an upward grade adjustment of a single grade sufficient where the special victim is a 
correctional officer? 
  Pro:  The single grade adjustment is insufficient because it results in a lower grade than is provided under 
current law (Class B felony for causing serious physical injury; Class D felony for causing physical injury), and does 
not reflect the seriousness of the offense.  Correctional officers are particularly vulnerable, given the circumstances 
in which they serve.  Assaults of correctional officers cause harm not only to the victims themselves, but also to the 
public and inmate populations they serve.   
  Con:  Assaults of correctional officers are more serious than other assaults, but they do not deserve 
multiple grade increases.  Every grade increase doubles the maximum punishment available for the offense.  The 
identity of these victims should be taken into account at sentencing, arguing for a sentence at the high end of 
available punishment, rather providing quadruple or octuple maximum punishment. 
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(6) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(7) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
 
Section 1203.  Reckless Injuring 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she recklessly causes 
physical injury to another person. 
(b) Grading.  If the injury caused is: 
(1) serious physical injury, the offense is: 
(A) a Class 5 felony if: 
(i) injury is caused by the person’s abuse or neglect of a child 
less than 14 years of age; or 
(ii) the offense results in the unlawful termination of the 
victim’s pregnancy without the victim’s consent; or 
(B) a Class 7 felony in all other cases. 
(2) physical injury, the offense is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if the victim is a child less than: 
(i) 4 years of age; or 
(ii) 14 years of age whose intellectual or physical capacity 
discernibly falls outside the normal range of performance and 
behavior with regard to age, development, and environment; or 
(iii) 14 years of age, and physical injury is caused by a deadly 
weapon or dangerous instrument; or 
(B) a Class B misdemeanor in all other cases.8 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Abuse of a child” has the meaning given in 10 Del.C. § 901(1). 
(2) “Dangerous instrument” has the meaning given in Section 5109(a). 
                                                             
8 Issue:  Should a general offense be established in Section 1203 for negligently causing injury?  If so, the 
phrase “or negligently” would be added to Section 1203(a), and the following grading provision would be added to 
Section 1203(b): 
(2) Negligent Injuring.  If the injury was negligently caused, the offense is: 
(A) a Class 7 felony if the injury is: 
(i) serious physical injury 
(ii) caused by use of a firearm 
(iii) that the defendant possessed in violation of Section 5104 [possessing a 
firearm by a prohibited person]. 
(B) a Class A misdemeanor if the injury is:  
(i) caused by a firearm or other deadly weapon; or 
(ii) serious physical injury. 
[(C) a Class B misdemeanor in all other cases.] 
  Pro:  The negligent injury offense described above should be included, even without the bracketed 
language making it a general offense.  It is reasonable to impose a greater duty of care upon persons who use 
inherently dangerous items, like firearms and vehicles.   
  Con:  Negligence is too slight a culpability requirement to support creating such a broad offense with so 
little support in current law.  Currently, Delaware does not generally punish negligently causing injury.  The 
Delaware Code contains a few, specialized negligent-injury offenses involving vehicles or firearms.  See 11 Del.C. 
§§ 611(2), 628, 628A(1), 629, 1448(e)(2).  The Proposed Code has generally rejected this piecemeal approach.  But 
instead of generalizing those special cases into a general rule, those special cases should be eliminated.   
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(3) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
(4) “Neglect of a child” has the meaning given in 10 Del.C. § 901(18). 
(5) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(6) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
 
Section 1204.  Reckless Endangerment 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she engages in conduct 
by which the person creates a substantial risk of physical injury to another person. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 8 felony if the person creates a substantial risk of death or 
serious physical injury; or 
(2) a Class B misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(c) Treatment of a Child by Prayer: Defense.  In a prosecution under this Section 
that is based upon an alleged failure or refusal to provide proper medical care or 
treatment to an ill child less than 18 years of age, it is a defense that: 
(1) the accused is a member or adherent of an organized church or religious 
group,  
(2) the tenets of which prescribe prayer as the principal treatment for 
illness, and  
(3) the accused treated or caused the ill child to be treated in accordance 
with those tenets. 
(d) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(2) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
 
Section 1205.  Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol  
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she operates a vehicle, 
airplane, or vessel while chemically impaired. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(c) Additional Civil and Procedural Provisions. Any person convicted of this 
offense is subject to civil consequences and procedures set forth in 21 Del.C. § 4177 
[e.g., license revocation, installation of ignition interlock device, program of education or 
rehabilitation]. 
(d) Prescription Drug Taken As Directed: Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution 
under this Section that the person’s chemical impairment was entirely due to 
consumption of a drug: 
(1) for which the person had an authorized prescription, and 
(2) according to the directions and terms of that prescription. 
(e) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Authorized prescription” has the meaning given in Section 5210(b). 
(2) “Chemically impaired” has the meaning given in Section 1210(a). 
(3) “Vessel” has the meaning given in Section 308(f). 
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Section 1206.  Genital Mutilation of a Female Minor 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of 
the genitalia of a female under 18 years of age; or 
(2) being a parent or guardian of a female under 18 years of age, allows the 
act to be performed. 
(b) Custom or Ritual No Defense.  It is no defense to an offense under this Section 
that the act is required or permitted as a matter of custom, ritual, or standard practice.   
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class 6 felony. 
(d) Defined Term.  “Genitalia” has the meaning given in Section 1307(a). 
 
Section 1207.  Terroristic Threats; Menacing 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) he or she: 
(A) being reckless as to causing another person to experience 
extreme fear or distress, 
(B) threatens to commit any offense likely to result in death, or 
serious injury to person or property; or 
(2) he or she intentionally places another person in fear of imminent 
physical injury. 
(b) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1) is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if the victim is or has ever been a public servant 
and the threat is made because of the victim’s status as such; or 
(B) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(2) is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if fear is created by: 
(i) displaying a firearm or deadly weapon; or 
(ii) causing the victim to believe that he or she is or has been 
exposed to a substance or device that could cause physical injury or 
death; or 
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(B) a Class B misdemeanor if fear is created by congregating with 
other persons in a public place while wearing masks, hoods, or other 
garments rendering their faces unrecognizable.9  
(C) a Class D misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(2) “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
(3) “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 3104(d). 
 
Section 1208.  Unlawfully Administering Drugs 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) administers a drug to another person, 
(2) without that person’s consent, 
(3) thereby intentionally causing stupor, unconsciousness, or any other 
alteration of the person’s physical or mental condition. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class 8 felony. 
 
Section 1209.  Reckless Infliction of Severe Mental or Emotional Harm 
(a) Abuse of Vulnerable Persons: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense 
if: 
(1) having a duty to provide medical or personal care or maintenance, 
(2) he or she recklessly: 
(A) causes severe mental or emotional harm to; or 
(B) fails to provide the care or maintenance necessary for the safety 
and welfare of, 
(3) a victim who: 
(A) is a vulnerable person; or 
(B) is a patient or resident of any facility where medical or personal 
care is provided 
(b) Hazing: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she engages in 
conduct by which the person: 
(1) recklessly creates a substantial risk of severe mental or emotional harm 
to another person, 
                                                             
9 Issue:  Should the Proposed Code carry forward 11 Del.C. § 1301(1)g. in its current law form, rather than 
in the form that appears in Section 1207? 
   Pro:  11 Del.C. § 1301(1)g. more broadly protects any likely, imminent deprivations of constitutional 
rights, privileges, or immunities.  Section 1207(b)(2)(B) is too narrow, because it relates only to fear of “imminent 
physical injury.”  Discrete events intended to deprive individuals of constitutional rights, such as Ku Klux Klan 
rallies, are worthy of condemnation under Delaware law, even if federal statutes are available, and even if the 
offense would be very difficult to prove. 
   Con:  By targeting more narrow behavior, Section 1207(b)(2)(B) can justify raising the grade of this 
offense.  To the extent the current offense targets pure civil rights violations, federal statutes criminalizing actions 
intended to cause a federal constitutional deprivation are available.  Criminalizing a single, highly specific instance 
of constitutional deprivation is inconsistent with the goals of recodification.  The current draft couches these issues 
within a framework that the criminal code is already equipped to address: threats to do harm. 
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(2) as part of a program of initiate, admit, or renew membership of that 
person in any organization. 
(c) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(2) under Subsection (b) is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(d) Defined Term.  “Vulnerable person” has the meaning given in Section 806(e). 
 
Section 1210.  Definitions 
(a) “Chemically impaired” means, except as authorized by law: 
(1) to be: 
(A) less able than a person would ordinarily have been, either 
mentally or physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical 
control, or due care, 
(B) due to consumption of alcohol, a controlled substance, or 
another intoxicating substance, or a combination of them; or 
(2) to have an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, meaning: 
(A) an amount of alcohol in a sample of a person’s blood equivalent 
to .08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or 
(B) an amount of alcohol in a sample of a person’s breath equivalent 
to .08 grams per 210 liters of breath; or 
(3) a person’s blood contains any amount of the following substances, or a 
preparation or mixture containing one of them: 
(A) a Schedule I controlled substance under [16 Del.C. § 4714]; or 
(B) cocaine, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(b)(4); or 
(C) amphetamine, including its salts, optical isomers, and salt of its 
optical isomers, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(1)]; or 
(D) methamphetamine, including its salt, isomer or salt of an isomer 
thereof, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(3)]; or 
(E) phencyclidine, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(e)(5)]; or 
(F) a designer drug, as defined in [16 Del.C. § 4701]. 
(b) “Physical injury” means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain, 
including physical harm that would normally cause substantial pain.  
(c) “Serious physical injury” means physical injury that: 
(1) creates a substantial risk of death; or 
(2) causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of 
health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ; or 
(3) causes the unlawful termination of a pregnancy without the consent of 
the pregnant female.  
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CHAPTER 1300.  SEXUAL OFFENSES 
 
Section 1301.  Rape and Sexual Assault  
Section 1302.  Prohibited Sexual Contact by Persons in Positions of Trust 
Section 1303.  Bestiality 
Section 1304.  Prohibited Conduct by a Person Convicted of a Sexual Offense Against a 
Child 
Section 1305.  Sexual Harassment 
Section 1306.  General Provisions Relating to this Chapter 
Section 1307.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 1301.  Rape and Sexual Assault 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) causes another person to submit to or engage in sexual intercourse, oral 
or object penetration, or sexual contact with anyone, and 
(2) (A) the person uses force, coercion, deception, or any other 
compulsion that would cause a reasonable person to submit under the 
circumstances; or 
(B) the person knows that the victim is: 
(i) unable to understand the nature of the act; or 
(ii) unable to consent to the act; or 
(iii) unconscious, asleep, or otherwise unaware of the act; or 
(C) the person had substantially impaired the victim’s power to 
appraise or control the victim’s own conduct by administering or 
employing, without the victim’s knowledge or against the victim’s will, 
drugs, intoxicants, or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; 
or 
(D) the victim is: 
(i) less than 16 years of age, and the person is more than four 
years older than the victim; or 
(ii) less than 12 years of age. 
(b) Grading.   
(1) Enhanced Aggravated Rape.  The offense under Subsection (a) is a 
Class 3 felony if the offense conduct is sexual intercourse, and: 
(A)  (i) the person: 
(aa) causes serious physical injury to the victim; or 
(bb) displays a deadly weapon or an object intended to 
appear to be a deadly weapon; or  
(cc) represents by word or conduct that the person is in 
possession or control of a deadly weapon or dangerous 
instrument; 
(ii) during: 
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(aa) commission or attempted commission of the 
offense; or 
(bb) immediate flight from the offense; or 
(cc) an attempt to prevent the offense from being 
reported; or 
(B) the offense is committed under Subsection (a)(2)(D)(ii), and the 
defendant is over 18 years of age; or 
(C) the person acts with the active participation or assistance of one 
or more other persons who are present at the time of the act of sexual 
intercourse or oral or object penetration. 
(2) Aggravated Rape.  The offense under Subsection (a) is a Class 4 felony 
if the offense conduct is sexual intercourse, and: 
(A) the person causes physical injury to the victim during: 
(i) commission or attempted commission of the offense; or 
(ii) flight from the offense; or 
(iii) an attempt to prevent the offense from being reported; or 
(B) the offense is committed under Subsection (a)(2)(D)(i), and the 
victim is under 14 years of age; or 
(C) the person commits any other felony in the course of committing 
or fleeing from the offense. 
(3) Rape.  The offense under Subsection (a) is a Class 6 felony in all other 
cases where the offense conduct is sexual intercourse. 
(c) Oral or Object Penetration.  If the offense conduct is oral or object 
penetration, rather than sexual intercourse, the grade of the offense is one grade lower 
than that provided in Subsection (b) for similar circumstances. 
(d) Sexual Assault.  If the offense conduct is sexual contact, rather than sexual 
intercourse, the grade of the offense is three grades lower than that provided in 
Subsection (b) for similar circumstances.  
(e) Grade Adjustment: Sexual Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of Trust.  
The grade of an offense under this Section shall be increased by one grade if: 
(A) the person occupies a position of trust, authority, or supervision 
over the victim, and 
(B) the victim is less than 16 years of age. 
(f) No Defense for Mistake as to Age Under 14.  Where an element of the offense 
or grading provision under this Section requires that the victim be less than 14 years of 
age, it is no defense that the person: 
(1) did not know the victim’s age to be less than 14; or 
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(2) reasonably believed the victim was 14 or more years of age.10  
(g) Child Support.  In a conviction under this Section where the offense resulted in 
the birth of a child, and the child is in the custody and care of the victim or the victim’s 
legal guardian, the court shall make it a condition of any probation term imposed that the 
defendant timely pay any child support for that child ordered by the Family Court. 
(h) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Attempt” or “attempting” has the meaning given in Section 1107(b). 
(2) “Coercion” has the meaning given in Section 1107(c). 
(3) “Dangerous instrument” has the meaning given in Section 5109(a). 
(4) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
(5) “Deceiving” or “deception” has the meaning given in Section 2103(b). 
(6) “Oral or object penetration” has the meaning given in Section 1307(b).  
(7) “Position of trust, authority, or supervision” has the meaning given in 
Section 1307(c).   
(8) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(9) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
(10) “Sexual contact” has the meaning given in Section 1307(e).  
(11) “Sexual intercourse” has the meaning given in Section 1307(f).  
 
Section 1302.  Prohibited Sexual Contact by Persons in Positions of Trust 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) engages in sexual contact with another person, and 
(2) the victim is: 
(A) in custody at a detention facility, and the person is an employee, 
volunteer, or other person working at the detention facility; or 
(B) a child under 18 years of age, and the person is in a position of 
trust, authority, or supervision over that child; or 
(C) a patient or resident of any facility where medical or personal 
care is provided, and the person is an employee, volunteer, or other person 
working at that facility. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 5 felony if the offense conduct is sexual intercourse. 
                                                             
10 Issue:  Should Section 1301 impose strict liability as to a victim being less than 16 years of age (as does 
current law) rather than 14 years of age? 
   Pro:  Persons having sex with younger persons should bear the whole risk of their own mistakes.  
Imposing strict liability makes unavailable the often-abused argument that the defendant “did not know” or 
“reasonably believed” the victim was of an appropriate age.  Sixteen is the age of sexual consent in Delaware, and 
the age for strict liability should be set to match that cut-off. 
   Con:  Strict liability in this context is sensible where a defendant is unlikely to make a reasonable 
mistake as to age.  However, reasonable mistakes are much more likely to occur at age 16 than 14.  Many 16-year-
olds look much older than they are, having reached puberty some years earlier.  Few states have explicit strict 
liability provisions like Delaware’s; and among those that do, 14 is roughly the average age at which strict liability 
is set.  Note that proposed Section 1306(a) has been added to strike a balance with this change from current law.  
Under Section 1306(a), the prosecution need only prove that a defendant was negligent as to the victim being 
underage for any relevant age above 14. 
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(2) a Class 6 felony if the offense conduct is oral or object penetration. 
(3) a Class 8 felony if the offense conduct is sexual contact. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Facility” has the meaning given in 16 Del.C. § 1131(4), but does not 
include a detention facility. 
(2) “Oral or object penetration” has the meaning given in Section 1307(b). 
(3) “Position of trust, authority, or supervision” has the meaning given in 
Section 1307(c).   
(4) “Sexual contact” has the meaning given in Section 1307(e). 
 
Section 1303.  Bestiality 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she intentionally: 
(1) engages in sexual contact with the genitalia of an animal; or 
(2) causes another person to engage in sexual contact with the genitalia of 
an animal with intent to gratify the person’s own sexual desire. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class 6 felony. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Sexual contact” has the meaning given in Section 1307(e). 
 
Section 1304.  Prohibited Conduct by a Person Convicted of a Sexual Offense 
Against a Child 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) the person has been previously convicted of committing one of the 
offenses contained in this Chapter or the following Sections, or their equivalents in 
another jurisdiction, against a person less than 16 years of age: 
(A) Section 4201 [public indecency]; 
(B) Section 4202(b)(1) [patronizing a victim of sexual servitude];  
(C) Section 4203 [promoting or permitting prostitution]; 
(D) Section 4204(a)(1)–(2) or (b)(3)(A) [child pornography and 
obscenity]; 
(E) Section 4302 [voyeurism]; 
(F) Section 4401 [incest]; and 
(2) the person loiters or resides on or within 500 feet of the property of any 
institution that has as its primary purpose the education or instruction of children 
less than 16 years of age.11 
                                                             
11 Issue:  Should Section 1304 impose strict liability as to the defendant being within the prohibited area? 
   Pro:  11 Del.C. § 1112(c) provides that it is no defense to prosecution that the defendant “was unaware 
that the prohibited conduct took place on or within 500 feet of any school property.”  This places the burden of 
discovering where schools are, as well as the whole risk of a mistake, on the defendant.  This is appropriate because 
of the prior history of these defendants, and is necessary to deter them from preying upon children. 
   Con:  Section 1304 should require recklessness by the defendant as to his location.  Recklessness is the 
lowest level of culpability at which the defendant is aware of a risk that he is taking.  Unless the defendant is aware 
of a risk his conduct creates, he cannot be deterred from engaging in that conduct.  Therefore, using strict liability in 
this context does not make children safer, and only creates criminal liability for prior offenders who are in a 
prohibited place by mistake. 
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(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class 8 felony. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Dwelling” has the meaning given in Section 2403(a). 
(2) “Loiters” has the meaning given in Section 4108(a). 
(3) “Reside” has the meaning given in Section [1307(d)]. 
 
Section 1305.  Sexual Harassment 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) threatens to engage in conduct likely to result in the commission of a 
sexual offense against another; or 
(2) (A) knowingly causes annoyance, offense, or alarm to another 
person  
(B) by suggesting, soliciting, requesting, commanding, or otherwise 
attempting to induce another to engage in sexual contact with the person. 
(b) Grading. 
(1) The offense is a Class 8 felony if: 
(A) the victim is a person less than 16 years of age, over whom the 
defendant stands in a position of trust, authority, or supervision, and 
(B) the defendant is at least 4 years older than the victim. 
(2) Otherwise, the offense: 
(A) under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor; or 
(B) under Subsection (a)(2) is a Class D misdemeanor.12 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Position of trust, authority, or supervision” has the meaning given in 
Section 1307(c). 
(2) “Sexual contact” has the meaning given in Section 1307(e). 
 
Section 1306.  General Provisions Relating to this Chapter 
(a) Culpability as to Age.  Unless expressly provided otherwise, where an offense 
in this Chapter requires that the victim be under a specific age, it need be proven only that 
the defendant was negligent as to the victim being under that age. 
                                                             
12 Issue:  Should the new grading for sexual harassment—grading threats as a Class A misdemeanor and 
all other conduct as a Class D misdemeanor—be retained? 
   Pro:  11 Del.C. § 763 grades sexual harassment of any kind as ”an unclassified misdemeanor,” while 
ordinary harassment is graded as a Class A misdemeanor in 11 Del.C. § 1311.  Sexual harassment where the 
defendant “threatens to engage in conduct likely to result in the commission of a sexual offense against another” is 
more serious than the other conduct set forth in § 763, and should be graded to at least be consistent with other 
forms of harassment. 
   Con:  The threats described in 11 Del.C. § 763 are too far removed from the possible commission of a 
sexual offense to justify increasing the offense grade.  The defendant need not threaten to actually commit an 
offense, but merely to “engage in conduct” that is “likely to result” in a sexual offense.  A threat to commit an 
offense likely to result in death or serious physical injury is a Class A misdemeanor under the current terroristic 
threatening offense (11 Del.C. § 621).  Sexual harassment is not similar enough to terroristic threatening to justify 
grading them the same. 
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(b) Medical Treatment Exemption.  A medical examination or procedure is not an 
offense under this Chapter if: 
(1) with intent to provide diagnosis or treatment,  
(2) it is conducted by a licensed medical professional, parent, or guardian,  
(3) in a manner consistent with reasonable medical standards. 
 
Section 1307.  Definitions 
(a) “Genitalia” means: 
(1) a woman’s vagina, labia minora, labia majora, or clitoris; or 
(2) a man’s penis or scrotum. 
(b) “Oral or object penetration” means: 
(1) placing any object, substance, or body part inside the anus or vagina of 
another person; or 
(2) the defendant placing an object inside another person’s mouth, 
intending the act to be sexual in nature.  
(c) A person occupies a “position of trust, authority, or supervision” if: 
(1) the person has regular direct contact with one or more children because 
of his or her familial relationship, profession, employment, vocation, avocation, or 
volunteer service, and 
(2) in the course thereof assumes responsibility, whether temporary or 
permanent, for the care or supervision of one or more children.  
[(d) “Reside” means to occupy a dwelling as one’s place of abode, whether 
permanently or temporarily.] 
(e) “Sexual contact” means: 
(1) (A) any touching of any body part of another person, whether 
clothed or unclothed, by any body part, body fluid, or object; or 
(B) any undressing that reveals the breast, genitalia, or buttocks of 
another person; and 
(2) the touching or undressing is intended to be sexual in nature.   
The term includes sexual intercourse and oral or object penetration.  
(f) “Sexual intercourse” means: 
(1) any act of penetration, however slight, of the genitalia or anus of one 
person with the genitalia of another person; or 
(2) any oral contact with genitalia between the defendant and another 
person. 
(3) Evidence of emission of semen is not required to prove sexual 
intercourse occurred.  
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CHAPTER 1400.  KIDNAPPING, COERCION, RESTRAINT, AND RELATED OFFENSES 
 
Section 1401.  Kidnapping and Unlawful Restraint 
Section 1402.  Human Trafficking 
Section 1403.  Coercion 
Section 1404.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 1401.  Kidnapping and Unlawful Restraint  
(a) Unlawful Restraint: Offense Defined.  Except as authorized by law, a person 
commits an offense if he or she knowingly and materially interferes with another 
person’s liberty, without that person’s consent, by: 
(1) moving the victim from one place to another; or 
(2) confining the victim. 
(b) Kidnapping: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she 
commits unlawful restraint under Subsection (a), with the intent to: 
(1) hold the victim for ransom or reward; or 
(2) use the victim as a shield or hostage; or 
(3) facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or 
(4) inflict physical injury upon the victim, or to violate or abuse the victim 
sexually; or 
(5) terrorize the victim or a third person; or 
(6) take or entice any victim less than 18 years of age from the custody of 
the victim’s parent, guardian, or lawful custodian, and the person is not a relative 
of the victim. 
(c) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if the defendant’s conduct recklessly creates a 
substantial risk of serious physical injury to the victim; or 
(B) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(2) under Subsection (b) is: 
(A) a Class 4 felony if the defendant does not voluntarily release the 
victim alive, unharmed, and in a safe place before trial; or 
(B) a Class 5 felony in all other cases. 
(d) Relationship to Interference with Custody.  A person who does not satisfy the 
elements of Subsection (b)(6) because he or she is a relative of the victim may 
nevertheless be liable under Section 4404 [interference with custody]. 
(e) Defined Term.  “Relative” has the meaning given in Section 1404. 
  
Section 1402.  Human Trafficking 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) knowingly trades, barters, buys, or sells a person; or 
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(2) knowingly uses force, coercion, intimidation, or deception to compel a 
person to provide labor or services, including prostitution; or 
(3) knowingly obtains, transports, harbors, isolates, or provides a person, or 
secures continued performance of the labor or services of a person: 
(A) knowing that the person is being compelled to provide labor or 
services, as provided in Subsection (a)(2); or 
(B) knowing that the person will have body parts removed for sale; 
or 
(4) benefits financially from participation in a venture that the person 
knows has engaged in acts constituting the offense under Subsection (a)(3)(B). 
(b) Grading.  The offense:  
(1) under Subsection (a)(3)(B) or (a)(4) is a Class 3 felony. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3)(A) is a Class 4 felony. 
(3) is a Class 6 felony in all other cases.  
(4) Grade Adjustments.  The grade of the offense shall be increased by one 
grade if: 
(A) the victim is less than 18 years of age; or 
(B) the defendant recruited, enticed, or obtained the victim from a 
shelter designed to serve: 
(i) victims of human trafficking, domestic violence, or sexual 
assault; or 
(ii) runaway youth, foster children, or homeless persons. 
(c) Exception: Payments Related to Adoption.  It is not a violation of Subsection 
(a)(1) to pay: 
(1) reasonable medical expenses related to pregnancy; or 
(2) reasonable room and board to providers of services; 
in conjunction with placement of a child for adoption in accordance with 13 Del.C. 
§ 904(a)(2). 
(d) Additional Penalties. 
(1) Forfeiture. 
(A) In General.  The Court shall order any person convicted of an 
offense under this Section to forfeit any interest in property: 
(i) that was used or intended to be used to facilitate the 
commission of the offense; or 
(ii) that constitutes or derives from proceeds that the 
defendant obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the offense. 
(B) Organizational Forfeiture.  An organization convicted under this 
Section may be ordered by the Court to forfeit: 
(i) profits from activities in violation of this Section; or 
(ii) state and local government contracts. 
(2) Restitution.   
(A) Valuation.  In ordering restitution under Section 803(c) for a 
violation of this Section, the Court may order the greatest of: 
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(i) the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim’s 
labor or services; or 
(ii) the value of the victim’s labor as guaranteed under the 
minimum wage and overtime provisions of either: 
(aa) the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et 
seq.; or 
(bb) Title 19 of the Delaware Code. 
(B) Victim Availability. 
(i) Restitution must be ordered for violations of this Section, 
even if the victim is unavailable to accept payment of restitution. 
(ii) If the victim is unavailable for 5 years from the date of the 
restitution order, the restitution must be paid to the Victim 
Compensation Fund established under [current 11 Del. C. § 9016]. 
(e) Motion to Vacate Sentence; Expungement. 
(1) Motion to Vacate: Procedures and Presumptions. 
(A) A person convicted of prostitution, loitering, or an obscenity or 
child pornography offense as a direct result of being a victim of human 
trafficking may file a motion in the court in which the conviction was 
obtained to vacate the judgment of conviction.   
(B) Contents of Motion.  A motion filed under this Subsection must: 
(i) be in writing, 
(ii) be sent to the Delaware Department of Justice, 
(iii) be made 2 years after the person’s last criminal 
conviction and within a reasonable period of time after the person 
ceases to be a victim of human trafficking, and 
(iv) describe the evidence and provide copies of any official 
documents showing that the person is entitled to relief under this 
Subsection. 
(C) The court shall hold a hearing on any motion that satisfies the 
requirements of Subsection (e)(1)(B), unless the motion fails to assert 
grounds on which relief may be granted, in which case the motion may be 
dismissed. 
(D) Presumption of Direct Result.  Official documentation of the 
person’s status as a victim under this Section or a similar offense in a 
different jurisdiction, whether from a federal, state, or local government 
agency, shall create a presumption, subject to rebuttal, that the person 
committed the offense as a direct result of human trafficking. 
(E) Burden on Defendant.  The defendant must prove he or she is 
entitled to relief under this Subsection by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(F) Vacated Sentence Mandatory.  If the person meets his or her 
burden under Subsection (e)(1)(E), the court shall grant the motion, and 
may take any additional action that is appropriate in the circumstances or 
that justice requires. 
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(2) Expungement Following Vacated Judgment of Conviction.  
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary: 
(A) A person seeking a vacated judgment of conviction under 
Subsection (e)(1) may seek expungement of the criminal record related to 
that conviction either in the same motion or after the motion has been 
granted.   
(B) If the motion to vacate is granted, the motion to expunge must 
also be granted, subject to the provisions of [11 Del.C. §§ 4374(f), 4376, 
and 4377]. 
(f) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Coercion” has the meaning given in Section 1107(c). 
(2) “Deception” has the meaning given in Section 2110(b). 
 
Section 1403.  Coercion 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to cause another 
to perform or to omit to perform any act, the person threatens to: 
(1) cause physical injury to any person; or 
(2) cause damage to property; or 
(3) engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or 
(4) accuse any person of an offense or cause criminal charges to be 
instituted against a person; or 
(5) expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, 
tending to subject a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or 
(6) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with 
respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or 
(7) use or abuse the defendant’s position as a public servant by performing 
an act within or related to the defendant’s official duties, or by failing or refusing 
to perform an official duty so as to affect another person adversely; or 
(8) perform any other act that is calculated to cause material harm to 
another person’s health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, 
reputation, or personal relationships. 
(b) Defense.  In a prosecution under Subsection (a)(4), it is an defense that: 
(1) the defendant believed the threatened criminal charge to be true, and  
(2) the defendant’s sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take 
reasonable action to make good the wrong that was the subject of the threatened 
charge. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
 
Section 1404.  Definition 
“Relative” means a parent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, or aunt. 
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PROPERTY OFFENSES 
 
CHAPTER 2100.  THEFT OFFENSES 
 
Section 2101. Consolidation of Theft Offenses 
Section 2102. Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition 
Section 2103.  Theft by Deception 
Section 2104.  Theft by Extortion 
Section 2105.  Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mistake  
Section 2106.  Theft of Services 
Section 2107.  Receiving Stolen Property 
Section 2108.  Unauthorized Distribution of Protected Works 
Section 2109.  Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle 
Section 2110.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 2101.  Consolidated Grading of Theft Offenses 
(a) Consolidation.  Conduct prohibited by Sections 2102 through 2107 constitutes 
a single offense of theft.  A prosecution for theft may be supported by evidence that it 
was committed in any manner described in Sections 2102 through 2107. 
(b) Grading.  Any offense defined in Sections 2102 through 2107 is: 
(1) a Class 5 felony if the value of the property is $1,000,000 or more. 
(2) a Class 6 felony if the value of the property is $100,000 or more. 
(3) a Class 7 felony if 
(A) the value of the property is $25,000 or more; or 
(B) the property is a firearm. 
(4) a Class 8 felony if 
(A) the value of the property is $5,000 or more; or 
(B) the property is a motor vehicle; or 
(C) the property is a blank prescription pad, and the defendant is not 
a practitioner. 
(5) a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the property is $1,500 or more. 
(6) a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the property is $100 or more. 
(7) a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the property is less than $100. 
(c) Extortion: Grade Adjustment.  The grade of the offense shall be increased by 
one grade when theft is committed in the manner described in Section 2104. 
(d) Claim of Right. It is a defense to prosecution for theft that the person 
reasonably believed he or she had a right to use or possess the property. 
(e) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 5109(e). 
(2) “Motor vehicle” has the meaning given in Section 2110(d). 
(3) “Practitioner” has the meaning given in Section 2110(g). 
(4) “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
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(5) “Value” has the meaning given in Section 2110(l). 
 
Section 2102.  Theft by Taking or Disposition 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits theft if he or she: 
(1) knowingly takes or obtains without consent, or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another person, 
(2) with the intent to deprive the other person of that property. 
(b) Shoplifting: Permissive Inferences.  If the theft is from a retail store, the trier of 
fact may infer that: 
(1) a person who intentionally conceals unpurchased merchandise of that 
store, inside or outside the premises of the store, does so with the intent required in 
Subsection (a)(2). 
(2) a person who intentionally alters, removes, or otherwise disfigures any 
packaging, label, price tag, or marking affixed to unpurchased merchandise of that 
store, inside the premises of the store, does so with the intent required in 
Subsection (a)(2). 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Deprive” has the meaning given in Section 2110(c). 
(2) “Obtain” has the meaning given in Section 2110(e). 
(3) “Owner” has the meaning given in Section 2110(f). 
(4) “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
(5) “Property of another” has the meaning given in Section 2110(h). 
 
Section 2103.  Theft by Deception 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits theft if he or she: 
(1) intentionally obtains the property of another person 
(2) by deceiving the other person or a third person. 
(b) Inferences. 
(1) Permissive.  The finder of fact may infer the deception required in 
Subsection (a)(2) if the defendant leased or rented personal property of another, 
and the defendant: 
(A) failed to return or make arrangements acceptable to the owner to 
return the property to the owner or the owner’s agent within 10 days after 
proper notice, following the expiration of the lease or rental agreement; or 
(B) after returning the lease or rental property, failed to make 
payment, at the agreed rental rate, for the full period which the property 
was leased or rented, except when the defendant has a good faith dispute 
with the owner of the property as to the amount owed; or  
(C) presented to the owner materially false or incorrect identification 
as to name, address, place of employment, or other information for the 
purpose of entering into the lease or rental agreement. 
(D) Proper Notice.  Proper notice under Subsection (c)(1)(A) may be 
given by mailing the notice by certified or registered mail to an address 
 
 131 
supplied by the defendant at the time of the lease or rental agreement, or the 
defendant’s last known address if later furnished by the defendant or the 
defendant’s agent. 
(2) Prohibited.   
(A) Mere Failure to Perform Promise.  Deception as to a person’s 
intention to perform a promise may not be inferred solely from the fact that 
the promise was not later performed. 
(B) Exception.  However, that deception may be inferred if: 
(i) the promise related to and was made in the course of 
business, and 
(ii) the person who made the promise was not properly 
licensed to engage in that business.   
(c) Defense. It is a defense in a prosecution for theft by deception in which the 
defendant leased or rented personal property of another, if the defendant: 
(1) accurately stated the defendant’s name, address, and other material 
items of identification at the time of rental, and 
(2) failed to receive the owner’s notice due to no material fault of the 
defendant, and 
(3) returned the personal property to the owner or the owner’s agent within 
48 hours of the commencement of the prosecution, together with any charges for 
the overdue period and the value of damage to the property, if any. 
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Deceiving” has the meaning given in Section 2110(b). 
(2) “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
(3) “Property of another” has the meaning given in Section 2110(h). 
 
Section 2104.  Theft by Extortion 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits theft if he or she intentionally deprives 
another of property by means of coercion that would constitute an offense under Section 
1403. 
(b) Defense.  In a prosecution involving coercion under Subsection 1403(a)(4), it 
is a defense that: 
(1) the defendant believed the threatened criminal charge to be true, and  
(2) the defendant’s sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take 
reasonable action to make good the wrong that was the subject of the threatened 
charge. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Coercion” has the meaning given in Section 1107(c). 
(2) “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
 
Section 2105.  Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mistake 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits theft if he or she: 
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(1) comes into possession of property that the person knows has been lost, 
mislaid, or delivered by mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or as to 
the recipient, 
(2) with the intent to deprive another of such property, and 
(3) fails to take reasonable measures to return the property to its owner. 
(b) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Deprive” has the meaning given in Section 2110(c). 
(2) “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
 
Section 2106.  Theft of Services 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits theft if he or she: 
(1) knowingly obtains without consent services that the person knows are 
available only for compensation 
(2) by 
(A) deception, threat, or false representation or statement; or 
(B) by installing, rearranging, or tampering with any facility or 
equipment 
(3) with the intent to avoid payment for the services. 
(b) Theft from Public Utilities: Permissive Inferences.   
(1) In a prosecution based upon Subsection (a)(2)(B) involving: 
(A) services that have been obtained from a public utility, and  
(B) facilities or equipment owned or used by the public utility to 
provide those services,  
the finder of fact may infer that the person to whom the services are being 
furnished created the condition violating Subsection (a)(2)(B) with the intent 
required in Subsection (a)(3). 
(2) Exception.  Subsection (b)(1) is inapplicable to any person to whom the 
services have been furnished for fewer than 31 days, or until there has been at least 
1 meter reading. 
(c) Defined Term.   
(1) “Obtain” has the meaning given in Section 2110(e). 
(2) “Services” has the meaning given in Section 2110(j). 
 
Section 2107.  Receiving Stolen Property 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person: 
(1) intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of property of another,  
(2) with intent to deprive the owner of the property, 
(3) knowing or believing that the property has been stolen. 
(b) Permissive Inference.  The finder of fact may infer the knowledge required in 
Subsection (a)(3) in the case of: 
(1) a person who 
(A) acquires the property for consideration which the person knows 
is substantially below its reasonable value; or 
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(B) is found in possession or control of property whose affixed 
identification or serial number is altered, removed, defaced, or falsified; or 
(2) a person or dealer who acquires the property for consideration, when 
such property consists of traffic signs, other traffic control devices, or historical 
markers, and the acquisition is not accompanied by a written authorization for the 
property’s disposition from the Department of Transportation, Department of 
state, or other entity which owns the property. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Dealer” has the meaning given in Section 2110(a). 
(2) “Deprive” has the meaning given in Section 2110(c). 
(3) “Property of another” has the meaning given in Section 2110(h). 
(4) “Receive” has the meaning given in Section 2110(i). 
(5) “Stolen” has the meaning given in Section 2110(k). 
 
Section 2108.  Unauthorized Distribution of Protected Works 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) sells, gives, or otherwise makes available to another person whose 
identity is known to the person, 
(2) a protected work that the person knows is only available for 
compensation, 
(3) with intent to enable the other person to avoid payment to the owner of 
the work. 
(b) Exception: Lawfully Obtained Originals.  Subsection (a) is inapplicable to 
original copies of protected works that the defendant obtained lawfully. 
(c) Grading.  If the protected work is distributed to: 
(1) 1,000 or more recipients, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(2) 100 or more recipients, the offense is a Class D misdemeanor. 
(3) fewer than 100 recipients, the offense is a violation. 
(d) Defined Term. “Protected work” has the meaning given in Section 2110(_).13 
 
Section 2109.  Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
                                                             
13 Issue:  Should Delaware adopt Section 2108, Unauthorized Distribution of Protected Works, as a new 
offense? 
   Pro:  Currently, Delaware only has a few scattered, highly specific offenses that indirectly criminalize 
infringements upon copyright.  See 11 Del.C. §§ 858, 920.  This piecemeal approach leads to disproportionate 
punishment of some persons infringing on copyright, but not others.  Section 2108 will allow any unauthorized 
distribution to be punished criminally, regardless of the type of material involved.  Note that the breadth of the 
offense is offset by the fact that it is only graded as a misdemeanor. 
   Con:  There is insufficient support in current Delaware law to create a general offense punishing 
copyright violations criminally.  Copyright violations are best left to civil litigation.  Furthermore, due to the ease of 
sharing copyrighted materials on the Internet, this offense potentially exposes an enormous number of people to 
liability. 
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(1) the person knowingly operates another’s motor vehicle, airplane, vessel, 
or other vehicle, without the owner’s consent to do so; or 
(2) having custody of another’s vehicle pursuant to an agreement that the 
person will perform for compensation a specific service for the owner involving 
the maintenance, repair, or use of the vehicle, the person operates the vehicle 
without consent of the owner in a manner constituting a gross deviation from the 
agreed purpose of the person’s custody; or 
(3) having custody of another’s vehicle under an agreement that it is to be 
returned to the owner at a specified time, the person intentionally retains or 
withholds possession without consent of the owner for so lengthy a period beyond 
the specified time as to be a gross deviation from the agreement. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Motor vehicle” has the meaning given in Section 2110(d).  
(2) “Vessel” has the meaning given in Section 308(f). 
 
Section 2110.  Definitions 
(a) “Dealer” means a person in the business of buying, selling, or lending on the 
security of goods, including a pawnbroker.  
(b) “Deceiving” means: 
(1) creating or reinforcing a false impression as to any fact; or 
(2) preventing another person from acquiring information that would 
adversely affect the other person’s judgment of a transaction.  
(c) “Deprive” means: 
(1) to withhold property of another person permanently or for so extended a 
period as to appropriate a major portion of its economic value, or with the intent to 
restore it only upon payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(2) to dispose of property of another person so as to make it unlikely that 
the owner will recover it.  
(d) “Motor vehicle” means an automobile, motorcycle, van, truck, trailer, 
semitrailer, truck tractor and semitrailer combination, or any other vehicle which is self-
propelled, which is designed to be operated primarily on a roadway as defined in § 101 of 
Title 21, and in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported. 
"Motor vehicle" as used in this Code shall not include any device that is included within 
the definitions of "moped", "off-highway (OHV)", "triped", "motorized scooter or 
skateboard", "motorized wheelchair" or "electric personal assistive mobility device" as 
defined in § 101 of Title 21.  
(e) “Obtain” means: 
(1) in relation to property, to bring about or receive a transfer or purported 
transfer of any interest in property; or 
(2) in relation to labor or services, to secure performance of the labor or 
services.  
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(f) “Owner” means a person, other than the defendant, who has possession of or 
any other interest in the property involved, even though such interest or possession is 
unlawful, and without whose consent the defendant has no authority to exert control over 
the property.  
(g) “Practitioner” means  
(1) a physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific investigator or other person 
licensed, registered or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, administer, or 
conduct research on a controlled or noncontrolled substance in the course of 
professional practice or research in this State.  
(2) a pharmacy, hospital or other institution licensed, registered, or 
otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, administer, or conduct research on a 
controlled or noncontrolled substance in the course of professional practice or 
research in this State.  
(h) “Property of another” means property to which another person holds a greater 
claim of right, whether such a claim is temporary, permanent, or illegal.  A legal person, 
such as the government or a corporation, may hold a claim of right.  The owner of 
flowers, burial mounds, mementos, or any other property left by its owner in a cemetery 
for the purpose of honoring the dead retains a claim of right to that property.   
(_) “Protected work” means all or substantially all of a copyrighted writing, visual 
representation, audio recording, motion picture, video game, or other creative work that 
can be embodied in tangible or electronic form.14 
(i) “Receive” means to acquire possession, control, or title, or lending on the 
security of the property.  
(j) For the purposes of this Chapter, “services” include: labor; professional service; 
transportation; public service or utility; accommodation in hotels, restaurants, or 
elsewhere; admission to exhibitions; use of vehicles or other moveable property; use of 
intellectual property; and computer services, including computer access, data processing, 
and data storage.  “Computer services” has the meaning given in Section 806(a). 
(k) “Stolen” property means property over which control has been obtained by 
theft.  
(l) “Value” of property is calculated as provided in Section 805.  
  
                                                             
14 Note: The addition of this definition depends upon whether Section 2108 is adopted as a new offense 
(see footnote 12 supra).  
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CHAPTER 2200.  FORGERY AND FRAUDULENT PRACTICES 
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Section 2213.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 2201.  Forgery and Counterfeiting 
(a) Forgery: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to 
defraud, deceive, or injure anyone, he or she: 
(1) alters any written instrument of another without that person’s authority; 
or 
(2) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, or transfers any 
written instrument so that it purports: 
(A) to be the act of another who did not authorize that act; or 
(B) to have been executed at a time or place, or in a numbered 
sequence, other than was in fact the case; or 
(C) to be a copy of an original when no original existed; or 
(3) possesses a written instrument, knowing that it was made, completed, 
or altered under circumstances constituting forgery; or 
(4) puts forward any written instrument that the person knows to be forged 
in a manner specified in Subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2). 
(b) Counterfeiting: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, knowingly, 
he or she manufactures, uses, displays, advertises, distributes, sells, or possesses 
with intent to sell or distribute any item or service bearing, or identified by a 
counterfeit mark. 
(c) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is: 
(A) a Class 7 felony if the written instrument is or purports to be: 
(i) part of an issue of money, stamps, securities, or other 
valuable instruments issued by the government; or 
(ii) part of an issue of stock, bonds, or similar instruments 
representing interests in or claims against any property or enterprise. 
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 (B) a Class 8 felony if the written instrument is or purports to be a 
deed, will, codicil, contract, release, assignment, commercial instrument, 
check, or similar instrument evidencing, creating, transferring, terminating, 
or otherwise affecting a legal right, interest, obligation, or status. 
(C) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
  (2) under Subsection (b): 
(A) has the grade determined by the value of the item or service 
bearing or identified by a counterfeit mark and the grade values set forth in 
Section 2101(b) [consolidated grading of theft offenses]. 
(i) Valuation.  If items bearing a counterfeit mark are 
components of a finished product, the value of the finished product 
shall be used for grading purposes.   
(d) Permissive Inference.  The trier of fact may infer intent to sell or distribute 
items bearing a counterfeit mark, if a person possesses or controls more than 25 items 
bearing a counterfeit mark. 
(e) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Counterfeit mark” has the meaning given in Section 2213(b). 
(2) “Defraud” has the meaning given in Section 2213(c). 
(3) “Put forward” has the meaning given in Section 2213(i). 
(4) “Security” has the meaning given in 6 Del.C. § 73-103(a)(20). 
(5) “Written instrument” has the meaning given in Section 806(f). 
 
Section 2202.  Fraudulent Tampering with Records15 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud 
anyone, he or she: 
(1) tampers with or fails to properly maintain public records, as would 
constitute an offense under Section 3203(a) [Tampering with Public Records]; or 
(2) issues, offers, or presents an instrument that contains false statements or 
false information. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class 8 felony. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Defraud” has the meaning given in Section 2213(c). 
 
                                                             
15 Issue:  Should the defense to fraudulent tampering with records in 11 Del.C. § 872 for employees 
“merely execut[ing] the orders of an employer” be added to Section 2202?  Note that whatever is done here should 
also be done for the similar defense to issuing a bad check in Section 2204, based upon 11 Del.C. § 902. 
   Pro:  Employees occupy a greater position of vulnerability than their superiors, making it difficult to 
contradict the orders of their superiors.  Employees should not be penalized for the fraudulent acts of their superiors, 
nor for failing to resist pressure to act as an agent in those situations. 
   Con:  An employee acting under authority of a superior is unlikely to have the “intent to defraud” 
required by the offense definition, making an defense unnecessary.  If the employee does have that intent, she is just 
as culpable has her employer and just as deserving of criminal liability. 
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Section 2203.  Fraudulent Treatment of Public Records 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud 
anyone, he or she obtains, displays, possesses, or upon proper demand fails to surrender 
any document issued by a governmental entity. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Defraud” has the meaning given in Section 2213(c). 
 
Section 2204.  Issuing a Bad Check 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she issues or passes a 
check, knowing it will not be honored by the drawee.   
(b) Grading.  The value of the check shall be used to determine the grade of the 
offense, according to the grade values set forth in Section 2101(b) [consolidated grading 
of theft offenses]. 
(c) Permissive Inference.  The trier of fact may infer that an issuer knew the check 
would not be honored, if: 
(1) the issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check was 
issued; or 
(2) payment was refused by the drawee upon presentation, on or after the 
date written on the check, for lack of funds, and the issuer failed to make good 
within 10 days after receiving notice of that refusal.  
(d) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Issues” has the meaning given in Section 2213(d). 
(2) “Passes” has the meaning given in Section 2213(f). 
(3) “Value” has the meaning given in Section 2110(l). 
 
Section 2205.  Unlawful Use of a Payment Card 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she uses a payment 
card with the intent to obtain property or services, knowing that: 
(1) the card is stolen, forged, or fictitious; or 
(2) the card has been revoked or cancelled; or 
(3) for any other reason, use of the card is not authorized by the issuer or 
cardholder. 
(b) Grading.  
(1) Generally.  The value of the property or services obtained by use of the 
payment card shall be used to determine the grade of the offense, according to the 
grade values set forth in Section 2101(b) [consolidated grading of theft offenses]. 
(2) Aggregation.  When the offense is committed in a single scheme or 
continuous course of conduct, whether involving one issuer or several issuers, the 
conduct may be considered a single offense, and the value of the property or 
services aggregated for grading purposes. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Payment card” has the meaning given in Section 2213(g). 
(2) “Services” has the meaning given in Section 2110(j). 
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(3) “Stolen” has the meaning given in Section 2110(k). 
(4) “Value” has the meaning given in Section 2110(l). 
  
Section 2206.  Deceptive Business Practices 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) uses a weight, measure, or any other device for determining or 
recording the quality or quantity of a commodity to be sold, that the person knows 
to be false or misleading; or 
(2) sells, offers or exposes for sale, or delivers what the person knows to be 
less than the represented quantity of any commodity or service; or 
(3) takes what the person knows to be more than the represented quantity of 
any commodity or service; or 
(4) sells, or offers or exposes for sale, commodities the person knows to be 
adulterated or mislabeled; or 
(5) makes a statement the person knows to be false or misleading in any 
advertisement addressed to the public, or to a substantial segment of it, with the 
intent to promote the sale or increase the consumption of property or services; or 
(6) makes what the person knows is a false or misleading written statement 
to promote the sale of securities, or omits information required by law to be 
disclosed in written documents relating to securities; or 
(7) notifies any other person that the other person has won a prize, received 
an award or has been selected or is eligible to receive anything of value if the other 
person is required to respond through the use of a 900 service telephone number or 
similar pay-per-call service number. 
(b) Exception: Republication.  In any case under this Section involving false or 
misleading information, this Section is inapplicable to persons or entities that publish 
information originating from other sources without knowledge of its deceptive character. 
(c) Grading.  The amount of the victim’s loss shall be used to determine the grade 
of the offense, according to the grade values set forth in Section 2101(b) [consolidated 
grading of theft offenses]. 
(d) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Adulterated” has the meaning given in Section 2213(a). 
(2) “Mislabeled” has the meaning given in Section 2213(e). 
(3) “Services” has the meaning given in Section 2110(j). 
 
Section 2207.  Defrauding Secured Creditors 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) with intent to hinder enforcement of a security interest, 
(2) destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise deals 
with property subject to that security interest. 
(b) Grading.  The amount of the victim’s loss shall be used to determine the grade 
of the offense, according to the grade values set forth in Section 2101(b) [consolidated 
grading of theft offenses]. 
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Section 2208.  Fraud in Insolvency 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) with intent to defraud any creditor, and 
(2) knowing that proceedings have been or are about to be instituted for the 
appointment of a receiver or other person entitled to administer property for the 
benefit of creditors has been appointed, or that any other composition or 
liquidation for the benefit of creditors has been or is about to be made,  
(3) he or she: 
(A) conveys, transfers, removes, conceals, destroys, encumbers, or 
otherwise disposes of any part of or any interest in the debtor’s estate; or 
(B) obtains any substantial part of or interest in the debtor’s estate; 
or 
(C) presents to any creditor or to the receiver or administrator any 
written instrument or record relating to the debtor’s estate, knowing that it 
contains a material false statement; or  
(D) knowingly misrepresents or fails or refuses to disclose to the 
receiver or administrator the existence, amount, or location of any part of or 
any interest in the debtor’s estate, or any other information that the person 
is legally required to furnish to the administrator. 
(b) Grading.  The amount of the victim’s loss shall be used to determine the grade 
of the offense, according to the grade values set forth in Section 2101(b) [consolidated 
grading of theft offenses]. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Defraud” has the meaning given in Section 2213(c). 
(2) “Written instrument” has the meaning given in Section 806(f). 
 
Section 2209.  Identity Theft 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud, he or 
she: 
(1) obtains, sells, gives, or transfers personal identifying information 
belonging or pertaining to another person without the consent of the other person; 
or 
(2) possesses or uses a scanning device to obtain information encoded on a 
payment card; or 
(3) possesses or uses a reencoder to place encoded information on a 
payment card or any electronic medium without the permission of the owner of the 
card; or 
(4) writes down or requests to be written down the address, telephone 
number, account number or any other personal identification information of the 
payment card holder, unless: 
(A) the information is necessary for the shipping, delivery or 
installation of consumer goods; or  
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(B) for special orders of consumer goods or services. 
(b) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsections (a)(1)–(3) is a Class 7 felony. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(4) is a Class D misdemeanor. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Personal identifying information” has the meaning given in Section 
2213(h). 
(2) “Reencoder” has the meaning given in Section 2213(j). 
(3) “Scanning device” has the meaning given in Section 2213(k). 
(4) “Services” has the meaning given in Section 2110(j). 
 
Section 2210.  Commercial Bribery 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she:  
(1) with the intent to: 
(A) influence another in any respect to that person’s acts, decisions, 
or duties; or 
(B) be influenced by another in any respect to the person’s acts, 
decisions, or duties, 
(2) offers, confers, or agrees to confer; or solicits, accepts, or agrees to 
accept any benefit as consideration for violating or agreeing to violate a duty of 
fidelity of a: 
(A) partner, agent or employee of another; or 
(B) trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary; or 
(C) lawyer, physician, accountant, appraiser, or other professional 
adviser; or 
(D) officer, director, manager or other participant in the direction of 
the affairs of an incorporated or unincorporated association; or 
(E) an official or participant in a sports contest; and 
(3) the recipient is not authorized by law to accept that benefit. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
 
Section 2211.  Fraudulent Conveyance or Receipt of Public Lands 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud, he or 
she:  
(1) executes or receives any deed or other written instrument purporting to 
convey an interest in land,  
(2) any part of which is public lands of this State,  
(3) when the person had no legal or equitable interest in the land described 
in the instrument. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class 8 felony. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Defraud” has the meaning given in Section 2213(c). 
(2) “Written instrument” has the meaning given in Section 806(f). 
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Section 2212.  Unauthorized Impersonation 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) the person misrepresents that he or she is another person, real or 
fictitious, and acts in that capacity with intent to obtain a benefit, or to injure or 
defraud another person; or 
(2) the person falsely represents that he or she is a bail bond agent; or 
(3) he or she: 
(A) having been involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in 
serious physical injury or death to any person, 
(B) falsely represents, as the case may be, that the person was or was 
not operating a motor vehicle involved in the accident. 
(b) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(3) is a Class 8 felony. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Motor vehicle” has the meaning given in Section 2110(d). 
(2) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
 
Section 2213.  Definitions 
(a) “Adulterated” means varying from the standard of composition or quality 
prescribed by or pursuant to any statute providing criminal penalties for such variance, or 
set by established commercial usage. 
(b) A “counterfeit mark” means any unauthorized reproduction or copy of 
intellectual property or intellectual property affixed to any item knowingly sold, offered 
for sale, manufactured or distributed or identifying services offered or rendered, without 
the authority of the owner of the intellectual property. 
(c) “Defraud” means to obtain anything of value through deception. 
(d) A person “issues” a check when: 
(1) as drawer of the check or as a person who signs in a capacity as 
representative or agent of the principal drawer or obligor,  
(2) the person delivers or causes the check to be delivered, 
(3) to a person who acquires a right against the drawer as to the check by 
reason of delivery. 
(e) “Mislabeled” means varying from the standard of truth or disclosure in labeling 
prescribed by or pursuant to any statute providing criminal penalties for such variance, or 
set by established commercial usage. 
(f) A person “passes” a check when: 
(1) being a payee, holder, or bearer of a check that purports to have been 
drawn and issued by another, 
(2) the person delivers the check, 
(3) for a purpose other than collection to a third person who acquires a right 
as to the check by reason of delivery. 
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(g) “Payment card” means any instrument or device issued by an issuer for use of 
the cardholder in obtaining anything of value, either on credit, by withdrawing funds 
from a deposit account, or through use of value stored on the card.  “Payment card” 
includes the number assigned to the card, even if the physical instrument or device is not 
used or presented.  
(h) “Personal identifying information” includes names, addresses, birth dates, 
Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, telephone numbers, financial services 
account numbers, savings account numbers, checking account numbers, payment card 
numbers, identification documents or false identification documents, electronic 
identification numbers, educational records, health care records, financial records, credit 
records, employment records, e-mail addresses, computer system passwords, mother's 
maiden name or similar personal number, record or information. 
(i) To “put forward” a written instrument, record, device, or object means to issue, 
authenticate, transfer, publish, circulate, present, display, or otherwise give legitimacy to 
that item. 
(j) “Reencoder” means an electronic device that places encoded information from 
the computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a payment card onto the computer chip or 
magnetic strip or stripe of a different payment card or any electronic medium that allows 
an authorized transaction to occur. 
(k) “Scanning device” means a scanner, reader, or any other electronic device that 
is used to access, read, scan, obtain, memorize, or store, temporarily or permanently, 
information encoded on the computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a payment card. 
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CHAPTER 2300.  ARSON AND OTHER PROPERTY DAMAGE OFFENSES 
 
Section 2301.  Arson 
Section 2302.  Endangering by Fire or Explosion 
Section 2303.  Unlawful Incendiary Devices 
Section 2304.  Criminal Damage 
Section 2305.  Causing or Risking Catastrophe; Ecological Catastrophe 
Section 2306.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 2301.  Arson 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person damages a 
building by intentionally starting a fire or causing an explosion. 
(b) Grading. 
(1) Knowingly16 Causing Damage.  If the person knew the damage would 
result, the offense is: 
(A) a Class 4 felony if the person knew another person was within 
the building at the time of the offense; or 
(B) a Class 5 felony if the person was reckless as to the presence of 
another person within the building at the time of the offense; or 
(C) a Class 6 felony in all other cases. 
(2) Recklessly Causing Damage.  If the person was reckless as to the 
resulting damage, the offense is a Class 8 felony. 
(c) Ownership Exemption.  Except under Subsection (b)(1)(A)–(B), a person does 
not commit an offense under Section 2301 if the building belongs solely to the person. 
(d) Defined Term.  “Owner” has the meaning given in Section 2102(b)(3). 
 
Section 2302.  Endangering by Fire or Explosion 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person: 
(1) intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on the 
person’s own property or another’s, and  
(2) thereby recklessly creates a risk of damaging another’s building or other 
real or personal property. 
                                                             
16 Issue:  Should this arson offense grading require the defendant to have “intentionally,” rather than 
“knowingly,” caused the damage? 
   Pro:  Use of intentional culpability more closely follows current Delaware law and the blameworthiness 
judgments the General Assembly has already made regarding grading.  Subjective intentionality is very serious, and 
the higher grade of the offense should correspond to that serious culpability. 
   Con:  Currently, Delaware arson statutes sometimes punish a defendant the same whether the person 
caused damage recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally, and sometimes require only the highest culpability 
requirement—intent.  But a person who sets a fire, knowing a building will be damaged as a result, is not 
significantly less blameworthy than a person who subjectively intends to damage the building.  By contrast, a person 
who is merely aware of a risk of damaging the building is significantly less blameworthy.  The draft should remain 
as it is, punishing intentionally and knowingly causing damage the same. 
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(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
 
Section 2303.  Unlawful Incendiary Devices 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person manufactures or 
possesses any incendiary device with intent to cause physical injury or to unlawfully 
damage any property. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class 6 felony. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Damage” has the meaning given in Section 2306(c). 
(2) “Incendiary device” has the meaning given in Section 2306(e).  
 
Section 2304.  Criminal Damage 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person: 
(1) damages property of another; or 
(2) tampers with property of another and thereby creates a risk of damage to 
property; or 
(3) unlawfully tampers with the tangible property of a public service. 
(b) Grading.   
(1) Recklessly Causing Damage.  Where damage, loss, or risk is recklessly 
caused, the offense is: 
(A) a Class 6 felony if the pecuniary loss is $1,000,000 or more; or 
(B) a Class 7 felony if the pecuniary loss is $100,000 or more; or 
(C) a Class 8 felony if the pecuniary loss is $25,000 or more; or 
(D) a Class A misdemeanor if: 
(i) the pecuniary loss is $5,000 or more; or 
(ii) the person intentionally causes a substantial interruption 
or impairment of a public service; or 
(E) a Class B misdemeanor if the pecuniary loss is $1,500 or more; 
or 
(F) a Class C misdemeanor if the pecuniary loss is $100 or more; or 
(G) a Class D misdemeanor if the pecuniary loss is less than $100. 
(2) Knowingly Causing Damage.  The grade of the offense under 
Subsection (b)(1)(A)–(G) shall be increased by one grade if the damage, loss, or 
risk is knowingly caused. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Damage” has the meaning given in Section 2306(c). 
(2) “Public service” has the meaning given in Section 2306(f). 
(3) “Property of another” has the meaning given in Section 2102(b)(4). 
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Section 2305.  Causing or Risking Catastrophe; Ecological Catastrophe 
(a) Causing Catastrophe. 
(1) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person causes a 
catastrophe by fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of a building, bridge, or tunnel, use 
of a catastrophic agent, unauthorized disposal of solid waste, or by any other 
means of causing potentially widespread injury or damage. 
(2) Grading.  The offense is: 
(A) a Class 2 felony if the catastrophe is knowingly caused. 
(B) a Class 4 felony if the catastrophe is recklessly caused. 
(b) Risking Catastrophe. 
(1) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person recklessly 
creates a risk of catastrophe by any of the means described in Subsection (a)(1). 
(2) Grading.  The offense is a Class 7 felony. 
(c) Threatening to Cause Catastrophe. 
(1) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person threatens 
to cause a catastrophe using any of the means described in Subsection (a)(1). 
(2) Grading.  The offense is a Class 8 felony. 
(d) Failure to Prevent Catastrophe. 
(1) Offense Defined.  A person who recklessly fails to take reasonable 
measures to prevent or mitigate a catastrophe commits an offense if the person: 
(A) knows that he or she is under an official, contractual, or other 
legal duty to take such measures; or 
(B) did or assented to the act causing or threatening the catastrophe. 
(2) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(e) Ecological Catastrophe.  A person commits an offense if the person engages in 
any of the acts described in Subsections (a)–(d), but in relation to an ecological 
catastrophe. 
(1) Grading.  The grade of the offense: 
(A) for causing an ecological catastrophe is: 
(i) a Class 6 felony if knowingly caused; or 
(ii) a Class 7 felony if recklessly caused. 
(B) for risking an ecological catastrophe is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(C) for threatening to cause an ecological catastrophe is a Class C 
misdemeanor. 
(D) for failure to prevent an ecological catastrophe is a Class D 
misdemeanor. 
(2) Fines.  Per day that activity causing or risking ecological catastrophe 
continues, the offense is subject to a maximum fine of twice that provided for the 
grade of the offense under Section 803(a). 
(f) Limitation on Convictions for Multiple Related Offenses.  Section 210 
[conviction when the defendant satisfies the requirements of more than one offense or 
grade] may prohibit convictions under both this Section and another offense based upon 
the same conduct. 
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(g) Definitions. 
(1) “Catastrophe” has the meaning given in Section 2306(a). 
(2) “Catastrophic agent” has the meaning given in Section 2306(b). 
(3) “Ecological catastrophe” has the meaning given in Section 2306(d). 
(4) “Solid waste” has the meaning given in 7 Del.C. § 6302(12). 
 
Section 2306.  Definitions 
(a) “Catastrophe” means: 
(1) serious physical injury to five or more persons; or 
(2) substantial damage to five or more buildings or habitable structures; or 
(3) substantial damage to a vital public facility that seriously impairs its 
usefulness or operation. 
“Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1202(d)(2). 
(b) A “catastrophic agent” means an explosive, an incendiary device, a timing or 
detonating mechanism for such device, poison or poisonous gas, a deadly biological or 
chemical contaminant or agent, or a radioactive substance. 
(c) “Damage” to property means impairing its usefulness or value by any means, 
and includes deleting or altering computer programs or other electronically recorded data, 
or impairing access to computer services.  “Computer services” has the meaning given in 
Section 805(d)(1). 
(d) “Ecological catastrophe” means substantial damage to a marine environment 
within the State or any other ecological environment designated by law to be so 
protected. 
(e) “Incendiary device” means any item designed to ignite by hand, chemical 
reaction, or spontaneous combustion, and includes bombs and other explosives. 
(f) “Public service” includes any public water, gas, or power supply; any 
telecommunications service; any transportation service, facility, or road; any service 
furnished by an electric company; or any other public utility. 
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CHAPTER 2400.  BURGLARY AND OTHER CRIMINAL TRESPASS OFFENSES 
 
Section 2401.  Burglary and Home Invasion 
Section 2402.  Criminal Trespass 
Section 2403.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 2401.  Burglary and Home Invasion 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person: 
(1) with intent to commit an offense therein, 
(2) enters or remains in a building, 
(3) knowing that the person has no license or privilege to do so. 
(b) Exception: It is not an offense under this Section to enter or remain upon 
premises which appear at the time to be open to the public unless the person: 
(1) defies a lawful order not to enter or remain upon such premises, 
personally communicated by the owner of the premises or another authorized 
person; or 
(2) in a building partially open to the public, enters or remains in that part 
of the building which is not open to the public. 
(c) Grading.   
(1) Home Invasion.  The offense is a Class 5 felony if: 
(A) the offense is committed in the dwelling of another, and 
(B) the dwelling is occupied, and 
(C) the offense intended under Subsection (a)(1) is robbery, 
aggravated or enhanced aggravated assault, homicide, rape, or kidnapping, 
and 
(D) the person attempts to complete that offense. 
(2) Aggravated Burglary.  If the offense is committed in the dwelling of 
another, it is: 
(A) a Class 6 felony if committed at night; or 
(B) a Class 7 felony in all other cases. 
(3) Burglary.  In all other cases, the offense is a Class 8 felony. 
(4) Grade Adjustment.  The grade of the offense shall be increased by one 
grade if, during commission of or flight from the offense, the defendant either: 
(A) is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or 
(B) causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in 
the offense. 
(d) No Merger with Underlying Offense.  A person may be convicted of both an 
offense under Section 2401 and of committing or attempting to commit the offense that 
was the purpose of the person’s unlawful entry. 
(e) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Attempt” has the meaning given in Section 1107(b). 
(2) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
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(3) “Dwelling” has the meaning given in Section 2403(a).  
(4) “Entry” has the meaning given in Section 2403(b).  
(5) “Night” has the meaning given in Section 2403(c). 
(6) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
 
Section 2402.  Criminal Trespass 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person:  
(1) enters or remains in or upon any real property, 
(2) knowing that he or she has no license or privilege to do so. 
(b) Exception: It is not an offense under this Section to enter or remain upon 
premises which appear at the time to be open to the public unless the person: 
(1) defies a lawful order not to enter or remain upon such premises, 
personally communicated by the owner of the premises or another authorized 
person; or 
(2) in a building partially open to the public, enters or remains in that part 
of the building which is not open to the public. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class A misdemeanor if the real property is a dwelling. 
(2) a Class B misdemeanor if the person intends to peer or peep into the 
window or door of an occupied dwelling. 
(3) a Class D misdemeanor if the real property is fenced or enclosed in a 
manner manifestly designed to exclude intruders. 
(4) a violation in all other cases. 
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Dwelling” has the meaning given in Section 2403(a). 
(2) “Real property” has the meaning given in Section 2403(d).  
 
Section 2403.  Definitions 
(a) “Dwelling” means a structure or vehicle in which a person usually lodges.  
(b) “Entry” is made upon premises when a person introduces any body part or any 
part of any instrument, by whatever means, into or upon the premises.  
(c) “Night” means a period between 30 minutes after sunset and 30 minutes before 
sunrise.  
(d) “Real property” means land or any permanent structures attached to land, 
including buildings.  
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
 
CHAPTER 3100.  BRIBERY, IMPROPER INFLUENCE, AND OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
Section 3101.  Bribery 
Section 3102.  Improper Influence 
Section 3103.  Official Misconduct 
Section 3104.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 3101.  Bribery 
(a) Bribery: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person:  
(1) knowingly offers, confers, or agrees to confer a personal benefit  
(2) that the person believes would influence the performance of an act 
related to the employment or function of a: 
(A) public servant; or 
(B) party officer; or 
(C) witness; and 
(3) the other person is not authorized by law to accept that personal benefit. 
(b) Accepting a Bribe: Offense Defined.  A public servant, party officer or witness 
commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept a personal benefit from 
another person as consideration for influencing or agreeing to influence the 
performance of an act related to his or her employment or function; and 
 (2) he or she is not authorized by law to accept that personal benefit. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class A misdemeanor if, in a prosecution under Subsection (a), the 
defendant’s conduct was a direct response to wrongdoing by the bribe recipient. 
(2) a Class 7 felony in all other cases. 
(d) Forfeiture of Office.  A public servant of this State or any of its political 
subdivisions who is convicted of violating any provision of this Section forfeits the 
person’s office or employment, regardless of whether the conviction is later vacated or 
reversed on appeal. 
(e) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Party officer” has the meaning given in Section 3104(b). 
(2) “Personal benefit” has the meaning given in Section 3104(c). 
(3) “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 3104(d). 
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Section 3102.  Improper Influence 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she uses coercion with 
intent to influence another person’s decision, opinion, vote, or other exercise of discretion 
as a public servant, party officer, or voter.   
(b) Defect in Office No Defense.  It is no defense to a prosecution under this 
Section that a person whom the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the 
desired way, whether because the person had not yet assumed office, lacked jurisdiction, 
or for any other reason.  
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class 8 felony.  
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Coercion” has the meaning given in Section 1107(c). 
(2) “Party officer” has the meaning given in Section 3104(b). 
(3) “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 3104(d). 
 
Section 3103.  Official Misconduct 
(a) Official Misconduct: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or 
she is a public servant, and, intending to obtain a personal benefit or to cause harm to 
another person, the person:  
(1) performs an act the person knows is in excess of the person’s authority; 
or 
(2) knowingly refrains from performing a duty that is imposed by law or is 
clearly inherent in the nature of the office, even if the duty is not directly related to 
the public servant’s official functions; or 
(3) performs official functions in a way intended to benefit the person’s 
own property or financial interests; or 
(4) knowingly performs official functions in a way that is intended to 
discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, age, handicapped status, or 
national origin.  
(b) Profiteering: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person is a 
public servant, and, in contemplation of official action by the public servant or by a 
governmental entity with which the public servant is associated, or in reliance on 
information to which the public servant has access in an official capacity and that has not 
been made public, the person knowingly: 
(1) acquires a pecuniary interest in any property, transaction, or enterprise 
that may be affected by the official action or information; or 
(2) speculates or wagers on the basis of the official action or information; 
or 
(3) aids another person to engage in an act prohibited by Subsection (b)(1) 
or (b)(2), intending to thereby gain a personal benefit.  
(c) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is a Class 7 felony. 
(2) under Subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor.  
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(d) Forfeiture of Office.  A public servant of this State or any of its political 
subdivisions who is convicted of violating any provision of this Section forfeits the 
person’s office or employment, regardless of whether the conviction is later vacated or 
reversed on appeal. 
(e) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Enterprise” has the meaning given in 5304(b). 
(2) “Harm to another person” has the meaning given in Section 3104(a).  
(3) “Personal benefit” has the meaning given in Section 3104(c). 
(4) “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108(h). 
(5) “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 3104(d). 
 
Section 3104.  Definitions 
(a) “Harm to another person” means loss, disadvantage, injury, or anything so 
regarded by the person affected, including acts done to third persons in whose welfare the 
person is interested. 
(b) “Party officer” means a person who holds any position or office in a political 
party, whether by election, appointment, or otherwise.  
(c) “Personal benefit” means: 
(1) any gain or advantage to the recipient personally; or 
(2) a gain or advantage conferred on the behalf of another person in whose 
welfare the person is interested.  
(d) “Public servant” means: 
(1) any officer or employee of the State or any political subdivision thereof, 
and  
(2) persons who are candidates for office or who have been elected to office 
but who have not yet assumed office, and 
(3) includes jurors, and advisors and consultants performing governmental 
functions, but not witnesses.  
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CHAPTER 3200.  PERJURY AND OTHER OFFICIAL FALSIFICATION OFFENSES 
 
Section 3201.  Perjury 
Section 3202.  Falsification Under Penalty 
Section 3203.  Tampering with Public Records 
Section 3204.  Criminal Impersonation 
Section 3205.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 3201.  Perjury 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person: 
(1) makes a false statement of fact, or affirms a false statement of fact 
previously made, 
(2) that the person does not believe to be true, 
(3) while under oath. 
 (b) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 6 felony if: 
(A) the false statement is an oral, testimonial statement in an official 
proceeding, and 
(B) the statement is material to the proceeding. 
(2) a Class 7 felony if the false statement is: 
(A) made in a written instrument that would have no legal efficacy 
in a court of law absent the oath,  
(B) the written instrument is delivered to another person with intent 
to deceive a public servant, and 
(C) the statement is material to the proceeding or matter. 
(3) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(c) Retracted Statement: Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution under this Section 
that the defendant: 
(1) retracted the false statement, 
(2) in the course of the same proceeding in which it was made, and 
(3) the retraction was made: 
(A) before the false statement materially affected the proceeding or 
matter, and 
(B) before it became manifest that the statement’s falsity has been or 
would be exposed. 
(d) No Defense.  In a prosecution under this Section, it is no defense that: 
(1) the defendant was not competent under the Rules of Evidence to make 
the allegedly false statement; or 
(2) the defendant mistakenly believed the false statement to be immaterial; 
or 
(3) the oath was administered or taken in an irregular manner; or 
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(4) a written statement purporting to be made under oath was not in fact 
made under oath; or 
(5) the court in which the acts constituting the offense were committed 
lacked jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject matter. 
(e) Evidentiary Rules. 
(1) Proof of Falsity.  Where contradictory statements are made under oath 
in the same or in different proceedings or matters: 
(A) the prosecution need not specify which statement is false, and 
(B) the falsity of one or the other of the statements may be 
established by proof of their irreconcilable inconsistency. 
(2) Corroboration Required.  In any prosecution under this Section, falsity 
of a statement may not be established solely by the uncorroborated testimony of a 
single witness. 
(f) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Oath” has the meaning given in Section 3205(a). 
(2) “Statement is material” has the meaning given in Section 3205(b).  
 
Section 3202.  Written Falsification Under Penalty 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person: 
(1) makes a false statement, 
(2) that the person does not believe to be true,  
(3) in a written instrument bearing a notice, authorized by law, that false 
statements made therein are punishable. 
(b) Corroboration Required.  In any prosecution under this Section, falsity of a 
statement may not be established solely by the uncorroborated testimony of a single 
witness. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
 
Section 3203.  Tampering with Public Records 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) he or she: 
(A) knowingly removes, mutilates, destroys, conceals, makes a false 
entry in, or falsely alters; or 
(B) having a legal duty to do so, knowingly fails to make an entry in; 
(2) any record or written instrument: 
(A) belonging to, or received or kept by the government for 
information or record; or 
(B) required by law to be kept by another for government reference. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
 
Section 3204.  Criminal Impersonation 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she falsely represents 
himself or herself to be: 
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(1) a public servant; or 
(2) a peace officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician, paramedic, 
or fire police officer, and the representation is made with intent to facilitate the 
commission of or flight from an offense. 
(b) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(2) is: 
(A) a Class 5 felony if the offense facilitated: 
(i) results in physical injury to anyone; or 
(ii) is a Class 1, 2, 3, or 4 felony; or  
(iii) an offense in Chapter 1300 [sexual offenses]. 
(B) a Class 7 felony in all other cases. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Peace officer” has the meaning given in Section 3305(d). 
(2) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1202(d)(1). 
(3) “Public Servant” has the meaning given in Section 3104(d). 
(4) “Sexual intercourse” has the meaning given in Section 1306(e). 
 
Section 3205.  Definitions 
(a) “Oath” includes an affirmation and every other mode authorized by law of 
attesting to the truth of a statement.  
(b) A “statement is material” when, regardless of its admissibility under the 
Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence, it could have affected the course or outcome of the 
proceeding or investigation. 
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CHAPTER 3300.  OFFENSES INVOLVING OBSTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENTAL 
OPERATIONS; ESCAPE 
 
Section 3301.  Obstructing Justice 
Section 3302.  Resisting or Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer 
Section 3303.  Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Government Function 
Section 3304.  Refusing to Aid an Officer 
Section 3305.  Escape 
Section 3306.  Prohibited Conduct Related to Official Custody 
Section 3307.  Intimidating, Improperly Influencing, or Retaliating Against a Witness, 
Juror, or Victim 
Section 3308.  Criminal Contempt 
Section 3309.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 3301.  Obstructing Justice 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) with intent to prevent, hinder, or delay the investigation, apprehension, 
prosecution, or defense of any person,  
(2) he or she: 
(A) provides what he or she knows to be a false, misleading, or 
incomplete oral or written statement to a law enforcement officer or 
agency, and the statement is material to the investigation; or 
(B) harbors or conceals the person; or 
(C) warns the person of impending apprehension; or 
(D) provides the person with money, transportation, a weapon, a 
disguise, or other means of avoiding apprehension; or 
(E) prevents a third person from aiding in the apprehension of the 
person, or lodging a criminal charge against the person; or 
(F) not being a public servant, solicits, confers, or accepts a benefit 
in exchange for dropping, withholding, or refraining from initiating a 
criminal prosecution; or 
(G)  (i) destroys, alters, conceals, or falsifies physical evidence; or  
(ii) suppresses use of physical evidence by force, 
intimidation, or deception; or 
(iii) produces or offers false physical evidence in a 
proceeding; or 
(H) alters, conceals, or falsifies information about an electronic or 
telephone communication, including its: 
(i) existence, 
(ii) place of origin or destination, or  
(iii) originating or receiving telephone number, address, or 
account; or 
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(I) fails to stop and await the arrival of law enforcement or 
emergency personnel following an automobile collision: 
(i) in which the person drove an involved vehicle, and 
(ii) that resulted in the physical injury or death of any person. 
 (b) Grading.   
(1) The offense under Subsection (a)(2)(G) is a Class 8 felony. 
(2) The offense under Subsection (a)(2)(I) is: 
(A) a Class 7 felony if the collision causes death; or 
(B) a Class 8 felony if the collision causes physical injury. 
(3) Otherwise, the offense is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if the offense under investigation or prosecution 
is a felony; or 
(B) a Class A misdemeanor if the offense under investigation or 
prosecution is a misdemeanor. 
(c) Restitution or Indemnification: Defense.  In a prosecution for soliciting, 
conferring, or accepting a benefit in exchange for dropping, withholding, or refraining 
from initiating a criminal prosecution under Subsection (a)(2)(F), it is an defense that the 
benefit did not exceed the amount that the accused believed to be due to him or her as 
restitution or indemnification for harm caused by the underlying offense. 
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Deception” has the meaning given in Section 2110(b) 
(2) “Electronic communication” has the meaning given in Section 4307(e). 
(3) “Law enforcement officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(c). 
(4) “Originating address” or “originating account” has the meaning given in 
Section 4307(h). 
(5) “Physical evidence” has the meaning given in Section 3309(f).  
(6) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(7) “Receiving address” or “receiving account” has the meaning given in 
Section 4307(k). 
(8) “Statement is material” has the meaning given in Section 3502(b). 
 
Section 3302.  Resisting or Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) knowingly resists, obstructs, or interferes with the performance of an act 
within the course and scope of employment 
 
 158 
(2) of one known by the person to be a law enforcement officer, firefighter, 
correctional officer, or emergency medical personnel.17 
(b) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 5 felony if the offense conduct includes disarming a law 
enforcement officer of his or her weapon. 
(2) a Class 8 felony if the defendant uses force or violence upon, or causes 
physical injury to, a law enforcement officer while committing, attempting to 
commit, or fleeing from the offense. 
(3) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Correctional officer” has the meaning given in Section 308(a). 
(2) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(n). 
(3) “Law enforcement officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(b). 
(4) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
 
Section 3303.  Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Government Function 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) knowingly obstructs, impairs, or perverts the administration of law or 
other governmental function 
(2) by physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any 
unlawful act. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 7 felony if the offense conduct is obstructing the efforts of 
public health officials or agencies to control a viral outbreak or other public health 
emergency, or obstructing compliance with a duly served investigative demand of 
the Attorney General under 11 Del. C. § 1509, in an investigation for violation of 
Section 5301 [Organized Crime and Racketeering]. 
(2) a Class 8 felony if the offense conduct is obstructing entry into premises 
for an inspection authorized by Chapter 47 of Title 16. 
(3) a Class A misdemeanor if the offense conduct is a violation of a juror’s 
official duty of secrecy or impartiality. 
(4) a Class B misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Juror” has the meaning given in Section 3309(b). 
 
                                                             
17 Issue:  Should emergency personnel be removed from the list of special persons covered by Section 
3302? 
   Pro:  Current law does not criminalize obstruction of emergency personnel.  Section 3302 does broaden 
the class of persons whose official acts are protected beyond that of current law, but keeps the group very narrow, 
adding only correctional officers (a type of law enforcement officer) and fire fighters (due to the catastrophic effects 
of obstructing their efforts).  Adding more classes beyond this narrow group could proliferate the number of groups, 
rendering useless the general obstruction offense in Section 3303. 
   Con:  Adding emergency medical personnel is a natural extension of the protections already given to 
other first-responders in this Section.  No other classes need be added beyond this. 
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Section 3304.  Refusing to Aid an Officer 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, when commanded to do so, 
he or she: 
(1) knowingly fails to provide reasonable aid 
(2) to a person known by the defendant to be a peace officer 
(3) in: 
(A) effecting a lawful arrest, or 
(B) preventing the commission of an offense by another person. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(c) Limitation on Civil Liability.  A person who complies with a peace officer’s 
command to aid under Subsection (a) shall not be held liable to any person for damages 
resulting from that aid.   
(d) Defined Term.  “Peace officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(d). 
 
Section 3305.  Escape 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) he or she is: 
(A) imprisoned in penal custody under a conviction or charge for an 
offense; or 
(B) otherwise in lawful penal custody, or civilly committed; or  
(C) restrained by a public servant pursuant to an arrest or court 
order; or 
(D) placed in nonsecure facilities by the Division of Youth 
Rehabilitative Services; and 
(2) knowing the person is not permitted to do so, he or she departs from 
custody, commitment, restraint, or placement. 
(b) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1)(A) for escape from penal custody is: 
(A) a Class 4 felony if the person causes physical injury to anyone 
from the time of escape until the person has been returned to penal custody. 
(B) a Class 5 felony if the person uses force or threat of force, or 
possesses a deadly weapon, during commission of the offense. 
(C) a Class 6 felony in all other cases. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(1)(B) is a Class 8 felony. 
(3) under Subsection (a)(1)(C) or (a)(1)(D) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
(2) “Penal custody” has the meaning given in Section 3309(e). 
(3) “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 3104(d). 
 
Section 3306.  Prohibited Conduct Related to Official Custody 
(a) Promoting Prison Contraband: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense 
if, except as authorized by law, he or she: 
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(1) introduces what the person knows to be contraband into a detention 
facility; or 
(2) possesses contraband with intent to deliver it a person confined in a 
detention facility; or 
(3) being confined in a detention facility, makes, obtains, or possesses what 
the person knows to be contraband. 
(b) Misuse of Prisoner Mail: Offense Defined.  A person in penal custody or civil 
commitment commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) communicates by mail with a person not in custody in a manner the 
person knows is likely to cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm; or 
(2) designates a written communication as legal mail, knowing that the 
communication is wholly unrelated to any legal matter. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 7 felony under Subsection (a) if the contraband is a deadly 
weapon; or 
(2) a Class 8 felony under Subsection (a) if the contraband is a mobile 
phone or other prohibited electronic device; or 
(3) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Contraband” has the meaning given in Section 3309(a).  
(2) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
 
Section 3307.  Intimidating, Improperly Influencing, or Retaliating Against a 
Witness, Juror, or Victim 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) with intent to: 
(A) influence the performance of a juror’s duties; or 
(B) deter a party or witness from testifying freely, fully, or truthfully 
in an official proceeding; or 
(C) annoy, harass, intimidate, or victimize a current or former juror 
or witness because of the victim’s service as a juror or witness; or 
(D) prevent a victim or witness from: 
(i) reporting a crime; 
(ii) assisting in the prosecution of a complaint, indictment, 
information, or probation or parole violation; or 
(iii) arresting or seeking the arrest of any person in 
connection with a crime;  
(2) he or she: 
(A) causes or threatens physical injury to anyone; or  
(B) deceives, persuades, or commits an offense against the person or 
a third person; or 
(C) communicates, directly or indirectly, with a juror or witness, 
other than as authorized by law. 
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(b) Exception: Juror Deliberations.  It is not an offense under this Section for 
jurors in the same proceeding to communicate with each other with regard to matters 
admitted as evidence in the proceeding. 
(c) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(2)(A) is a Class 5 felony. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(2)(B) is: 
(A) a Class 5 felony if committed: 
(i) in furtherance of a conspiracy, or 
(ii) for financial gain; or 
(B) a Class 6 felony in all other cases. 
(3) under Subsection (a)(2)(C) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(d) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Deceives” has the meaning given in Section 2110(b). 
(2) “Juror” has the meaning given in Section 3309(b). 
(3) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(4) “Witness” has the meaning given in Section 3309(g). 
 
Section 3308.  Criminal Contempt 
(a) Criminal Contempt: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or 
she engages in the following conduct: 
(1) (A) disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior,  
(B) committed during the sitting of a court, 
(C) in the court’s immediate view and presence, and 
(D) directly tending to interrupt the court’s proceedings, or to impair 
the respect due to its authority; or 
(2) breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to 
interrupt a court’s proceedings; or 
(3) persistent refusal: 
(A) to be sworn as a witness in any court proceeding; or 
(B) having been sworn in, to answer a proper question; or 
(4) publishing what the person knows to be a false or grossly inaccurate 
report of a court’s proceedings; or 
(5) persistent refusal to serve as a juror; or 
(6) intentional, unexcused failure by a juror to attend a trial for which the 
person has been chosen to serve as a juror; or 
(7) intentional failure to appear on the required date, after having been 
released from custody upon condition that the person will later appear personally 
in connection with a criminal proceeding; or 
(8) knowing disobedience or resistance to the process, injunction, order, or 
other mandate of a court. 
(b) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(2)–(7) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
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(3) under Subsection (a)(8) is  
(A) a Class 8 felony if the offense conduct is a violation of or failure 
to obey a protective order issued by a court of any jurisdiction in the United 
States, and the violation or failure: 
(i) results in physical injury to any person; or 
(ii) involves the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon. 
(B) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(c) Summary Punishment for Simple Contempt.  A person who commits the 
offense under Subsection (a)(1) may be convicted and sentenced, without further criminal 
proceedings, during or immediately after termination of the proceeding in which the 
conduct constituting the offense occurred. 
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b) 
(2) “Juror” has the meaning given in Section 3309(c). 
(3) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
 
Section 3309.  Definitions 
(a) “Contraband” means:  
(1) intoxicating liquor; or  
(2) drug prohibited under [Chapter 47 of Title 16, current law]; or 
(3) tobacco or nicotine products; or 
(4) money, without the knowledge or consent of the Department of Health 
and Social Services; or 
(5) any instrument that may be used to effect an escape; or 
(6) mobile phone or other electronic device; or 
(7) a deadly weapon or a part thereof.  
(b) “Juror” means any person who has received notice of summons to appear for 
jury service.  
(c) “Law enforcement officer” means a public servant who is authorized by law or 
by a government agency to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, 
investigation, or prosecution of offenses.  
(d) “Peace officer” means any person who, by virtue of his or her office or public 
employment, is vested by law with a duty to make arrests for offenses, whether that duty 
extends to all offenses or is limited to specific offenses, and regardless of the person’s 
jurisdiction. 
(e) “Penal custody” means custody in a detention facility or a facility of the 
Department of Corrections. 
(f) “Physical evidence” means any object, document, record, or other physical 
item that is, or is about to be, used as evidence in an official proceeding.  
(g) “Witness” means any person who: 
(1) has knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of facts relating to any 
offense; or 
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(2) has testified or been served with a subpoena to testify under oath at an 
official proceeding; or 
(3) has reported an offense.   
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH, ORDER, AND DECENCY 
 
CHAPTER 4100.  OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY 
 
Section 4101.  Riot; Disorderly Conduct; Failure to Disperse 
Section 4102.  Public Alarms 
Section 4103.  Stalking; Harassment 
Section 4104.  Public Intoxication 
Section 4105.  Loitering 
Section 4106.  Obstructing Public Ways 
Section 4107.  Desecration 
Section 4108.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 4101.  Riot; Disorderly Conduct; Failure to Disperse 
(a) Disorderly Conduct: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, with 
intent to cause or create a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, he or she: 
(1) engages in fighting, or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior; 
or 
(2) makes unreasonable noise or offensively coarse utterance, gesture, or 
display, or addresses abusive language to any person present; or  
(3) disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of persons without lawful 
authority; or 
(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition that serves no 
legitimate purpose. 
(b) Failure to Disperse: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) he or she and at least one other person are participating in an offense 
under Subsection (a), and 
(2) a peace officer or other public servant engaged in executing or 
enforcing the law orders the participants and others in the immediate vicinity to 
disperse, and 
(3) the person refuses or knowingly fails to obey the order. 
(c) Grading.  
(1) Riot.  The offense under Subsection (a) is a Class 8 felony if the person 
participates in it with two or more other persons: 
(A) with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of an offense; 
or 
(B) with intent to prevent or coerce official action; or 
(C) in which the person knows a firearm or other deadly weapon will 
be used. 
(2) Disrupting a Funeral.  The offense under Subsection (a) is Class A 
misdemeanor if, within 300 feet of a building or other location where a funeral or 
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memorial service is being conducted, or within 1,000 feet of a funeral procession 
or burial, the person: 
(A) intentionally disturbs or disrupts a funeral, memorial service, or 
funeral procession; or 
(B) directs abusive epithets or makes threatening gestures, knowing 
that the speech or conduct is likely to provoke a violent reaction. 
(3) Failure to Disperse.  The offense under Subsection (b) is a Class C 
misdemeanor. 
(4) Disorderly Conduct.  In all other cases, the offense under Subsection (a) 
is a Class D misdemeanor. 
(d) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
(2) “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 5109(e). 
 
Section 4102.  False Public Alarms 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, knowing that the report, 
warning, or call is false or baseless, he or she: 
(1) initiates or circulates a report or warning of an impending occurrence of 
a fire, explosion, crime, catastrophe or other emergency: 
(A) under circumstances where it is likely to cause evacuation of a 
building, place of assembly, or facility of public transport, or cause public 
inconvenience or alarm; or   
(B) to any law enforcement officer, agency, or other public safety 
official; or 
(2) calls or summons any fire-fighting apparatus, ambulance, or rescue 
truck. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Law enforcement officer” has the meaning given in Section 
3309(c). 
 
Section 4103.  Stalking; Harassment 
(a) Harassment: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another: 
(A) makes communications repeatedly, anonymously, or in 
offensively coarse language; or 
(B) engages in any other alarming or distressing conduct that: 
(i) serves no legitimate purpose, and 
(ii) is in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly 
response, or to cause a reasonable person to suffer fear, alarm, or 
distress. or; 
  (2) knowingly and repeatedly follows, monitors, or interferes with the 
activities or the property of another in a manner described in Subsection (b)(1)(A)(iii). 
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(3) Picketing: Defense.  It is a defense to Harassment that the defendant 
was engaged in lawful picketing. 
(b) Grading. 
(1) Stalking.   
(A) If the defendant’s conduct offense under Subsection (a): 
(i) spans three or more separate incidents, 
(ii) is directed at a specific person, and 
(iii) would cause a reasonable person in the victim’s 
circumstances to: 
(aa) fear physical injury to any person; or 
(bb) suffer other substantial mental anguish or distress, 
regardless of whether that suffering requires medical or other 
professional treatment or counseling; 
(B) then the offense is: 
(i) a Class 7 felony if: 
(aa) the defendant is 21 years of age or older, and the 
victim is less than 14 years of age; or 
(bb) the defendant’s conduct violates a court order 
prohibiting contact with the victim; or 
(ii) a Class 8 felony in all other cases. 
(2) Harassment.  In all other cases, the offense under Subsection (a) is a 
Class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
 
Section 4104.  Public Intoxication 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) appears in a public place manifestly under the influence of alcohol, 
narcotics, or any other drug not administered or prescribed by a physician,  
(2) to the degree that the person may be in danger or endanger other 
persons or property, or annoy persons in the vicinity.  
(b) Grading.  The offense is a violation. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Public place” has the meaning given in Section 4108(c). 
 
Section 4105.  Loitering 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) loiters, congregates with others, or prowls, 
(2) in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding 
individuals, and 
(3) under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or 
property in the vicinity. 
(b) Requirement of Request to Identify and Explain.  Unless flight by the defendant 
or other circumstances make it impracticable, a peace officer shall, before any arrest for 
an offense under this Section, afford the defendant an opportunity to dispel any alarm that 
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would otherwise be warranted, by requesting identification and an explanation of the 
person’s presence and conduct.   
(c) Bar to Conviction.  No person shall be convicted of an offense under this 
Section if the peace officer did not comply with Subsection (b), or if it appears at trial 
that the explanation given by the defendant was true and, if believed by the peace officer 
at the time, would have dispelled the alarm. 
(d) Victim of Human Trafficking: Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution under this 
Section that the defendant committed the offense as a direct result of being a victim of 
human trafficking under Section 1402. 
(e) Grading.  The offense is a violation. 
(f) Defined Terms.  
(1) “Loiters” has the meaning given in Section 4108(a). 
(2) “Peace officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(d). 
 
Section 4106.  Obstructing Public Ways 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, except as authorized by law, 
he or she: 
(1) recklessly renders any public passage unreasonably inconvenient or 
hazardous to use; or 
(2) intentionally enters upon, tampers with, or obstructs a public utility 
right-of-way. 
(b) Picketing: Defense.  It is a defense to the offense under Subsection (a)(1) that 
the defendant was engaged in lawful picketing. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class D misdemeanor. 
(d) Defined Term.  “Public passage” has the meaning given in Section 4108(b). 
 
Section 4107.  Desecration 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) knowing it will outrage the sensibilities of persons likely to observe or 
discover the actions, 
(2) he or she intentionally defaces, damages, pollutes or otherwise 
physically mistreats any: 
(A) public monument or structure, or place of worship; or  
(B) other object of veneration by the public or a substantial segment 
thereof in a public place; or 
(C) burial place. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
 
Section 4108.  Definitions  
(a) “Loiters” means to stand or sit idly without a legitimate reason for doing so. 
(b) “Public passage” includes ingress to or egress from public buildings, 
pedestrian traffic, and vehicular traffic  
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(c) “Public place” means a place to which the public or a substantial group of 
persons has access, and includes highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of 
amusement, parks, playgrounds, prisons and hallways, lobbies and other portions of 
apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual 
residence.  
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CHAPTER 4200.  PUBLIC INDECENCY AND OBSCENITY OFFENSES 
 
Section 4201.  Public Indecency 
Section 4202.  Prostitution; Patronizing a Prostitute 
Section 4203.  Promoting or Permitting Prostitution 
Section 4204.  Distribution and Possession of Obscene Material and Child Pornography 
Section 4205.  Unauthorized Combat Event 
Section 4206.  Abuse of Human Remains or Associated Funerary Objects 
Section 4207.  Cruelty to Animals 
Section 4208.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 4201.  Public Indecency 
(a) Public Sexual Act: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) (A) is in a place open to public view; or 
(B) knows he or she is being viewed by a child less than 16 years of 
age; and 
(2) either: 
(A) performs an act of sexual intercourse or sexual conduct; or 
(B) exposes the person’s sex organs, anus, or breast, with the intent 
to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of the person or another person. 
(b) Non-Sexual Indecency: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or 
she: 
(1) is in a place open to public view, and 
(2) either: 
(A) exposes the person’s sex organs, anus, or breast; or 
(B) urinates or defecates. 
(c) Exception.  Breast-feeding of an infant is not an offense under this Section. 
(d) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1)(B) is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if the person stands in a position of trust, 
authority, or supervision over the child; or 
(B) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(2) under Subsection (a) is a Class B misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(3) under Subsection (b) is a Class D misdemeanor. 
(e) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Place open to public view” has the meaning given in Section 4208(h). 
(2) “Sexual conduct” has the meaning given in Section 4208(i). 
(3) “Sexual intercourse” has the meaning given in Section 1306(e). 
(4) “Position of trust, authority, or supervision” has the meaning given in 
Section 1306(b)  
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Section 4202.  Prostitution; Patronizing a Prostitute 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she offers or accepts a 
fee for performing any act of sexual contact.   
(b) Grading.   
(1) Patronizing a Victim of Sexual Servitude.  If the person patronizes a 
prostitute that he or she knows is a victim of the offense under Section 1402 
[human trafficking], the offense is: 
(A) a Class 5 felony if the prostitute is less than 18 years of age. 
(B) a Class 6 felony in all other cases. 
(2) The offense is a Class B misdemeanor in all other cases.18 
(c) Victims of Human Trafficking: Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution under 
this Section that the defendant committed the offense as a direct result of being a victim 
of human trafficking under Section 1402. 
(d) Screening for Sexually Transmitted Diseases.  Any person convicted under this 
Section must undergo testing for sexually transmitted diseases, as designated by the 
Department of Health and Social Services in its rules and regulations.  The results of the 
testing may only be released to the defendant, the defendant’s spouse, and the court 
issuing the order for testing. 
(e) Definition and Defined Term.   
(1) For the purposes of this Section, an “offer” or “acceptance” may be 
made to or through a third person not participating in the sexual contact. 
(2) “Sexual contact” has the meaning given in Section 1306(d). 
 
Section 4203.  Promoting or Permitting Prostitution 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) knowingly arranges a situation in which a person may engage in 
prostitution; or 
(2) provides premises that the person knows will be used for prostitution; or 
(3) accepts or receives anything of value from another person for 
acquiescing in or supporting prostitution activity. 
(b) Exemption for Prostitutes and Patrons.  Subsection (a) is inapplicable to 
prostitutes and persons patronizing prostitutes, as defined by Section 4202.   
(c) Grading.  The offense is: 
                                                             
18 Issue:  Should 11 Del.C. § 1343(c)–(d), authorizing seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used in connection 
with patronizing a prostitute, be added to Section 4203? 
   Pro:  Vehicle forfeiture economically addresses the reality that demand for prostitution creates supply, 
and that the demand side faces fewer practical consequences for prostitution activity.  It degrades neighborhoods to 
have open-air prostitution, which is encouraged by solicitation from automobiles.  It may also be the case that a 
solicited act of prostitution takes place in the vehicle, making it the equivalent of a brothel.  As a compromise, 
forfeiture could be added as a consequence of a second or subsequent conviction, but not a first conviction. 
   Con:  Forfeiture of a high-value asset is disproportionate to the grade of the offense for patronizing 
prostitution.  The offense is a Class B misdemeanor in proposed Section 4203, and is only “a misdemeanor” in 
current law.  See 11 Del.C. § 1343(b).  The maximum authorized fine for a Class B misdemeanor in 11 Del.C. 
§ 4206(b) is $1,150, which is significantly less than the value of most automobiles.  Furthermore, patronizing 
prostitution is one of only two non-felonies subject to forfeiture in Title 11. 
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(1) a Class 4 felony if the prostitution involved in the offense includes 
prostitution of a person less than 16 years of age. 
(2) a Class 5 felony if the prostitution involved in the offense includes 
prostitution of a person less than 18 years of age. 
(3) a Class 7 felony if the person manages, controls, supervises, or owns a 
prostitution enterprise involving two or more prostitutes. 
(4) a Class 8 felony in all other cases. 
 
Section 4204.  Dissemination and Possession of Obscene Material and Child 
Pornography 
(a) Offenses Defined. 
(1) Dissemination or Creation of Child Pornography.  A person commits 
an offense if he or she knowingly: 
(A) sells, delivers, provides, publishes, exhibits, or otherwise makes 
available to any person any child pornography; or 
(B) creates or participates in the creation of child pornography. 
(2) Possession of Child Pornography.  A person commits an offense if he 
or she possesses child pornography.   
(3) Dissemination of Pornography.  A person commits an offense if he or 
she knowingly: 
(A) sells, delivers, provides, publishes, exhibits, or otherwise makes 
available to any person any representation or embodiment of obscenity; or 
(B) presents, directs, or produces an obscene play, dance, 
performance, or film, or participates directly in the portion that makes it 
obscene. 
(4) Possession of Pornography for Distribution.  A person commits an 
offense if he or she: 
(A) possesses any obscene material, 
(B) with intent to sell or otherwise commercially disseminate that 
material. 
(b) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1) is: 
(A) a Class 4 felony if the offense is committed for financial gain; or 
(B) a Class 5 felony in all other cases. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(2) is: 
(A) a Class 5 felony if the child pornography is possessed with intent 
that it be sold or otherwise commercially disseminated. 
(B) a Class 7 felony in all other cases. 
(3) under Subsection (a)(3) is: 
(A) a Class 7 felony if the person provided obscene material to a 
person less than 18 years of age. 
(B) a Class 8 felony in all other cases. 
(4) under Subsection (a)(4) is a Class 8 felony. 
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(5) Sexting Among Minors.  The offense is a Class C misdemeanor if: 
(A) it involves a visual depiction, exchanged between peers, that 
would otherwise be child pornography, and 
(B) the parties are 12 to 18 years of age or 19 years of age and 
enrolled in high school, and are no more than 3 years apart in age, and 
(C) the offense involves a depiction of one of the parties, and 
(D) for an offense involving dissemination, the defendant reasonably 
believed that the recipient would have consented to receiving the material if 
asked before dissemination. 
(E) Dissemination outside of the relationship described above may 
only produce liability under Section 4305 [Unlawful Dissemination of 
Personal Pornography]19 
(c) Business Closure.  Upon conviction under this Section for obscenity or child 
pornography involving live conduct, the business or establishment that exhibited such 
conduct shall be closed for a period of 6 months. 
(d) Dissemination or Possession for Gain: Permissive Inference.  The trier of fact 
may infer that a person who disseminates or possesses obscene material or child 
pornography for financial gain knowingly disseminates or possesses the material or 
pornography. 
(e) Defenses.  
(1) Dissemination of Obscenity in Special Circumstances: Defense.  It is a 
defense to prosecution for an offense under Subsection (b)(3)(B) or (b)(4) that the 
dissemination: 
(A) was not for financial gain, and was made to a personal associate 
who was 18 years of age or older; or 
(B) was to an institution or individual having scientific or other 
special justification for possessing the material. 
(2) Victims of Human Trafficking: Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution 
under this Section that the defendant committed the offense as a direct result of 
being a victim of human trafficking under Section 1402. 
(3) Victims of Child Pornography.  It is a defense to prosecution under 
Subsection (a)(1)(B) for participating in the creation of child pornography that the 
person is a victim of the offense. 
(f) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Obscene” has the meaning given in Section 4208(g). 
(2) “Child pornography” has the meaning given in Section 4208(a). 
                                                             
19 Issue:  Should Section 4204 contain this lower grade for cases of teenage “sexting”?   
   Pro:  “Sexting” is a relatively recent phenomenon that technically satisfies the elements of child 
pornography offenses.  However, where it involves consensual conduct between young persons in some kind of 
intimate relationship, sexting does not cause the sort of harm that the child pornography offenses exist to combat.  
Without this lower grade, sexting teenagers could be liable for very serious felonies.  Note that most states are 
seeking to address this issue. 
   Con:  No cases indicate that teens who engage in sexting are being charged with child pornography 
offenses.  It is not necessary to complicate an already complicated area of law with these nuances. 
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Section 4205.  Unauthorized Combat Event 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she promotes, arranges, 
advertises, conducts, or participates as a competitor in a combat event that the person 
knows is unauthorized by law. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Combat event” has the meaning given in Section 4208(b). 
 
Section 4206.  Abuse of Human Remains or Associated Funerary Objects 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, except as authorized by law, 
he or she: 
(1) treats human remains in a way that would outrage ordinary family 
sensibilities, while reckless as to the outrageousness of the treatment; or 
(2) knowingly acquires, sells, or transports for profit: 
(A) funerary objects associated with interment; or 
(B) human remains removed from marked or unmarked burials. 
 (b) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(2)(A) is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(3) under Subsection (a)(2)(B) is a Class 8 felony. 
 (c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Funerary object associated with interment” has the meaning given in 
Section 4208(e). 
(2) “Human remains” has the meaning given in Section 4208(f). 
(3) “Unmarked burial” has the meaning given in Section 4208(j). 
 
Section 4207.  Cruelty to Animals 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) subjects any animal to cruelty; or 
(2) subjects, by neglect, any animal in the person’s custody to cruelty; or 
(3) kills or injures any animal belonging to another without legal privilege, 
justification, or consent of the animal’s owner; or 
(4) knowingly facilitates or promotes animal fighting or baiting. 
(b) Exceptions.   
(1) Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are inapplicable to accepted veterinary 
practices and activities carried on for scientific research. 
(2) This Section is inapplicable to lawful hunting or trapping of animals. 
 (c) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(4) is a Class 7 felony. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(3) is a Class 8 felony if the person intentionally 
kills or causes serious physical injury to the animal. 
(3) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(d) Additional Consequences of Conviction.   
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(1) Restricted Possession.  A person convicted under this Section is 
prohibited from owning or possessing any animal after conviction for a period of: 
(A) 15 years for offenses committed under Subsection (c)(1). 
(B) 15 years for offenses committed under Subsection (c)(2), 
excluding commercial animals. 
(C) 5 years for offenses committed under Subsection (c)(3), 
excluding commercial animals. 
(2) Forfeiture.  A person convicted under the Section forfeits: 
(A) all animals in the person’s custody that are victims under this 
Section, or that are owned illegally according to Chapter 79 of Title 3; and 
(B) all equipment, devices, and proceeds involved in any animal 
fighting or baiting operation. 
(3) Mandatory Fines.  A person convicted under this Section must be fined 
at least: 
(A) $5,000 for offenses committed under Subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2). 
(B) $1,000 for all other offenses. 
(4) Counseling.  The court may require a person convicted under 
Subsection (a)(4) to attend and participate in an appropriate treatment program, or 
to obtain appropriate psychiatric or psychological counseling, or both.  The person 
may be required to bear the costs of the treatment. 
(e) Rescue from Unsafe Motor Vehicle 
(1) Justification Defense.  The conduct of a law enforcement officer, animal 
control officer, animal cruelty investigator, or firefighter is justified when and to 
the extent that: 
(A) the conduct is immediately necessary to remove an unattended 
animal from a standing or parked motor vehicle, when 
(B) the animal is confined in the vehicle under conditions likely to 
cause suffering, physical injury, or death, 
(C) provided that: 
(i) the person uses reasonable means to contact the owner of 
the animal, and 
(ii) if the owner cannot be reached, the person leaves written 
notice on the motor vehicle, containing the person’s name and 
office, and the address of the location where the animal can be 
claimed. 
(2) Mistake as to Justification.  The justification defense in Subsection 
(e)(1) is subject to the excuse defense for a mistake as to a justification in Section 
410. 
(3) Excluded Animals.  The justification in this Subsection does not apply 
to the lawful transportation of horses, cattle, swine, sheep, poultry, or other 
agricultural animals in motor vehicles designed to transport those animals. 
(f) Definitions. 
(1) “Commercial animals” has the meaning given in Section 4208(c). 
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(2) “Cruelty” has the meaning given in Section 4208(d). 
(3) “Law enforcement officer” has the meaning given in Section 3309(c). 
(4) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
 
Section 4208.  Definitions 
(a) “Child pornography” means a visual depiction or depictions of a person or 
persons less than 16 years of age engaged in sexual conduct,  
(1) regardless of whether the depiction is actual or simulated, and 
(2) even if the material has been created, adapted, modified, or edited to 
merely appear as though the person is engaged in sexual conduct. 
(b) “Combat event” means any match, contest, or event that features boxing, 
mixed martial arts, or any other combative sport.  
(c) “Commercial animals” means: 
(1) animals grown, raised, or produced within the State for resale, or for 
sale of a product thereof,  
(2) where the person has all necessary licenses for that sale or resale, and 
(3) the person receives at least 25 percent of the person’s annual gross 
income from that sale or resale.  
(d) “Cruelty” means any act or omission whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable 
physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted.  
(e) “Funerary object associated with interment” means:  
(1) an item of human manufacture or use that has been intentionally placed 
with human remains at the time of interment in a burial site, or later as a part of a 
death rite or ceremony of a culture, religion, or other group, and 
(2) includes any gravestone, monument, tomb, or other structure in or 
directly associated with an existing burial site.  
(f) “Human remains” means any part of the body of a deceased human being in 
any stage of decomposition.  
(g) Any material or performance is “obscene,” whether a depiction is actual or 
simulated, if: 
(1) the average person, applying contemporary adult community standards, 
would find that, taken as a whole, it appeals to the prurient interest, and 
(2) it depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way: ultimate sexual acts 
or sadomasochistic sexual acts, masturbation, excretory functions, or lewd 
exhibition of the genitals, and 
(3) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value. 
(h) “Place open to public view” means any place where people would not 
reasonably expect to see the conduct without their prior knowledge or consent.  
(i) “Sexual conduct” means any act designed to produce sexual gratification to any 
person.  It is not limited to sexual intercourse.  
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(j) “Unmarked burial” means any interment of human remains for which there 
exists no grave marker or any other historical documentation providing information as to 
the identity of the deceased. 
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CHAPTER 4300.  INVASION OF PRIVACY OFFENSES 
 
Section 4301.  Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance 
Section 4302.  Voyeurism 
Section 4303.  Interception of Private Information 
Section 4304.  Unlawful Use of Information 
Section 4305.  Unlawful Dissemination of Personal Pornography 
Section 4306.  Unlawful Access to Information 
Section 4307.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 4301.  Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she, except as 
authorized by law, knowingly and without consent: 
(1) trespasses on real property with intent to subject anyone in a private 
place to eavesdropping or other surveillance; or  
(2) installs in a private place, any device for observing, photographing, 
recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds, images, or events occurring in that 
place; or 
(3) installs or uses outside a private place any device for hearing, recording, 
amplifying, or broadcasting sounds originating in the private place that would not 
ordinarily be audible or comprehensible outside that place; or 
(4) installs a location tracking device in or on a motor vehicle without the 
consent of the registered owner, lessor, or lessee of the vehicle.  
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.  
(c) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Private place” has the meaning given in Section 4307(j).  
(2) “Motor vehicle” has the meaning given in Section 2110(d). 
(3) “Trespass on real property” has the meaning given in Section 4307(l). 
 
Section 4302.  Voyeurism 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she knowingly and 
without consent photographs, videotapes, or otherwise records the image of another 
person: 
(1) in the process of getting dressed or undressed; or 
(2) under or through the person’s clothes; or 
(3) who is nude, partially nude, or engaging in sexual conduct. 
(b) Child’s Consent Not Required.  Subsection (a) is inapplicable to a recording 
made by a parent of that parent’s child who is less than 18 years of age, so long as the 
recording is not made with intent to provide sexual gratification to any person. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class 8 felony.  
(d) Defined Term.  “Sexual conduct” has the meaning given in Section 4208(i). 
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Section 4303.  Interception of Private Information 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she, except as 
authorized by law, without consent: 
(1) knowingly intercepts any private electronic, written, or oral 
communication; or 
(2) divulges the contents of a communication that: 
(A) the person knows was unlawfully intercepted under Subsection 
(a)(1); or 
(B) the person learned about in the course of employment with an 
agency or communications common carrier engaged in transmitting the 
communication.  
(b) Exception.  It is not a violation of this Section to overhear messages through a 
regularly installed instrument on a telephone party line, an extension, or any other 
regularly installed instrument or equipment. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.  
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Contents of a communication” has the meaning given in Section 
4307(c). 
(2) “Electronic communication” has the meaning given in Section 4307(e). 
(3) “Intercepts” has the meaning given in Section 4307(g). 
(4) “Private communication” has the meaning given in Section 4307(i). 
 
Section 4304.  Unlawful Use of Information 
(a) Unlawful Use or Disclosure of Information: Offense Defined.  A person 
commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) discloses or uses information or a recording that the person knows was 
obtained in a manner prohibited by Sections 4301, 4302, or 4303; or 
(2) discloses information that is required by law to be kept confidential. 
(b) Misuse of Computer System Information: Offense Defined.  A person commits 
an offense if the person: 
(1) knowingly makes or causes to be made an unauthorized display, use, 
disclosure, or copy, in any form, of data residing in, communicated by, or 
produced by a computer system; or 
(2) knowingly, and without authorization, alters, deletes, tampers with, 
damages, destroys, takes, or adds to data intended for use by a computer system. 
(c) Misuse of Electronic Mail: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if 
he or she: 
(1) knowingly, and without authorization, distributes or causes to be 
distributed unsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail to a receiving address or 
account under the control of any authorized user of a computer system; or 
(2) knowingly fails to prevent commercial electronic mail from being sent 
to any receiving address or account under the control of any authorized user of a 
computer system after being properly requested to do so.  
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(d) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.  
(2) under Subsection (b) is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(3) under Subsection (c) is a Class C misdemeanor. 
(e) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Commercial electronic mail” has the meaning given in Section 
4307(a). 
(2) “Computer system” has the meaning given in Section 4307(b). 
(3) “Data” has the meaning given in Section 4307(d). 
(4) “Electronic mail” has the meaning given in Section 4307(f). 
(5) “Originating address” or “originating account” has the meaning given in 
Section 4307(h). 
(6) “Receiving address” or “receiving account” has the meaning given in 
Section 4307(k). 
 
Section 4305.  Unlawful Dissemination of Personal Pornography 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) disseminates to anyone a visual depiction, not made for commercial 
purposes, of another person: 
(A) engaged in sexual conduct; or 
(B) revealing the person’s sex organs, breast, or anus; 
(2) without the consent the person depicted. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Defendant’s Participation, Consent to Possession Immaterial.  In a prosecution 
under this Section, it is immaterial that the defendant: 
(1) appears in the visual depiction with the victim; or 
(2) possessed the visual depiction lawfully before its dissemination. 
(d) Defined Term.  “Sexual conduct” has the meaning given in Section 4208(i). 
 
Section 4306.  Unlawful Access to Information 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) knowing the person is not authorized to do so,  
(2) he or she accesses, or causes to be accessed, information, electronic 
programs, or data. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class C misdemeanor.   
 
Section 4307.  Definitions 
(a) “Commercial electronic mail” means any electronic mail message that is sent 
to a receiving address or account for the purposes of advertising, promoting, marketing, 
or otherwise attempting to solicit interest in any good, service, or enterprise.  
(b) “Computer system” means a computer, its software, related equipment, and 
communications facilities, if any.  
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(c) “Contents of a communication” includes any information concerning the 
identity of the parties to the communication or the existence, substance, or meaning of 
that communication.  
(d) “Data” means information of any kind in any form.  
(e) “Electronic communication” means any communication made in whole or in 
part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of 
electronic, microwave, radio, cable, satellite, or other connection between the point of 
origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by a common carrier.  
(f) “Electronic mail” means any message that is automatically passed from an 
originating address or account to a receiving address or account.  
(g) “Intercepts,” when applied to a communication, means visual or aural 
acquisition, or the recording by any means, of all or part of the contents of the 
communication.  
(h) “Originating address” or “originating account” means the sequence of 
characters used to specify the source of any electronic mail message.  
(i) “Private communication,” whether electronic, written, or oral, means 
communication made:  
(1) with an expectation that such communication is not subject to 
interception, and  
(2) under circumstances justifying that expectation.  
(j) “Private place” means a place where a person would reasonably expect to be 
safe from unauthorized intrusion or surveillance.  
(k) “Receiving address” or “receiving account” means the sequence of characters 
used to specify the destination of any electronic mail message.   
(l) “Trespass on real property” means any act that satisfies the definition of a 
trespass in Section 2402(a).  
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CHAPTER 4400.  OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY 
 
Section 4401.  Incest 
Section 4402.  Bigamy 
Section 4403.  Child Abandonment 
Section 4404.  Interference with Custody 
Section 4405.  Assisting a Runaway 
Section 4406.  Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor 
Section 4407.  Persistent Non-Support 
Section 4408.  Definition 
 
 
Section 4401.  Incest 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person: 
(1) engages in sexual intercourse or oral or object penetration  
(2) with an individual to whom the person knows he or she: 
(A) is related by blood, marriage, or adoption, and 
(B) stands in one of the following relationships, regardless of 
whether the person is the elder or younger party: 
(i) parent and child; 
(ii) grandparent and grandchild; 
(iii) sibling and sibling; or 
(iv) niece or nephew and aunt or uncle. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Oral or object penetration” has the meaning given in Section 1306(a). 
(2) “Sexual intercourse” has the meaning given in Section 1306(e). 
 
Section 4402.  Bigamy 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the person: 
(1) already having a spouse, subsequently marries another person; or 
(2) being previously unmarried: 
(A) marries another person, 
(B) with knowledge of circumstances that render the other person 
guilty of an offense under Subsection (a)(1). 
(b) Defense: Absent Spouse.  It is a defense to prosecution under this Section that 
the prior spouse had been living apart from the person for a period of 7 consecutive years, 
during which time the person did not know the prior spouse to be alive. 
(c) Grade.  The offense is a Class 8 felony. 
 
Section 4403.  Child Abandonment 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
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(1) being a parent, guardian, or other person legally charged with the care 
or custody of a child, 
(2) the person leaves the child in any place, 
(3) intending to permanently end the person’s care or custody. 
(b) Defense: Abandonment of Newborn at Hospital.  It is a defense to prosecution 
under this Section that the person surrendered care or custody of a baby, no more than 14 
days old: 
(1) inside a hospital’s emergency department, 
(2) directly to a staff member, and 
(3) the baby was alive and unharmed at the time of surrender. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 8 felony if the child is less than 14 years of age. 
(2) a Class A misdemeanor if the child is 14 years of age or older. 
 
Section 4404.  Interference with Custody 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, knowing that the person has 
no legal right to do so, the person takes or entices from the victim’s lawful custodian: 
(1) (A) a child less than 16 years old, 
(B) intending to hold the child permanently or for a prolonged 
period, and 
(C) the person is a relative of the child; or 
(2) a person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person 
or an institution. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 8 felony if the person, after commission of the offense under 
Subsection (a)(1), removes the child from this State. 
(2) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
 
Section 4405.  Harboring or Assisting a Runaway 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, except as authorized by law, 
he or she: 
(1) knowingly encourages or aids a minor to run away from the minor’s 
parents, guardian, or custodian; or 
(2) (A) without the consent of the minor’s parents, guardian, or 
custodian, and without notifying local law enforcement authorities,  
(B) knowingly shelters the minor for more than 48 hours. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
 
Section 4406.  Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, being at least 4 years older 
than the influenced child, he or she: 
(1) acts or fails to act in any way that knowingly causes a child less than 18 
years of age to commit an offense; or 
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(2) (A) permits a child less than 18 years of age to enter or remain in a 
place where unlawful activity is taking place,  
(B) knowing that doing so creates a risk that the child will commit 
an offense. 
(b) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(2) is a Class B misdemeanor. 
 
Section 4407.  Persistent Non-Support 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1)  (A) fails to meet the obligation of a court or administrative order of 
support, 
(B) for a period of at least 4 months; or 
(2) (A) refuses to provide food, clothing, medical care, or shelter for that 
person’s dependent child, 
(B) knowing that the dependent child is in need of such support, 
regardless of whether the dependent child is also receiving support from 
other sources. 
(b) Grading.   
(1) The offense under Subsection (a)(1) is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if: 
(i) full and timely payment has not been made for a period of 
at least 8 months; or 
(ii) the obligation is $10,000 or more in arrears. 
(B) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(2) The offense under Subsection (a)(2) is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(c) Fines Applied to Support Child.  Any money received in payment of a fine 
upon conviction under Subsection (a)(1) shall be applied in accordance with the support 
order.  The court, in its discretion, may order that any money received in payment of a 
fine imposed upon conviction under Subsection (a)(2) be paid for the support of the child 
entitled to it.  Funds received and distributed under this Subsection for either offense 
shall not satisfy the fine owed to the court. 
(d) Defenses. 
(1) Full Payment of Obligation.  In a prosecution under this Section, it is a 
defense that the defendant has fully complied with the support order that formed 
the basis of the charged offense. 
(2) Inability to Pay.  In a prosecution under this Section, it is a defense that 
the defendant did not have the financial resources to pay or provide necessary 
support.  However, the defendant’s inability to pay must be the result of 
circumstances over which the defendant had no control, such as unemployment or 
underemployment that persist despite the defendant diligently pursuing reasonable 
opportunities to earn income.   
(e) Evidentiary Provisions. 
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(1) Sufficient Evidence.  Absent evidence to the contrary, payment records 
maintained by an administrative agency or court through which a support order is 
payable are sufficient evidence of the support paid or unpaid, and of the amount of 
any remaining support obligation. 
(2) No Spousal Communication Privilege.  In a prosecution under this 
Section, there is no privilege against disclosure of confidential communications 
between spouses, and either spouse is competent to testify against the other as to 
any relevant matter. 
(f) Defined Term.  “Dependent child” has the meaning given in Section 4408. 
 
Section 4408.  Definition 
“Dependent child” means: 
(1) a person less than 18 years of age; or 
(2) a person more than 18 years of age but less than 19 years of age who is 
enrolled in high school.  
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CHAPTER 4500.  GAMBLING OFFENSES 
 
Section 4501.  Unlawful Gambling and Betting Practices 
Section 4502.  Cheating and Related Practices 
Section 4503.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 4501.  Unlawful Gambling and Betting Practices 
(a) Unlawful Gambling or Betting: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense 
if, except as authorized by law, he or she: 
(1) sells a lottery ticket, except to raise funds for a charitable purpose; or 
(2) receives or records a bet upon the result of a trial or contest; or 
(3) bets upon the result of a trial or contest on behalf of any person; or 
(4) uses a private wire to disseminate or receive information in furtherance 
of gambling; or 
(5) possesses, buys, sells, or manages what the person knows to be a slot 
machine or other gambling device that is less than 25 years old; or 
(6) benefits financially from investment, participation, or acquiescence in 
conduct, with knowledge of circumstances that render the conduct a violation of 
this Subsection; or 
(7) wagers money or property using dice. 
(b) Providing Premises for Gambling: Offense Defined.  A person commits an 
offense if, except as authorized by law, he or she provides or maintains premises that the 
person knows will be used: 
(1) for gambling activity; or 
(2) to violate any other provision of this Section. 
(c) Exception: Operations Controlled by the State.  It is not a violation of this 
Section to engage in conduct concerning gambling or lottery operations that are under the 
State’s control. 
(d) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1)–(6) is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if the trial or contest involved is animal fighting 
or baiting; or 
(B) a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases; or 
(2) under Subsection (a)(7) is a violation; or 
(3) under Subsection (b) is a Class D misdemeanor.   
 (e) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Gambling device” has the meaning given in Section 4503(a). 
(2) “Lottery ticket” has the meaning given in Section 4503(b). 
(3) “Private wire” has the meaning given in Section 4503(c). 
(4) “Trial or contest” has the meaning given in Section 4503(e). 
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Section 4502.  Cheating at Games and Contests 
(a) Cheating: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, for a game upon 
which a lawful wager may be placed, he or she: 
(1) alters the element of chance, method of selection, or criterion that 
determines: 
(A) the result of a game; or 
(B) the amount of frequency of payment in a game, including 
intentionally taking advantage of a malfunctioning machine; or 
(C) the value of a wagering instrument; or 
(D) the value of a wagering credit; or 
(2) uses a device, without the written consent of the Delaware Lottery 
Director, that is intended to assist anyone in: 
(A) projecting the outcome of a table game or video lottery machine; 
or 
(B) keeping track of the cards played; or 
(C) analyzing the probability of the occurrence of an event relating 
to the game; or 
(D) analyzing the strategy for playing or wagering to be used in the 
game. 
(b) Contest Rigging: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) (A) offers, confers, solicits, or accepts anything of value  
(B) with intent to influence the outcome of a trial or contest, or any 
game or event on which a wager may be placed; or 
(2) places, cancels, or increases or decreases the amount of a wager on the 
basis of non-public information that a contest has been rigged, as provided in 
Subsection (b)(1). 
(c) Unfair Wagering: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) places, cancels, or increases or decreases the amount of a wager, 
(2) on the basis of information regarding the outcome of a table game, and 
(3) that information is not available to other players. 
(d) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(2) under Subsection (b) is a Class 8 felony. 
(3) under Subsection (c) is: 
(A) a Class 5 felony if the amount gained or loss avoided is 
$1,000,000 or more; or 
(B) a Class 6 felony if the amount gained or loss avoided is 
$100,000 or more; or 
(C) a Class 7 felony if the amount gained or loss avoided is $25,000 
or more; or 
(D) a Class 8 felony if the amount gained or loss avoided is $5,000 
or more; or 
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(E) a Class A misdemeanor if the amount gained or loss avoided is 
$1,500 or more; or 
(F) a Class B misdemeanor if the amount gained or loss avoided is 
$100 or more; or 
(G) a Class C misdemeanor if the amount gained or loss avoided is 
less than $100. 
(H) Aggregation.  When the offense under Subsection (c) is 
committed in a single scheme or continuous course of conduct, whether by 
one or several persons, the conduct may be considered a single offense, and 
the amounts involved may be aggregated for grading purposes. 
(e) Forfeiture.  A person convicted under this Section forfeits to the State: 
(1) any devices, slugs, or other materials used in the commission of the 
offense; or 
(2) materials intended to be used to manufacture devices for cheating; or 
(3) vehicles used to store those items. 
(f) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Table game” has the meaning given in Section 4503(d). 
(2) “Video lottery machine” has the meaning given in Section 4503(f). 
 
Section 4503.  Definitions 
(a) “Gambling device” means a device, machine, table, paraphernalia, or 
equipment designed for use in the playing phases of any gambling activity.  The term 
does not include lottery tickets. 
(b) “Lottery ticket” means a policy, number, certificate, or device that entitles the 
holder to receive property upon a contingency based in chance, including number series.  
(c) “Private wire” means any equipment that transmits or receives electronic or 
telephone communications through a wired connection, but is not accessible from a 
public network or utility.  
(d) “Table game” means any game played with cards, dice, or a device or 
machine, that is played for money, credit, or other value.  The term does not include 
video lottery machines.  
(e) “Trial or contest” means any trial or contest of skill, speed, power, or 
endurance, whether of humans or animals, and includes combat events and sports.  
“Combat event” has the meaning given in Section 4208(b). 
(f) “Video lottery machine” means a machine in which bills, coins, tokens, or 
electronic credits are deposited in order to play a game of chance in which the results, 
including options to the player, are randomly and immediately determined by the 
machine.  A machine may use spinning reels or video displays, or both.   
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CRIME CONTROL OFFENSES 
 
CHAPTER 5100.  OFFENSES INVOLVING FIREARMS AND OTHER DEADLY WEAPONS 
 
Section 5101.  Possessing a Firearm or Deadly Weapon During Commission of an 
Offense; Supplying a Firearm for Felonious Possession 
Section 5102.  Dealing in Unlawful Weapons 
Section 5103.  Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon or Dangerous Instrument 
Section 5104.  Possessing or Purchasing Deadly Weapons by Persons Prohibited 
Section 5105.  Providing Weapons to Disqualified Persons 
Section 5106.  Possessing a Firearm While Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol 
Section 5107.  Offenses Related to Background Checks for Firearm Sales 
Section 5108.  Grade Adjustment for Offenses Committed in a Safe School and 
Recreation Zone 
Section 5109.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 5101.  Possessing a Firearm or Deadly Weapon During Commission of an 
Offense; Supplying a Firearm for Felonious Possession 
(a) Possession During a Felony: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if 
he or she possesses a firearm or deadly weapon during the commission of a felony 
(b) Supplying a Firearm for Use During Certain Offenses: Offense Defined.  A 
person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) sells, gives, or otherwise supplies a firearm to another person, 
(2) knowing that the other person intends, while in possession of the 
firearm, to commit: 
(A) a felony; or 
(B) a Class A misdemeanor; or 
(C) an offense under Chapter 5200 [drugs]. 
(c) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is a Class 4 felony. 
(2) under Subsection (b) is a Class 7 felony. 
(d) Conviction for Underlying Felony: Limitation.  A defendant may not be 
convicted of an offense under Subsection (a) unless he or she is convicted of the felony 
during which the defendant was alleged to have possessed the firearm or deadly weapon. 
(e) Use or Intent Not Required.  A defendant may be convicted of an offense under 
Subsection (a) regardless of whether the firearm or deadly weapon is used or intended to 
be used to further the commission of the felony. 
(f) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b).  
(2) “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 5109(e). 
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Section 5102.  Dealing in Unlawful Weapons 
(a) Trafficking a Firearm with an Altered Serial Number: Offense Defined.  A 
person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) transports, ships, or possesses a firearm manufactured after 1972, 
(2) knowing that the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number has been 
removed or altered in a manner that disguises or conceals the identity or origin of 
the firearm.  
(b) Dealing in Unlawful Weapons: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense 
if, except as authorized by law, he or she sells, buys, or possesses: 
(1) a destructive weapon; or 
(2) a knife: 
(A) that is not detectable by a metal detector or magnetometer set at 
standard calibration; or 
(B) the blade of which is: 
(i) released by a spring mechanism or gravity; or 
(ii) supported by a knuckle ring grip handle; or 
(3) a sharp, metal throwing star; or 
(4) either: 
(A) a weapon that, by compressed air or spring, projects a pellet, 
slug, or bullet larger than a B.B. shot, or their pellets, slugs, or bullets; or 
(B) a pellet, slug, or bullet intended to be used by a weapon 
prohibited by Subsection (b)(4)(A). 
(c) Exception: Supplying Weapons to Special Parties.  This Section does not apply 
to weapons provided to: 
(1) law enforcement or military entities; or 
(2) historical societies, museums, and institutional collections that are open 
to the public, so long as the weapons are stored safely and secured from 
unauthorized handling. 
(d) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is a Class 6 felony. 
(2) under Subsection (b)(1) is a Class 7 felony. 
(3) under Subsection (b)(2)(A) is a Class 8 felony. 
(4) is a Class B misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(5) Adjustment for Commission in a Safe School and Recreation Zone.  The 
grade of the offense may be adjusted upward as provided in Section 5108. 
(e) Defined Term.  “Destructive weapon” has the meaning given in Section 
5109(d).  
 
Section 5103.  Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon or Dangerous Instrument 
(a) Offense Defined.  Except as authorized by law, a person commits an offense if 
he or she: 
(1) possesses: 
(A) a deadly weapon; or 
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(B) a dangerous instrument, other than a disabling chemical spray; 
(2) that is concealed, and 
(3) the weapon or instrument is available and accessible for the person’s 
immediate use. 
(b) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(1)(A) is: 
(A) a Class 6 felony if the deadly weapon is a firearm; or 
(B) a Class 8 felony in all other cases. 
(2) under Subsection (a)(1)(B) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Adjustment for Commission in a Safe School and Recreation Zone.  The 
grade of the offense may be adjusted upward as provided in Section 5108. 
(c) Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(1)(B) that the 
defendant:  
(1) did not intend to cause or threaten physical injury to another person, and 
 (2) carried the concealed dangerous instrument for a specific lawful 
purpose. 
(d) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Dangerous instrument” has the meaning given in Section 5109(a). 
(2) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
(3) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
 
Section 5104.  Possessing or Purchasing Deadly Weapons by Persons Prohibited 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she possesses, 
purchases, owns, or controls what the person knows to be a deadly weapon or 
ammunition for a firearm, if the person: 
(1) was previously convicted of: 
(A) a felony; or 
(B) a crime involving violence that resulted in physical injury; or 
(C) an misdemeanor offense under Section 5201(a)–(b) [drug 
possession]; or 
(D) a misdemeanor domestic violence offense, meaning an offense:  
(i) involving threats, endangerment, physical injury, sexual 
contact, or interference with custody,  
(ii) that was committed by: 
(aa) a member of the victim’s family; or 
(bb) a former spouse of the victim; or 
(cc) a person who cohabitated with the victim at the 
time of the offense; or 
(dd) a person with a child in common with the victim; 
(2) (A) has ever been committed to a hospital, mental institution, or 
sanitarium due to a mental disorder, 
(B) unless the person can demonstrate under [§ 1448A of this title] 
that he or she is no longer prohibited; 
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(3) (A) as a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for conduct that would 
constitute a felony if committed by an adult, but 
(B) this prohibition only lasts until the person turns 25 years of age; 
(4) is less than 18 years of age, if: 
(A) the deadly weapon is a handgun, and 
(B) the person intends to use it for an activity other than lawful 
hunting, instruction, sporting, or recreational activity while under the 
supervision of an adult; 
(5) is subject to a protection from abuse order, so long as the order is not: 
(A) ex parte; or 
(B) a contested order issued solely upon 10 Del.C. § 1041(1)d., e., or 
h. [alarming conduct or trespassing]; 
(6) a fugitive from justice who knows he or she is a defendant alleged to 
have committed a felony. 
(b) Limitation on Length of Prohibition.  Any person prohibited under Subsection 
(a) solely as the result of a prior misdemeanor conviction shall only be prohibited for 5 
years following the date of that conviction. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is: 
(1) a Class 6 felony under Subsection (a)(1)–(6) if the unlawfully possessed 
item is a destructive weapon, firearm or ammunition for a firearm. 
(2) a Class 8 felony in all other cases. 
(3) Adjustment for Commission in a Safe School and Recreation Zone.  The 
grade of the offense may be adjusted upward as provided in Section 5108. 
(d) Seizure and Disposal.   
(1) Any deadly weapons or ammunition possessed in violation of 
Subsection (a) may be seized by law enforcement and disposed of, as provided in 
[§ 2311 of this title].  
(2) Exception.  Subsection (d)(1) does not apply to antique firearms, 
manufactured before 1898, that have not been restored to a firing condition, and 
for which ammunition is no longer manufactured in the United States. 
(3) Burden of Proving Exception.  The prohibited person has the burden of 
proving a firearm is an antique subject to the exception in Subsection (d)(2). 
(e) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
(2) “Family” has the meaning given in 10 Del.C. § 901(12). 
(3) “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 5109(e). 
(4) “Handgun” has the meaning given in Section 5109(f). 
(5) “Physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(b). 
(6) “Sexual contact” has the meaning given in Section 1307(e). 
 
Section 5105.  Providing Weapons to Disqualified Persons 
(a) Providing Deadly Weapons to Disqualified Persons: Offense Defined.  A 
person commits an offense if he or she: 
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(1) either: 
(A) sells, gives, or transfers a deadly weapon or ammunition to; or  
(B) buys or obtains a deadly weapon or ammunition on behalf of, 
(2) a person he or she knows to be: 
(A) a person prohibited from ownership or possession under Section 
5104(a); or 
(B) less than the lawful age of purchase, ownership, or possession; 
or 
(C) intoxicated; or 
(D) otherwise legally disqualified from purchasing, owning, or 
possessing the deadly weapon in this State.   
(b) Providing Weapons to Children Without Consent: Offense Defined.  A person 
commits an offense if: 
(1) he or she: 
(A) transfers a B.B., air, or spear gun, or ammunition for those 
weapons, to a child less than 16 years of age; or 
(B) obtains such a weapon or ammunition on behalf of a child less 
than 16 years of age, 
(2) without the consent of the child’s parent or guardian. 
(c) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a)(2)(A) is a Class 8 felony.  
(2) under Subsection (a)(2)(B) is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if: 
(i) the recipient is a child less than 18 years of age, and 
(ii) the weapon is a firearm, and 
(iii) the firearm is transferred without the consent of the 
child’s parent or guardian. 
(B) a Class B misdemeanor if: 
(i) the recipient is a person less than 21 years of age, and 
(ii) the weapon is a deadly weapon designed for the defense 
of one’s person. 
(3) under Subsection (a)(2)(C) is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(4) under Subsection (a)(2)(D) is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if the weapon is a firearm; or 
(B) a Class B misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(5) under Subsection (b) is a Class C misdemeanor. 
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Deadly weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5109(b). 
(2) “Deadly weapon designed for the defense of one’s person” has the 
meaning given in Section 5109(c).  
(3) “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 5109(e). 
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Section 5106.  Possessing a Firearm While Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) possesses a firearm 
(2) in a public place 
(3) while chemically impaired. 
(b) Inoperable Firearm: Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution under this Section 
that: 
(1) the firearm was disassembled or stored in a manner to prevent its 
immediate use; or 
(2) the person did not possess ammunition for the firearm. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(d) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Chemically impaired” has the meaning given in Section 1210(a). 
(2) “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 5109(e). 
(3) “Public place” has the meaning given in Section 4108(c). 
 
Section 5107.  Offenses Related to Background Checks for Firearm Sales 
(a) Sale Without Conducting Required Check: Offense Defined.  A person commits 
an offense if he or she: 
(1) sells or transfers a firearm to another person 
(2) without first performing a criminal history background check, as 
required by [11 Del.C. §§ 1448A and 1448B], to determine whether the sale or 
transfer would violate state or federal law. 
(b) Misuse of Criminal Records: Offense Defined.  A licensed dealer, importer, or 
manufacturer of firearms commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) requests a criminal history record check from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, National Instant Criminal Background Check System, 
(2) with intent to use the information for a purpose other than compliance 
with Subsection (a) and [11 Del.C. §§ 1448A and 1448B]. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(d) Defined Term.  “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 5109(e). 
 
Section 5108.  Grade Adjustment for Offenses Committed in a Safe School and 
Recreation Zone 
(a) Adjustment Defined.  The grade of an offense under Section 5102, 5103, or 
5104 shall be increased by one grade if the weapon was possessed in one of the following 
circumstances, unless the weapon was possessed for the purpose of engaging in any 
school-authorized activity: 
(1) the offense is committed: 
(A) (i) in, on, or within 1,000 feet of a structure or real property; 
or 
(ii) in a motor vehicle; 
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that is owned, operated, leased, or rented by a public or private school, 
including a vocational-technical school or a college or university; or 
(B) in or on any structure that is utilized as a recreation center, 
athletic field, or sports stadium; and 
(2) the unadjusted grade of the offense is a Class 7 felony or lower. 
(b) Private Residence: Defense.  It is a defense to application of the grade 
adjustment in Subsection (a) that: 
(1) the prohibited conduct took place entirely within a private residence, 
and 
(2) no person less than 18 years of age was present in the residence at any 
time during the commission of the offense. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Motor vehicle” has the meaning given in Section 2110(d). 
 
Section 5109.  Definitions 
(a) “Dangerous instrument” means any instrument, article, or substance that, under 
the circumstances in which it is used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of 
causing death or serious physical injury.  The term includes disabling sprays, such as 
“pepper spray,” and electronic devices designed to incapacitate a person, such as 
“Tasers.”   
(b) “Deadly weapon” includes firearms, [whether operable or inoperable,] and: 
(1) a bomb, switchblade knife, any other knife (other than a folding knife, 3 
inches or less in length, in its closed position), billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal 
knuckles, slingshot, or razor; or  
(2) any dangerous instrument, when it is used with intent to cause death or 
serious physical injury. 
(c) “Deadly weapon designed for the defense of one’s person” includes a pistol, 
revolver, stiletto, and steel or brass knuckles.  The term does not include toy pistols, 
pocketknives, knives used for sporting purposes or in domestic households, or surgical 
instruments.  
(d) “Destructive weapon” means: 
(1) a bomb or bomb shell; or 
(2) a firearm silencer; or 
(3) a shotgun: 
(A) with 1 or more barrels less than 18 inches in length; or 
(B) modified to have an overall length of less than 26 inches; or 
(4) a machine gun, or any other weapon that is adaptable for use as a 
machine gun. 
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(e) “Firearm” means any weapon from which a bullet, projectile, or other object 
may be discharged by force of combustion, explosive, gas, and/or mechanical means,20 
regardless of whether the weapon is loaded [or stored in multiple pieces].21  The term 
does not include a B.B. gun.  
(f) “Handgun” means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm designed to be fired when 
held in 1 hand.  
  
                                                             
20 Issue:  Should weapons discharged by “mechanical means” (such as bows) be removed from the 
definition of a “firearm” and added instead to the definition of a “deadly weapon”? 
   Pro:  The sorts of violence associated with guns that justify penalizing their illegal possession and use so 
harshly simply do not occur with bows.  Ordinary people do not intuitively consider bows to be “firearms”, making 
it likely that someone who is prohibited from possessing a firearm might break the law entirely innocently by 
possessing a bow.  Although some mechanical “firearms” (such as compound bows) are certainly capable of 
inflicting serious physical injury or death, they require greater skill to do so than other sorts of firearms, making 
such results unlikely.  They are also much larger than many guns, making them difficult to conceal.   
   Con:  If a projectile weapon can cause death, it should be treated as a firearm.  If a person is dangerous 
using a gun, the person is dangerous using a bow, no matter what other differences there may be between the 
weapons.  Changing the definition of “firearm” exclude bows effectively lessens the punishments associated with 
illegal use of bows, which may encourage offenders to use bows instead of guns.  
21 Issue:  Should the definition of a “firearm” exclude inoperable firearms, as the current draft does?  If so, 
how should inoperable firearms be accounted for in the draft? 
   Pro:  Inoperable firearms do not present the harms that justify punishing illegal use and possession of a 
firearm so harshly.  Inoperable firearms may be used to scare or threaten others, but not to cause physical injury or 
death.  Offenses that aggravate the grade of an offense based on display of what appears to be a firearm will cover 
these cases without defining “firearm” in a counterintuitive way.  The current draft puts two suggested possible 
additions to the text in brackets to account for inoperable firearms, though perhaps only one or the other is 
necessary.  First, inoperable firearms could be treated as deadly weapons, ensuring some punishment for their 
unlawful possession in most cases.  Second, the definition of “firearm” can include firearms that are operable when 
assembled, but are stored in multiple pieces, closing the most worrisome loophole that could result from the draft as 
written. 
   Con:  Current law treats inoperable firearms identically to operable firearms.  Display and possession of 
inoperable firearms encourages gun violence, regardless of what a particular weapon might be capable of, and gun 
violence must be discouraged as strongly as possible under the law. 
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CHAPTER 5200.  DRUG AND RELATED OFFENSES 
 
Section 5201.  Possession of Controlled and Noncontrolled Substances 
Section 5202.  Manufacture or Delivery of Controlled and Noncontrolled Substances 
Section 5203.  Aggravating Factors Providing Grade Increase for Offenses in Sections 
5201–02 
Section 5204.  Drug Paraphernalia Offenses 
Section 5205.  Prescription Drug Registrant Offenses 
Section 5206.  Unlawful Possession of a Prescription Form 
Section 5207.  Internet Pharmacy Offenses 
Section 5208.  Immunity in Life-Threatening Emergency 
Section 5209.  Court Having Jurisdiction 
Section 5210.  Definitions 
 
 
Section 5201.  Possession of Controlled and Noncontrolled Substances 
(a) Possession of a Controlled Substance: Offense Defined.  A person commits an 
offense if, except as authorized by law or as provided in Subsection (b), he or she: 
(1) knowingly possesses, uses, or consumes 
(2) either: 
(A) a controlled substance; or 
(B) a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Possession of Marijuana: Offense Defined.  Except as authorized by law, a 
person commits an offense if he or she knowingly possesses, uses, or consumes: 
(1) being 18 years of age or older, either: 
(A) more than 1 ounce of leaf marijuana; or 
(B) any quantity of marijuana, other than leaf marijuana; or 
(2) any quantity of marijuana, and the person is less than 18 years of age. 
(c) Unlawful Possession of Noncontrolled Prescription Drugs: Offense Defined.  
A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) knowingly possesses for personal use, uses, or consumes, 
(2) a drug that is not a controlled substance, but for which a prescription is 
required by law,  
(3) without an authorized prescription. 
(d) Grading. 
(1) The offense under Subsection (a) is: 
(A) a Class 4 felony if the offense involves a controlled substance in 
a Tier 5 quantity;  
(B) a Class 5 felony if the offense involves a controlled substance in 
a Tier 4 quantity, except as defined in 16 Del.C. § 4751C(2)j. [prescription 
drugs];  
(C) a Class 6 felony if the offense involves a controlled substance in 
a Tier 3 quantity;  
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(D) a Class 7 felony if the offense involves a controlled substance in 
a Tier 2 quantity, except as defined in 16 Del.C. § 4751C(4)j. [prescription 
drugs]; 
(E) a Class 8 felony if the offense involves a controlled substance in 
a Tier 1 quantity; 
(F) a Class B misdemeanor in all other cases. 
(2) The offense under Subsection (b) is a Class C misdemeanor. 
(3) The offense under Subsection (c) is a Class D misdemeanor. 
(4) Grade Adjustments.  The grade of the offense: 
(A) under Subsections (d)(1)(C)–(E) shall be adjusted upward up to 
two grades if aggravating factors under Section 5203 are present, one grade 
per factor; or 
(B) under Subsections (d)(1)(B), (d)(1)(F), (d)(2), or (d)(3) shall be 
adjusted upward one grade if an aggravating factor under Section 5203 is 
present. 
(5) Knowledge of Weight or Quantity Not an Element.  The defendant’s 
culpability as to the precise weight or quantity of a substance is not a required 
element that the State must prove to determine the grade of an offense under 
Subsection (d). 
(e) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Authorized prescription” has the meaning given in Section 5210(b). 
(2) “Controlled substance” has the meaning given in Section 5210(c). 
(3) “Counterfeit controlled substance” has the meaning given in 16 Del.C. 
§ 4701(7). 
(4) “Leaf marijuana” has the meaning given in Section 5210(g). 
(5) “Marijuana” means a controlled substance or counterfeit controlled 
substance classified in 16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(19). 
(6) “Prescription drug” has the meaning given in 16 Del.C. § 4701(38). 
(7) “Tier 1” through “Tier 5” quantities have the meanings given in Section 
5210 (k)–(o). 
 
Section 5202.  Manufacture or Delivery of Controlled and Noncontrolled Substances 
(a) Manufacture or Delivery of a Controlled Substance: Offense Defined.  Except 
as authorized by law, a person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) either: 
(A) manufactures or delivers; or 
(B) possesses with intent to deliver to another person, 
(2) a controlled substance, or a counterfeit or purported controlled 
substance. 
(b) Unlawful Delivery of Noncontrolled Prescription Drugs: Offense Defined.  
Except as authorized by law, a person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) knowingly: 
(A) delivers; or 
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(B) possesses with intent to deliver to another person, 
(2) a drug that is not a controlled substance but for which a prescription is 
required by law. 
(c) Grading.  
(1) The offense: 
(A) under Subsection (a)(1)(A) is one grade higher than it would be 
under Subsection (a)(1)(B) for the same amount of the same substance. 
(B) under Subsection (a)(1)(B) is: 
(i) a Class 5 felony if the offense involves a controlled 
substance in a Tier 4 quantity; 
(ii) a Class 6 felony if the offense involves a controlled 
substance in a Tier 2 quantity; 
(iii) a Class 7 felony if the offense involves a controlled 
substance in a Tier 1 quantity or less; or 
(iv) a Class 8 felony in all other cases. 
(2) The offense: 
(A) under Subsection (b)(1)(A) is a Class A misdemeanor; or 
(B) under Subsection (b)(1)(B) is a Class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Grade Adjustment.  The grade of the offense shall be adjusted upward 
one grade if an aggravating factor under Section 5203 is present, but in no case 
shall the grade of the offense be adjusted higher than a Class 4 felony. 
(4) Knowledge of Weight or Quantity Not an Element.  The defendant’s 
culpability as to the precise weight or quantity of a substance is not a required 
element that the State must prove to determine the grade of an offense under 
Subsection (c). 
(d) Valid Prescription Within Household: Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution 
under Subsection (b) that: 
(1) the prescription drug was possessed by the person while transporting the 
drug to a member of the person’s household who had a valid prescription for the 
drug, and 
(2) the prescription drug was in: 
(A) the original container in which it was dispensed or packaged; or 
(B) a pillbox or other daily pill container. 
(e) Remediation and Cleanup Costs.  Any sentence for an offense under 
Subsection (a) for offense conduct involving manufacturing shall include restitution for 
all reasonable costs, if any, associated with: 
(1) remediation of the site of manufacture,  
(2) cleanup of any substances, materials, or hazardous waste, and 
(3) cleanup of any other site resulting from the manufacturing operation, 
including disposal of substances or materials. 
(f) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Controlled substance” has the meaning given in Section 5210(c). 
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(2) “Counterfeit controlled substance” has the meaning given in 16 Del.C. 
§ 4701(7). 
(3) “Deliver” or “delivery” has the meaning given in Section 5210(d). 
(4) “Prescription drug” has the meaning given in 16 Del.C. § 4701(38). 
(5) “Purported controlled substance” has the meaning given in 16 Del.C. 
§ 4701(43). 
(6) “Tier 1” through “Tier 5” quantities have the meanings given in Section 
5210 (k)–(o). 
 
Section 5203.  Aggravating Factors Providing Grade Increase for Offenses in 
Sections 5201–02 
(a) The offenses defined in Sections 5201 and 5202 shall have their grades 
increased as provided in those Sections if any of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) The offense was committed on, in, or—except for private places—
within 300 feet of a structure or real property: 
(A) owned, operated, leased, or rented by: 
(i) a public or private kindergarten, elementary, secondary, or 
vocational-technical school; or 
(ii) a church, synagogue, or other place of worship; or 
(B) in a park or recreation area, including parkland. 
(2) The offense was committed inside a motor vehicle. 
(3) At the time of the offense: 
(A) the defendant was at least 18 years of age, and 
(B) the offense involved an accomplice, co-conspirator, or recipient 
of a controlled substance who was less than 18 years of age, and 
(C) the defendant was at least 4 years older than the other person. 
(b) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Accomplice” has the meaning given in Section 5210(a). 
(2) “Co-conspirator” has the meaning given in Section 5210(b). 
(3) “Controlled substance” has the meaning given in Section 5210(c). 
(4) “Motor vehicle” has the meaning given in Section 2110(d). 
(5) “Parkland” has the meaning given in 9 Del.C. § 8110(a)(2). 
(6) “Private place” has the meaning given in Section 4307(j). 
 
Section 5204.  Drug Paraphernalia Offenses 
(a) Use of Drug Paraphernalia: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, 
except as authorized by law or provided in [16 Del.C. § 4774(b)], he or she uses, or 
possesses with intent to use, drug paraphernalia. 
(b) Manufacture and Sale of Drug Paraphernalia: Offense Defined.  A person 
commits an offense if, except as authorized by law: 
(1) he or she: 
(A) delivers, conveys, sells, or converts drug paraphernalia; or 
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(B) possesses or manufactures drug paraphernalia with intent to 
deliver it; 
(2) being reckless as to whether it will be used as drug paraphernalia in 
violation of Subsection (a). 
(c) Advertising Drug Paraphernalia: Offense Defined.  A person commits an 
offense if he or she: 
(1) places an advertisement in a publication, 
(2) being reckless as to whether the advertisement will promote the sale of 
drug paraphernalia. 
(d) Paraphernalia for Use of Marijuana: Limit on Multiple Charges.  A person 
charged under Section 5201(b) may not also be charged under Section 5204(a) for 
possession of drug paraphernalia pertaining to the use of marijuana. 
(e) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is a Class B misdemeanor; or 
(2) under: 
(A) Subsection (b)(1)(B) is a Class B misdemeanor; or 
(B) Subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases; or 
(3) under Subsection (c) is a Class D misdemeanor. 
(4) Grade Adjustment.  The grade of the offense under Subsection (b) shall 
be increased by one grade if the defendant: 
(A) is 18 years of age or older, and 
(B) sells or delivers drug paraphernalia 
(C) to a person less than 18 years of age. 
 (f) Defined Terms.   
(1) “Deliver” or “delivers” has the meaning given in Section 5210(d). 
(2) “Drug paraphernalia” has the meaning given in Section 5210(e). 
(3) “Marijuana” means a controlled substance or counterfeit controlled 
substance classified in 16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(19). 
 
Section 5205.  Prescription Drug Registrant Offenses 
(a) Unlawfully Distributing Prescription Drugs: Offense Defined.  Except as 
authorized by law, a person subject to subchapter III of Chapter 47 of Title 16 commits 
an offense if he or she knowingly distributes or dispenses a controlled substance: 
(1) on Schedule II, III, or IV without the written prescription of a 
practitioner; or 
(2) by refilling a prescription for a Schedule II substance; or 
(3) unless renewed by the practitioner who prescribed it, by refilling a 
prescription for a Schedule III or IV substance: 
(A) more than 6 months after the date of the prescription; or 
(B) more than 5 times; or 
(4) on Schedule V, without a legitimate medical purpose; or 
(5) not authorized by the person’s registration under [16 Del.C. § 4732, et 
seq.] 
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(b) Administering Performance Enhancing Steroids: Offense Defined.  A person 
commits an offense if: 
(1) with intent to increase human muscle weight or improve human 
performance in any form of exercise, sport, or game, 
(2) he or she prescribes or administers to another person an anabolic 
steroid. 
(c) Grading.  The offense is a Class 8 felony. 
(d) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Anabolic steroid” has the meaning given in [16 Del.C. § 4718(f)]. 
(2) “Controlled substance” has the meaning given in Section 5210(c). 
(3) “Practitioner” has the meaning given in Section 2110(g). 
(4) “Prescription drug” has the meaning given in 16 Del.C. § 4701(38). 
(5) “Registrant” has the meaning given in Section 5210(i). 
(6) A “Schedule” substance has the meaning given in [16 Del.C. § 4714 
(Schedule I), 4716 (Schedule II), 4718 (Schedule III), 4720 (Schedule IV), or 4722 
(Schedule V)]. 
 
Section 5206.  Unlawful Possession of a Prescription Form 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) possesses a blank prescription form or pad, and 
(2) is not a practitioner. 
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class 8 felony. 
(c) Defined Term.  “Practitioner” has the meaning given in Section 2110(g). 
 
Section 5207.  Internet Pharmacy Offenses 
(a) Distributing or Prescribing Drugs Through an Internet Pharmacy: Offense 
Defined.  A person commits an offense if: 
(1) the person is an internet pharmacy, or its owner or operator, and without 
an authorized prescription: 
(A) the person knowingly participates in the sale, distribution, 
dispensing, or delivery of a prescription drug 
(B) that was requested by a prescription drug order, and 
(C) the drug is to be delivered within the State; or 
(2) the person is a practitioner, and: 
(A) the practitioner issues a prescription drug order without an 
authorized prescription, 
(B) through what the practitioner knows to be an internet pharmacy, 
and 
(C) the drug is to be delivered within the State. 
(b) Patronizing an Internet Pharmacy: Offense Defined.  A person commits an 
offense if, without an authorized prescription, he or she: 
(1) purchases a prescription drug to be delivered within this State, 
(2) from what the person knows to be an internet pharmacy. 
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(c) Advertising an Internet Pharmacy: Offense Defined.  An internet pharmacy, or 
its owner or operator, commits an offense if it: 
(1) advertises, makes a sales presentation, or directly communicates to 
anyone within the State, 
(2) that a prescription drug may be obtained: 
(A) through a web-based consultation, questionnaire, or medical 
history form, 
(B) submitted to the internet pharmacy through a website.   
(d) Exception: Delaware Delivery Clearly Excluded.  Subsection (c) is 
inapplicable to an internet pharmacy if its advertisement or website clearly and 
conspicuously asserts that it will not deliver or ship prescription drugs to any location 
within this State. 
(e) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is: 
(A) a Class 4 felony if the prescription drug causes the death of its 
intended user. 
(B) a Class 5 felony if the prescription drug causes serious physical 
injury to its intended user. 
(C) a Class 6 felony in all other cases. 
(2) under Subsection (b) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(3) under Subsection (c) is a Class 6 felony. 
(f) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Authorized prescription” has the meaning given in Section 5210(b). 
(2) “Internet pharmacy” has the meaning given in Section 5210(f). 
(3) “Patient-practitioner relationship” has the meaning given in [16 Del.C. 
§ 4701(31)]. 
(4) “Practitioner” has the meaning given in Section 2110(g). 
(5) “Prescription drug” has the meaning given in 16 Del.C. § 4701(38). 
(6) “Serious physical injury” has the meaning given in Section 1210(c). 
 
Section 5208.  Immunity for Use of Inculpatory Evidence Obtained in Life-
Threatening Emergency 
(a) Immunity Defined.  If law enforcement authorities discover inculpatory 
evidence only because an offender calls those authorities or official medical personnel to 
report what the offender reasonably believes to be an overdose or other life-threatening 
medical emergency, that evidence may not be used against the offender in a criminal 
prosecution. 
(b) Applicable Offenses: Limitation.  The immunity in Subsection (a) only applies 
to evidence of offenses defined in Chapter 5200. 
(b) Defined Term.  “Overdose” has the meaning given in Section 5210(h). 
 
Section 5209.  Court Having Jurisdiction 
(a) Generally.  Except as provided in Subsection (b): 
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(1) the Superior Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over 
violations of this Chapter by persons 18 years of age or older, and 
(2) the Family Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over violations 
of this Chapter by persons less than 18 years of age. 
(b) Exception.  The Court of Common Pleas has original jurisdiction, concurrent 
with the Superior Court, over violations of the following Sections by persons 18 years of 
age or older: 
(1) Section 5201(b) [possession of marijuana], 
(2) Section 5201(c) [unlawful possession of noncontrolled prescription 
drugs], 
(3) Section 5201(d)(1)(F) [possession of either a controlled substance in 
less than Tier 1 quantity, or a counterfeit controlled substance], and 
(4) Section 5204 [drug paraphernalia offenses]. 
 
Section 5210.  Definitions 
The following terms have the definitions provided.  Additional definitions relevant 
to this Chapter can be found in 16 Del.C. § 4701: 
(a) “Accomplice” means a person who is legally accountable for the conduct of 
another, as provided in Section 211. 
(b) “Authorized prescription” means a prescription issued by a licensed 
practitioner who has a patient-practitioner relationship with the intended recipient of the 
prescription drug. 
(c) “Co-conspirator” means a person involved with the defendant in a criminal 
conspiracy, as provided in Section 703. 
(d) “Controlled substance” means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in 
Schedules I through V of subchapter II of Chapter 47 of Title 16, and includes designer 
drugs.   
(e) “Deliver” or “delivery” means the actual or constructive transfer from one 
person to another, whether or not there is an agency relationship. 
(f) “Drug paraphernalia” has the meaning given in [16 Del.C. § 4701(17)].  But it 
does not include items that are traditionally intended for use with tobacco products, such 
as pipes, paper, or accessories. 
(g) “Internet pharmacy” means any person: 
(1) maintaining a website that solicits or receives, or offers to solicit or 
receive, prescription drug orders 
(2) to be dispensed and delivered to Delaware patients through the mail or 
other delivery service.   
“Internet pharmacy” does not include a pharmacy that has been issued a valid permit or 
license by the Delaware State Board of Pharmacy. 
(h) “Leaf marijuana” means the dried leaves and flowering tops of the plant 
cannabis sativa L. 
(i) “Overdose” means an acute condition including physical illness, coma, mania, 
hysteria, or death resulting from the consumption or use of an ethyl alcohol, a controlled 
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substance, another substance with which a controlled substance was combined, a 
noncontrolled prescription drug, or any combination of these, including any licit or illicit 
substance. 
(j) “Registrant” means a person who has obtained registration to engage in 
activities related to prescription drugs under [16 Del.C. § 4732, et seq]. 
(k) “Tier 5 quantity” of a controlled substance means: 
(1) 25 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(b)(4)]; or 
(2) 5 grams or more of any morphine, opium or any salt, isomer or salt of 
an isomer thereof, including heroin, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714], or of any 
mixture containing any such substance; or 
(3) 5000 grams or more of marijuana, as described in [16 Del.C. 
§ 4701(26)]; or 
(4) 25 grams or more of methamphetamine, including its salt, isomer or salt 
of an isomer thereof, or of any mixture containing any such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(3)]; or 
(5) 25 grams or more of amphetamine, including its salts, optical isomers 
and salt of its optical isomers, or of any mixture containing any such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(1)]; or 
(6) 25 grams or more of phencyclidine, or of any mixture containing any 
such substance, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(e)(5)]; or 
(7) 500 or more doses or, in a liquid form, 50 milligrams or more of 
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), or any mixture containing such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(9)]; or 
(8) 62.5 or more doses or 12.5 or more grams or 12.5 milliliters or more of 
any substance as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714] that is not otherwise set forth in 
this definition, a designer drug as described in [16 Del.C. § 4701(9)], or of any 
mixture containing any such substance; or  
(9) 62.5 or more doses, or 12.5 or more grams, or 12.5 milliliters or more of 
3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), its optical, positional and 
geometric isomers, salts and salts of isomers, or any mixture containing such 
substance, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(21)].  
(l) “Tier 4 quantity” of a controlled substance means: 
(1) 20 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(b)(4)]; or 
(2) 4 grams or more of any morphine, opium or any salt, isomer or salt of 
an isomer thereof, including heroin, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714], or of any 
mixture containing any such substance; or 
(3) 4000 grams or more of marijuana, as described in [16 Del.C. 
§ 4701(26)]; or 
(4) 20 grams or more of methamphetamine, including its salt, isomer or salt 
of an isomer thereof, or of any mixture containing any such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(3)]; or 
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(5) 20 grams or more of amphetamine, including its salts, optical isomers 
and salt of its optical isomers, or of any mixture containing any such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(1)]; or 
(6) 20 grams or more of phencyclidine, or of any mixture containing any 
such substance, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(e)(5)]; or 
(7) 250 or more doses or, in a liquid form, 25 milligrams or more of 
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), or any mixture containing such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(9)]; or 
(8) 50 or more doses or 10 or more grams or 10 milliliters or more of any 
substance as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714] that is not otherwise set forth in this 
definition, a designer drug as described in [16 Del.C. § 4701(9)], or of any mixture 
containing any such substance; or  
(9) 50 or more doses, or 10 or more grams, or 10 milliliters or more of 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), its optical, positional and geometric 
isomers, salts and salts of isomers, or any mixture containing such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(21)]; or 
(10) 60 or more substantially identical doses of a narcotic Schedule II or III 
controlled substance that is a prescription drug, or 6 grams or more of any mixture 
that contains a narcotic Schedule II or III controlled substance that is a 
prescription drug. 
(m) “Tier 3 quantity” of a controlled substance means: 
(1) 15 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(b)(4)]; or 
(2) 3 grams or more of any morphine, opium or any salt, isomer or salt of 
an isomer thereof, including heroin, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714], or of any 
mixture containing any such substance; or 
(3) 3000 grams or more of marijuana, as described in [16 Del.C. 
§ 4701(26)]; or 
(4) 15 grams or more of methamphetamine, including its salt, isomer or salt 
of an isomer thereof, or of any mixture containing any such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(3)]; or 
(5) 15 grams or more of amphetamine, including its salts, optical isomers 
and salt of its optical isomers, or of any mixture containing any such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(1)]; or 
(6) 15 grams or more of phencyclidine, or of any mixture containing any 
such substance, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(e)(5)]; or 
(7) 100 or more doses or, in a liquid form, 25 milligrams or more of 
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), or any mixture containing such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(9)]; or 
(8) 37.5 or more doses, 7.5 or more grams, or 7.5 milliliters or more of any 
substance as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714] that is not otherwise set forth in this 
definition, a designer drug as described in [16 Del.C. § 4701(9)], or of any mixture 
containing any such substance; or  
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(9) 37.5 or more doses, 7.5 or more grams, or 7.5 milliliters or more of 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), its optical, positional and geometric 
isomers, salts and salts of isomers, or any mixture containing such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(21)]. 
(n) “Tier 2 quantity” of a controlled substance means: 
(1) 10 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(b)(4)]; or 
(2) 2 grams or more of any morphine, opium or any salt, isomer or salt of 
an isomer thereof, including heroin, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714], or of any 
mixture containing any such substance; or 
(3) 1500 grams or more of marijuana, as described in [16 Del.C. 
§ 4701(26)]; or 
(4) 10 grams or more of methamphetamine, including its salt, isomer or salt 
of an isomer thereof, or of any mixture containing any such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(3)]; or 
(5) 10 grams or more of amphetamine, including its salts, optical isomers 
and salt of its optical isomers, or of any mixture containing any such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(1)]; or 
(6) 10 grams or more of phencyclidine, or of any mixture containing any 
such substance, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(e)(5)]; or 
(7) 50 or more doses or, in a liquid form, 5 milligrams or more of lysergic 
acid diethylamide (LSD), or any mixture containing such substance, as described 
in [16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(9)]; or 
(8) 25 or more doses, 5 or more grams, or 5 milliliters or more of any 
substance as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714] that is not otherwise set forth in this 
definition, a designer drug as described in [16 Del.C. § 4701(9)], or of any mixture 
containing any such substance; or  
(9) 25 or more doses, 5 or more grams, or 5 milliliters or more of 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), its optical, positional and geometric 
isomers, salts and salts of isomers, or any mixture containing such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(21)]; or 
(10) 30 or more substantially identical doses of a narcotic Schedule II or III 
controlled substance that is a prescription drug, or 3 grams or more of any mixture 
that contains a narcotic Schedule II or III controlled substance that is a 
prescription drug. 
(o) “Tier 1 quantity” of a controlled substance means: 
(1) 5 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(b)(4)]; or 
(2) 1 gram or more of any morphine, opium or any salt, isomer or salt of an 
isomer thereof, including heroin, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714], or of any 
mixture containing any such substance; or 
(3) 175 grams or more of marijuana, as described in [16 Del.C. 
§ 4701(26)]; or 
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(4) 5 grams or more of methamphetamine, including its salt, isomer or salt 
of an isomer thereof, or of any mixture containing any such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(3)]; or 
(5) 5 grams or more of amphetamine, including its salts, optical isomers 
and salt of its optical isomers, or of any mixture containing any such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(d)(1)]; or 
(6) 5 grams or more of phencyclidine, or of any mixture containing any 
such substance, as described in [16 Del.C. § 4716(e)(5)]; or 
(7) 25 or more doses or, in a liquid form, 2.5 milligrams or more of lysergic 
acid diethylamide (LSD), or any mixture containing such substance, as described 
in [16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(9)]; or 
(8) 12.5 or more doses, 2.5 or more grams, or 2.5 milliliters or more of any 
substance as described in [16 Del.C. § 4714] that is not otherwise set forth in this 
definition, a designer drug as described in [16 Del.C. § 4701(9)], or of any mixture 
containing any such substance; or  
(9) 12.5 or more doses, 2.5 or more grams, or 2.5 milliliters or more of 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), its optical, positional and geometric 
isomers, salts and salts of isomers, or any mixture containing such substance, as 
described in [16 Del.C. § 4714(d)(21)]. 
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CHAPTER 5300.  OFFENSES INVOLVING ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING 
 
Section 5301. Organized Crime and Racketeering 
Section 5302. Gang Participation 
Section 5303. Money Laundering 
Section 5404. Definitions 
 
 
Section 5301.  Organized Crime and Racketeering 
(a) Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or she knowingly: 
(1) conducts or participates in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern 
of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt; or 
(2) acquires or maintains, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of 
any enterprise or property through a pattern of racketeering activity or proceeds 
derived therefrom; or 
(3) uses or invests, directly or indirectly, proceeds derived from a pattern of 
racketeering activity in the acquisition of any interest in, establishment of, or 
operation of any enterprise or real property.  
(b) Grading.  The offense is a Class 4 felony.  
(c) Forfeiture.  A person who commits an offense under Subsection (a) shall 
forfeit to the State any property or other benefit used in the course of, intended for use in 
the course of, or derived from conduct in violation of Subsection (a), including: 
(1) any property constituting an interest in or means of control or influence 
over the enterprise involved in the violation of Subsection (a), 
(2) any property constituting proceeds derived from conduct in violation of 
Subsection (a), 
(3) any position, office, appointment, tenure, commission, or employment 
contract that the person acquired or maintained in violation of Subsection (a), and 
(4) any compensation, right, or benefit derived from an item in Subsection 
(c)(3).  
(d) Discretionary Treble Fines.  Any person convicted of an offense in violation of 
Subsection (a) may be sentenced to pay a fine: 
(1) up to three times the value gained or loss caused by the offense, 
whichever is greater, plus 
(2) court costs and reasonably incurred costs of investigation and 
prosecution. 
(e) Renunciation. 
(1) Defense for Preventing Commission of the Offense.  A defense to 
prosecution under Subsection (a) is available for a voluntary and complete 
renunciation preventing commission of the offense, under the same terms as the 
defense in Section 706 [renunciation defense for attempt, solicitation, and 
conspiracy].   
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(2) Sentencing Mitigation for Unsuccessful Attempt to Prevent Commission 
of the Offense.  If the offense is not prevented under Subsection (e)(1), but the 
defendant made a substantial effort to prevent commission of the offense, that fact 
shall be taken into account as a mitigating factor during sentencing. 
(f) Unconvictable Confederate, Change in Identity No Defense.  In any 
prosecution under this Section where it is alleged that the defendant acted as a member of 
a group or informal organization: 
(1) Section 704 applies as to the other members, and 
(2) it is no defense that the defendant is not a member due to a change in 
number or identity of persons in the group or organization, as long as two or more 
of the original members remain in the group. 
(g) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Enterprise” has the meaning given in Section 5304(b). 
(2) “Pattern of racketeering activity” has the meaning given in Section 
5304(d). 
(3) “Proceeds” has the meaning given in Section 5304(e). 
(4) “Unlawful debt” has the meaning given in Section 5304(f). 
(5) “Voluntary and complete renunciation” has the meaning given in 
Section 706(b). 
 
Section 5302.  Gang Participation 
(a) Gang Participation: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he or 
she: 
(1) engages in any conduct that benefits a criminal street gang, 
(2) knowing that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of 
criminal gang activity, and 
(3) who knowingly promotes, furthers, or assists in any criminal conduct by 
members of that gang that would constitute a felony.  
(b) Recruitment of Juveniles: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if he 
or she knowingly solicits, invites, recruits, encourages, or otherwise causes a person less 
than 18 years of age to participate in or become a member of a criminal street gang.  
(c) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is a Class 7 felony.  
(2) under Subsection (b) is a Class 8 felony.  
(d) Defined Terms. 
(1) “Criminal street gang” has the meaning given in Section 5304(a). 
(2) “Pattern of criminal gang activity” has the meaning given in Section 
5304(c).  
 
Section 5303.  Money Laundering 
(a) Money Laundering: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if the 
person knowingly: 
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(1) conceals, possesses, transfers, transports, acquires or maintains an 
interest in the proceeds of criminal activity; or 
(2) conducts, supervises, or facilitates a transaction involving the proceeds 
of criminal activity; or 
(3) invests, expends,  receives, or offers to invest, expend, or receive the 
proceeds of criminal activity; or 
(4) provides, holds, or invests funds that are intended to further the 
commission of criminal activity; or 
(5) engages in a transaction involving the proceeds of criminal activity 
intended, in whole or in part, to avoid a currency transaction reporting requirement 
under the laws of this State, any other state, or the United States.  
(b) Structuring: Offense Defined.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to 
evade a transaction reporting requirement of this State or of the United States, he or she: 
(1) causes a financial institution, money transmitter, check casher, or any 
other individual or entity required by law to file a report regarding currency 
transactions or suspicious transactions: 
(A) to fail to file a report; or 
(B) to file a report that contains a material omission or misstatement; 
or 
(2) conducts or assists in conducting one or more transactions in currency, 
in any amount and in any manner, at one or more financial institutions, money 
transmitters, check cashers, or other entities required by law to file a report 
regarding currency transactions or suspicious transactions.  
(c) Grading.  The offense: 
(1) under Subsection (a) is a Class 6 felony.  
(2) under Subsection (b) is a Class 8 felony.   
(d) Knowledge of Specific Criminal Activity Not Required.  Knowledge of the 
specific nature of the criminal activity giving rise to the proceeds is not required to 
establish culpability under this Section.  
(e) Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution under this Section that the funds were 
received as bona fide legal fees by a licensed attorney and at the time of their receipt, the 
attorney did not have actual knowledge that the funds were derived from criminal 
activity.  
(f) Defined Term.  “Proceeds” has the meaning given in Section 5304(e). 
 
Section 5304.  Definitions 
(a) “Criminal street gang” means any ongoing organization, association, or group 
of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, that has: 
(1) a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, 
(2) whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged 
in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and  
(3) has as one of its primary activities the commission of criminal offenses.  
(b) “Enterprise” means: 
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(1) any sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, governmental, or 
other legal entity, and 
(2) any union, association, or group of persons associated in fact, even if 
not a legal entity. 
(c) “Pattern of criminal gang activity” means the commission of two or more 
incidents of conduct, the last of which occurred within three years of a prior offense, that 
constitute felony violations of offenses involving violence, coercion, sexual activity, 
controlled substances, property damage, or deadly weapons, and 
(1) were committed on separate occasions; or 
(2) were committed by two or more persons.  
(d) “Pattern of racketeering activity” means the commission of two or more 
incidents of conduct, the last of which occurred within 10 years of a prior incident of 
conduct, that: 
(1) are related to the affairs of the enterprise, 
(2) are not so closely related to each other and connected in time and place 
that they constitute a single event, and  
(3) constitute: 
(A) any activity defined as “racketeering activity” under 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1961(1)(A), (1)(B), (1)(C), or (1)(D); or 
(B) a felony under this Code.  
(e) “Proceeds” means funds acquired or derived directly or indirectly from, 
produced through, or realized through an act. 
(f) “Unlawful debt” means a debt incurred or contracted in an illegal gambling 
activity or business, or a debt that is unenforceable under state law, in whole or in part, as 
to either principal or interest.  
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  SUMMARY GRADING TABLE 
 
Class 1 Felony 
(Maximum Authorized Punishment – [Capital Punishment]; no less than life) 
Offense Description Section 
  
intentionally causing death of another person (murder in the first degree) 1101(b) 
  
Class 2 Felonies  
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – life; no less than [15] years) 
Offense Description Section 
  
recklessly causing death of another person with depraved indifference to human 
life (murder in the second degree) 
1102(b) 
knowingly causing the death of another person (murder in the second degree) 
1102(b) 
recklessly causing death of a law-enforcement officer in the line of duty (murder 
of law enforcement officer) 
1102(b) 
recklessly causing death by use or detonation of a bomb (murder by explosive) 
1102(b) 
recklessly causing death with intent to avoid or prevent arrest (evasive murder) 
1102(b) 
negligently causing death of another person while committing, fleeing from, or 
attempting any felony (felony murder) 
1102(b) 
providing a person less than 18 years of age, knowing the person's body parts 
will be removed for sale (trafficking in body parts of a minor) 
1402(b)(4)(A) 
benefitting financially from participation in a venture known to harvest the 
organs of a person less than 18 years of age for sale (benefitting from trafficking 
in body parts of a minor) 
1402(b)(4)(A) 
providing a person from a shelter, knowing the person's body parts will be 
removed for sale (trafficking in body parts of a sheltered person) 
1402(b)(4)(B) 
benefitting financially from participation in a venture known to harvest the 
organs of a victim taken from a shelter (benefitting from trafficking in body parts 
of sheltered persons) 
1402(b)(4)(B) 
knowingly causing a catastrophe 2305(a)(2)(A) 
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Class 3 Felonies  
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – [35] years; in specified cases – no 
less than [5] years) 
Offense Description Section 
  
causing serious physical injury while coercing sexual intercourse (enhanced 
aggravated rape) 
1301(b)(5) 
using a deadly weapon while causing another person to have sexual intercourse 
through coercive circumstances (enhanced aggravated rape) 
1301(b)(5) 
coercing a person under 12 years of age to have sexual intercourse with a person 
at least 18 years of age (enhanced aggravated rape) 
1301(b)(5) 
causing another person to have sexual intercourse through coercive 
circumstances with at least two present participants (gang rape) 
1301(b)(5) 
providing a person, knowing the person's body parts will be removed for sale 
(trafficking in body parts) 
1402(b)(1) 
benefitting financially from participation in a venture known to harvest human 
organs for sale (benefitting from trafficking in body parts) 
1402(b)(1) 
knowingly compelling labor, services, or prostitution of a person less than 18 
years of age (forced labor or sexual servitude of a minor) 
1402(b)(4)(A) 
knowingly providing a person less than 18 years of age for forced labor or sexual 
servitude 
1402(b)(4)(A) 
knowingly compelling labor, services, or prostitution of a person from a shelter 
(forced labor or sexual servitude of a sheltered person) 
1402(b)(4)(B) 
knowingly providing a person from a shelter for forced labor or sexual servitude 
1402(b)(4)(B) 
  
Class 4 Felonies 
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – [25] years; in specified cases – no 
less than [3] years) 
Offense Description Section 
  
recklessly causing death of another person (manslaughter) 1103(c) 
causing the death of another person that would be murder, except that the 
defendant committed the offense under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance (manslaughter mitigation) 
1103(c) 
negligently causing the death of another person by use of a firearm possessed in 
violation of Section 5104 (negligent homicide by unlawful firearm) 
1104(b)(1) 
taking a vehicle from another by force, and on occupant of the vehicle is less than 
14 years of age (carjacking involving a minor) 
1201(b)(1)(A) 
taking property from another by force, thereby causing physical injury to anyone 
(aggravated robbery) 
1201(b)(2)(A) 
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taking property from another by force while displaying or representing that the 
person is in possession of a deadly weapon (aggravated robbery) 
1201(b)(2)(B)–(C) 
assault by which a person knowingly causes the loss of another person’s limb 
(enhanced aggravated assault) 
1202(b)(1)(A) 
knowingly causing serious physical injury to another during commission of or 
flight from a felony (assault in furtherance of a felony) 
1202(b)(1)(B) 
knowingly causing serious physical injury by abuse or neglect of a child less than 
14 years of age (enhanced aggravated assault of a child) 
1202(b)(1)(C) 
causing serious physical injury while causing oral or object penetration to another 
person through coercive circumstances (enhanced aggravated penetration) 
1301(b)(4) 
using a deadly weapon while causing oral or object penetration to another person 
through coercive circumstances (enhanced aggravated penetration) 
1301(b)(4) 
oral or object penetration against a person under 12 years of age, caused by a 
person at least 18 years of age through coercive circumstances (enhanced 
aggravated penetration) 
1301(b)(4) 
oral or object penetration against another person, caused by at least two present 
participants through coercive circumstances (gang penetration) 
1301(b)(4) 
causing non-serious physical injury while causing another person to have sexual 
intercourse through coercive circumstances (aggravated rape) 
1301(b)(5) 
causing a person less than 14 years of age to have sexual intercourse with a 
person at least four years older through coercive circumstances (aggravated rape) 
1301(b)(5) 
causing another person to have sexual intercourse through coercive 
circumstances, in the course of committing another felony (aggravated rape) 
1301(b)(5) 
unlawful restraint for reward, etc.; victim not released alive, unharmed 
(aggravated kidnapping) 
1401(c)(2)(A) 
knowingly compelling labor, services, or prostitution (forced labor or sexual 
servitude) 
1402(b)(2) 
knowingly providing a person for forced labor or sexual servitude 1402(b)(2) 
knowingly damaging a building by intentionally starting a fire or causing an 
explosion, knowing another person was within the building (enhanced aggravated 
arson) 
2301(b)(1)(A) 
recklessly causing a catastrophe 2305(a)(2)(B) 
causing physical injury during escape from penal custody following a charge or 
conviction 
3306(b)(1)(A) 
knowingly promoting or profiting from prostitution of a person less than 16 years 
of age (aggravated prostitution of a minor) 
4203(c)(1) 
knowingly creating or disseminating child pornography for financial gain 4204(b)(1)(A) 
possessing a firearm or deadly weapon during commission of a felony 5101(c)(1) 
knowingly possessing a controlled substance in a Tier 5 quantity 5201(d)(1)(A) 
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manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance in a Tier 4 quantity 5202(c)(1)(A) 
knowingly selling or delivering a prescription drug through an internet pharmacy 
to a Delaware resident or location, and the drug causes the death of its intended 
user (heinous distribution of drugs through an internet pharmacy) 
5207(e)(1)(A) 
knowingly issuing a prescription drug order through an internet pharmacy, for 
delivery in Delaware, and the drug causes the death of its intended user (heinous 
prescription of drugs through an internet pharmacy) 
5207(e)(1)(A) 
(1) participating in the affairs of an enterprise; (2) acquiring an interest in an 
enterprise or property; or (3) uses or invests proceeds derived; through a pattern 
of racketeering activity (racketeering) 
5301(b) 
  
Class 5 Felonies 
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – [15] years) 
Offense Description Section 
  
negligently causing death of a child under 14 years of age by abuse or neglect 
(homicide by abuse) 
1104(b)(2) 
taking a vehicle from another by force, in the course of committing: (1) a Class D 
felony or greater; (2) an offense involving driving under the influence; or (3) a 
drug offense (aggravated carjacking) 
1201(b)(1)(B) 
knowingly causing serious physical injury to another person by means of a 
firearm or deadly weapon (aggravated assault) 
1202(b)(2)(A) 
recklessly causing serious physical injury by abuse or neglect of a child less than 
14 years of age (serious reckless injuring by abuse or neglect) 
1203(b)(1)(A)(i) 
recklessly causing unlawful termination of a pregnancy without the consent of 
the pregnant female (recklessly causing miscarriage) 
1203(b)(1)(A)(ii) 
causing non-serious physical injury while causing oral or object penetration to 
another person through coercive circumstances (aggravated penetration) 
1301(b)(4) 
oral or object penetration against a person less than 14 years of age, caused by a 
person at least four years older through coercive circumstances (aggravated 
penetration) 
1301(b)(4) 
committing any other felony in the course of causing oral or object penetration to 
another person through coercive circumstances (aggravated penetration) 
1301(b)(4) 
engaging in sexual intercourse in an enumerated prohibited relationship 
(enhanced aggravated prohibited sexual contact) 
1302(b)(1) 
unlawful restraint for reward, etc.; victim released alive, unharmed (kidnapping) 
1401(c)(2)(B) 
knowingly trading, bartering, buying, or selling a person less than 18 years of age 
(trafficking a minor) 
1402(b)(4)(A) 
knowingly trading, bartering, buying, or selling a person from a shelter 
(trafficking a sheltered person) 
1402(b)(4)(B) 
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theft of $1,000,000 or more 2101(b)(1) 
knowingly manufacturing, using, displaying, advertising, distributing, selling, or 
possessing with intent to sell or distribute any item or service bearing or 
identified by a counterfeit mark (trademark counterfeiting) in an amount of 
$1,000,000 or more 
2201(c)(2) 
issuing a bad check in an amount of $1,000,000 or more, knowing it will not be 
honored by the drawee 
2204(b) 
using a payment card that is stolen, revoked, forged, or fictitious to obtain 
property or services valued at $1,000,000 or more (unlawful use of payment 
card) 
2205(b)(1) 
committing deceptive business practices that cause a loss of $1,000,000 or more 
2206(c) 
intentionally hindering enforcement of a security interest by destroying, 
removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise dealing with 
property subject to that security interest, causing a loss of $1,000,000 or more 
(defrauding secured creditors) 
2207(b) 
intentionally defrauding a creditor during insolvency, causing a loss of 
$1,000,000 or more 
2208(b) 
knowingly damaging a building by intentionally starting a fire or causing an 
explosion, while reckless as to the presence of other persons within (aggravated 
arson) 
2301(b)(1)(B) 
knowingly causing damage, loss of $1,000,000 or more 2304(b)(2) 
entering the dwelling of another with intent to commit an enumerated violent 
felony; attempt to commit violent felony (home invasion) 
2401(c)(1) 
falsely representing oneself to be a police officer or emergency personnel with 
intent to facilitate a serious offense (aggravated impersonation of law 
enforcement) 
3204(b)(2)(A) 
disarming a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or correctional officer 
(disarming a law enforcement officer) 
3302(b)(1) 
escape from penal custody following a charge or conviction by force or threat of 
force, or while in possession of a deadly weapon 
3306(b)(1)(B) 
intimidating, improperly influencing, or retaliating against a witness, juror, or 
victim by causing or threatening physical injury to anyone 
3307(c)(1) 
intimidating, improperly influencing, or retaliating against a witness, juror, or 
victim: (1) in furtherance of a conspiracy; or (2) for financial gain 
3307(c)(2)(A) 
offering a fee in exchange for performance of sexual conduct by a victim of 
sexual servitude less than 18 years of age (patronizing a minor victim of sexual 
servitude) 
4202(b)(1)(A) 
knowingly promoting or profiting from prostitution of a person less than 18 years 
of age (prostitution of a minor) 
4203(c)(2) 
knowingly creating or disseminating child pornography, but not for financial gain 
4204(b)(1)(B) 
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possessing child pornography with intent to distribute it commercially 
(possessing child pornography for commercial distribution) 
4204(b)(2)(A) 
wagering on a table game on the basis of unlawful private information; gain (or 
loss avoided) of $1,000,000 or more 
4502(d)(3)(A) 
knowingly possessing a controlled substance in a Tier 4 quantity 5201(d)(1)(B) 
manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance in a Tier 2 quantity 5202(c)(1)(A) 
possessing with intent to deliver a controlled substance in a Tier 4 quantity 5202(c)(1)(B)(i) 
knowingly selling or delivering a prescription drug through an internet pharmacy 
to a Delaware resident or location, and the drug causes serious physical injury to 
its intended user (aggravated distribution of drugs through an internet pharmacy) 
5207(e)(1)(B) 
knowingly issuing a prescription drug order through an internet pharmacy, for 
delivery in Delaware, and the drug causes serious physical injury to its intended 
user (aggravated prescription of drugs through an internet pharmacy) 
5207(e)(1)(B) 
  
Class 6 Felonies 
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – [8] years) 
Offense Description Section 
  
negligently causing the death of another person (negligent homicide) 1104(b)(1) 
knowingly aiding another person to commit suicide, and the suicide is committed 
1105(b)(1) 
taking a vehicle from another by force, and the person (1) uses the vehicle to 
commit reckless endangerment; or (2) compels a lawful occupant of the vehicle 
to leave the vehicle (carjacking) 
1201(b)(1)(C) 
knowingly causing serious physical injury to another person (aggravated assault) 
1202(b)(2)(B)(i) 
knowingly causing (non-serious) physical injury to a pregnant female 
(aggravated assault of a pregnant woman) 
1202(b)(2)(B)(ii) 
knowingly circumcising a female under 18 years of age, or, being the parent of 
the female minor, allowing the circumcision to be performed (genital mutilation 
of a minor female) 
1206(c) 
causing serious physical injury while causing sexual contact to another person 
through coercive circumstances (enhanced aggravated sexual assault) 
1301(b)(1)(A)(i)(aa) 
using a deadly weapon while causing sexual contact to another person through 
coercive circumstances (enhanced aggravated sexual assault) 
1301(b)(1)(A)(i)(bb)-(cc) 
sexual contact against a person under 12 years of age, caused by a person at least 
18 years of age through coercive circumstances (enhanced aggravated sexual 
assault) 
1301(b)(1)(B) 
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causing another person to have sexual intercourse through coercive 
circumstances (rape) 
1301(b)(5) 
engaging in oral or object penetration in an enumerated prohibited relationship 
(aggravated prohibited sexual contact) 
1302(b)(2) 
engaging in or causing another person to engage in sexual contact with the 
genitalia of an animal (bestiality) 
1303(b) 
knowingly trading, bartering, buying, or selling a person (human trafficking) 
1402(b)(3) 
theft of $100,000 or more 2101(b)(2) 
knowingly manufacturing, using, displaying, advertising, distributing, selling, or 
possessing with intent to sell or distribute any item or service bearing or 
identified by a counterfeit mark (trademark counterfeiting) in an amount of 
$100,000 or more 
2201(c)(2) 
issuing a bad check in an amount of $100,000 or more, knowing it will not be 
honored by the drawee 
2204(b) 
using a payment card that is stolen, revoked, forged, or fictitious to obtain 
property or services valued at $100,000 or more (unlawful use of payment card) 
2205(b)(1) 
committing deceptive business practices that cause a loss of $100,000 or more 
2206(c) 
intentionally hindering enforcement of a security interest by destroying, 
removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise dealing with 
property subject to that security interest, causing a loss of $100,000 or more 
(defrauding secured creditors) 
2207(b) 
intentionally defrauding a creditor during insolvency, causing a loss of $100,000 
or more 
2208(b) 
knowingly damaging a building by intentionally starting a fire or causing an 
explosion (arson) 
2301(b)(1)(C) 
manufacturing or possessing an incendiary device with intent to injure or damage 
(unlawful incendiary devices) 
2303(b) 
knowingly causing damage, loss of $100,000 or more 2304(b)(2) 
recklessly causing damage, loss of $1,000,000 or more 2304(b)(1)(A) 
knowingly causing an ecological catastrophe 2305(e)(1)(A)(i) 
entering the dwelling of another at night with intent to commit an offense therein 
(nocturnal aggravated burglary) 
2401(c)(2)(A) 
making a materially false statement under oath in an official proceeding 
(testimonial perjury) 
3201(b)(1) 
escape from penal custody following a charge or conviction 3306(b)(1)(C) 
intimidating, improperly influencing, or retaliating against a witness, juror, or 
victim by deception, persuasion, or commission of an offense 
3308(c)(2)(B) 
offering a fee in exchange for performance of sexual conduct by an adult victim 
of sexual servitude (patronizing a victim of sexual servitude) 
4202(b)(1)(B) 
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wagering on a table game on the basis of unlawful private information; gain (or 
loss avoided) of $100,000 or more 
4502(d)(3)(B) 
knowingly trafficking a firearm with an altered or removed serial number 5102(d)(1) 
carrying a concealed firearm 5103(b)(1)(A) 
possession of a destructive weapon, firearm or ammunition by a person 
prohibited 
5104(c)(1) 
knowingly possessing a controlled substance in a Tier 3 quantity 5201(d)(1)(C) 
manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance in a Tier 1 quantity or less 
5202(c)(1)(A) 
possessing with intent to deliver a controlled substance in a Tier 2 quantity 5202(c)(1)(B)(ii) 
knowingly selling or delivering a prescription drug through an internet pharmacy 
to a Delaware resident or location (distribution of drugs through an internet 
pharmacy) 
5207(e)(1)(C) 
knowingly issuing a prescription drug order through an internet pharmacy, for 
delivery in Delaware (prescription of drugs through an internet pharmacy) 
5207(e)(1)(C) 
advertising sale of prescription drugs through an internet pharmacy on the basis 
of a web-based consultation or questionnaire 
5207(e)(3) 
engaging in a transaction involving the proceeds of criminal activity (money 
laundering) 
5303(d)(1) 
  
Class 7 Felonies 
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – [4] years) 
Offense Description Section 
  
knowingly aiding another person to commit suicide, and the suicide is attempted 
1105(b)(2) 
taking property from another by force or threat of force (robbery) 1201(b)(3) 
knowingly causing (non-serious) physical injury to another person by means of a 
firearm or deadly weapon (assault) 
1202(b)(3)(A)(i)(aa) 
knowingly causing the breathing or blood circulation of another person to be 
impeded by applying pressure to that person’s throat (strangulation) 
1202(b)(3)(A)(i)(bb) 
recklessly causing serious physical injury to another person (aggravated reckless 
injuring) 
1203(b)(1)(B) 
causing non-serious physical injury while causing sexual contact to another 
person through coercive circumstances (aggravated sexual assault) 
1301(b)(2)(A) 
sexual contact against a person less than 14 years of age, caused by a person at 
least four years older through coercive circumstances (aggravated sexual assault) 
1301(b)(2)(B) 
causing sexual contact to another person through coercive circumstances, in the 
course of committing another felony (aggravated sexual assault) 
1301(b)(2)(C) 
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causing oral or object penetration to another person through coercive 
circumstances (oral or object penetration) 
1301(b)(4) 
theft of $25,000 or more 2101(b)(3)(A) 
theft of a firearm 2101(b)(3)(B) 
forging: (1) money, stamps, securities, or other valuable instruments issued by 
the government; or (2) stocks or bonds. 
2201(c)(1)(A) 
knowingly manufacturing, using, displaying, advertising, distributing, selling, or 
possessing with intent to sell or distribute any item or service bearing or 
identified by a counterfeit mark (trademark counterfeiting) in an amount of 
$25,000 or more 
2201(c)(2) 
issuing a bad check in an amount of $25,000 or more, knowing it will not be 
honored by the drawee 
2204(b) 
using a payment card that is stolen, revoked, forged, or fictitious to obtain 
property or services valued at $25,000 or more (unlawful use of payment card) 
2205(b)(1) 
committing deceptive business practices that cause a loss of $25,000 or more 
2206(c) 
intentionally hindering enforcement of a security interest by destroying, 
removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise dealing with 
property subject to that security interest, causing a loss of $25,000 or more 
(defrauding secured creditors) 
2207(b) 
intentionally defrauding a creditor during insolvency, causing a loss of $25,000 
or more 
2208(b) 
with intent to defraud, obtaining personal identifying information of another, or 
possessing devices for obtaining information encoded on payment cards 
(aggravated identity theft) 
2209(b)(1) 
knowingly causing damage, loss of $25,000 or more 2304(b)(2) 
recklessly causing damage, loss of $100,000 or more 2304(b)(1)(B) 
recklessly creating a risk of catastrophe (risking catastrophe) 2305(b)(2) 
recklessly causing an ecological catastrophe 2305(e)(1)(A)(ii) 
entering the dwelling of another with intent to commit an offense therein 
(aggravated burglary) 
2401(c)(2)(B) 
knowingly soliciting or accepting a bribe (receiving a bribe) 3101(c)(2) 
knowingly offering or conferring a bribe (offering a bribe) 3101(c)(2) 
intentionally obtaining a personal benefit or harming another person through acts 
in excess of authority, discrimination, or refusing to perform a duty (official 
misconduct) 
3103(c)(1) 
making a materially false statement under oath in a written instrument (written 
perjury) 
3201(b)(2) 
falsely representing oneself to be a police officer or emergency personnel with 
intent to facilitate an offense (impersonation of law enforcement) 
3204(b)(2)(B) 
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failure to await arrival of law enforcement following a motor vehicle accident 
that resulted in death (aggravated flight from motor vehicle accident) 
3301(b)(2)(A) 
wearing a disguise during commission of a felony 3303(b)(1) 
obstructing the control and suppression of rabies in a place and at a time when a 
state of emergency as to rabies has been declared pursuant to § 8211 of Title 3 
3304(b)(1) 
introducing contraband into a detention facility or, being detained in the facility, 
possessing contraband; and the contraband is a deadly weapon (enhanced 
aggravated promotion of prison contraband) 
3306(c)(2) 
knowingly promoting or profiting from prostitution of two or more persons, in a 
position of management or ownership (operating a prostitution enterprise) 
4203(c)(3) 
possessing child pornography 4204(b)(2)(B) 
knowingly distributing obscene material to a person less than 18 years of age 
(distributing obscene material to a minor) 
4204(b)(3)(A) 
intentionally promoting or facilitating animal fighting or baiting (animal fighting) 
4207(c)(1) 
wagering on a table game on the basis of unlawful private information; gain (or 
loss avoided) of $25,000 or more 
4502(d)(3)(C) 
knowingly selling or providing a firearm to a person who intends to commit a 
crime while in possession of the firearm (supplying firearm for felonious 
possession) 
5101(c)(2) 
selling, buying, or possessing a destructive weapon 5102(d)(2) 
knowingly possessing a controlled substance in a Tier 2 quantity 5201(d)(1)(D) 
manufacturing or delivering a counterfeit or purported controlled substance 5202(c)(1)(A) 
possessing with intent to deliver a controlled substance in a Tier 1 quantity or 
less 
5202(c)(1)(B)(iii) 
delivering drug paraphernalia by an adult to a person less than 18 years of age 
(dealing drug paraphernalia to a minor) 
5202(e)(2)(A) 
participation in a criminal street gang 5302(c)(1) 
  
Class 8 Felonies 
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – [2] years) 
Offense Description Section 
  
knowingly aiding another person to commit suicide, but the suicide is not 
attempted 1105(b)(3) 
performing an unlawful abortion 1106(c)(1)(B) 
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recklessly causing (non-serious) physical injury to a child less than (1) 4 years of 
age (reckless injuring of a child); or (2) 14 years of age who has significant 
intellectual or developmental disabilities; or (3) 14 years of age, and injury is 
caused by a deadly weapon. 
1203(b)(2)(A) 
recklessly engaging in conduct creating a substantial risk of death  to another 
person (aggravated reckless endangerment) 
1204(b)(1) 
threatening to commit a crime likely to result in death or serious injury to the 
person or property of a public servant (terroristic threats to a public servant) 
1207(b)(1)(A) 
intentionally placing another person in fear of imminent physical injury by 
displaying a firearm or deadly weapon (aggravated menacing) 
1207(b)(2)(A)(i) 
intentionally causing another person to believe he or she has been exposed to a 
substance or device that could cause physical injury or death (terroristic hoax) 
1207(b)(2)(A)(ii) 
intentionally altering another person's mental or physical condition by 
administering a drug without that person's consent (unlawfully administering 
drugs) 
1208(b) 
engaging in sexual contact in an enumerated prohibited relationship (prohibited 
sexual contact) 
1302(b)(3) 
residing or loitering on or within 500 feet of a school, having been previously 
convicted of a sexual offense against a minor (prohibited conduct by convicted 
child sex offenders) 
1304(b) 
threatening to commit a sexual offense against another person, or knowingly 
causing alarm to another person by suggesting or soliciting sexual contact, and 
the victim is a child over whom the defendant stands in a position of trust, 
authority, or supervision (aggravated sexual harassment) 
1305(b)(1) 
knowingly interfering with another person's liberty without consent, results in 
reckless endangerment (aggravated unlawful restraint) 
1401(c)(1)(A) 
theft of $5,000 or more 2101(b)(4)(A) 
theft of a motor vehicle 2101(b)(4)(B) 
theft of a blank prescription pad 2101(b)(4)(C) 
forging a deed, will, codicil, contract, or other instrument relating to a legal right 
or interest 
2201(c)(1)(B) 
knowingly manufacturing, using, displaying, advertising, distributing, selling, or 
possessing with intent to sell or distribute any item or service bearing or 
identified by a counterfeit mark (trademark counterfeiting) in an amount of 
$5,000 or more 
2201(c)(2) 
tampering with or failing to properly maintain records, with intent to defraud 
(fraudulent tampering with records) 
2202(b) 
issuing a bad check in an amount of $5,000 or more, knowing it will not be 
honored by the drawee 
2204(b) 
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using a payment card that is stolen, revoked, forged, or fictitious to obtain 
property or services valued at $5,000 or more (unlawful use of payment card) 
2205(b)(1) 
committing deceptive business practices that cause a loss of $5,000 or more 2206(c) 
intentionally hindering enforcement of a security interest by destroying, 
removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise dealing with 
property subject to that security interest, causing a loss of $5,000 or more 
(defrauding secured creditors) 
2207(b) 
intentionally defrauding a creditor during insolvency, causing a loss of $5,000 or 
more 
2208(b) 
conveying public lands with intent to defraud 2211(b) 
falsely identifying one's involvement in a motor vehicle accident that results in 
serious physical injury or death (unauthorized impersonation in a motor vehicle 
accident) 
2212(b)(2) 
recklessly damaging a building by intentionally starting a fire or causing an 
explosion (reckless arson) 
2301(b)(2) 
knowingly causing damage, loss of $5,000 or more 2304(b)(2) 
recklessly causing damage, loss of $25,000 or more 2304(b)(1)(C) 
threatening to cause a catastrophe 2305(c)(2) 
entering a non-dwelling with intent to commit an offense therein (burglary) 2401(c)(3) 
using coercion to influence a public servant, party officer, or voter (improper 
influence) 
3102(c) 
tampering with physical evidence with intent to interfere with the criminal justice 
process (obstructing justice by tampering with physical evidence) 
3301(b)(1) 
failure to await arrival of law enforcement following a motor vehicle accident 
that resulted in physical injury (flight from motor vehicle accident) 
3301(b)(2)(B) 
intentionally interfering with the investigation, discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, or defense of a felony (aggravated obstruction of justice) 
3301(b)(3)(A) 
knowingly interfering with the performance of the duties of a law enforcement 
officer, firefighter, or correctional officer by force, violence, or physical injury 
(aggravated resisting or obstructing a law enforcement officer) 
3302(b)(2) 
obstructing entry into premises for an inspection authorized by Chapter 47 of 
Title 16 
3304(b)(2) 
escape from lawful penal custody or civil commitment 3306(b)(2) 
introducing contraband into a detention facility or, being detained in the facility, 
possessing contraband; and the contraband is a mobile phone or other prohibited 
electronic device (aggravated promotion of prison contraband) 
3307(c)(2) 
knowing violation of a protective order that results in physical injury or involves 
use or threatened use of a deadly weapon (violating order of protection) 
3309(b)(3)(A) 
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engaging in disorderly conduct with two or more other persons: (1) with intent to 
commit an offense; or (2) with intent to prevent or coerce official action; or (3) in 
which the person knows a firearm will be used (riot) 
4101(c)(1) 
knowingly and repeatedly following, monitoring, or interfering with the activities 
or the property of a specific other person in three or more instances, in a manner 
that would cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety or suffer significant 
mental distress (stalking) 
4103(b)(1)(B)(ii) 
performing an indecent act in a place open to public view, knowing one is viewed 
by a child under 16 years of age over whom one stands in a position of trust, 
authority, or supervision (indecent abuse of trust) 
4201(c)(1) 
knowingly promoting or profiting from prostitution (promoting prostitution) 
4203(c)(4) 
knowingly distributing obscene material 4204(b)(3)(B) 
possessing obscene material with intent to distribute it commercially (possessing 
pornography for commercial distribution) 
4204(b)(4) 
knowingly dealing in human remains removed from an unmarked burial (dealing 
in human remains) 
4206(b)(3) 
intentionally killing or causing serious physical injury to another's animal 
(aggravated animal cruelty) 
4207(c)(2) 
knowingly recording a person in a state of undress (voyeurism) 4302(c) 
marrying another person while already married, or knowingly marrying a person 
who is already married (bigamy) 
4402(c) 
intentionally abandoning a child under 14 years of age (child abandonment) 
4403(c)(1) 
knowingly taking or enticing a person less than 16 years of age or an incompetent 
person from his or her lawful custodian; then removing the person from the State 
(aggravated interference with custody) 
4404(b)(1) 
payment of support order delinquent for 8 months, or $10,000 in arrears 
(aggravated persistent non-support) 
4407(b)(1)(A) 
unlawful gambling, betting, or receiving financial benefit from animal fighting or 
baiting (gambling on animal fighting) 
4501(e)(1)(A) 
paying something of value to influence the outcome of a trial or contest, or 
altering a wager on the basis of non-public information that a contest has been so 
influenced (contest rigging) 
4502(d)(2) 
wagering on a table game on the basis of unlawful private information; gain (or 
loss avoided) of $5,000 or more 
4502(d)(3)(D) 
selling, buying, or possessing an undetectable knife 5102(d)(3) 
carrying a concealed deadly weapon 5103(b)(1)(B) 
possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited 5104(c)(2) 
providing firearms to persons prohibited 5105(c)(1) 
providing a sporting firearm or its ammunition to a child less than 18 years of age 
without consent of the child's parent or guardian 
5105(c)(2)(A) 
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knowingly possessing a controlled substance in a Tier 1 5201(d)(1)(E) 
possessing with intent to deliver a counterfeit or purported controlled substance 
5202(c)(1)(B)(iv) 
distributing or dispensing a controlled substance by person subject to subchapter 
III of Chapter 47 of Title 16, and: 
(1) the substance is in Schedule II, III, or IV, and it is distributed without the 
written prescription of a practitioner; or  
(2) it is a refill for a substance in Schedule II; or  
(3) it is a refill for a substance in Schedule III or IV, and the refill is 6 months 
past the date of the prescription, or more than the fifth refill; or  
(4) it is a Schedule V substance dispensed without a legitimate medical purpose; 
or  
(5) it is in excess of the authorization given by the person's registration. 
5205(c) 
administering or prescribing a performance-enhancing steroid 5205(c) 
possessing a blank prescription form or pad by a non-practitioner 5206(b) 
recruiting a person under 18 years of age to participate in or become a member of 
a criminal street gang (recruiting juveniles for a gang) 
5302(c)(2) 
evading transaction reporting requirements by (1) falsifying or failing to file a 
report; or (2) conducting multiple currency transactions (structuring) 
5303(d)(2) 
  
Class A Misdemeanors 
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – [1] year) 
Offense Description Section 
  
having an unlawful abortion performed on oneself 1106(c)(1)(A) 
knowingly causing (non-serious) physical injury to another person (assault) 1202(b)(3)(A)(ii) 
threatening to commit a crime likely to result in death or serious injury to person 
or property (terroristic threats) 
1207(b)(1)(B) 
recklessly causing mental or emotion harm, or failing to provide care for an 
enumerated vulnerable person, by a person having a duty to provide medical or 
personal care (abuse of vulnerable persons) 
1209(c)(1) 
causing sexual contact to another person through coercive circumstances (sexual 
assault) 
1301(b)(3) 
threatening to commit a sexual offense against another person (aggravated sexual 
harassment) 
1305(b)(2)(A) 
knowingly interfering with another person's liberty without consent (unlawful 
restraint) 
1401(c)(1)(B) 
intentionally causing another to perform or omit to perform any act by 
threatening harm to the victim or a third person (coercion) 
1403(c) 
theft of $1,500 or more 2101(b)(5) 
unauthorized use of a vehicle 2109(b) 
with intent to defraud, altering a written instrument of another without authority, 
or creating a false instrument purported to be of another (forgery) 
2201(c)(1)(C) 
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knowingly manufacturing, using, displaying, advertising, distributing, selling, or 
possessing with intent to sell or distribute any item or service bearing or 
identified by a counterfeit mark (trademark counterfeiting) in an amount of 
$1,500 or more 
2201(c)(2) 
fraudulently obtaining, displaying, or possessing an official document 2203(b) 
issuing a check in an amount of $1,500 or more, knowing it will not be honored 
by the drawee 
2204(b) 
using a payment card that is stolen, revoked, forged, or fictitious to obtain 
property or services valued at $1,500 or more (unlawful use of payment card) 
2205(b)(1) 
committing deceptive business practices that cause a loss of $1,500 or more 2206(c) 
intentionally hindering enforcement of a security interest by destroying, 
removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise dealing with 
property subject to that security interest, causing a loss of $100 or more 
(defrauding secured creditors) 
2207(b) 
intentionally defrauding a creditor during insolvency, causing a loss of $1,500 or 
more 
2208(b) 
intentionally influencing a violation of fidelity in a commercial relationship by 
offering or accepting a benefit 
2210(b) 
impersonating another person with intent to defraud, or falsely representing 
oneself as a public servant or bail bond agent (unauthorized impersonation) 
2212(b)(1) 
recklessly creating a risk of damaging another’s  property by intentionally 
starting a fire or causing an explosion (endangering by fire or explosion) 
2302(b) 
knowingly causing damage, loss of $1,500 or more 2304(b)(2) 
recklessly causing damage, loss of $5,000 or more 2304(b)(1)(D)(i) 
intentionally causing substantial interruption or impairment of a public service 
2304(b)(1)(D)(ii) 
recklessly failing to prevent a catastrophe by one in a position to do so 2305(d)(2) 
knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling (criminal trespass of 
dwelling) 
2402(c)(1) 
knowingly offering or conferring a bribe as a result of the recipient's wrongdoing 
3101(c)(1) 
knowingly speculating on or acquiring a pecuniary interest in property, a 
transaction, or an enterprise on the basis of non-public official information 
(profiteering) 
3103(c)(2) 
making an immaterially false statement under oath (false swearing) 3201(b)(3) 
making a false written statement under penalty 3202(c) 
knowingly making a false entry in, or failing to make an obligatory entry in, 
public records (tampering with public records) 
3203(b) 
falsely representing oneself to be a public servant (criminal impersonation) 3204(b)(1) 
intentionally interfering with the investigation, discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, or defense of a misdemeanor (obstruction of justice) 
3301(b)(3)(B) 
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knowingly interfering with the performance of the duties of a law enforcement 
officer, firefighter, or correctional officer (resisting or obstructing a law 
enforcement officer) 
3302(b)(3) 
violation of a juror's duty of secrecy or impartiality 3304(b)(3) 
escape from: (1) restraint due to arrest; or (2) nonsecure facilities of the Division 
of Youth Rehabilitative Services 
3306(b)(3) 
using prisoner mail to cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or designating 
prisoner mail as "legal mail" that is not legal mail (misuse of prisoner mail) 
3307(c)(3) 
introducing contraband into a detention facility or, being detained in the facility, 
possessing contraband (promoting prison contraband) 
3307(c)(3) 
unauthorized communication with a juror or witness 3308(c)(3) 
breach of peace in court proceedings; persistent refusal to be sworn in as a 
witness or answer questions; publishing false reports of a court's proceedings; 
persistent refusal to serve as a juror; intentional failure by a juror to attend trial; 
intentional failure to appear in court following release from custody under 
condition of appearance (aggravated criminal contempt) 
3309(b)(2) 
knowing disobedience or resistance to the process, injunction, order, or other 
mandate of a court 
3309(b)(3)(B) 
intentionally disturbing or disrupting a funeral 4101(c)(2) 
intentionally harassing, annoying, or causing alarm to another person by: (1) 
making repeated, inconvenient, anonymous communications; or (2) engaging in 
any conduct without legitimate purpose that is likely to provoke a violent or 
disorderly response, or cause a reasonable person to suffer fear, alarm, or distress 
(harassment) 
4103(b)(2) 
intentionally defacing a monument or other object of veneration, knowing it will 
outrage the sensibilities of persons likely to observe or discover it (desecration) 
4107(b) 
knowing it is false: (1) circulating a report of an emergency to law enforcement, 
or in circumstances likely to cause evacuation; or (2) calling or summoning 
emergency vehicles (false public alarms) 
4102(b) 
performing an indecent act in a place open to public view, knowing one is viewed 
by a child under 16 years of age (indecent exposure to a minor) 
4201(c)(2) 
knowingly promoting or participating in a combat event not authorized by law 
(unauthorized combat) 
4205(b) 
recklessly treating human remains in a way that would outrage ordinary family 
sensibilities (abuse of corpse) 
4206(b)(1) 
subjecting any animal to cruel mistreatment or neglect (animal cruelty) 4207(c)(3) 
knowingly trespassing on real property with intent to subject anyone in a private 
place to eavesdropping or other surveillance 
4301(b) 
knowingly installing or using a recording device in a private place 4301(b) 
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knowingly installing or using a device to broadcast or amplify sounds outside a 
private place 
4301(b) 
knowingly installing a tracking device in a motor vehicle 4301(b) 
knowingly intercepting or divulging contents of a communication (interception of 
private information) 
4303(c) 
knowingly using or disclosing improperly obtained information or recordings 
(unlawful use of information) 
4304(d)(1) 
recklessly humiliating or embarrassing another person by disseminating personal 
pornography without the person's consent (unlawful dissemination of personal 
pornography) 
4305(b) 
engaging in sexual conduct with a relative (incest) 4401(b) 
intentionally abandoning a child 14 years of age or older (child abandonment) 
4403(c)(2) 
knowingly taking or enticing a person less than 16 years of age or an incompetent 
person from his or her lawful custodian (interference with custody) 
4404(b)(2) 
knowingly encouraging or aiding a minor to run away from her guardian 
(assisting a runaway) 
4405(b) 
knowingly causing a minor to commit an offense (contributing to the delinquency 
of a minor) 
4406(b)(1) 
payment of support order delinquent for 4 months (persistent non-support) 4407(b)(1)(B) 
unlawful gambling or betting 4501(e)(1)(B) 
altering the element of chance of a game involving lawful wagers; or using a 
device to assist one's chances of winning a lawful games of cards or chance 
(cheating) 
4502(d)(1) 
wagering on a table game on the basis of unlawful private information; gain (or 
loss avoided) of $1,500 or more 
4502(d)(3)(E) 
carrying a concealed dangerous instrument, other than "pepper spray" 5103(b)(2) 
possessing a firearm in a public place while chemically impaired 5106(c) 
requesting a criminal history background check by a license firearms dealer, 
importer, or manufacturer, with intent to use the record for a purpose other than 
to determine the person's eligibility to possess a firearm 
5107(c) 
transferring a firearm to another person without performing a required criminal 
history background check 
5107(c) 
knowingly delivering a prescription drug that is not a controlled substance 
(dealing prescription drugs) 
5202(c)(2)(A) 
possessing or manufacturing drug paraphernalia with intent to deliver it, while 
reckless as to its ultimate use as drug paraphernalia 
5204(e)(2)(A) 
delivering drug paraphernalia while reckless as to its ultimate use as drug 
paraphernalia 
5204(e)(2)(B) 
knowingly purchasing a prescription drug through an internet pharmacy for 
delivery in Delaware without an authorized prescription 
5207(e)(2) 
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Class B Misdemeanors 
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – [6] months) 
Offense Description Section 
  
producing any instrument with intent that it be used in an unlawful abortion 
(instruments of unlawful abortion) 1106(c)(2) 
knowing offensive touching with urine or feces, no injury (aggravated offensive 
touching) 1202(b)(3)(B)(i) 
recklessly causing (non-serious) physical injury to another person (reckless 
injuring) 
1203(b)(2)(B) 
recklessly engaging in conduct creating a substantial risk of (non-serious) 
physical injury to another person (reckless endangerment) 
1204(b)(2) 
operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (operating a 
vehicle while chemically impaired) 
1205(b) 
recklessly creating a substantial risk of mental or emotional harm to another 
person with intent to initiate that person into an organization (hazing) 
1209(c)(2) 
theft of $100 or more 2101(b)(6) 
knowingly manufacturing, using, displaying, advertising, distributing, selling, or 
possessing with intent to sell or distribute any item or service bearing or 
identified by a counterfeit mark (trademark counterfeiting) in an amount of $100 
or more 
2201(c)(2) 
issuing a check in an amount of $100 or more, knowing it will not be honored by 
the drawee 
2204(b) 
using a payment card that is stolen, revoked, forged, or fictitious to obtain 
property or services valued at $100 or more (unlawful use of payment card) 
2205(b)(1) 
committing deceptive business practices that cause a loss of $100 or more 2206(c) 
intentionally hindering enforcement of a security interest by destroying, 
removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise dealing with 
property subject to that security interest, causing a loss of $100 or more 
(defrauding secured creditors) 
2207(b) 
intentionally defrauding a creditor during insolvency, causing a loss of $100 or 
more 
2208(b) 
recklessly causing damage, loss of $1,500 or more 2304(b)(1)(E) 
recklessly creating a risk of an ecological catastrophe 2305(e)(1)(B) 
knowingly entering or remaining upon real property with intent to peep into an 
occupied dwelling (peeping trespass) 
2402(c)(2) 
knowingly obstructing administration of law or other governmental function by 
physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any unlawful act 
(obstructing administration of law) 
3304(b)(4) 
knowing failure to provide reasonable aid to a peace officer in preventing an 
offense or effecting an arrest (refusing to aid an officer) 
3305(b) 
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engaging disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent conduct during a court session 
(criminal contempt) 
3309(b)(1) 
performing an indecent act in a place open to public view (public indecency) 
4201(c)(3) 
offering a fee in exchange for performance of sexual conduct (patronizing a 
prostitute) 
4202(b)(2) 
accepting a fee in exchange for performance of sexual conduct (prostitution) 
4202(b)(2) 
knowingly dealing in funerary objects associated with interment 4206(b)(2) 
knowingly displaying, disclosing, altering, or deleting computer data without 
authorization (misuse of computer system information) 
4304(d)(2) 
knowingly creating a risk that a minor will commit an offense (risking 
delinquency of a minor) 
4406(b)(2) 
knowingly refusing to provide for needs of one's minor child (non-support of 
child) 
4407(b)(2) 
wagering on a table game on the basis of unlawful private information; gain (or 
loss avoided) of $100 or more 
4502(d)(3)(F) 
selling, buying, or possessing enumerated, unlawful weapons and ammunition 
5102(d)(4) 
providing a self-defense weapon to a person who is less than 21 years of age 
5105(c)(2)(B) 
providing a deadly weapon to an intoxicated person 5105(c)(3) 
providing a deadly weapon to a person legally disqualified from possessing or 
owning one 
5105(c)(4)(B) 
knowingly possessing: (1) a controlled substance in less than a Tier 1 quantity; or 
(2) a counterfeit controlled substance 
5201(d)(1)(F) 
possessing with intent to deliver a prescription drug that is not a controlled 
substance 
5202(c)(2)(B) 
using, or possessing with intent to use, drug paraphernalia 5204(e)(1) 
  
Class C Misdemeanor 
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – [3] months) 
Offense Description Section 
  
theft of less than $100 2101(b)(7) 
knowingly manufacturing, using, displaying, advertising, distributing, selling, or 
possessing with intent to sell or distribute any item or service bearing or 
identified by a counterfeit mark (trademark counterfeiting) in an amount of less 
than $100 
2201(c)(2) 
issuing a check in an amount of less than $100, knowing it will not be honored by 
the drawee 
2204(b) 
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using a payment card that is stolen, revoked, forged, or fictitious to obtain 
property or services valued at less than $100 (unlawful use of payment card) 
2205(b)(1) 
committing deceptive business practices that cause a loss of less than $100 2206(c) 
intentionally hindering enforcement of a security interest by destroying, 
removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise dealing with 
property subject to that security interest, causing a loss of less than $100 
(defrauding secured creditors) 
2207(b) 
intentionally defrauding a creditor during insolvency, causing a loss of less than 
$100 
2208(b) 
recklessly causing damage, loss of $100 or more 2304(b)(1)(F) 
knowingly causing damage, loss of less than $100 2304(b)(2) 
threatening to cause an ecological catastrophe 2305(e)(1)(C) 
consensually exchanging explicit images between school-age peers (sexting 
among minors) 
4204(b)(5) 
knowingly distributing or failing to stop distributing unsolicited bulk commercial 
electronic email (misuse of electronic mail) 
4304(d)(3) 
knowing accessing information without authorization 4306(b) 
wagering on a table game on the basis of unlawful private information; gain (or 
loss avoided) of less than $100 
4502(d)(3)(G) 
providing a B.B., air, or spear gun, or B.B. shot to a child less than 16 years of 
age without the consent of the child's parent or guardian 
5105(c)(5) 
knowingly possessing: (1) more than 1 ounce of leaf marijuana; or (2) any 
quantity of non-leaf marijuana; by a person 18 years of age or older (possession 
of marijuana) 
5201(d)(2) 
knowingly possessing marijuana by a person less than 18 years of age 
(possession of marijuana by a minor) 
5201(d)(2) 
  
Class D Misdemeanor 
(Maximum Authorized Term of Imprisonment – [30] days) 
Offense Description Section 
  
knowing offensive touching, no injury (offensive touching) 1202(b)(3)(B)(ii) 
knowingly placing another person in fear of imminent physical injury (menacing) 1207(b)(2)(B) 
knowingly causing alarm to another person by suggesting or soliciting sexual 
contact (sexual harassment) 
1305(b)(2)(B) 
with intent to defraud, writing down the personal information of a payment card 
owner (identity theft) 
2209(b)(2) 
recklessly causing damage, loss of less than $100 2304(b)(1)(G) 
failing to prevent an ecological catastrophe by a person in a position to do so 
2305(e)(1)(D) 
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knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully upon real property enclosed in a 
manner manifestly designed to exclude intruders (criminal trespass) 
2402(c)(3) 
intentionally causing or creating a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or 
alarm (disorderly conduct) 
4101(c)(3) 
refusing to obey the order of a peace officer to disperse by persons engaging in 
disorderly (failure to disperse) 
4101(c)(3) 
providing or maintaining premises that the person knows will be used for 
gambling activity 
4501(e)(2) 
knowingly possessing, without a prescription, a prescription drug that is not a 
controlled substance (unlawful possession of a prescription drug) 
5201(d)(3) 
placing an advertisement in a publication, reckless as to whether the 
advertisement promotes the sale of drug paraphernalia 
5204(e)(3) 
  
Violations 
(No Term of Imprisonment is Authorized) 
Offense Description Section 
  
knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully upon real property (minor criminal 
trespass) 
2402(c)(4) 
appearing in a public place while intoxicated to a degree that would endanger 
other persons or property (public intoxication) 
4104(b) 
loitering or prowling in a place, time, or manner not usual for law-abiding 
citizens, and under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of nearby 
persons or property (loitering) 
4105(e) 
intentionally tampering with or obstructing a public utility right-of-way 
(obstructing public ways) 
4106(b) 
recklessly rendering a public passage unreasonably inconvenient or hazardous to 
use (obstructing public ways) 
4106(b) 
wagering money on a game of dice (playing craps) 4501(e)(3) 
  
General Adjustments to Grade 
Description Section 
  
if the offense is committed by a repeat felon, increase the offense grade by 1 804(a) 
if the victim of the offense is a vulnerable person, increase the offense grade by 
1; only applies if the offense is a Class 5 felony or lower before adjustment 
804(b) 
if the offense is a hate crime, increase the offense grade by 1; only applies if the 
offense is a Class 5 felony or lower before adjustment 
804(c) 
if  the offense is committed to benefit a criminal street gang, increase the offense 
grade by 1; only applies if the offense is a Class 5 felony or lower before 
adjustment 
804(d) 
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if the offender wears a disguise or body armor during commission of a felony, 
increase the offense grade by 1; only applies if the offense is a Class 5 felony or 
lower before adjustment 
804(e) 
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CONVERSION TABLE BY CURRENT PROVISION 
 
D.E. Code Title D.E. Code Provision Draft Provision 
2 309 1203 
2 310 C.A. 
3 1041 C.A. 
3 1045 C.A. 
6 4901A C.A. 
6 4902A C.A. 
6 4903A 2103 
6 4904A C.A. 
6 4905A C.A. 
6 4906A C.A. 
6 4907A C.A. 
6 4909A C.A. 
6 5132 3303(b)(4) 
6 5133 C.A. 
7 706 C.A. 
7 718 C.A. 
7 724 C.A. 
7 5402 4208(f), (j) 
7 5407(1)-(2) 4206(a)(2)(B), (b)(3) 
7 5407(3) 4206(a)(1), (b)(1) 
7 5409 4206(b)(3) 
7 6013(c)-(e) 1202(b)(2)(B)(i) 
7 6071 2305(e); 2306(d) 
7 6072 2305(e) 
7 6073 2305(e) 
7 6074 2305(e) 
7 6074(b) 2305(e)(2) 
7 6309 1204 
7 6309(f)-(g) C.A. 
7 6309(h) 2305(e) 
7 6309(i) 1204(b)(1) 
9 910(a) 108(d) 
11 222(15) 3309(c) 
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11 101 101(a) 
11 102 101(b) 
11 102(b)(1) C.A. 
11 102(c) C.A. 
11 103 101(c) 
11 103(b) 103(b) 
11 201 102(a) 
11 201(1) 102(a)(1) 
11 201(2) 102(a)(2) 
11 201(3) 102(a)(3) 
11 201(4) 102(a)(4) 
11 201(5) 102(a)(1) 
11 202(a) 103(a) 
11 202(b) 103(c) 
11 203 102(a) 
11 204(a)(1) 105(a)(1), (a)(6)(A) 
11 204(a)(2) 105(a)(3) 
11 204(a)(3) 105(a)(5) 
11 204(a)(4) 105(a)(6) 
11 204(a)(5) 105(a)(4) 
11 204(b) 105(b) 
11 204(c) 105(c) 
11 205 502(a), (b)(2), (b)(4), (c), 
(e), (f) 
11 205(c) 502(b)(1) 
11 205(e) 502(b)(3) 
11 205(j) 502(d) 
11 206(a) 210(a) 
11 206(a)(2) 210(a)(2)(A) 
11 206(a)(3) 210(a)(5) 
11 206(b) 210(a) 
11 206(b)(1) 210(a)(1)(A) 
11 206(b)(2) 210(a)(2)(B) 
11 206(b)(3) 210(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(ii) 
11 206(c) C.A. 
11 207 504 
11 207(1) 509(a) 
11 207(3) 509(b) 
11 207(4) 509(c) 
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11 208 505 
11 209 506 
11 210 507 
11 211 102(d)(2)-(3) 
11 221(a) 108(e) 
11 221(b) 108(d) 
11 221(c) 109 
11 222(2) 5210(d) 
11 222(3) 509(b) 
11 222(4) 5109(a) 
11 222(5) 5109(b) 
11 222(6) 2213(c) 
11 222(12) 5109(e) 
11 222(13) 2213(c) 
11 222(15) 3309(c) 
11 222(18) 410(c) 
11 222(20) C.A. 
11 222(21) 108(g) 
11 222(23) 1210(b) 
11 222(25) 410(c) 
11 222(26) 1210(c) 
11 223 107 
11 224 805(a)-(b) 
11 224(3) 805(c)(1) 
11 231 205(b) 
11 231(a) 205(b)(4) 
11 231(d) C.A. 
11 232 202(a); 106(b)(1)(C) 
11 233 C.A. 
11 234 C.A. 
11 241 103(d) 
11 242 204(a); 402(b)(1) 
11 243 204(c)-(d); 214(k); 402(a) 
11 251 C.A. 
11 251(a) 205(a) 
11 251(b) 205(d) 
11 251(c) 205(e) 
11 252 205(c) 
11 253 205(g) 
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11 254 205(b)(1)(D) 
11 255 205(b)(2)(B) 
11 261 203(a)(1) 
11 262 213(a) 
11 262(2) 203(a)(2) 
11 263 213(a) 
11 263(2) 203(a)(2) 
11 264 C.A. 
11 271 5210(a); 5209 
11 271(1)-(2) 211(a)(1) 
11 271(1)b. 211(h) 
11 271(2) 211(a)(1)(B)(ii) 
11 271(2)c. C.A. 
11 271(3) 211(a)(2) 
11 272(2) 211(d) 
11 272(3) 211(c) 
11 273 211(b) 
11 274 211(e) 
11 275 211(f) 
11 281 601(a) 
11 282 602(a) 
11 283 601(b) 
11 284 603 
11 301 106(b)(1)(A)-(B) 
11 301(c) 106(c)(1)(B) 
11 302 C.A. 
11 303(a)-(b) 106(c)(2) 
11 303(c) 106(b)(1)(B) 
11 304 106(b)(2) 
11 304(a)-(b) 106(c)(2) 
11 304(c) 106(b)(3) 
11 305 C.A.  
11 306 106(d) 
11 306(e) 106(b) 
11 307 205(h) 
11 308 C.A. 
11 401(a) 403(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (b) 
11 401(b) 403(a)(2)(C) 
11 401(c) 410(c) 
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11 402 C.A. 
11 403 C.A. 
11 404(a) C.A. 
11 404(b) C.A. 
11 405 C.A. 
11 406 C.A. 
11 408 C.A. 
11 409 C.A. 
11 421 212(a)-(b) 
11 422 C.A. 
11 423 401(d); 404; 410(b) 
11 424 212; 214(e), (l) 
11 431 401(d) 
11 431(a) 405(a), (b); 501(c) 
11 431(b) 401(b)(2); 503(b) 
11 431(c) C.A. 
11 432(a) 503(a) 
11 441(1) 206(a)  
11 441(3) C.A. 
11 451 208(a) 
11 451(1) C.A. 
11 452 208(b) 
11 453 208(c)(1)-(c)(4) 
11 454 C.A. 
11 461 300; 308(d) 
11 462(a)(1)-(3), (5) 303(a)(1)-(3) 
11 462(a)(4) 303(a)(4) 
11 462(b)(1) 303(b) 
11 463 300; 301(a), (d); 302(1), 
(2), (3) 
11 464(a) 302(1); 306(a); 409 
11 464(b) C.A. 
11 464(c) 306(c)(1); 409 
11 464(d) 301(c); 306(b)(2) 
11 464(e)(1) 301(d) 
11 464(e)(2) 306(c)(2)(A) 
11 464(e)(2)a.-c. 306(c)(2)(B) 
11 465(a) 301(c); 409 
11 465(a)(1)-(2) 306(b)(1) 
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11 465(a)(3) 306(a) 
11 465(b) 306(c)(2)(A) 
11 465(c) 306(c)(2)(B) 
11 466(a) 302(1) 
11 466(a)-(b) 307(a) 
11 466(a)-(c) 409 
11 466(b)(1)-(3) 307(b) 
11 466(c) 307(d) 
11 466(d) 307(e) 
11 467(a) 409 
11 467(a)(1) 301(c); 302(1); 304(a)(1) 
11 467(a)(2) C.A. 
11 467(b)(1) 304(a)(2) 
11 467(b)(2) 304(a)(4) 
11 467(c) 304(a)(3) 
11 467(c)(1) 304(a)(3)(C) 
11 467(c)(2) 304(a)(3)(B) 
11 467(c)(3) 304(a)(3)(D) 
11 467(c)-(f) 409 
11 467(d) 304(b) 
11 467(e) 306(d) 
11 468 305(a) 
11 468(1) 305(a)(1)(A)(i) 
11 468(1)b. C.A. 
11 468(1)c. 305(a)(1)(B) 
11 468(2) 305(a)(1)(A)(ii) 
11 468(2)a., (5)a., (6)a., (7)a. 409 
11 468(2)b. 305(a)(1)(B) 
11 468(3) 305(a)(1)(A)(iii) 
11 468(3)b. C.A. 
11 468(3)c. 305(a)(1)(B) 
11 468(4) 305(a)(2) 
11 468(5)-(5)a. 305(a)(3) 
11 468(5)b. C.A. 
11 468(5)c. 305(b) 
11 468(6)-(6)a. 305(a)(4) 
11 468(6)b. 305(b) 
11 468(7) 305(a)(5) 
11 469 409 
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11 470 409 
11 470(b) 301(e) 
11 471(a) 308(b) 
11 471(c) 308(c) 
11 475 501(c); 508 
11 476 5301(f) 
11 477 5301(e) 
11 501 702(a); 707 
11 502 702(a); 707 
11 503 702(a); 707 
11 511 703(a); 707; 5210(c); 5209 
11 512 703(a); 707; 5210(c); 5209 
11 513 703(a); 707; 5210(c); 5209 
11 521(a) 707 
11 521(b) 703(b) 
11 521(c) 705 
11 522 703(a), (c); 5210(c); 5209 
11 523 704 
11 531 701(a); 707 
11 532 701(b)(1) 
11 533 211(g) 
11 541(a)-(b) 706(a) 
11 541(c) 706(b) 
11 542 C.A. 
11 601 1202(a)(2), (b)(3)(B) 
11 601(c) 1202(b)(4)(A)-(C) 
11 602 1207(a)-(b) 
11 602(a) 1207(a)(2); (b)(2)(C) 
11 603 1204(b) 
11 603(a)(1) 1203(a); 1204(a) 
11 603(a)(2) C.A. 
11 604 1203(a); 1204(a), (b) 
11 605 804(b); 1203(b)(1)(A)(ii) 
11 606 804(b); 1202(b)(2)(B)(ii) 
11 607 1202(a)(1) 
11 607(a)(1)–(2) 1202(b)(3)(A)(i)(bb) 
11 607(a)(3) 804(a)  
11 607(a)(3)a. 1202(b)(2)(A) 
11 607(a)(3)b. 1202(b)(2)(B)(i) 
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11 611(1) 1202(a)(1), (b)(3)(A)(ii); 
(b)(2)(B),  
11 611(2) [1203(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii)] 
11 612(a) 1202(a)(1) 
11 612(a)(1) 1202(b)(2); 1203(b)(1)(B) 
11 612(a)(2) 1202(b)(3)(A)(i)(aa), 
(b)(2)(A)(iii) 
11 612(a)(3)-(4), (6), (8), (11) 1202(b)(4)(A)-(C) 
11 612(a)(5) C.A. 
11 612(a)(9) 1202(b)(2) 
11 612(a)(10) 1202(b)(4)(D) 
11 613(a) 1202(a)(1) 
11 613(a)(1) 1202(b)(2), (b)(2)(A) 
11 613(a)(2) 1202(b)(1) 
11 613(a)(3) C.A. 
11 613(a)(4) 1202(b)(1) 
11 613(a)(5)-(6) 1202(b)(4)(A)-(C) 
11 613(a)(7) C.A. 
11 613(a)(9) C.A. 
11 613(b) C.A. 
11 614 C.A. 
11 616(a)(1) 5304(a) 
11 616(a)(2) 5304(c) 
11 616(b) 5302(a), (c)(1) 
11 616(c) 804(d) 
11 617(b)(1) 5302(b), (c)(2) 
11 617(b)(2) C.A. 
11 621 1207(b); 4102 
11 621(a)(1) 1207(a), (a)(1)(B) 
11 621(a)(2)a.-c. 4102(a)(1)(A) 
11 621(a)(3) 1207(a) 
11 622 1207(a), (b)(2)(A)(ii) 
11 625 1208(a) 
11 626 1208(a) 
11 627 C.A. 
11 628 [1203(b)(2)(C)] 
11 628A [1203(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii)] 
11 629 1203 
11 630(b) 802(a) 
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11 630(c) C.A. 
11 630A(b) 802(a) 
11 630A(c) C.A. 
11 631 1104(a), (b)(3); 1106(c) 
11 632 1103(c) 
11 632(1) 1103(a)(1) 
11 632(2) C.A. 
11 632(3) 1103(a)(2) 
11 632(4) C.A. 
11 632(5) 1105(a), (b)(1) 
11 633 1104(b)(2) 
11 633(d) 802(a) 
11 634 C.A. 
11 635 1102(b) 
11 635(1) 1102(a)(2)(A) 
11 635(2) 1102(a)(3) 
11 636(a)(1) 1101(a) 
11 636(a)(3) 1105(c) 
11 636(a)(4) 1102(a)(2)(B) 
11 636(a)(5) 1102(a)(2)(C) 
11 636(a)(6) 1102(a)(2)(D) 
11 636(b)(1)-(2) 1101(b) 
11 641 1103(b) 
11 645 1105(a), (b)(3) 
11 651 1106(a), (c) 
11 652 1106(a), (c) 
11 653 1106(b) 
11 654 1107(a) 
11 761 1301(a)(2)(A) 
11 761(b) 1307(f)(2) 
11 761(c) 1307(f)(2) 
11 761(d) 1307(c) 
11 761(e) 1307(c) 
11 761(f) 1307(e) 
11 761(g)(1) 1307(f)(1), (f)(3) 
11 761(g)(2) 1307(f)(2) 
11 761(i) 1307(b) 
11 761(j)(2)-(3) 1301(a)(2)(B) 
11 761(j)(4) 1301(a)(2)(A) 
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11 761(j)(5) 1301(a)(2)(C) 
11 761(j)-(k) 1301(a)(2) 
11 761(k) 1301(a)(2)(D) 
11 762(a) 1301(f); 1306(a) 
11 762(c) C.A. 
11 763 1305(a), (b)(2) 
11 764 4201(a), (b) 
11 765 4201(a), (d)(1)(B) 
11 766 4401 
11 767 1301(a)(1), (d) 
11 767(a)(1) 1301(b)(1)(A)(i)(bb)-(cc) 
11 768 1301(a)(1), (d) 
11 769 1301(a)(1), (d) 
11 769(a)(1) 1301(b)(2)(A) 
11 769(a)(3) 1301(a)(2)(D)(ii), (b)(1)(B) 
11 770 1301(a)(1), (b)(3) 
11 770(a)(3) 1301(c) 
11 770(b) 1306(b) 
11 771 1301(a)(1) 
11 771(a)(1) 1301(a)(2)(D), (b)(2)(B) 
11 771(a)(2) 1301(c) 
11 771(a)(2)a.-b. 1301(b)(2)(A) 
11 771(b) 1306(b) 
11 771(c) 1301(g) 
11 772 1301(a)(1) 
11 772(a) 1301(b)(1)(A)(ii) 
11 772(a)(2) 1301(c) 
11 772(a)(2)a. 1301(b)(1)(A)(i)(aa) 
11 772(a)(2)b. 1301(b)(2)(C) 
11 772(a)(2)c. 1301(b)(1)(A)(i)(aa) 
11 772(a)(2)d.-e. 1301(b)(1)(A)(i)(bb)-(cc) 
11 772(a)(2)f. 1301(b)(1)(C) 
11 772(a)(2)g. 1301(b)(1)(B) 
11 772(c) 802(a) 
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11 773 1301(a)(1), (b)(5) 
11 773(a) 1301(b)(1)(A)(ii) 
11 773(a)(1) 1301(b)(1)(A)(i)(aa), 
(b)(2)(A) 
11 773(a)(2)a. 1301(b)(2)(C) 
11 773(a)(3) 1301(b)(1)(A)(i)(bb)-(cc) 
11 773(a)(4) 1301(b)(1)(C) 
11 773(a)(5) 1301(a)(2)(D)(ii), (b)(1)(B) 
11 774 1301 
11 775 1303 
11 776 804(a) 
11 777(a) C.A. 
11 777A 1304 
11 778 1301(e) 
11 778(3)-(4) 1302(a)(2)(B) 
11 778(6)(b) 802(a) 
11 778A(1) 1301(e) 
11 778A(2) 4201(d)(1)(A) 
11 778A(3) 1305(b)(1) 
11 778A(4)b. 4201(d)(1)(A) 
11 780(a) 1206(a) 
11 780(b) 1206(c) 
11 780(c) 1206(b) 
11 780(d) 1306(b) 
11 781 1401(a), (c)(1) 
11 782 1401(a), (c)(1) 
11 783 1401(b), (c)(2) 
11 783A 1401(b), (c)(2) 
11 784 1401(b)(6), (d) 
11 785 4404(a)-(b) 
11 786(b) 4404(a)(1)–(2); 1404 
11 786(c) 1401(a) 
11 787 1402(b) 
11 787(b) 4203(c)(1)-(2) 
11 787(b)(1) 1402(a)(3)(A) 
11 787(b)(2)-(3) 1402(a)(2) 
11 787(b)(3)a.1. C.A. 
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11 787(b)(3)c. C.A. 
11 787(b)(4) 4202(b)(1) 
11 787(b)(5)a. 1402(a)(3)(B) 
11 787(b)(5)b. 1402(a)(4) 
11 787(b)(6)a. 1402(b)(4) 
11 787(b)(6)b. C.A. 
11 787(c)(2) 1402(d)(1)(B) 
11 787(c)(2)a. C.A. 
11 787(d) 1402(d)(2) 
11 787(e)(1) 1402(d)(1)(A) 
11 787(e)(2)-(3) C.A. 
11 787(f) C.A. 
11 787(g) C.A. 
11 787(h) 4105(d); 4202(c); 
4204(e)(2) 
11 787(i) C.A. 
11 787(j)(2)–(4) 4204(e) 
11 787(k) C.A. 
11 787(l) C.A. 
11 787(m) C.A. 
11 787(n) C.A. 
11 791 1403(a), (c) 
11 792 1403(b) 
11 801 2301(a), (b)(2) 
11 801(b) 2301(c) 
11 802 2301(a) 
11 802(a) 2301(b)(1)(B) 
11 802(b)(1) 2301(c) 
11 802(b)(2) C.A. 
11 802(b)(3) C.A. 
11 803 2301(a), (b)(1)(A) 
11 804 2302 
11 804(b) 2304(b) 
11 805 1207 
11 811(a) 2304(a) 
11 811(a)(3) 2306(c), (f) 
11 811(b) 2304(b) 
11 811(b)(1) 2306(f) 
11 811(b)(3) 2304(b)(1)(G), (b)(2) 
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11 811(b)(4) C.A. 
11 812 210(a)(1)(B)(i) 
11 812(a)(2) 2304(b) 
11 812(b) 708 
11 813 2102(a); 2110(h) 
11 820 2402(a), (b)(2) 
11 821 2402(a), (b)(4) 
11 822 2402(a), (b)(3) 
11 823 2402(a), (b)(1) 
11 824 2401(a), (b)(3) 
11 825 2401(a) 
11 825(a)(1) 2401(b)(2) 
11 825(a)(2) 2401(b)(4) 
11 825(b) 802(a) 
11 826 2401(a) 
11 826(a) 2401(b)(4) 
11 826(b) 802(a) 
11 826A 2401(a), (b)(1) 
11 826A(b) 802(a) 
11 827 2401(c) 
11 828 708 
11 829(b) 2403(a) 
11 829(c) 2403(b) 
11 829(e) C.A. 
11 831(a) 1201(a), (b)(3) 
11 832(a) 1201(a) 
11 832(a)(1) 1201(b)(2)(A) 
11 832(a)(2) 1201(b)(2)(B)-(C) 
11 832(b) 802(a) 
11 835(a) 1201(a) 
11 835(b)(1) 1201(b)(1)(D) 
11 835(b)(2) 1201(b)(1)(B) 
11 835(c) C.A. 
11 835(d) C.A. 
11 836(a) 1201(a) 
11 836(a)(1)-(3) 1201(b)(1)(B) 
11 836(a)(4) 1201(b)(2)(B)-(C) 
11 836(a)(5) 1201(b)(2)(A) 
11 836(a)(6) 1201(b)(1)(A) 
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11 836(c) C.A. 
11 836(d)-(f) C.A. 
11 840 2101(b)(4)-(5), (b)(1) 
11 840(a)(2) 2103 
11 840(a)(4)-(5) 2102(b)(2) 
11 840(c) 307(c) 
11 840(d) 307(e) 
11 840A(a) 2202(a)(2) 
11 841 2102(a) 
11 841(a) 2101(a) 
11 841(b) 2110(h) 
11 841(c) 800(e); 2101(b) 
11 841(c)(1)-(2) C.A. 
11 841A 2101(b)(4)(B) 
11 841A(b) 2110(d) 
11 841B C.A. 
11 841B(c) 804(a) 
11 841C 2101(b)(4)(C); 5206 
11 841C(b)(1) 2110(g) 
11 842 2105 
11 843 2103(a); 2110(b) 
11 844 2103(a), (b)(2) 
11 845(a) 2106(a) 
11 845(b)-(c) 2106(b) 
11 846 2101(c); 2104(a) 
11 847(a) 2101(d) 
11 847(b) 2104(b) 
11 848 C.A. 
11 849(a) C.A. 
11 849(b)-(c) 2103(b)(1) 
11 849(d) C.A. 
11 849(e) 2103(c) 
11 850 C.A. 
11 850(a)(1) 708 
11 850(a)(1)b. 3301(a)(2)(H) 
11 851 804(a); 2107(a) 
11 852 2107(b) 
11 852A  804(a) 
11 853 2109; 2207(b) 
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11 853(4) 2207(a) 
11 854(a) 2209(a)(1) 
11 854(b) 2209(a)(1) 
11 854(c) 2213(h) 
11 854(d) 2209(b)(1) 
11 854A C.A. 
11 855(a)-(b) 2101(a) 
11 855(c) 805(d) 
11 856 C.A. 
11 857(2) 2110(a) 
11 857(3) 2110(c) 
11 857(4) 2110(e) 
11 857(5) 2110(f) 
11 857(7) 2110(h) 
11 857(8) 2110(j) 
11 858 2108 
11 858(d)-(e) 307(e) 
11 858(f) C.A. 
11 859 C.A. 
11 860 708 
11 861(a)(1) 2201(a)(1) 
11 861(a)(2) 2201(a)(2) 
11 861(b)(1) 2201(b)(1) 
11 861(b)(2) 2201(b)(2) 
11 861(b)(3) 2201(b)(3) 
11 862 708 
11 863 806(f) 
11 871 2202(a)(1) 
11 872 2202(a)(1) 
11 873 3203(a)-(b) 
11 876 2202(a)(1) 
11 877 2202(a)(2) 
11 878 2202(a)(2) 
11 881 2210(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), 
(b) 
11 882 2210(a)(2), (b) 
11 891 2207(b) 
11 892 2208 
11 893 2207(a)-(b) 
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11 900 2204(b) 
11 900(a) 2204(a), (c) 
11 900(b) C.A. 
11 900A C.A. 
11 901(a) 2213(d) 
11 901(b) 2213(f) 
11 902 C.A. 
11 903(a)(1) 2205(a)(1) 
11 903(a)(1)(3) 2205(a)(2) 
11 903(a)(2) 2205(a)(3) 
11 903(a)(4) 2205(a)(3) 
11 903(c) 2205(b)(1) 
11 903(d) 2205(b)(2) 
11 903A(a) 2209(a)(2) 
11 903A(a) 2209(b)(1), (a)(3) 
11 903A(e)(1) 2213(j) 
11 903A(e)(2) 2213(k) 
11 904 2213(g) 
11 905 C.A. 
11 906 2206(a)-(c) 
11 906(4) 2213(a), (e) 
11 907 2212(b)(1); 3204(b)(1) 
11 907(1) 2212(a)(1) 
11 907(2) 2212(a)(1) 
11 907(3) 3204(a)(1) 
11 907A 2212(a)(3), (b)(2) 
11 907B 3204(a)(2) 
11 907B(b) 3204(b)(2) 
11 908 2103 
11 909 2202(a)(2) 
11 910 2207(a) 
11 911 2211 
11 912 2211 
11 913 2103 
11 913A 2103 
11 914(b) 2209(a)(4) 
11 914(c) 2209(b)(2) 
11 915 2209(a)(4), (b)(2) 
11 915(d) 2209(b)(2) 
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11 915A 2209(a)(4) 
11 916 2103 
11 917 2103 
11 918 C.A. 
11 920 2108 
11 921 2108 
11 922 2206(c) 
11 923 C.A. 
11 924 C.A. 
11 924A C.A. 
11 925 C.A. 
11 926(a) 2201(a)(4) 
11 926(b)(1) 2213(b) 
11 931 C.A. 
11 931(2) 4307(a) 
11 931(6) 806(a); 2110(j) 
11 931(8) 4307(b), (h) 
11 931(9) 4307(d) 
11 931(10) 4307(f) 
11 931(14) 806(c) 
11 931(17) 4307(k) 
11 932 4306(a) 
11 933 2106(a) 
11 934 2306(c) 
11 935 4304(b) 
11 936 C.A. 
11 937 708; 4304(c)(1) 
11 937(2)-(4) 3301(a)(2)(H) 
11 938 4304(c)(2) 
11 939 2101(b); 4304(d); 4306(b) 
11 939(g)-(h) 805(c)(2)-(3) 
11 940 C.A. 
11 941 105(a)(7)(B) 
11 951(a) 5303(a) 
11 951(b) 5303(d) 
11 951(c)(4) 5304(e) 
11 951(d) 5303(e) 
11 951(e)-(g) 5303(c) 
11 951(f)(1)-(2) 5303(b)(1) 
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11 951(f)(3) 5303(b)(2) 
11 1001 4402(a), (c) 
11 1002(1) C.A. 
11 1002(2) 4402(b) 
11 1002(3)-(4) C.A. 
11 1003 C.A. 
11 1004 C.A. 
11 1100(3) 4406(a)(1) 
11 1100(9) 1203(b)(2)(A)(ii) 
11 1100A 1402(a)(1), (b), (b)(3), (c) 
11 1101 4403(a), (c) 
11 1102(a)(2) 4406(a)(1) 
11 1102(a)(3) 4405(a) 
11 1102(a)(4)-(6) C.A. 
11 1102(b) C.A. 
11 1102(b)(4) 4405(b); 4406(b)(1) 
11 1102(c) C.A. 
11 1102A 4403(b) 
11 1103 1203(b)(2)(B) 
11 1103A 1203(b)(2)(A)(i) 
11 1103B 1202(b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(A)(i) 
11 1104 1204(c) 
11 1105 804(b) 
11 1105(c) 800(e) 
11 1106 4406(a)(2), (b)(2) 
11 1107 C.A. 
11 1108 4204(a)(1), (b)(1) 
11 1109 4204(a)(1), (b)(1) 
11 1109(3) C.A. 
11 1109(4) 105(a)(7)(B); 108 
11 1110  804(a) 
11 1111 4204(a)(2), (b)(2) 
11 1112 1304 
11 1112(b)(2) 1307(d) 
11 1112A C.A. 
11 1112B C.A. 
11 1113(a) 4407(b)(2) 
11 1113(a)-(b) 4407(a) 
11 1113(b) 4407(b)(1) 
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11 1113(c) 4407(d)(1) 
11 1113(d) 4407(d)(2) 
11 1113(e) 4407(a)(2)(B) 
11 1113(f)-(g) 4407(e) 
11 1113(h) 104 
11 1113(i) 4407(c) 
11 1113(j) C.A. 
11 1113(k)(2) 4408 
11 1114 C.A. 
11 1114A C.A. 
11 1115–27 C.A. 
11 1201 3101(a), (c)(2) 
11 1202 3101(c)(1) 
11 1203 3101(b), (c)(2) 
11 1204 C.A. 
11 1205 3101(a) 
11 1206 3101(b) 
11 1207 3102(a), (c) 
11 1208 3102(b) 
11 1209(1) 3104(a) 
11 1209(2) 3104(b) 
11 1209(3) 3104(c) 
11 1209(4) 3104(d) 
11 1211 3103(a), (c) 
11 1212 3103(b), (c) 
11 1221 3201(b)(3) 
11 1222 3201(a) 
11 1223 3201(a), (b)(1) 
11 1224 3201(a), (b)(2)(B) 
11 1225 3201(e) 
11 1231 3201(c) 
11 1232 3201(d) 
11 1233 3202(a), (c) 
11 1234 3201(e); 3202(b) 
11 1235(a) 3205(b) 
11 1235(b) 3205(a) 
11 1235(c) 3201(b)(2)(A) 
11 1235(f) 3201(b)(1) 
11 1239(a) 804(e) 
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11 1240 1207(b)(1)(A) 
11 1240(a) 1207(a) 
11 1241 3304(a)-(b) 
11 1242 3304(c) 
11 1242(b) C.A. 
11 1243 3302(b)(3) 
11 1244(a)(1) 3301(a)(2)(B) 
11 1244(a)(2) 3301(a)(2)(C) 
11 1244(a)(3) 3301(a)(2)(D) 
11 1244(a)(4) 3301(a)(2)(E) 
11 1244(a)(5) 3301(a)(2)(G) 
11 1244(a)(6) C.A. 
11 1244(b)-(c) 3301(b) 
11 1245 4102(b); 4103(a) 
11 1245(1) 4102(a)(1), (a)(1)(A) 
11 1245(2) 4102(a)(1)(B) 
11 1245(4) 4102(a)(2) 
11 1245A 3301(b) 
11 1245A(a) 3301(a)(1)-(2)(A) 
11 1245A(b)(1) C.A. 
11 1245A(b)(2) 3301(a)(2)(A0 
11 1245A(b)(3)-(4) C.A. 
11 1246 3301(a)(2)(F) 
11 1247 3301(c) 
11 1248 3303(a) 
11 1248(a) 3303(b)(1) 
11 1248(b) 3303(b)(4) 
11 1249 C.A. 
11 1250 3302(a)(1) 
11 1251 3305(a)(1)(C)-(D), (b)(3); 
3309(e) 
11 1252 3305(a)(1)(B), (b)(2); 
3309(e) 
11 1253 3305(a)(1)(A), (b)(1); 
3309(e) 
11 1254 1202(b)(4)(E); 802(a) 
11 1256 3306(a), (c) 
11 1257 3302(a)(1) 
11 1257(a) 3302(b)(2) 
11 1257(b) 3302(b)(3) 
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11 1257A 3302(a)(1) 
11 1258(1) 3309(a) 
11 1258(2) 3305(a)(1)(C)-(D) 
11 1258(3) 3305(a)(1)(A)-(B) 
11 1258(4) 3305(a)(2) 
11 1259 1302(a)(2)(A) 
11 1260 3306(b)–(c) 
11 1261 3101(b)(1)(C) 
11 1262 3101(b)(1)(C) 
11 1263 3307(a)(2)(B), (c) 
11 1263(1) 3307(a)(1)(A)-(B) 
11 1263(2) 3307(a)(2)(A)-(B) 
11 1263A 3307(c) 
11 1263A(a) 3307(a)(1)(B) 
11 1264 C.A. 
11 1265 C.A. 
11 1266 3307(c); 3309(b) 
11 1266(1) 3307(a)(2)(C) 
11 1266(2) C.A. 
11 1267 3303(a), (b)(3) 
11 1268 3307(b)-(c) 
11 1269 3301(a)(2)(G) 
11 1271 3308(a)-(b) 
11 1271A(c) 3308(b) 
11 1271A(d)-(e) C.A. 
11 1272 3308(c) 
11 1273 3303(a), (b)(4) 
11 1274(3) 3309(f) 
11 1301 4101(c)(3)-(4) 
11 1301(1)a. 4101(a)(1) 
11 1301(1)b. 4101(a)(2) 
11 1301(1)c. 4101(a)(3) 
11 1301(1)d. 4108(b) 
11 1301(1)e. C.A. 
11 1301(1)f. 4101(a)(4) 
11 1301(1)g. 1207(b)(2)(B) 
11 1301(2) 4101(b) 
11 1302 4101(c)(1) 
11 1303 4101(c)(2) 
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11 1304 804(c) 
11 1304(a)(1)-(2) 804(c)(1) 
11 1304(a)(2) 804(c)(2); 806(b), (d) 
11 1304(b) 804(c), (f)(2)(A) 
11 1311(a)(1)-(3) 4103(a)(1) 
11 1311(a)(4) 1305(a) 
11 1311(b) 4103(b)(2) 
11 1312 4103(b)(1) 
11 1312(c)-(d) C.A. 
11 1312(h) C.A. 
11 1312(i) 4103(a)(2) 
11 1313 4102 
11 1313(b) 3303(a)(1) 
11 1315 4104 
11 1316 C.A. 
11 1320 4105(a), (e); 4108(a) 
11 1321 4105(a), (e); 4108(a) 
11 1321(6) 4105(b)-(c) 
11 1322 1204 
11 1322(1) 1204(b)(2) 
11 1323 4106(a), (c) 
11 1324 4106(b)-(c); 4108(b) 
11 1325 4207(a)-(d) 
11 1325(a)(3) 4208(d) 
11 1325(b)(6) 4207(e) 
11 1325(c)-(d) 4208(c) 
11 1325A C.A. 
11 1326 4207(a)-(d) 
11 1326(c) 4501(d)(1)(A) 
11 1327 4207 
11 1330 C.A. 
11 1331 4107 
11 1332 4206(a)(1)-(b)(1) 
11 1333 4206(a)(2)(A), (b)(2) 
11 1333(a)(1) 4208(e); 4301(a)(1) 
11 1335(a)(2) 4301(a)(2) 
11 1335(a)(3) 4301(a)(3) 
11 1335(a)(4) 4303(a) 
11 1335(a)(5) 4303(a)(2) 
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11 1335(a)(6) 4302(a)(1), (b) 
11 1335(a)(7) 4302(a)(2) 
11 1335(a)(8) 4301(a)(4) 
11 1335(a)(9) 4302(a)(3); 4304(a); 4305 
11 1335(a)(9)b. 4305 
11 1335(c) 4301(b); 4302(c); 4303(b) 
11 1337 4301(a) 
11 1337(a) 4307(j) 
11 1337(b) 4108(c) 
11 1338 2303 
11 1338(a)(1) 2306(e) 
11 1338(c) C.A. 
11 1338(d) C.A. 
11 1339 1202(a)(1) 
11 1341 4201(a), (d)(2) 
11 1342(a)(1) 4202(a) 
11 1342(b)(1) C.A. 
11 1343(a) 4202(a) 
11 1343(b) 4202(b)(2) 
11 1343(c) C.A. 
11 1343(d) C.A. 
11 1343(e)(1) C.A. 
11 1344 C.A. 
11 1345 4202(d) 
11 1351 4203(a), (c)(4) 
11 1352 4203(a) 
11 1352(1) 4203(c)(3) 
11 1353 4203(a), (c)(4) 
11 1354 C.A. 
11 1355 4203(a) 
11 1356(1)-(2) 4203(b) 
11 1356(2) 4203(a)(3) 
11 1356(4) 4208(i) 
11 1356(a)-(b) 4203(a) 
11 1361(1)-(3) 4204(a)(3) 
11 1361(4) 4204(a)(4) 
11 1361(a)(5) C.A. 
11 1361(b) 4204(b)(3)-(4), (c) 
11 1361(c) 804(a) 
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11 1362 4204(e)(1) 
11 1363 4204(d) 
11 1364 4208(g) 
11 1365 C.A. 
11 1366 C.A. 
11 1367 4205; 4208(b) 
11 1368 4205; 4208(b) 
11 1401 4501(a)(1), (a)(6), 
(d)(1)(B) 
11 1401(1)-(2) 4503(b) 
11 1401(a) 708 
11 1402 C.A. 
11 1403 4501(a)(6), (d)(1)(B) 
11 1403(1) 4503(e) 
11 1403(2) 4501(b) 
11 1403(3) 4501(a)(2) 
11 1403(4) 4501(a)(3) 
11 1404 804(a); 4501(b), (d)(2) 
11 1405 4501(d)(1)(B) 
11 1405(a) 4501(a)(5) 
11 1406(a)(1)-(2) 4501(a)(5) 
11 1406(c) 4501(a)(5) 
11 1407 4501(a)(7), (d)(3) 
11 1408 4501(a)(1) 
11 1409 C.A. 
11 1411 4501(a)(4), (d)(1)(B) 
11 1412 C.A. 
11 1413 4501(c) 
11 1421 C.A. 
11 1422 C.A 
11 1423 C.A. 
11 1424 C.A. 
11 1425 C.A. 
11 1426 C.A. 
11 1427 C.A. 
11 1428 C.A. 
11 1431 C.A. 
11 1432(c) 4503(a) 
11 1432(e) 4503(c) 
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11 1441 C.A. 
11 1441A C.A. 
11 1441B C.A. 
11 1442 5103(a), (b)(1) 
11 1443 5103(a), (c) 
11 1443(d) 5103(b)(2) 
11 1444(a) 5102(b)(1), (d) 
11 1444(b) 5102(b), (d)(2) 
11 1444(c) 5109(d) 
11 1445(1) 5102(b)(4) 
11 1445(2) 5105(b), (c)(5) 
11 1445(3) C.A. 
11 1445(4) 5105(a); 5105(c)(2)(A) 
11 1445(5) 5101(b)-(c) 
11 1446 5102(b)(2)(B)(i) 
11 1446A(a) 5102(b)(2)(A), (d)(3) 
11 1446A(b) C.A. 
11 1446A(c) 5102(c)(1) 
11 1446A(d) 5102(c)(2) 
11 1447(a) 5101(a), (c) 
11 1447(b)-(c) C.A. 
11 1447(d) C.A. 
11 1447(e) C.A. 
11 1447A(a) 5101(a), (c) 
11 1147A(b)-(c) 802(a) 
11 1447A(d)-(g) C.A. 
11 1448(5) 5109(f) 
11 1448(a)(1) 5104(a)(1)(A)-(B) 
11 1448(a)(2) 5104(a)(2) 
11 1448(a)(3) 5104(a)(1)(C) 
11 1448(a)(4) 5104(a)(3) 
11 1448(a)(5) 5104(a)(4) 
11 1448(a)(6) 5104(a)(5) 
11 1448(a)(7) 5104(a)(1)(D) 
11 1448(a)(8) 5104(a)(6) 
11 1448(a)(9) 5104(a)(1)(A), (C) 
11 1448(a)(10) 5104(d) 
11 1448(c) 5104(c)(1)-(2) 
11 1448(d) 5104(b) 
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11 1148(e) 802(a) 
11 1448(e)(1) 5104(c)(1) 
11 1448(e)(2) 1104(b)(1); 
[1203(b)(2)(A)] 
11 1448(e)(3)-(4) C.A. 
11 1448(f)-(g) C.A. 
11 1448A(c) C.A. 
11 1448A(d) C.A. 
11 1448A(e) 5107(b)-(c) 
11 1448A(f) C.A. 
11 1448A(g) 5107(a), (c) 
11 1448A(k) C.A. 
11 1448A(l) C.A. 
11 1448B(c) C.A. 
11 1448B(e) 5107(a), (c) 
11 1448B(f) C.A. 
11 1449 804(e) 
11 1449(b) C.A. 
11 1449(c) C.A. 
11 1449(d) C.A. 
11 1449(e) C.A. 
11 1449(f) C.A. 
11 1449(g) 804(e) 
11 1450 2101(b)(3)(B) 
11 1451 2101(b)(3)(B) 
11 1452 5102(b)(2)(B)(ii) 
11 1453 5102(b)(3) 
11 1454 5105(a), (c)(1) 
11 1455 804(a); 5105(a), (c)(4)(A) 
11 1456 C.A. 
11 1457 5102(d)(5); 5103(b)(3); 
5104(c)(3) 
11 1457(b) 5108(a)(2) 
11 1457(c) 5108(a)(1) 
11 1457(d)-(f) C.A. 
11 1457(g) 5108(b) 
11 1457(h) C.A. 
11 1458(a)(2) 3302(a)(2) 
11 1458(b) 3302(b)(1) 
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11 1459 5102(a) 
11 1459(c) 5102(d)(1) 
11 1460(a) 5106(a)-(b) 
11 1460(b)(1) 5106(b) 
11 1460(b)(4) C.A. 
11 1460(c) C.A. 
11 1460(d) 5106(c) 
11 1461 C.A. 
11 1470(a) 4502(a)(1) 
11 1470(d) 4503(d) 
11 1470(e) 4503(f) 
11 1471(a) 4502(a)(1) 
11 1471(b) C.A. 
11 1471(c) C.A. 
11 1471(d) 4502(a)(1) 
11 1471(e) C.A. 
11 1471(f) 4502(c) 
11 1471(g) C.A. 
11 1471(h) C.A. 
11 1471(i) 4502(c) 
11 1471(j) 4502(c) 
11 1471(k) 4502(b) 
11 1471(l) 4502(a)(2) 
11 1472(a) 4502(d)(1) 
11 1472(b) 4502(d)(3) 
11 1472(c) 4502(d)(2) 
11 1472(d) 4502(d)(3)(H) 
11 1472(f) 4502(e) 
11 1473 C.A. 
11 1474 307(c) 
11 1501 C.A. 
11 1502(3) 5304(b) 
11 1502(5) 5304(d) 
11 1502(9) 5304(d) 
11 1502(12) 5304(f) 
11 1503(a)(1) 5301(a)(1) 
11 1503(b) 5301(a)(2) 
11 1503(c) 5301(a)(3) 
11 1503(d) C.A. 
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11 1504(a) 5301(b) 
11 1504(b) 5301(c) 
11 1504(b)(3) C.A. 
11 1504(b)(4) C.A. 
11 1504(c) 5301(d) 
11 1505 C.A. 
11 1506 C.A. 
11 1507 C.A. 
11 1508 C.A. 
11 1509 C.A. 
11 1510 C.A. 
11 1511 C.A. 
11 3531 3307(a)(1)(B), (c) 
11 3531(3) 3309(g) 
11 3532 3307(a)(1)(C) 
11 3532(1)-(3) 3307(a)(1)(D) 
11 3533(1) 3307(a)(2)(A) 
11 3533(3) C.A. 
11 3534 C.A. 
11 4201 801(a) 
11 4201(b) 801(b)(2)(A)-(B) 
11 4202 801(a) 
11 4203 801(a), (b)(3) 
11 4204(c)(9) 803(c) 
11 4205(b)(1) 802(a)(2) 
11 4205(b)(2) 802(a)(4) 
11 4205(b)(3) 802(a)(5) 
11 4205(b)(4) 802(a)(6) 
11 4205(b)(5) 802(a)(7) 
11 4205(b)(6) 802(g) 
11 4205(k) 803(a) 
11 4205A 802(a) 
11 4206 803(a) 
11 4206(a) 802(h) 
11 4206(b) 802(i) 
11 4206(c) 802(k) 
11 4207 803(a) 
11 4207(a) 802(l) 
11 4208 803(b) 
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11 4209 1108 
11 4209(e) 1108(f) 
11 4209(a) 802(a)(1) 
11 4209(e)(1)j. C.A. 
11 4209(e)(1)l. 1108(f)(6)(D) 
11 4209(e)(1)q.-r. 1108(f)(2)(B) 
11 4209(e)(2) C.A. 
11 4209A C.A. 
11 4214 804(a) 
12 210 2103 
13 728 C.A. 
14 9302 1209(b)-(c) 
14 9303 1209(b) 
16 1131(1)b. 1302(a)(2)(C) 
16 1131(1)c. 1209(a)(2)(A) 
16 1131(4) 1209(a)(3) 
16 1136 1209(c) 
16 1136(a) 1302(a)(2)(C) 
16 1136(a)-(b) 1209(a) 
16 2223 C.A. 
16 4701 5209 
16 4701(8) 5210(e) 
16 4701(17) 5210(f) 
16 4701(33) 5210(h) 
16 4701(41) 5203(a)(1) 
16 4701(42) 5203(a)(1) 
16 4739 5205(a) 
16 4740(g) 3203(a)(1)(B) 
16 4743 5207; 5209 
16 4743(2) 5207(a)(1) 
16 4743(5) 5210(g) 
16 4744 5207 
16 4744(a)(1) 5207(a)(1); 5210(b) 
16 4744(a)(2) 803(a); 5207(e)(1) 
16 4744(b)(1) 5207(c)-(d) 
16 4744(b)(2) 5207(e)(3) 
16 4744(c)(1) 5207(a)(2); 5210(b) 
16 4744(c)(2) 5207(a)(2)(B), (e)(1) 
16 4744(d) 5207(a)(1) 
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16 4744(d)(2) 803(a) 
16 4744(e)(1) 5207(b); 5210(b) 
16 4744(e)(2) 5207(e)(1), (e)(2) 
16 4744(f) C.A. 
16 4744(g) C.A. 
16 4744(h) 104 
16 4751A 5203 
16 4751A(1)a.-b. 5203(a)(1) 
16 4751A(1)c. 5203(a)(2) 
16 4751A(1)d. 5203(a)(3) 
16 4751A(1)e. C.A. 
16 4751A(2) C.A. 
16 4751B 804(a) 
16 4751C(1) 5210(k) 
16 4751C(2) 5210(l) 
16 4751C(3) 5210(m) 
16 4751C(4) 5210(n) 
16 4751C(5) 5210(o) 
16 4751D 5201; 5202 
16 4751D(a) 5201(d)(5); 5202(c)(4) 
16 4752 5201(a), (d)(1); 5202(a), 
(c)(1) 
16 4753 5201(a), (d)(1); 5202(a), 
(c)(1) 
16 4754 5201(a), (d)(1); 5202(a), 
(c)(1) 
16 4755 5201(a), (d)(1); 5202(a), 
(c)(1) 
16 4756 5201(a), (d)(1); 5202(a), 
(c)(1) 
16 4757 5205 
16 4757(a)(1) 5205(a) 
16 4757(a)(2) C.A. 
16 4757(a)(3) C.A. 
16 4757(a)(4) C.A. 
16 4757(a)(5) C.A. 
16 4757(a)(6) C.A. 
16 4757(a)(7) 5205(b) 
16 4757(b) 5205(c) 
16 4757(c) C.A. 
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16 4758 5202(a), (c)(1) 
16 4759 5205 
16 4759(a)(1) 5205(a) 
16 4759(a)(2) 5205(a)(5) 
16 4759(a)(3) C.A. 
16 4759(a)(4) 3303(b)(2) 
16 4759(b) 5205(c) 
16 4760 C.A. 
16 4760A(b) 5202(e) 
16 4761(a) 5201(c), (d)(3); 5202(b) 
16 4761(a)(2) C.A. 
16 4761(b) 5202(b) 
16 4761(c) 5201(c); 5202(b), (c)(2) 
16 4761(d) 5201(c) 
16 4761(e) 5201(c); 5202(d) 
16 4761(f) C.A. 
16 4762 211; 5201(a) 
16 4763 5201(a) 
16 4763(b) 5201(d)(1)(F) 
16 4764 5201(d)(2) 
16 4764(a) 5201(b) 
16 4764(b) 5201(b) 
16 4764(c)-(d) C.A. 
16 4765 C.A. 
16 4766 210 
16 4767 C.A. 
16 4769 508(a); 5208 
16 4769(a)(2) 5210(i) 
16 4771 5204(e) 
16 4771(a) 5204(a), (d) 
16 4771(b) 5204(b) 
16 4772 C.A. 
16 4773(1) 5204(a) 
16 4773(1) 5204(b) 
16 4773(2) 5210(f) 
16 4774 5204(e) 
16 4774(a) 5204(a) 
16 4774(c)-(d) 5204(b) 
16 4774(d) 5204(e)(2)(A) 
 
 265 
16 4774(e) 5204(c) 
16 4795 5209 
16 4798(r) 4304(a)(2) 
16 4798(s) C.A. 
16 4798(t) C.A. 
16 4919A(s) C.A. 
16 4919A(v) C.A. 
16 5023 C.A. 
16 7103 C.A. 
16 7109(c) 3203 
16 7113(2)-(4) C.A. 
18 4354 2212(b)(1) 
18 4354(a) 2212(a)(2) 
21 305(m) C.A. 
21 2610(g) 3203 
21 2315 3203 
21 2316 2201(a) 
21 2613 C.A. 
21 2620(a)-(b) 3203 
21 2651(a)-(p) 2203 
21 2751 2201(a) 
21 2752 3203 
21 2760 2201(a) 
21 3107 3203 
21 4103 804(a) 
21 4103(b) 3302(b)(3) 
21 4134 1203 
21 4176A C.A. 
21 4177 1205(b)-(c); 1210(a) 
21 4177(a) 1205(a); 1210(a) 
21 4177(b)(3)b. 1205(d) 
21 4177(c)(1) 1210(a)(2) 
21 4177(c)(7) 1210(a)(3) 
21 4177(c)(8) 1210(a) 
21 4177(c)(11) 1210(a)(1) 
21 4177(d) C.A. 
21 4177A 5200 
21 4177M C.A. 
21 4201 C.A. 
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21 4202(a)-(c) 3301(a)(2)(I) 
21 4601 708 
21 4603 3203(a)(1)(B) 
21 4604(a) 708 
21 4604(b) C.A. 
21 6701 C.A. 
21 6702 802(j); 2109 
21 6704 211; 2101(b)(4)(B) 
21 6705 2201(a); 3203 
21 6705(d) 2203 
21 6708 708 
21 6709 2201(a); 2203 
21 6710 708 
23 2301(f) 308(f) 
23 2302(a) 1205(a) 
23 2305 1205(b) 
23 2305(1)-(4) C.A. 
24 901 5109(c) 
24 902 C.A. 
24 903 5105(a), (c)(2)(B), (c)(3) 
24 904 C.A. 
24 904A C.A. 
24 1790 1106(a)(2) 
31 1003 C.A. 
31 1004 2202(a)(1) 
31 1005 2210(a) 
31 2117 C.A. 
31 3902(1)b. 1209(a)(2)(A) 
31 3912 C.A. 
31 3913 1209(c) 
31 3913(a) 1209(a) 
31 3913(b) C.A. 
31 3913(c) 1209(a) 
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CONVERSION TABLE BY PROPOSED DRAFT 
 
Draft Provision D.E. Code Title D.E. Code Provision 
101(a) 11 101 
101(b) 11 102 
101(c) 11 103 
102(a) 11 201; 203 
102(a)(1) 11 201(1); 201(5) 
102(a)(2) 11 201(2) 
102(a)(3) 11 201(3) 
102(a)(4) 11 201(4) 
102(b) -- -- 
102(c) -- -- 
102(d)(1) -- -- 
102(d)(2) 11 211 
102(d)(3) 11 211 
103(a) 11 202(a) 
103(b) 11 103(b) 
103(c) 11 202(b) 
103(d) 11 241 
104 11 1113(h) 
104 16 4744(h) 
105 11 1109(4); 204(a)(1) 
105(a)(1) 11 204(a)(1) 
105(a)(2) -- -- 
105(a)(3) 11 204(a)(2) 
105(a)(4) 11 204(a)(5) 
105(a)(5) 11 204(a)(3) 
105(a)(6) 11 204(a)(4) 
105(a)(7)(A) 11 204(a)(1) 
105(a)(7)(B)  11 1109(4) 
105(b) 11 204(b) 
105(c) 11 204(c) 
106(a) -- -- 
106(b) 11 306(e) 
106(b)(1)(A) 11 301 
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106(b)(1)(B) 11 301; 303(c) 
106(b)(1)(C) 11 232 
106(b)(2) 11 304 
106(b)(3) 11 304(c) 
106(c)(1)(A) -- -- 
106(c)(1)(B) 11 301(c) 
106(c)(2) 11 303(a)-(b); 304(a)-(b) 
106(d) 11 306 
107 11 223 
108 11 1109(4); 204(a)(1); 304(c) 
108(d) 11 221(b) 
108(e) 11 221(a) 
108(g) 11 222(21)  
109 11 221(c) 
201 -- -- 
202(a) 11 232 
202(b) -- -- 
203(a)(1) 11 261 
203(a)(2) 11 262(2); 263(2) 
203(a)(3) -- -- 
203(b) -- -- 
204(a) 11 242 
204(b) -- -- 
204(c) 11 243 
204(d) 11 243 
205(a) 11 251(a) 
205(b) 11 231 
205(b)(1)(D) 11 254 
205(b)(2)(B) 11 255 
205(b)(4) 11 231(a) 
205(c) 11 252 
205(d) 11 251(b) 
205(e) 11 251(c) 
205(f) -- -- 
205(g) 11 253 
205(h) 11 307 
206(a)  11 441(1) 
206(b) -- -- 
206(c) -- -- 
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207 -- -- 
208(a) 11 451 
208(b) 11 452 
208(c)(1)-(c)(4) 11 453 
208(c)(5) -- -- 
209 -- -- 
210(a) 11 206(a)-(b) 
210(a)(1)(A) 11 206(b)(1); 206(b)(3) 
210(a)(1)(B)(i) 11 812 
210(a)(1)(B)(ii) 11 206(b)(3) 
210(a)(1)(C) -- -- 
210(a)(2)(A) 11 206(a)(2) 
210(a)(2)(B) 11 206(b)(2) 
210(a)(3) -- -- 
210(a)(4) -- -- 
210(a)(5) 11 206(a)(3) 
210 (b) -- -- 
210(c) -- -- 
210(d) -- -- 
210 16 4766 
211(a)(1) 11 271(1)-(2) 
211(a)(1)(B)(ii) 11 271(2) 
211(a)(2) 11 271(3) 
211(b) 11 273 
211(c) 11 272(3) 
211(d) 11 272(2) 
211(e) 11 274 
211(f) 11 275 
211(g) 11 533 
211(h) 11 271(1)b. 
212(a)-(b) 11 421 
212(c) -- -- 
212 11 424 
213(a) 11 262 
213(a) 11 263 
213(b) -- -- 
214(a) -- -- 
214(b) -- -- 
214(c) -- -- 
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214(d) -- -- 
214(e) 11 424 
214(f) -- -- 
214(g) -- -- 
214(h) -- -- 
214(i) -- -- 
214(j) -- -- 
214(k) 11 243 
214(l) 11 424 
300 11 461; 463 
301(a) 11 463 
301(b) -- -- 
301(c) 11 464(d); 467(a)(1); 465(a) 
301(d) 11 463; 464(e)(1) 
301(d)(3) -- -- 
301(e) 11 470(b) 
302(1) 11 463; 464(a); 466(a); 
467(a)(1) 
302(2) 11 463 
302(3) 11 463 
303(a)(1)-(3) 11 462(a)(1)-(3), (5) 
303(a)(4) 11 462(a)(4) 
303(b) 11 462(b)(1) 
304(a)(1) 11 467(a)(1) 
304(a)(2) 11 467(b)(1) 
304(a)(3) 11 467(c) 
304(a)(3)(A) -- -- 
304(a)(3)(B) 11 467(c)(2) 
304(a)(3)(C) 11 467(c)(1) 
304(a)(3)(D) 11 467(c)(3) 
304(a)(4) 11 467(b)(2) 
304(b) 11 467(d) 
305(a) 11 468 
305(a)(1)(A)(i) 11 468(1) 
305(a)(1)(A)(ii) 11 468(2) 
305(a)(1)(A)(iii) 11 468(3) 
305(a)(1)(B) 11 468(1)c.; 468(2)b.; 468(3)c. 
305(a)(2) 11 468(4) 
305(a)(3) 11 468(5)-(5)a. 
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305(a)(4) 11 468(6)-(6)a. 
305(a)(5) 11 468(7) 
305(b) 11 468(5)c.; 468(6)b. 
306(a) 11 464(a); 465(a)(3) 
306(b)(1) 11 465(a)(1)-(2) 
306(b)(2) 11 464(d) 
306(c)(1) 11 464(c) 
306(c)(2)(A) 11 464(e)(2); 465(b) 
306(c)(2)(B) 11 464(e)(2)a.-c.; 465(c) 
306(d) 11 467(e) 
307(a) 11 466(a)-(b) 
307(b) 11 466(b)(1)-(3) 
307(c) 11 840(c); 1474 
307(d) 11 466(c) 
307(e) 11 466(d); 840(d); 854(d)-(e) 
308(a) -- -- 
308(b) 11 471(a) 
308(c) 11 471(c) 
308(d) 11 461 
308(e) -- -- 
308(f) 23 2301(f) 
401(a) -- -- 
401(b)(2) 11 431(b) 
401(c) -- -- 
401(d) 11 431; 423 
402(a) 11 243 
402(b)(1) 11 242 
402(b)(2) -- -- 
403(a)(1) 11 401(a) 
403(a)(2)(A) -- -- 
403(a)(2)(B) 11 401(a) 
403(a)(2)(C) 11 401(b) 
403(b) 11 401(a) 
403(c) -- -- 
404 11 423 
405(a) 11 431(a) 
405(b) -- 431(a) 
406 -- -- 
407 -- -- 
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408 -- -- 
409 11 464(a), (c); 465(a); 466(a)-
(c); 467(a), (c)-(f); 468(2)a., 
(5)a., (6)a., (7)a.; 469; 470 
410(a) -- -- 
410(b) 11 423  
410(c) 11 222(18), (25); 401(c) 
501(a) -- -- 
501(b) -- -- 
501(c) 11 432(a); 475 
501(d) -- -- 
502(a) 11 205 
502(b)(1) 11 205(c) 
502(b)(2) 11 205 
502(b)(3) 11 205(e) 
502(b)(4) 11 205 
502(c) 11 205 
502(d) 11 205(j) 
502(e) 11 205 
502(f) 11 205 
502(g) -- -- 
502(h) -- -- 
503(a) 11 432(a) 
503(b) 11 431(b) 
503(c) -- -- 
504 11 207 
505 11 208 
506 11 209 
507 11 210 
508 11 475 
508(a) 16 4769 
509(a) 11 207(1) 
509(b) 11 207(3); 222(3) 
509(c) 11 207(4) 
509(d) -- -- 
601(a) 11 281 
601(b) 11 283 
601(c) -- -- 
602(a) 11 282 
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602(b) -- -- 
602(c) -- -- 
603 11 284 
701(a) 11 531 
701(b)(1) 11 532 
701(b)(2) -- -- 
702(a) 11 501; 502; 503 
702(b) -- -- 
703(a) 11 511; 512; 513; 522 
703(b) 11 521(b) 
703(c) 11 522 
704 11 523 
705 11 521(c) 
706(a) 11 541(a)-(b) 
706(b) 11 541(c) 
707 11 501; 502; 503; 511; 512; 
513; 521(a); 531 
708 11 1401(a); 812(b); 828; 
850(a)(1); 860; 862; 937 
708 21 4601; 4604(a); 6708; 6710 
801(a) 11 4201; 4202; 4203 
801(b)(2)(A) 11 4201(b) 
801(b)(2)(B) 11 4201(b) 
801(b)(3) 11 4203 
802(a) 11 630(b), 630A(b), 633(d), 
772(c), 778(6)b., 825(b), 
826(b), 826A(b), 832(b), 
1254, 1447A(b)–(c), 
1448(e), 4205A, 4209(a) 
802(a)(1) -- 4209(a) 
802(a)(2) 11 4205(b)(1) 
802(a)(3) 11 -- 
802(a)(4) 11 4205(b)(2) 
802(a)(5) 11 4205(b)(3) 
802(a)(6) 11 4205(b)(4) 
802(a)(7) 11 4205(b)(5) 
802(a)(8) 11 4205(b)(6) 
802(a)(9) 11 4206(a) 
802(a)(10) 11 4206(b) 
802(a)(11) 21 6702 
 
 274 
802(a)(12) 11 4206(c) 
802(a)(13) 11 4207(a) 
803(a) 11 4205(k); 4206; 4207 
803(a) 16 4744(a)(2), (d)(2) 
803(b) 11 4208 
803(c) 11 4204(c)(9) 
803(d) -- -- 
804(a) 11 4214; 607(a)(3), 776, 
841B(c), 851, 852A, 1110, 
1114A(c), 1249(d), 1361(c), 
1404, 1455; 16 Del.C. 
§ 4751B; 21 Del.C. § 4103 
804(b) 11 1105; 605; 606 
804(c) 11 1304; 1304(b) 
804(c)(1) 11 1304(a)(1)-(2) 
804(c)(2) 11 1304(a)(2) 
804(d) 11 616(c) 
804(e) 11 1239(a); 1449(g) 
804(f)(2)(A) 11 1304(b) 
804(g) -- -- 
805(a) 11 224 
805(b) 11 224 
805(c)(1) 11 224(3) 
805(c)(2) 11 939(g)-(h) 
805(c)(3) 11 939(g)-(h) 
805(d) 11 855(c) 
806(a) 11 931(6) 
806(b) 11 1304(a)(2) 
806(c) 11 931(14) 
806(d) 11 1304(a)(2) 
806(e) 11 1105(c) 
806(e) 11 841(c) 
806(f) 11 863 
1101(a) 11 636(a)(1) 
1101(b) 11 636(b)(1)-(2) 
1102(a)(1) -- -- 
1102(a)(2)(A) 11 635(1) 
1102(a)(2)(B) 11 636(a)(4) 
1102(a)(2)(C) 11 636(a)(5) 
1102(a)(2)(D) 11 636(a)(6) 
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1102(a)(3) 11 635(2) 
1102(b) 11 635 
1103(a)(1) 11 632(1) 
1103(a)(2) 11 632(3) 
1103(b) 11 641 
1103(c) 11 632 
1104(a) 11 631 
1104(b)(1) 11 1448(e)(2) 
1104(b)(2) 11 633 
1104(b)(3) 11 631 
1104(c) -- -- 
1105(a) 11 632(5); 645 
1105(b)(1) 11 632(5) 
1105(b)(2) -- -- 
1105(b)(3) 11 645 
1105(c) 11 636(a)(3) 
1106(a) 11 651; 652 
1106(a)(2) 24 1790 
1106(b) 11 653 
1106(c) 11 651; 652; 631 
1106(d) -- -- 
1107(a) 11 654 
1107(b) -- -- 
1107(c) -- -- 
1107(d) -- -- 
1108 11 4209 
1108(f) 11 4209(e) 
1108(f)(2)(B) 11 4209(e)(1)q.-r. 
1108(f)(6)(D) 11 4209(e)(1)l. 
1201(a) 11 831(a); 832(a); 835(a); 
836(a) 
1201(b)(1)(A) 11 836(a)(6) 
1201(b)(1)(B) 11 836(a)(1)-(3) 
1201(b)(1)(C) 11 835(b)(2) 
1201(b)(1)(D) 11 835(b)(1) 
1201(b)(2)(A) 11 832(a)(1); 836(a)(5) 
1201(b)(2)(B)-(C) 11 832(a)(2); 836(a)(4) 
1201(b)(3) 11 831(a) 
1202(a)(1) 11 611(1); 612(a); 613(a); 607; 
1339 
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1202(a)(2) 11 601 
1202(b)(1) 11 613(a)(2), (4) 
1202(b)(1)(C) 11 1103B 
1202(b)(2) 11 612(a)(1), (9); 613(a)(1) 
1202(b)(2)(A) 11 607(a)(3)a.; 613(a)(1) 
1202(b)(2)(B)(i) 7 6013(c)-(e) 
1202(b)(2)(B)(i) 11 607(a)(3)b. 
1202(b)(2)(B)(ii) 11 606 
1202(b)(3)(A)(i)(aa) 11 612(a)(2) 
1202(b)(3)(A)(i)(bb) 11 607(a)(1)–(2) 
1202(b)(3)(A)(ii) 11 611(1) 
1202(b)(3)(B) 11 601 
1202(b)(4)(A)-(C) 11 601(c); 612(a)(3)-(4), (6), 
(8), (11); 613(a)(5)-(6) 
1202(b)(4)(D) 11 612(a)(10) 
1202(b)(4)(E) 11 1254 
1203(a) 11 603(a)(1); 604 
1203(b)(1)(A)(i) 11 1103B 
1203(b)(1)(A)(ii) 11 605 
1203(b)(1)(B) 11 612(a)(1) 
1203(b)(2)(A)(i) 11 1103A 
1203(b)(2)(A)(ii) 11 1100(9) 
1203(b)(2)(A)(iii) 11 612(a)(2) 
1203(b)(2)(B) 11 611(1); 1103 
1203 2 309 
1203 11 629 
1203 21 4134 
[1203(b)(2)(A)] 11 1448(e)(2) 
[1203(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii)] 11 611(2); 628A 
[1203(b)(2)(C)]22 11 628 
1204 7 6309 
1204 11 1322 
1204(a) 11 603(a)(1); 604 
1204(b) 11 603; 604 
1204(b)(1) 7 6309(i) 
1204(b)(2) 11 1322(1) 
1204(c) 11 1104 
                                                             
22 These bracketed provisions’ inclusion in the Proposed Code depends upon resolution of an open issue: 
whether or not to include some form of negligent injuring offense. 
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1205(a) 21 4177(a) 
1205(a) 23 2302(a) 
1205(b) 21 4177 
1205(b) 23 2305 
1205(c) 21 4177 
1205(d) 21 4177(b)(3)b. 
1206(a) 11 780(a) 
1206(b) 11 780(c) 
1206(c) 11 780(b) 
1207(a) 11 602; 621(a)(1); 621(a)(3); 
622; 1240(a) 
1207(a)(1)(A) -- -- 
1207(a)(1)(B) 11 621(a)(1) 
1207(a)(2) 11 602(a) 
1207(b) 11 602; 621 
1207(b)(1)(A) 11 1240 
1207(b)(2)(A)(ii) 11 622 
1207(b)(2)(B) 11 1301(1)g. 
1207(b)(2)(C) 11 602(a) 
1207 11 805 
1208 11 625; 626 
1209(a) 16 1136(a)-(b) 
1209(a) 31 3913(a), (c) 
1209(a)(2)(A) 16 1131(1)c. 
1209(a)(2)(A) 31 3902(1)b. 
1209(a)(3) 16 1131(4) 
1209(b) 14 9302; 9303 
1209(c) 14 9302 
1209(c) 16 1136 
1209(c) 31 3913 
1210(a) 21 4177(a), (c)(1), (c)(7), 
(c)(8), (c)(11) 
1210(b) 11 222(23) 
1210(c) 11 222(26) 
1301(a)(1) 11 767; 768; 769; 770; 771; 
772; 773 
1301(a)(2) 11 774; 761(j)-(k) 
1301(a)(2)(A) 11 761; 761(j)(4) 
1301(a)(2)(B) 11 761(j)(2)-(3) 
1301(a)(2)(C) 11 761(j)(5) 
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1301(a)(2)(D) 11 761(k); 771(a)(1) 
1301(a)(2)(D)(ii) 11 769(a)(3); 773(a)(5) 
1301(b)(1)(A)(i)(aa) 11 772(a)(2)a., c.; 773(a)(1) 
1301(b)(1)(A)(i)(bb)-(cc) 11 767(a)(1); 773(a)(3); 
772(a)(2)d.-e. 
1301(b)(1)(A)(ii) 11 773(a); 772(a) 
1301(b)(1)(B) 11 769(a)(3); 772(a)(2)g.; 
773(a)(5) 
1301(b)(1)(C) 11 772(a)(2)f.; 773(a)(4) 
1301(b)(2)(A) 11 769(a)(1); 771(a)(2)a.-b.; 
773(a)(1) 
1301(b)(2)(B) 11 771(a)(1) 
1301(b)(2)(C) 11 772(a)(2)b.; 773(a)(2)a. 
1301(b)(3) 11 770 
1301(c) 11 770(a)(3); 771(a)(2); 
772(a)(2) 
1301(d) 11 767; 768; 769 
1301(e) 11 778; 778A(1) 
1301(f) 11 762(a) 
1301(g) 11 771(c) 
1302(a)(2)(A) 11 1259 
1302(a)(2)(B) 11 778(3)-(4) 
1302(a)(2)(C) 16 1131(1)b.; 1136(a) 
1302(b) -- -- 
1303 11 775 
1304 11 1112; 777A 
1305(a) 11 763; 1311(a)(4) 
1305(b)(1) 11 778A(3) 
1305(b)(2) 11 763 
1306(a) 11 762(a) 
1306(b) 11 761(d); 770(b); 771(b); 
780(d) 
1307(a) -- -- 
1307(b) 11 761(i) 
1307(c) 11 761(e) 
1307(d) 11 1112(b)(2) 
1307(e) 11 761(f) 
1307(f)(1) 11 761(g)(1) 
1307(f)(2) 11 761(b), (c), (g)(2) 
1307(f)(3) 11 761(g)(1) 
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1401(a) 11 781; 782; 786(c) 
1401(b) 11 783; 783A 
1401(b)(6) 11 784 
1401(c)(1) 11 781; 782 
1401(c)(2) 11 783; 783A 
1401(d) 11 784 
1402(a)(1) 11 1100A 
1402(a)(2) 11 787(b)(2)-(3) 
1402(a)(3)(A) 11 787(b)(1) 
1402(a)(3)(B) 11 787(b)(5)a. 
1402(a)(4) 11 787(b)(5)b. 
1402(b) 11 787; 1100A 
1402(b)(3) 11 1100A 
1402(b)(4) 11 787(b)(6)a. 
1402(c) 11 1100A 
1402(d)(1)(A) 11 787(e)(1) 
1402(d)(1)(B) 11 787(c)(2) 
1402(d)(2) 11 787(d) 
1402(e) 11 787(j)(2)–(4) 
1403(a) 11 791 
1403(b) 11 792 
1403(c) 11 791 
1404 11 786(b) 
2101(a) 11 841(a); 855(a)-(b) 
2101(b) 11 841(c); 939 
2101(b)(3)(B) 11 1450; 1451 
2101(b)(4)-(5) 11 840 
2101(b)(4)(B) 11 841A 
2101(b)(4)(B) 21 6704 
2101(b)(4)(C) 11 841C 
2101(b)(6) -- -- 
2101(b)(7) -- -- 
2101(c) 11 846 
2101(d) 11 847(a) 
2102(a) 11 841; 813 
2102(b)(1) 11 840 
2102(b)(2) 11 840(a)(4)-(5) 
2103 11 840(a)(2); 913; 913A; 916; 
917; 908 
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2103 6 4903A 
2103 12 210 
2103(a) 11 843; 844 
2103(b)(1) 11 849(b)-(c) 
2103(b)(2) 11 844 
2103(c) 11 849(e) 
2104(a) 11 846 
2104(b) 11 847(b) 
2105 11 842 
2106(a) 11 845(a); 933 
2106(b) 11 845(b)-(c) 
2107(a) 11 851 
2107(b) 11 852 
2108 11 858; 920; 921 
2109( 11 853 
2109 21 6702 
2110(a) 11 857(2) 
2110(b) 11 843 
2110(c) 11 857(3) 
2110(d) 11 841A(b) 
2110(e) 11 857(4) 
2110(f) 11 857(5) 
2110(g) 11 841C(b)(1) 
2110(h) 11 857(7); 841(b); 813 
2110(i) -- -- 
2110(j) 11 857(8); 931(6) 
2110(k) -- -- 
2110(l) 11 805 
2201(a) 21 2316; 6705; 6709; 2751; 
2760 
2201(a)(1) 11 861(a)(1) 
2201(a)(2) 11 861(a)(2) 
2201(a)(3) -- -- 
2201(a)(4) 11 926(a) 
2201(b)(1) 11 861(b)(1) 
2201(b)(2) 11 861(b)(2) 
2201(b)(3) 11 861(b)(3) 
2201(c) -- -- 
2202(a)(1) 11 871; 872; 876; 1004 
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PART I:  THE GENERAL PART 
 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
 
CHAPTER 100.  PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
 
Section 101.  Short Title and Effective Date 
Section 102.  Principle of Construction; General Purposes 
Section 103.  All Offenses Defined by Statute; Applicability 
Section 104.  Civil Remedies Preserved; No Merger with Civil Injury 
Section 105.  State Criminal Jurisdiction 
Section 106.  Burdens of Proof; Permissive Inferences 
Section 107.  Words of Gender or Number 
Section 108.  Definitions; General Definitions 
Section 109.  Definitions Index 
 
 
General Comments Regarding Chapter 100: 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 233, 302, 308 
 
Comment: 
The proposed Chapter 100 does not specifically address the following current provisions: 
Definition and classification of offenses.  11 Del.C. § 233 is not included because every 
offense definition throughout the Special Part determines what conduct is forbidden.  Since all 
offenses must be defined by statute under both 11 Del.C. § 202 and proposed Section 103(a), no 
further provision is necessary.  Additionally, the classification of offenses is done 
comprehensively in Section 801, so no reference to it here is necessary. 
Jury instruction for defendant on reasonable doubt.  11 Del.C. § 302 is not included 
because it addresses purely procedural issues that are best collected with others like it in the part 
of Title 11 dealing with criminal procedure. 
Construction of provisions allowing no defense.  11 Del.C. § 308 is not included because 
the Proposed Code is drafted to minimize the likelihood that provisions denying a defense would 
be construed to authorize other defenses. 
 
 
Comment on Section 101.  Short Title and Effective Date 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision gives a name for the Code and specifies the date on which it 
becomes legally effective.  It also specifies the effect of current law in prosecutions committed 
after the effective date, but which concern conduct that occurred before the effective date of the 
Code.  
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Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 101(a) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 101.  Note however, that while § 101 provides that Title 11 Part I is the “Delaware Criminal 
Code,” this denomination of Title 11 Part I would be inaccurate after the enactment of the 
Proposed Code.  Therefore, § 101 cannot be retained and all references to Title 11 Part I as the 
“Delaware Criminal Code” or “Criminal Code” must be deleted or amended accordingly in Title 
11.  Section 101(b)–(c) are substantially similar to 11 Del.C. §§ 102, addressing offenses 
committed prior to 1973.  The latter provision is no longer necessary, and is not retained in Title 
11. 
 
 
Comment on Section 102.  Principle of Construction; General Purposes 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 201, 203, 211 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision articulates the general legislative purposes of the Code and 
sets forth the principles of construction to be used in its interpretation.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 102(a) combines, and is substantially similar 
to, 11 Del.C. §§ 201 and 203.  Language has been added to Subsection (a) to clarify that when 
the language of a statute is subject to differing constructions, the courts should first “apply[] 
general principles of statutory interpretation and available signs of legislative intent . . . .”  
Courts should resort to the general purposes of the Code set forth in Subsections (a)(1)–(4) for 
guidance only if the language remains ambiguous after using those rules in an effort to determine 
the intent behind a specific provision.  This order of preference ensures that the general purposes 
do not “trump” a more specific legislative intent as to a particular provision.  The proposed 
provision expands on the rule of construction in 11 Del.C. § 203, which simply states that “the 
provisions herein must . . . effect the purposes of the law, as stated in § 201 of this title,” but does 
not specify when, or how, courts should resort to those general purposes. 
Sections 102(a)(1)–(4) are substantially similar to the general purposes in 11 Del.C. 
§§ 201(1)–(4).  In Subsection (a)(3), the term “culpability” has been substituted for “mental 
state” in § 201(3) to maintain consistent terminology throughout the Proposed Code.  Current 
§ 201(4) has been reworded in Subsection (a)(4) to maintain the principle of proportional 
punishment it expresses, but also to reflect the fact that the Proposed Code distinguishes between 
more nuanced gradations than simply “serious” and “minor” offenses, mentioned in § 201(4), 
and to make explicit the connection between proportional punishment and the blameworthiness 
of the offender.  All offenses in the Proposed Code are set on a continuum of blameworthiness, 
from violations to Class 1 felonies.  The reformulation of § 201(4) more accurately expresses 
that idea and is consistent with the first amendment of the Model Penal Code described below.   
Note that Subsections (a)(1)–(4) make no reference to the distributive principles of 
deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation (implied by 11 Del.C § 201(5)).  As criminal law 
literature had pointed out, providing a list of conflicting distributive principles is unhelpful and 
often counterproductive, since it promotes inconsistent interpretation of the law according to 
each interpreter’s preferred distributive principle.  Moreover, while originally the Model Penal 
Code also listed conflicting distributive principles in § 1.02(2), the American Law Institute’s first 
amendment of the Model Penal Code in 2007 modified that provision.  The amended provision 
determines the primacy of proportional punishment (as a function of: “the gravity of offenses, 
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the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders”) over alternative 
distributive principles.  While the Proposed Code has not taken up this debate, nothing in it is 
inconsistent with the amended Model Penal Code’s position.   
Section 102(b) provides that this commentary “should be used as an aid in interpreting” 
the Code.  The provision does not specify how much weight courts are to give the commentary in 
interpreting the Code, however, it points out that they should use the commentary as a guide.   
Section 102(c) provides that no headings used throughout the Code “shall exclusively 
govern, limit, modify, or affect the scope, meaning, or intent of a provision.”  Nevertheless, it 
also provides that “headings may be used as an aid in interpreting the provisions of this Code. 
This provision does not appear in current law, but it is useful to ensure that the language of the 
Code is not misinterpreted due to its heading.  Headings are used often throughout the Code, and 
their main goal is to help the reader find key provisions quickly, and at times to highlight the 
typical case to which the provision refers to. The headings therefore should not be read as 
exclusively limiting the provision they refer to. Consider for instance the heading used in Section 
4204(b)(5) “Sexting Among Minors”.  While the meaning of the colloquial word “Sexting” may 
change, such change will not necessarily limit the applicability of the provision in a case when 
the elements described in its text exist.  Nevertheless, headings do impact Code users’ 
understanding of the meaning of its provisions, and subsequently the notice they provide. 
Therefore, the Code explicitly recognizes that headings may be used as an aid in the 
interpretation of those provisions. 
Sections 102(d)(2)–(3), providing that repealing any criminal offense under Delaware 
law does not affect either liability already incurred or pending proceedings under that provision, 
are substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 211.  Subsection (d)(1) is a standard savings clause that 
has been added for clarity, though the current code does not explicitly provide one. 
 
 
Comment on Section 103.  All Offenses Defined by Statute; Applicability 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 103, 202, 241 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision prohibits common-law offenses by requiring that offenses be 
defined in the Code or another statute.  At the same time, the provision recognizes and preserves 
the courts’ inherent powers to punish for contempt and to enforce orders and civil judgments.  
Section 103 also provides that the Code’s General Part applies to all offenses in the Code itself, 
as well as to offenses defined by statutes other than the Code, unless the Code otherwise 
provides.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Sections 103(a) and (c) are substantially the same as 
11 Del.C. §§ 202(a) and (b).  Section 103(b) performs the same function as 11 Del.C. § 103.  
Section 103(d) provides that conviction by a court having personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction must precede the imposition of punishment, and is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 241.   
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Comment on Section 104.  Civil Remedies Preserved; No Merger with Civil Injury 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): E.g., 11 Del.C. § 1113(h); 16 Del.C. § 4744(h) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision makes clear that the Code does not negatively affect rights or 
liabilities in civil actions related to conduct made punishable by the Code, nor do civil actions 
affect or bar criminal liability under the Code for the same prohibited conduct. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 104 has no corresponding provision in the 
general part of the current Delaware code.  However, there are provisions scattered throughout 
the code that apply the same rule to specific offenses.  See, e.g., 11 Del.C. § 1113(h) (“No civil 
proceeding in any court or administrative agency shall be a bar to prosecution for criminal 
nonsupport . . . .”); 16 Del.C. § 4744(h) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit . . . 
civil or administrative action permitted by law . . . .”).  No provision in current law contradicts 
the principle in proposed Section 104, and the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that “the State 
may impose both a criminal and a civil penalty for the same act.”  Tarr v. State, 486 A.2d 672, 
675 (Del. 1984). Section 104 codifies this rule and applies it consistently throughout the 
Proposed Code.   
 
 
Comment on Section 105.  State Criminal Jurisdiction 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 204, 940 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision provides the rules for determining whether a person is subject 
to prosecution in the State for an offense. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 105 is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 204.  Section 105(a)(1) corresponds to § 204(a)(1), but has been simplified.  The references to 
“conduct” and “results” have been consolidated in the defined phrase “partly within this State,” 
which is defined in Section 108(b)(1), in order to make Subsection (a)(1) easier to read.  Due to 
the number of computer-related offenses that have been added to the current code in the last 
twenty years, “partly within this state” has been expanded to include storing or receiving 
electronic communications or data.  See Commentary to Section 108.   
Subsection (a)(3) corresponds to § 204(a)(2), providing jurisdiction over a conspiracy to 
commit an offense within the State, so long as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy 
occurs in the State.  Subsection (a)(2) has been added in light of Subsection (a)(3) to provide 
jurisdiction over an attempt to commit an offense within the State.  Attempt and conspiracy 
generate similar inchoate liability, and attempt liability requires a “substantial step” towards 
completion of the offense in the same way that a conspiracy requires an overt act.   
Subsection (a)(4) corresponds to § 204(a)(5), but has restructured that provision to make 
its elements clear.  However, the culpability requirement in § 204(a)(5) that the defendant 
“knows or should know that . . . [his] conduct is likely to affect . . . [a legitimate interest of 
Delaware]” has been changed to “recklessness.”  “Knows or should know” is a requirement most 
similar to negligence, which is too slight to support jurisdiction based solely on affecting the 
State’s interests.   
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Subsection (a)(5) corresponds to § 204(a)(3), providing for jurisdiction where the 
defendant’s acts within this State constitute inchoate or accomplice liability as to an offense in 
another jurisdiction, and the conduct is an offense both in this State and in the target jurisdiction. 
Subsection (a)(6) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 204(a)(4), providing that an 
omission to perform a duty imposed by the laws of this State occurs in the State, regardless of 
the defendant’s location at the time of the omission. 
Subsection (a)(7) defines what it means when, for jurisdictional purposes, an offense is 
committed partly within this State.  As discussed above, Subsection (a)(7)(A) is based upon 11 
Del.C. § 204(a)(1), while Subsection (a)(7)(B) is a necessary addition to jurisdiction based on the 
need to deal with electronic information and communication.  See, e.g., 11 Del.C. §§ 1109(4) 
(providing jurisdiction over child pornography offense committed outside the State when digital 
files are stored or received by a computer in the State), 940 (setting specialized venue rules for 
computer crimes).  Subsection (a)(7)(B) has been generalized to cover all of the specific 
jurisdictional provisions it has been created to supersede. 
Section 105(b) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 204(b), but has been restructured to make the 
elements of the exception clear, and make explicit that the defendant’s recklessness applies not 
merely to the occurrence of the result within the state, but also to his causation of this result.  
Section 105(c) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 204(c), providing a rebuttable 
presumption that if a homicide victim’s body is found in this State, the homicide occurred in this 
State as well. 
 
 
Comment on Section 106.  Burdens of Proof; Permissive Inferences 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 232,  301, 303, 304, 305, 306 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision sets forth the presumption that a defendant is innocent until 
proven guilty, establishes two distinct burdens of proof, and provides rules for the consequences 
of permissive inferences established elsewhere in the Proposed Code. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  The presumption of innocence in Section 106(a) is 
followed in Delaware, though it does not appear explicitly in current Delaware statutes.   
Sections 106(b) and (c) establish two distinct evidentiary burdens for different stages of a 
criminal proceeding.  Section 106(b) sets forth the ultimate burden of persuasion.  Section 106(b) 
consolidates a few different provisions in current law, with Subsection (b)(1) laying out the 
burden of the State, and Subsection (b)(2) laying out the burden of the defendant.  Subsection 
(b)(1)(A) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 301(b), putting the ultimate burden of persuasion 
on the State to establish all elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Under the 
Proposed Code, exceptions to liability are treated as specific refinements of an offense definition, 
not affirmative defenses.  See Section 108 [Definitions] and corresponding Commentary.  This is 
a different approach to the use of exceptions than current law, which, in 11 Del.C. § 305 treats 
exceptions identically to affirmative defenses.  Given this different approach, § 305 cannot be 
carried forward, since the Constitution does not permit the burden of disproving elements of an 
offense to be shifted onto a defendant.  As a result, Subsection (b)(1)(A) places the burden of 
persuasion upon the State to disprove exceptions, once properly raised by the defendant, beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  
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Section 106(b)(1)(B), placing that ultimate burden upon the State to disprove all 
justification defenses by a preponderance of the evidence, is a compromise position between 
possible readings of §§ 301 and 303.  Current §301(b) states that “no person may be convicted of 
an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt”; § 303 places 
the burden of production for non-affirmative defenses upon the defendant; and § 303(c) requires 
a jury instruction that defendant must be acquitted if the jury finds that the defense raises a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.  These provisions, however, fail to state explicitly 
which party bears the burden of persuasion in establishing the existence of the defense, and by 
what standard of proof.  According to the official commentary to the Criminal Code of 1972, 
“the importance of [§ 303(c)] is that it requires only that the defense raise a reasonable doubt in 
the minds of the jury, not that the jury be persuaded that the defense is more probably true than 
not.” (emphasis added).1  If a lower standard of proof than the preponderance of the evidence 
existed in criminal law that could be ascribed to the defendant, § 303(c) might describe 
something like it.  However, the only real options remaining place the burden of persuasion on 
the State to disprove non-affirmative defenses that are properly raised by the defendant—either 
by a preponderance of the evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt.  Nothing in current Delaware 
law suggests the General Assembly intended to require disproof beyond a reasonable doubt—
equal in difficulty to proving the elements of an offense definition—so proposed Subsection 
(b)(1)(B) takes the less demanding route.  Note that the current criminal code distinguishes 
between affirmative and simple defenses, suggesting that different burdens of proof must attach 
to each type of defense.  Note that the jury instruction aspect of § 303(c) is not incorporated into 
Section 106, because the Proposed Code does not address such procedural issues. 
Section 106(b)(1)(C) provides a new default rule that all other facts required for liability 
need only be proven by the State by a preponderance of the evidence.  11 Del.C. § 232, in 
defining what are elements of offenses, provides that “[f]acts establishing jurisdiction and venue 
and establishing that the offense was committed within the [statutory limitations period] must 
also be proved as elements of the offense.”  This is the sole provision in current law that might 
speak to the burden of proof as to jurisdiction, venue, or other facts required for liability.  At a 
minimum, § 232 suggests that issues of jurisdiction, venue, and limitations must be properly 
alleged by the State in an indictment; however, by equating these items with elements of the 
offense, § 232 implies that the State bears the burden of also proving those elements to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  It seems highly unlikely that the General Assembly intended to 
saddle the State with such a difficult task, one that is not constitutionally required.  In the face of 
these ambiguities, Subsection (b)(1)(C) proposes that the State bear the burden of proving facts 
required for liability—like jurisdiction and venue—that are not actual elements of an offense 
definition, but by the lower preponderance standard.  This ensures that a consistent rule is 
applied and that proof beyond a reasonable doubt—an extremely exacting burden for facts that 
are not elements of the offense definition—is not applied unintentionally.  
Section 106(b)(2) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 304.  Note that since Subsection 
(b)(1)(B) specifically allocates the burden of persuasion for justification defenses to the State, 
justification defenses are not included in Subsection (b)(2). 
Section 106(b)(3) sets out what it means to prove an element of an offense or defense by 
a preponderance of the evidence.  This directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 304(c). 
Section 106(c) sets forth the burdens of production for the State and the defendant.  The 
burdens of production define the requisite threshold amount of evidence the burdened party must 
                                                             
1 Hamilton v. State, 343 A.2d 594, 596 (Del. 1975). 
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present to have an issue sent to the “trier of fact” (the jury in a jury trial, or the court in a bench 
trial).  Section 106(c)(2), as previously mentioned, maintains the current standards in 11 Del.C. 
§§ 303 and 304(a)–(b), placing the burden of production on the defendant for defenses and 
mitigations. Note that the jury instruction aspect of § 304(b) is not incorporated into Section 106, 
because the Proposed Code does not address such procedural issues. 
 Since current law does not explicitly provide who bears the burden of production for 
exceptions to liability, they have been added to Subsection (c)(2).  Subsection (c)(1)(A) 
corresponds to 11 Del. C. § 301(a) and mirrors (c)(2) by explicitly placing the burden of 
production on the State for offenses to be considered by the trier of fact..  Subsection (c)(1)(B) 
corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 301(c), which provides that “[i]n any prosecution for any compound 
crime, . . . the corpus delicti of the underlying felony need not be proved independently of a 
defendant’s extrajudicial statement.”  However, since the only compound crime carried forward 
into the Proposed Code that is described in § 301(c) is felony murder, Subsection (c)(1)(B) is 
written to only apply to felony murder.  In the language proposed by Sections 105(b)–(c), the 
current provision translates into an assurance that the prosecution can still meet its burden of 
production, allowing the case of a compound crime to proceed to trial, even if the only evidence 
of the underlying felony is the defendant’s confession.  This requirement is structured under 
Subsection (c) to make clear that this requirement does not alter the State’s ultimate burden of 
persuasion to prove the underlying felony beyond a reasonable doubt.     
Section 106(d) explains the significance of permissive inferences established elsewhere 
in the Proposed Code. Although 11 Del.C. § 306 discusses rebuttable presumptions, it does not 
explain the evidentiary effect of a rebuttable presumption.  11 Del.C. § 306(e) only provides, 
significantly, that the establishment of a rebuttable presumption does not relieve the State of its 
ultimate burden of persuasion.  As discussed above, this requirement is maintained in Section 
106(b).  Subsection (d), and the use of permissive inferences throughout the Proposed Code, are 
intended to replace the use of “rebuttable presumptions” throughout the current code.2  
Therefore, Subsection (d) does not establish any general presumptions.  But note that the trier of 
fact is permitted to infer a defendant’s culpability from the facts of the case under Section 
106(d)(2).   
Note that the Proposed Code, as is specified in the current code in 11 Del.C. § 306, 
contains no conclusive presumptions.  Section 106 does not expressly state this position because 
all conclusive presumptions were already abolished by the current code, and the Proposed Code 
                                                             
2 The Supreme Court of the United States decided in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) that “[a] 
presumption which, although not conclusive, [has] the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant . . . [suffers] from similar infirmities” as a conclusive presumption.  442 U.S. at 524.  A jury instruction 
explaining the effect of a rebuttable presumption, however, does not violate the Constitution if it “merely describe[s] 
a permissive inference—that is, it allow[s] but d[oes] not require the jury to draw conclusions . . . .”  Id. at 514 
(emphasis added).  Under Delaware Supreme Court decisions following Sandstrom, it is clear that rebuttable 
presumptions presented to the jury in their plain terms—i.e., as “presumptions”—impermissibly shift the burden of 
persuasion on the defendant.  See, e.g., Plass v. State, 457 A.2d 362, 367–68 (Del. 1983) (referring to 11 Del.C. 
§ 306(c)(1), stated verbatim in a jury instruction, as “glaringly deficient,” in part because “it is stated in terms of 
‘presumed.’”).  On the other hand, a jury instruction that explains a rebuttable presumption in terms of an inference 
the jury is permitted (but not required) to make, and without using language of “presumption,” stands constitutional 
scrutiny under Sandstrom.  See, e.g., Craig v. State, 457 A.2d 755, 761–62 (Del. 1983).   
11 Del.C. § 306 was enacted prior to Sandstrom.  Delaware courts have admirably shaped the application 
of § 306 to prevent it from running afoul of the Constitution, but by explaining it at length in terms that avoid its 
plain meaning.  Rather than continue this practice, it is proposed that “rebuttable presumptions” be renamed what 
they must be under Sandstrom—“permissive inferences.” 
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does not contain any.  Furthermore, conclusive presumptions of fact against a defendant are per 
se unconstitutional.  Plass v. State, 457 A.2d 362, 366 (Del. 1983) (“The federal Constitution . . . 
would prohibit a statute which amounts to a conclusive presumption (i.e. directs the jury to find 
intent from the basic facts) or shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant (i.e. violates the 
constitutional requirement that the State must prove every essential element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt).”). 
Note that Section 106 explicitly mentions “mitigations” whenever it discusses defenses to 
make clear that it may apply to rules that reduce liability as well as to rules that exonerate the 
defendant entirely.  See, e.g., proposed Section 1103(a)(2) (defining a statutory mitigation to 
reduce liability from murder to manslaughter).  Current law does not specifically provide 
evidentiary burdens for mitigations. 
Defenses, Affirmative Defenses, and General Defenses.  The Proposed Code eliminates 
use of the term “affirmative defense.”  The distinction between defenses and affirmative defenses 
is often misunderstood, and for good reason.  Current Delaware law does not carefully set 
different burdens of production and persuasion for simple defenses and affirmative defenses.  It 
also uses the term “justification” to apply to certain defenses, without using the word “defense” 
in the definitions of those justifications, and then fails to define the burdens of production and 
persuasion for justifications clearly.  Presumably, the rules for non-affirmative defenses would 
apply to justifications, but nowhere does the current code make that obvious.   
Rather than carry forward this confusion, the Proposed Code only uses the term 
“defense,” apart from the general defenses of “justification defenses,” “excuse defenses,” and 
“nonexculpatory defenses.”  Each of the general defense chapters contains a governing section 
that sets the burden of persuasion for the defenses contained in that chapter.  Those burdens are 
referenced throughout Section 106(b) for maximum clarity.  See also Section 108 [Definitions] 
and corresponding Commentary.  Aside from those specific provisions, Section 106 contains a 
single rule for any defense: the defendant bears the burden of production, and the burden of 
persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.  This makes sense since the defendant benefits 
from the defense.  Note that the burden of production for every defense in the Proposed Code 
rests with the defendant, under Section 106(c)(2).  
Caveat Regarding Future Legislation.  The relationship in the Proposed Code between 
defenses, mitigations, exceptions to liability is meaningfully different from that in current 
Delaware law.  Additionally, the Proposed Code specifies the burdens of proof required for each 
class of general defenses—something the current code does not.  In the future, designating a 
provision as an exception, mitigation, or defense will have clearly stated consequences in terms 
of the parties’ burdens.  Care should be taken in making those designations in future criminal 
legislation.   
 
Comment on Section 107.  Words of Gender or Number 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 223 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  The Proposed Code is drafted to be as precise as possible when using words 
indicating the singular or plural, and to be gender neutral whenever possible.  This provision is 
included to protect against typos or inconsistent drafting in future legislation. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 107 directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 223. 
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Comment on Section 108.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 204(a)(1), 221(a)–(b), 304(c), 1109(4) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 108 collects the definitions for terms that are most frequently used in 
Chapter 100.  Because this is the first definitions section in the Proposed Code, Section 108 also 
contains definitions for terms that are so ubiquitous that their definitions should appear as early 
in the Code as possible. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Sections 108(a)-(c) and (f) contain definitions for the 
terms “defense,” “exception to liability,” “general defense” and “mitigation” which are used 
throughout the Proposed Code.  Note that the definition of the term “defense” differs from the 
meaning of the term in current law.  See also Commentary to Section 106 [Burdens of Proof; 
Permissive Inferences]. 
Sections 108(d) and (e) contain definitions for the terms “include” and “means” as they 
are used to define terms throughout the Proposed Code.  They are taken directly from 11 Del.C. 
§§ 221(a) and (b). Note however, that the term “means” is explicitly limited to the meaning 
given to the defined word in the Proposed Code itself.  Even if the same term is defined 
differently in other parts of the Delaware Code (e.g., in Title 11), the controlling definition is the 
one provided by the Proposed Code.  See Commentary to Section 109.  Note also that §§ 221(a) 
and (b) are still retained in Title 11, because they are essential for the few definitional provisions 
that will remain in that Title after the enactment of the Proposed Code. 
Section 108(g) defines the term “person,” which is used constantly throughout the 
Proposed Code.  The definition directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 222(21). Note also that this 
definition renders current law definitions of the term that are limited to specific offenses (see 
e.g., 11 Del. C. §§ 931(13), 1325(a)(8)) unnecessary. 
Section 108(h) defines the term “property,” which is used constantly throughout the 
Proposed Code, and should be interpreted as broadly as possible to ensure all kinds of tangible 
and intangible property are included.   Current law does not provide a general definition for 
property.  Note that occasionally, current law provides definitions of the term that are limited to 
specific offenses, (see e.g., 11 Del. C. §§ 849(a), 931(15)), or states that specific animals are 
property (see e.g., 16 Del. C. § 3050F).  In light of the broad general definition of Section 108(h) 
these specific definitions are unnecessary. 
   
 
 
Comment on Section 109.  Definitions Index 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 109 catalogues every defined term used in the Proposed Code, 
providing a comprehensive and complete list of the definitions it requires.  Note that after the 
enactment of the Proposed Code, most of Title 11 Part I of the Delaware Code will be repealed; 
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however, it will still retain certain defined terms.  These terms are required for the remaining 
provisions of Title 11, and might be similar to defined terms in the Proposed Code.  
Nevertheless, the remaining definitions in Title 11 will not apply to the Proposed Code, which 
will be governed by the definitions listed in Section 109.  Whenever a defined term is used in the 
Code, a reference to the section defining the term is provided at the end of that Section.  In 
addition to ensuring that key terms’ definitions are always easy to find, this format has the 
additional benefit of signaling right in the text of each section which terms are defined terms.  
Every term is defined in the definitions section at the end of the chapter that either: (1) relies on 
the term most heavily; or (2) uses the term first. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  The introductory language to Section 109 provides 
that “[a] word not defined in this Code has its commonly accepted meaning, and may be defined 
as appropriate to fulfill the general purposes listed in Section 102.”  This corresponds directly to 
11 Del.C. § 221(c).  Note that § 221(c) is still retained in Title 11, because it is essential for 
interpreting the provisions that will remain in that Title after the enactment of the Proposed 
Code.  Yet, § 221(c) has been modified to refer to the general purposes listed in Section 102. 
For a discussion of the relationship between the Proposed Code’s defined terms and 
current law, refer to the Commentary for the provision in which each term is defined. 
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REQUIREMENTS OF OFFENSE LIABILITY 
 
CHAPTER 200.  BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF OFFENSE LIABILITY 
 
Section 201.  Basis of Liability 
Section 202.  Offense Elements Defined 
Section 203.  Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result 
Section 204.  Requirement of a Voluntary Act; Omission Liability; Possession Liability 
Section 205.  Culpability Requirements 
Section 206.  Ignorance or Mistake Negating Required Culpability 
Section 207.  Mental Illness or Disorder Negating Required Culpability 
Section 208.  Consent 
Section 209.  Customary License; De Minimis Infractions; Conduct Not Envisaged by General 
Assembly as Prohibited by the Offense 
Section 210.  Conviction When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements of More than One 
Offense or Grade 
Section 211.  Accountability for the Conduct of Another 
Section 212.  Voluntary Intoxication 
Section 213.  Divergence Between Consequences Intended or Risked and Actual Consequences 
Section 214.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 201.  Basis of Liability 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision establishes the bases of liability for an offense under the 
Proposed Code.  Section 201 makes clear the relevance and function of the other specific 
Chapters of the Code in relation to the determination of criminal liability for offenses contained 
both within and outside of the Proposed Code.  Section 201(a) provides that an actor may be 
liable for an offense only if she satisfies all of its elements, except where a provision in Section 
211 through 214 operates to impute a missing element.  Section 201(a)(1) also clarifies that 
liability may not be imposed where the defendant satisfies the requirements of any bar to liability 
(whether defined as a defense, exception to liability, or other rule).  Section 201(b) provides that 
the defenses set forth in Chapters 300-500 will preclude liability even though all of an offense’s 
elements are satisfied or imputed.  Such provisions differ from the bars to liability covered by 
Section 201(a) in that they present general, rather than special, defenses (and thus apply to any 
offense, rather than to a particular offense or group of offenses).   
Relation to current Delaware law.  The principles expressed in Section 201 reflect the 
current understanding of the basis of criminal liability in Delaware.  No current provision in Title 
11 contains an explicit statement of the material in Section 201. 
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Comment on Section 202.  Offense Elements Defined 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 232; see also, e.g., § 251 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision categorizes and defines offense elements in terms of conduct, 
circumstances, results, and culpability requirements.  Defining offense elements in this manner 
enables a systematic and clear approach to offense definition.  Specifically, the offense element 
definitions aid in defining culpability requirements, which can be more precisely identified by 
their application to each type of offense element.   
As Section 202(a)(2) makes explicit, offense elements may appear not only in the offense 
definition itself, but also in the provisions that define the offense grade, or otherwise specify a 
level of liability that will attach to the offense.  Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) 
(establishing a constitutional rule that facts affecting a defendant’s potential maximum 
punishment are offense elements and must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).  
Section 202(a)(1) defines an offense’s “objective elements.”  This term distinguishes an 
offense’s conduct, circumstance, and result elements from its culpability requirements.  The 
distinction makes it clear that the culpability requirements set out in proposed Section 205 apply 
only to an offense’s objective elements. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Current Delaware law in 11 Del.C. § 232 defines 
“elements of an offense” similarly to proposed Section 202(a) to include acts, circumstances, 
results, and “states of mind.”  However, none of the objective elements are specifically defined 
in current law, which they are in proposed Section 202(a).  Additionally, the Proposed Code uses 
the term “culpability” throughout instead of “state of mind,” which appears throughout current 
Delaware law.  See, e.g., 11 Del.C. § 251.  The Proposed Code adopts the term “culpability” 
because it is a more accurate term when using negligence as a possible basis of liability. 
Negligence is the culpable absence of a specific state of mind. The law expects a person to have 
a certain awareness of her surroundings and the consequences of her actions, and may punish a 
person for failing to have such an awareness.   
 
 
Comment on Section 203.  Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 261, 262, 263; see also § 264 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision specifically defines the minimum causal nexus between given 
conduct and its attendant results that will allow imposition of criminal liability for the conduct.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 203(a) establishes the general framework of 
determining causation.  Subsection (a)(1) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 261, establishing 
that the conduct must be the factual, or “but-for,” cause of the result an offense prohibits.  
Subsection (a)(2) imposes an additional “proximate cause” requirement that is derived from 11 
Del.C. §§ 262(2) and 263(2).  The provisions allowing liability where the result “is not too 
remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity 
of the offense” are borrowed from Model Penal Code § 2.03.  Although it expresses the concept 
of proximate cause, current Delaware law presents the issue of proximate cause as a function of 
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the defendant’s culpability as to causing the prohibited result.  Additionally, it requires that the 
actual result involve the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result of the defendant’s 
conduct.  Delaware’s current approach creates two problems.  First, it is ambiguous what harms 
should be considered the “same kind of harm” as the probable result of the defendant’s conduct.  
Nevertheless, similarity of harms must be proven.  Second, Delaware’s approach creates 
ambiguity as to whether the prosecution has to prove the defendant’s culpability as to the manner 
of causing a particular result, or merely as to the result itself.  Subsection (a)(2) proposes to solve 
both problems by divorcing the proximate cause requirement from the notion of culpability, and 
instead focusing entirely on the strength of the connection between the defendant’s act and the 
prohibited result.  
Note that broadening the application of a proximate cause requirement makes 11 Del.C. 
§ 264 unnecessary.  That provision established a general proximate cause requirement for strict 
liability offenses.  However, since Section 203(a)(2) applies to all offenses, no special provision 
needs to be made for strict liability offenses. 
Subsection (a)(3) requires satisfaction of any additional causation requirements imposed 
elsewhere (including the offense definition itself).  Subsection (a)(3) has no explicit analogue in 
current Delaware law, but expresses the implied principle that the General Assembly is free to 
impose more specific requirements for particular offenses.  For example, the General Assembly 
could require that a particular offense’s result element occur within a certain amount of time. 
Likewise, Section 203(b) is not based upon a current section of the Delaware code.  
However, it addresses the important causal problem where more than one person contributes to a 
prohibited result, and each person’s conduct alone would have caused the result.  In those 
situations, Subsection (b) treats each person as having caused the result.  This provision prevents 
equally blameworthy persons from escaping liability due to the fortuity that someone else 
independently caused the prohibited result.  Delaware courts have long held that concurrent 
sufficient causes should not allow a blameworthy person to escape liability.  See, e.g., Fioretti v. 
State, 245 A.2d 170 (Del. 1968) (holding that the trier of fact need not find that the defendant 
was the sole proximate cause of a collision in order to find the defendant guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter, where the collision caused an automobile passenger’s death). 
 
 
Comment on Section 204.  Requirement of a Voluntary Act; Omission Liability; Possession 
Liability 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 242, 243 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 204 sets the minimum conduct requirements for criminal liability.  A 
fundamental principle of criminal law holds that it is inappropriate to punish “mere thoughts” 
unaccompanied by a physical act or a failure to discharge a specified legal duty.  Section 204(a) 
prohibits liability absent an overt act or a failure to perform an act that the person is physically 
capable of performing.  Furthermore, Section 204(b) provides that, as a general matter, an 
offense’s conduct element may be satisfied by either an affirmative act or a failure to perform a 
legal duty.  Section 204(c) defines the circumstances under which possession is considered a 
“voluntary act” for the purposes of criminal liability.   
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Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 204(a) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 242.  Section 204(b), however, is new, and not based on any current Delaware statute, but 
rather on the Model Penal Code’s § 2.01(3)(b).  Delaware law does not explicitly require that a 
person have a duty to act before failure to act can become the basis of criminal liability.  11 
Del.C. § 242 merely requires that the defendant must have been “physically capable” of acting.  
This creates a significant ambiguity about the criminal liability of bystanders.  Specifically, it 
raises the question of whether there is an implied duty to aid victims or prevent crimes when 
possible, and whether failure to aid or prevent crime can support criminal liability, absent an 
explicit duty to do so created elsewhere in the law.  Since a general duty to aid would have wide-
ranging consequences, one would expect it to be explicitly stated by statute, which it is not in § 
242.  Therefore, rather than resolving this ambiguity in favor of a general duty to aid, Subsection 
(b) resolves it in favor of requiring a legal duty to act before failure to act can support criminal 
liability.  Note also, that while Section 204(b) is based on MPC § 2.01(3)(b), its formulation 
differs from that of the Model Code. While the Model Code establishes that liability cannot be 
based on omissions unless a duty to act is imposed by law, the Proposed Code directly states that 
liability can be based on omissions if a duty to act is imposed by law. 
Sections 204(c) and (d) directly correspond to 11 Del.C. § 243. 
 
 
Comment on Section 205.  Culpability Requirements 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 231, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 307; see 
also §§ 231(d), 454. 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 205 does two important things.  First, it defines four culpability 
requirements—intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence—as they relate to each type of 
offense element: conduct, circumstances, and results.  Second, it establishes rules governing the 
application of culpability requirements to objective elements.   
Section 205(a) specifies that some level of culpability is normally required as to each 
objective element of an offense.  (Note that, under Section 202(a), this and Section 205’s other 
requirements apply to those elements defined in the grading provisions, as well as to elements 
appearing in the offense definition itself.)   
Section 205(b) specifies what those levels of culpability are.  The Proposed Code uses 
four culpability levels, exclusively, which is the norm for modern criminal codes.   
Section 205(c) provides a general rule that a stated culpability requirement for one 
objective element governs later objective elements as well, in order to avoid unnecessary 
repetition.   
Section 205(d) provides a “read-in” culpability requirement of recklessness where no 
culpability level is specified (either through direct statement or through application of the rule in 
Section 205(c)), to avoid excess verbiage and ensure that offenses, or offense elements, do not 
allow strict liability for want of an explicit culpability term for each element.   
Section 205(e) sets prerequisites for imposition of strict liability. 
Section 205(f) establishes that culpability as to the criminality of one’s conduct is not 
required unless the offense definition so provides.  For example, one need not know specifically 
that one is committing a crime, or intend to commit “a crime” per se, to be subject to liability.   
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Section 205(g) points out that the requirement of a given culpability level is satisfied by 
proof of a more serious culpability level.  Note that the drafting of Section 205(b) accounts for 
the application of Section 205(g), in order to avoid inconsistencies.  For instance, in order to 
prove “knowledge” as to a circumstance, Subsection (b)(2)(B) requires a belief in high 
probability that the circumstance exists.  Since Subsection (g)(3) allows to prove “knowledge” 
by proving intent, “intent” as to circumstance must not be defined as merely a belief (in low 
probability) that the circumstance exists.  Such definition would paradoxically make “intent” 
easier to prove than “knowledge” and transform the more demanding requirement for 
“knowledge” as to a circumstance in Subsection (b)(2)(B) to a dead letter.  Therefore, in order to 
prove “intent” as to a circumstance, Subsection (b)(1)(B) also requires a belief in high 
probability that the circumstance exists.  However, Subsection (b)(1)(B) contains a different 
alternative for “intent” as to circumstance, by proving hope that the circumstance exists.  This 
qualitatively different alternative can appropriately serve as a substitute for “knowledge” as to 
circumstance.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 205(a) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 251(a), 
which requires “proof that the person had the state of mind required by the law defining the 
offense.”  The language of § 251(a) implies there is only one culpability requirement that applies 
to all elements of an offense; however, that may not be the case.  Therefore, Section 205(a) 
specifies that the culpability requirement as to every objective element must be satisfied, except 
where strict liability applies. 
Section 205(b) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 231, with a few changes.  First, 
§ 254 (dealing with conditional intent) is incorporated directly into the provision dealing with 
“intent” culpability, in Subsection (b)(1)(D).  Second, § 255 (defining “knowledge” to include 
knowledge of a high probability) is incorporated directly into the provision dealing with 
“knowing”  and “intentional” culpability as to circumstance elements, in Subsections (b)(2)(B) 
and (b)(1)(B).  Note also that these provisions refer to the defendant’s belief – rather than 
awareness – regarding the existence of a circumstance.  The term belief in this context 
encompasses awareness, but also improves upon it.  While awareness implies the actual 
existence of the circumstance, the term belief allows to prove culpability as to circumstance even 
if that circumstance does not exist, as long as the defendant believes there is a high probability 
that it does.  Third, the part of § 231(e) concerning voluntary intoxication has not been retained, 
as this issue is addressed in Section 212.  Fourth, and most significantly, Subsection (b) drops the 
current culpability of “negligence” in § 231(d).  Subsection (b)(4) retains the content of the 
current definition of “criminal negligence” in § 231(a), but rebrands it simply as “negligence.”  
Criminal negligence and tort—or ordinary—negligence are similar but distinct.  In both cases, 
the actor fails to perceive a risk that harm will result from the actor’s conduct, or that a 
circumstance exists.  In both cases, the risk is one that the “reasonable person” would have 
perceived.  However, in criminal negligence, the risk must be a “gross deviation” from the 
standard of care a reasonable person would have exercised in the actor’s situation.  This greater 
culpability is necessary to justify applying the coercive machinery of criminal law to a person’s 
inattentiveness, since only truly blameworthy action should be condemned by criminal law.  Just 
as a person’s failure to act is only punished by criminal law if the person had a legal duty to act, 
a person’s failure to perceive a fact should only be punished if it is so egregious that it justifies 
the creation of a duty to pay attention.  Additionally, ordinary negligence is such a slight 
culpability requirement that it threatens to capture a variety of behaviors beyond those 
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contemplated by the offense definitions.  For these reasons, the Proposed Code does not use 
ordinary negligence as a culpability requirement. 
Section 205(c) corresponds to § 252, but uses more common sense criteria.  § 252 
provides that any stated culpability in an offense definition applies to all elements of the offense 
“unless a contrary legislative purpose plainly appears.”  Use of grammatical clauses within an 
offense definition would suggest that a different culpability might apply, especially since (as 
discussed below) both the current and Proposed codes read in recklessness wherever a 
culpability requirement is lacking.  Subsection (c) specifies that, as a default position, stated 
culpability requirements only apply to objective elements grouped together in the same 
grammatical clause.  Any other objective elements that common sense would suggest were 
intended by the legislature to also fall under the stated culpability requirement will be treated that 
way under Subsection (c).  Subsection (c) is preferable to § 252 because the legislature does not 
always carefully construct the culpability requirements in an offense.  Having a stronger default 
rule will help maintain consistent and predictable culpability requirements in those situations, but 
without overriding any explicit legislative decisions. 
Section 205(d) directly corresponds to § 251(b), establishing a default requirement of 
reckless culpability as to any objective element of an offense or grade provision that does not 
specify a culpability requirement.  This provision is, perhaps, the most important provision in the 
entire Proposed Code.  Requiring a defendant to have some culpable mental state before liability 
may be imposed sets criminal law apart from all other types of law, such as torts.  Criminal law 
carries the stigma, and attendant social influence, of moral condemnation.  That condemnation is 
misplaced—and, critically, the community living under the law sees it as misplaced—when a 
defendant can be convicted despite having a blameless state of mind.  In modern criminal codes, 
punishment tracks a defendant’s blameworthiness, which is in turn informed in large part by the 
defendant’s culpability.  For this reason, modern, culpability-based criminal codes eschew the 
use of strict liability (i.e., requiring no culpability). 
However, current law in 11 Del.C. § 454 contains an exception to the default culpability 
provision of § 251(b), and imposes strict liability as a general principle in certain cases.  Current 
§ 454 provides that “it is no defense for an offense . . . which has as an element of such 
offense . . . the age of the victim that the accused did not know the age of the victim or 
reasonably believed the person to be of an age which would not meet the element of such 
offense . . . .”  Subsection (d) does not retain that provision.  It imposes strict liability as to the 
circumstance element of a victim’s age—not as a specific carve-out in uniquely appropriate 
circumstances (for example, the age of victims of sexual offenses, as provided in proposed 
Section 1301(f)), but as a general principle of liability.  This is a sweeping, categorical exception 
to a foundational principle of criminal law (as discussed in the previous paragraph), and not 
merely in the abstract.  The principle of required culpability is foundational to Delaware criminal 
law as it currently stands.  Current § 454 is a glaringly, arbitrarily inconsistent with the 
remainder of current Delaware law. It is arbitrary because there is no obvious reason why a 
victim’s age—one of thousands, even millions, of possible circumstances that could be relevant 
to the seriousness of a particular offense—ought to receive unique treatment.  Having an 
exception to culpability for a victim’s age invites additional offense characteristics to be added as 
exceptions in the future, further degrading the consistency, rationality, and moral force of the 
criminal law.  
Finally, the creation of such a general exception leads to an odd result. According to the 
United States Supreme Court ruling in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 217 (1977), it is 
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unconstitutional for a State to shift the prosecution’s burden of proving that an element of an 
offense exists to the defendant. In other words, a State is barred from creating even a rebuttable 
presumption about the existence of an offense element – including the presumption that the 
defendant was aware of the age of victim (or of any other offense characteristic). Yet, in effect, a 
general exception to the code’s culpability rule for offense elements involving a victim’s age, 
creates an even more stringent, irrebuttable presumption. Such a general exception appears 
incompatible with the rationale of the ruling in Patterson.   For all these reasons, Subsection (d) 
does not carry forward § 454. 
Section 205(e) directly corresponds to § 251(c) by narrowly defining the situations where 
absence of a stated culpability requirement may impose strict liability.  Note that offenses 
imposing strict liability are either violations or misdemeanors.  These cannot be bootstrapped to 
establish liability for offenses of a higher grade.  For instance, while a particular provision may 
establish a duty to act in a specific way without the need to prove culpability, the punishment for 
a failure to act according to that provision is appropriately defined by a violation grade.  It cannot 
also be used to establish a duty to act for a different, more serious offense.  
Section 205(f) is not specified in the current code; however, it reflects Delaware’s 
practice that the State need not prove an actor’s culpability as to the existence or meaning of the 
law.  Subsection (f) leaves open the possibility, however, that the General Assembly may choose 
to require culpability as to the existence or meaning of the law in a specific offense definition. 
Section 205(g) directly corresponds with § 253, except as the latter relates to ordinary 
negligence, which is not used in the Proposed Code. 
Section (h) is a simplified form of 11 Del.C. § 307 intended to avoid confusion over the 
fact that the State must that prove the defendant has any required culpability beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  This provision allows the judge or jury to find a defendant’s culpability or belief—which 
is inherently subjective—from circumstantial evidence in the case, rather than requiring direct 
evidence. 
 
 
Comment on Section 206.  Ignorance or Mistake Negating Required Culpability 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 441(1)-(2); see also §§ 454, 1114(d)(2), 
1114A(d) 
 
Comment: 
Generally. Section 206 makes it explicit that an offense definition’s requirements are not 
satisfied if a person’s ignorance or mistake as to a fact or law negates a required culpability level.  
Section 206(c) addresses situations where a person has a mistaken belief, but is not entitled to a 
defense under Section 206 because, even under her mistaken view, she was committing an 
offense.  In those cases, culpability as to the committed offense will be imputed based on the 
person’s culpability as to the intended offense. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 206(a) corresponds with the current defense 
in 11 Del.C. § 441(1)-(2) (see also, 1114(d)(2), 1114A(d)).  However, § 441 does not recognize 
mistakes of law, while Subsection (a) does.  This change is necessary to avoid an arbitrary 
distinction between questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and law, which are just as 
likely to affect the actor’s culpability level.  Including mistakes of law is not inconsistent with 
proposed Section 205(f).  As a general matter, no culpability must be proven as to the 
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defendant’s knowledge of the law; however, a defendant’s mistake or ignorance of law might 
negate a culpability requirement applicable to an objective element of an offense.  For example, 
whether something satisfies the definition of “property” for the purpose of theft is a legal issue, 
but a mistake on that point would not afford a defense under current law.  In any case, the 
availability of a mistake defense under Subsection (a) is limited by the requirements of 
Subsection (b), which the current law does not specify. 
Note that, absent specific provisions providing otherwise in offense definitions, 
Subsection (a) will govern the issue of culpability as to the age of victims.  As discussed in the 
Commentary to Section 205(d), the Proposed Code does not carry forward the current provision 
in 11 Del.C. § 454 because it imposes strict liability, as a general default rule, as to knowledge of 
a victim’s age where the age of the victim is an element of an offense or grading provision.  
Having a default rule of strict liability that applies to all ages creates the real possibility of 
injustice at ages where a genuine mistake is most likely to occur.  For example, an offense may 
only apply if the victim is less than 18 years of age.  But 17-year-olds often do not look younger 
than 18-year-olds; many, in fact, can appear much older.  The same would be true for older 
people.  Throughout the current code, offense grades are increased for victims who are 62 years 
of age or older, yet still impose strict liability as to knowledge of that age.  Many 62-year-olds 
appear much younger than their age, making a genuine mistake as to age highly likely.  
However, at the extremes, a genuine mistake is much less likely, making altered culpability rules 
easier to justify.  This is what the Proposed Code does in Chapter 1300 for sexual offenses, 
where the age of victims is the most sensitive.  Section 1305(a) provides that the only culpability 
that need be proven as to a victim’s age is negligence—but that rule only applies to Chapter 
1300.  Additionally, Section 1301(c) imposes strict liability as to the age of victims less than 14 
years of age, because it is extremely unlikely that a defendant could mistake a person less than 
14 with a 16- or 18-year-old.  Only in the most appropriate circumstances should strict liability 
be imposed, on a case-by-case basis—not as a general rule.  The current code’s approach to 
knowledge of age is an anomaly; strict liability is not generally imposed regarding any other 
issue. 
Section 206(b) refines current law by explaining in detail the conditions under which a 
mistake “negates” an offense’s culpability requirement.  Subsection (b) categorizes mistakes as 
reckless, negligent, or reasonable.  Just as there are different levels of culpability as to conduct, 
there are different categories of mistakes.  If a person arrives at a mistake through culpability 
greater than or equal to the culpability required by the offense itself, the person’s mistake should 
not exonerate her.  In other words, a person’s recklessness as to forming or holding a mistaken 
belief should not preclude liability where the offense definition itself requires only recklessness 
as the subject of belief.  Accordingly, Subsection (b) states that a reckless mistake may negate 
only intention or knowledge; a negligent mistake negates intention, knowledge, and recklessness; 
and a reasonable—or non-negligent—mistake negates any level of culpability. 
Section 206(c) has no corresponding provision in current Title 11; however, it is based on 
the Model Penal Code’s § 2.04(2).  Subsection (c) is useful because it closes a potential loophole 
in current law by denying the defense and holding a defendant liable for the offense charged 
where the defendant’s ignorance or mistaken belief is consistent with another, different offense 
of equal or greater severity.  Functionally, the first sentence of Section 206(c) imputes the 
person’s culpability for the offense the person presumes he is committing, to the offense charged.  
For instance, consider a person who believes he is shooting at a street performer posing as a 
statue, but in reality is shooting at an actual statue.  That person can be charged with criminal 
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damage offense, for instance, even if he mistakenly supposed at the time of the conduct that he 
was committing murder.  Section 206 will not provide that person with a defense.  Rather, 
although the person did not have the required culpability for the offense he was charged with 
(criminal damage), Section 206(c) will impute that person’s culpability for the offense he 
supposed he was committing (murder), and allow convicting that person for the criminal damage 
offense he actually committed.  Note, however, that the second sentence of 206(c) makes clear 
that in cases when the grade or degree of the offense the person supposes to commit is lower than 
those of the offense charged, than the defendant’s liability for the offense of which he may be 
convicted is reduced to the grade of the other offense that is consistent with his mistaken belief 
or ignorance.  Thus, if a person charged with murder mistakenly supposed at the time of the 
conduct that he was committing criminal damage, Section 206 will still not provide a complete 
defense.  Yet, it will reduce the grade of the offense of which that person may be convicted to 
that of the relevant criminal damage offense.   
 
 
Comment on Section 207.  Mental Illness or Disorder Negating Required Culpability 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 207 recognizes that a mental illness or disorder, like ignorance or 
mistake in proposed Section 206, may negate an offense’s culpability requirement.  Section 207 
makes clear that evidence of mental illness or disorder may be relevant in contexts other than 
those covered by proposed Section 403’s excuse defense for insanity and Section 504’s 
nonexculpatory defense for persons unfit to plead or stand trial.  For example, the insanity 
defense provides a freestanding excuse when a person satisfies all culpability requirements of the 
offense itself, but merits exoneration because she could not control her conduct or] lacked 
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her act.  Section 207, on the other hand, 
would apply in cases where the person’s mental incapacity prevented her from satisfying the 
offense’s elements in the first place, as where an offense requires knowledge and the person’s 
mental incapacity prevented her from “knowing” something another person might know.  For 
example, where, due to a mental illness or disorder, a defendant enters another’s home believing 
it to be her own, she would not satisfy all of proposed Section 2402’s elements of trespass, in 
that she would lack the requisite knowledge that she entered a place where she had no license or 
privilege to be.  In that case, the admissibility of evidence related to the defendant’s mental 
illness or disorder should not rest on her ability to present sufficient evidence to properly raise an 
insanity excuse under Section 403. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Although Section 207 has no corresponding provision 
in current Title 11, the Delaware Supreme Court has construed the current insanity excuse to 
address the question of whether mental illness undermines culpability, rendering the defendant’s 
conduct not blameworthy.  Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 123 (Del. 1990).  The proposed 
insanity excuse in Section 403 is intended, however, to take effect in situations where the 
defendant does satisfy the culpability requirements of an offense.  Section 207 is necessary, then, 
to ensure that all aspects of the current law are preserved as to the effect of mental illness upon 
criminal liability. 
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Comment on Section 208.  Consent 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 451, 452, 453 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 208 establishes rules governing when the consent of one who would 
otherwise be the victim of an offense will preclude criminal liability.  Section 208(a) defines the 
general rule; Section 208(b) provides special rules for offenses involving bodily harm; and 
Section 208(c) defines the circumstances under which a person’s agreement will not constitute 
valid, legal consent.  Note that although a defense of consent, subject to the rules in Section 208, 
is normally available for all offenses, some offenses contain an element that the prohibited 
conduct be performed without the victim’s consent.  In those cases, lack of consent must be 
proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, just like any other element of an offense. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 208(a) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 451.  However, it does not include § 451(1), specifying that the rule only applies where 
physical injury is not involved, because specific requirements for those situations are laid down 
in Subsection (b), and more specific requirements always control more general requirements 
applying to the same circumstances.  Subsection (a) also does not preserve § 451’s provision that 
a “person who enters the presence of other people consents to the normal physical contacts 
incident to such presence.”  This is because normal contacts incident to one’s presence among 
other persons does not constitute an offense; therefore, no explicit provision of consent is 
necessary.  If a contact is made negligently or recklessly, it has to involve actual physical injury 
to be an offense—in which case, it is not a “normal,” incidental contact.  If the contact is made 
intentionally, the contact still must be of an offensive or alarming nature under Section 
1202(a)(3) of the Proposed Code to be an offense.  Again, this is not a “normal,” incidental 
contact. 
Section 208(b), setting forth specific rules that determine when consent to physical injury 
is effective, directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 452. 
Section 208(c)(1)-(c)(4), defining the circumstances under which a person’s agreement 
will not constitute valid, legal consent, directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 453.  Subsection 
(c)(1), however, removes the provision that consent by a legally incompetent person is not a 
defense “unless the defendant believes the victim is legally competent” (emphasis added).  This 
exception in current law does not even require that the defendant’s belief in the victim’s 
competence be a reasonable belief.  Any subjective belief would do; but this seems to contradict 
the purpose of making incompetent persons’ consent ineffective in the first place.  It is the 
person’s status that makes the consent invalid, which is an objective requirement.   
Section 208(c)(5) proposes an additional circumstance where agreement should not be 
considered valid consent.  That circumstance is agreement to submit to a surgical procedure, but 
where the procedure is not performed by a person who is licensed to perform it.  This captures 
situations where surgery is performed by a medical professional, but one who is not licensed to 
perform the surgery at issue, as well as situations where the “surgeon” is not a medical 
professional at all.  However, this provision does not cover “gray” areas where a procedure 
arguably is not surgery, and where persons other than medical professions are authorized by law 
to perform such procedures.  For example, Subsection (c)(5) does not invalidate consent to 
receiving a piercing at a tattoo parlor, or consent to being circumcised by a mohel. 
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Comment on Section 209.  Customary License; De Minimis Infractions; Conduct Not 
Envisaged by General Assembly as Prohibited by the Offense 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision sets out defenses—actually modifications of the meaning of 
the underlying offense definitions—for persons whose conduct was within a customary license, 
was too insignificant to merit criminal punishment, or did not cause the harm contemplated by 
the offense’s existence.  These provisions enable  the court to dismiss prosecutions on these 
bases, creating an additional safeguard beyond the usual reliance on prosecutorial discretion.  
These defenses are to be presented to, and ruled on by, the court before trial, rather than to the 
jury at trial.  Most jurisdictions, following the Model Penal Code’s Section 2.12, contain such 
“safety net” provision 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 209 has no corresponding provision in current 
Title 11.  Section 209’s defenses are consistent, however, with the well-accepted rule of 
construction that a statute should not be interpreted to produce an absurd result.3  
Section 209(a) provides that conduct may be exempt from liability if it is within a 
“customary license.”  For example, where a landowner had previously allowed his neighbors to 
use his yard as a shortcut, even though the yard was posted against trespassing, Section 209(a) 
would provide a defense to the neighbors if the landowner unexpectedly decided to accuse them 
of criminal trespass.  Section 209(a)’s defense is not available, however, where a license has 
been “expressly negated by the person whose interest was infringed” or is inconsistent with the 
relevant offense. 
Section 209(b) recognizes a defense for conduct that, although technically constituting an 
offense, is too trivial to fairly warrant a criminal conviction.  For example, one would technically 
commit an offense by taking a single stick of gum from a candy store; however, a judge may 
determine that, under the circumstances, the condemnation of criminal conviction is too onerous 
a consequence for the loss of $0.10 worth of merchandise.  Delaware courts have occasionally 
acknowledged that de minimis infractions should not support criminal liability.  See, e.g., J.C. v. 
State, 2011 WL 5345407, at *4 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 26, 2011) (reasoning that any annoyance 
caused by two text messages could not rise to a level that the General Assembly intended to 
prohibit by creating a harassment offense). 
Section 209(c) provides a defense where one did not actually cause the harm or wrong at 
which the offense is aimed.  For example, proposed Section 3204(a)(1) prohibits impersonation 
of a public servant.  This would appear to reach a person who dresses up as a police officer on 
Halloween.  Subsection (c) would allow the court to dismiss a prosecution based on such 
conduct, because it would not involve the sort of harm the offense aims to prohibit. 
                                                             
3 See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 575 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Del. 1990) (“Literal or perceived interpretations, which 
yield illogical or absurd results, should be avoided in favor of interpretations consistent with the intent of the 
legislature.”); Spielberg v. State, 558 A.2d 291, 293 (Del. 1989) (“[A] statute must be viewed as a whole, and literal 
or perceived interpretations which yield mischievous or absurd results are to be avoided.”); C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 
722 (Del. 1974) (“[A] statute will not be construed so as to require an absurd or unworkable result.”). 
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Note that the defendant bears the burden of persuasion and must prove these defenses by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
 
Comment on Section 210.  Conviction When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements of 
More than One Offense or Grade 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 206 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 210 defines the circumstances under which the court may enter 
multiple convictions when a person’s criminal conduct satisfies the requirements of more than 
one offense or grading provision.  Significantly, this provision does not restate (or even directly 
relate to) the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy, but is more comprehensive, 
addressing broad, general issues regarding the appropriateness of multiple liability that go 
beyond the Constitution’s minimum requirements.  Moreover, this provision does not address 
any procedural issues relating to how, or when, a jury is to be instructed regarding various 
offenses, such as “included offenses” of charged offenses.  Section 210 speaks only to the issue 
of when multiple liability is appropriate and allowed under the Proposed Code. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 210(a) provides the circumstances in which a 
court may not enter a judgment of conviction for both of two related offenses or grades of 
offenses of which the defendant has been convicted.  All the corresponding circumstances in 11 
Del.C. § 206(a)-(b) have been preserved, though they are structured differently and sometimes 
reworded for greater clarity and specificity.  Subsection (a)(1)(A), dealing with offense harms 
entirely contained within each other, or simply dealing with different degrees of the same kind of 
harm, is based upon § 206(b)(1) and (b)(3).   
Section 210(a)(1)(B)(i), which has no analogue in current Delaware law, bars multiple 
convictions where two offenses or grades differ only in that one prohibits a kind of conduct 
generally and the other criminalizes a specific subset of the same conduct.  The Proposed Code 
has been drafted to avoid overlap of this kind, but current Delaware law has offenses illustrating 
the desirability of such a provision.  For example, 11 Del.C. § 812’s “graffiti” offense differs 
from § 811’s general property damage offense, “criminal mischief,” only in requiring that 
property be damaged by a person who “draws, paints, etches or makes any significant mark or 
inscription” on the property.  Section 210(a)(1)(B)(i) makes clear that convictions for both 
criminal mischief and graffiti, based on the same conduct, would be inappropriate. 
Section 210(a)(1)(B)(ii), directly corresponding to 11 Del.C. § 206(b)(3), provides that 
multiple liability may not be imposed where two offenses or grades differ only in that “one 
requires a lesser kind of culpability than the other.” 
Section 210(a)(1)(C), which has no analogue in current Delaware law, bars multiple 
liability where an offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct and the offender’s conduct 
is uninterrupted.  For example, the proposed offense in Section 5104 prohibits enumerated 
groups of persons from possessing a firearm or deadly weapon.  Section 210(a)(1)(C)’s rule 
makes clear that multiple convictions under Section 5104 would not be appropriate based upon a 
defendant’s single, uninterrupted possession of the same weapon.  Section 210(a)(1)(C) allows 
the General Assembly to override this general rule against multiple convictions, however, by 
expressly providing that specific periods of continuing conduct constitute separate offenses. 
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Section 210(a)(2)(A) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 206(a)(2)—which bars conviction for 
both an attempt and the completed target offense—but extends the rule to solicitation as well.  
Current § 206 is silent as to whether a defendant may be convicted of conspiracy or solicitation 
as well as the completed target offense.  All inchoate offenses address a similar harm—
unsuccessful preparation toward completion of an offense, whether by taking a substantial step 
toward the offense (attempt), or soliciting or conspiring with another person to commit it.  Once 
the target offense has been committed, however, the preparatory nature of the inchoate offense 
makes it irrelevant.  At that point, only conviction of the target offense is appropriate.  This 
understanding of inchoate offenses is reflected in Delaware’s current approach to attempts, so 
Subsection (a)(2)(A) explicitly extends it to solicitation to ensure the criminal code remains 
internally consistent.  Subsection (a)(2)(B), directly corresponding to 11 Del.C. § 206(b)(2), 
expands this rule to bar convictions for both an inchoate offense, and any offense that relates to 
the inchoate offense’s target offense in such a way that Subsection (a)(1) would bar convictions 
for both of them.  For example, Subsection (a)(2)(B) would preclude convictions (based upon the 
same conduct) for both assault in the first degree and attempted assault in the second degree, or 
attempted assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree. 
Section 210(a)(3), barring convictions for multiple inchoate offenses toward a single 
substantive offense, has no corresponding provision in current Title 11.  As a matter of policy, 
there is little justification for permitting convictions of multiple inchoate offenses toward the 
same substantive offense.  A conviction of a single inchoate offense sufficiently punishes an 
offender for her incomplete efforts toward an offense.  Assuming a court orders that sentences be 
served consecutively, Section 210(a)(3) is necessary to prevent the possibility of punishing an 
offender who does not complete an offense more severely than one who does.  
Section 210(a)(4) codifies a rule that Delaware courts follow already: that a person 
cannot be convicted of the same offense twice, where one conviction is based upon her own 
conduct, and the other is based upon her complicity for another’s conduct toward the same 
offense.  Thus, where two people jointly commit the offense of home invasion, each may be 
convicted on one count of home invasion, but not for another count based solely on each one’s 
accountability for the other’s conduct.  See Erskine v. State, 4 A.3d 391, 394 (Del. 2010) ("A 
person may be convicted of an offense as a principal, based upon his own conduct, or as an 
accomplice to another person.").   
Section 210(a)(5) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 206(a)(3), which prohibits legally 
inconsistent simultaneous convictions. 
Section 210(b), providing that convictions for conspiracy and the offense that is the target 
of the conspiracy merge for sentencing purposes, reflects a similar understanding of inchoate 
liability as discussed in the Commentary to Subsection (a)(2)(A) above.  However, given the 
unique harm to society caused by conspiratorial, organized approaches to criminality, Subsection 
(b) allows a defendant to be convicted of both a conspiracy and its target offense.  This sets 
conspiracies apart from the other inchoate offenses of attempt and solicitation, for which only 
one conviction may be entered (either for the inchoate or completed offense). 
Section 210(c) is a recommended addition to the scheme of multiple convictions that 
draws attention to the intentional structure of the Proposed Code.  In consolidating related or 
overlapping offenses from the current code, the Proposed Code sometimes presents multiple 
related offenses within the same Section.  This has been done intentionally to make clear that 
those offenses are related in such a way that they should be viewed as alternatives to each 
other—at least as far as multiple convictions are concerned.  For example, both offenses for 
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dissemination of child pornography and dissemination of pornography (obscenity) are grouped 
together under proposed Section 4204.  This grouping is intentional, and is meant to signal that, 
among other things, a single instance of disseminating child pornography should not also support 
a conviction for disseminating pornography.  Section 210(b) makes the effect of these groupings 
explicit.  However, multiple offenses are sometimes grouped within the same Section for a 
completely different reason, such as offenses’ common relationship with a regulatory 
requirement, as in proposed Section 5108.  Therefore, Subsection (b) is not an absolute rule, but 
rather a factor to be considered by the court when deciding whether multiple charges based on 
the same conduct ought to support multiple convictions.   
Section 210(d) makes clear that where multiple convictions conflict and only one may be 
entered into judgment, the court must enter a conviction for the most serious of those offenses 
(or the more serious of two grades of the same offense). 
Note that Section 210 does not include 11 Del.C. § 206(c), which makes some provision 
for when the court is obligated to instruct the jury as to “included offenses.”  This provision is 
not retained in the Proposed Code because it is bound up in the larger issues of how and when 
juries ought to be instructed, none of which is contained within the Proposed Code.  Rather, 
§ 206(c) should be relocated to a chapter on criminal procedure dealing with those issues in 
greater depth.  Additionally, Section 210 makes it unnecessary to carry forward 16 Del.C. 
§ 4766, which specifies which current drug offenses are lesser-included offenses of each other, 
since the rules set forth are comprehensive enough to cover those situations without enumerating 
them. 
Application to Grade Adjustments.  The Proposed Code differs from the current Delaware 
criminal code by utilizing grade adjustments—some generally applicable, as in proposed Section 
804, and some specific to offenses—as much as is practicable.  This provides a principled 
approach to avoid multiplying liability for overlapping offenses while ensuring that greater 
harms are graded more seriously.  However, use of so many grade adjustments could 
nevertheless result in improper multiple charges if the elements of a grade adjustment to one 
offense overlap with the elements of a separate offense.  To avoid this problem, Section 210 
should be read broadly to apply to all elements of any offenses and attending grade adjustments 
charged against a defendant. 
 
 
Comment on Section 211.  Accountability for the Conduct of Another 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 533 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision sets out the circumstances under which one person may be 
held accountable for the conduct of another person. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 211(a)(1) is similar to the current complicity 
provisions in 11 Del.C. § 271(1)-(2), defining two standards for liability: the first applies where 
the defendant’s assistance is a “but-for” cause of the crime; the second applies where the 
defendant’s objective contribution to the crime is less substantial, but the accomplice has the 
culpability of “intent” as to her assistance.  Besides restructuring the two bases of liability, two 
changes have been made to § 271: 
 
 331 
(1) The mental state elements of the current provisions have been rephrased.  The phrase 
“having the culpability required by the offense” replaces “[a]cting with the state of mind 
that is sufficient for commission of the offense” in § 271(1), and has been added to 
Section 211(a)(1)(A).  The imputation of one person’s conduct to another person should 
not alter the culpability level required by the offense.  Rather, the person held 
accountable for another’s conduct should satisfy the standard culpability level for the 
underlying offense—no more, no less.  “State of mind” from § 271(1) is replaced by 
“culpability” to maintain consistent terminology throughout the Proposed Code.   
The phrase “[i]ntending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense” in 
§ 271(2) has been changed to “intentionally” in Section 211(a)(1)(B)(ii).  The current 
phrasing is confusing, as it is unclear whether the requisite “intent” relates to the person’s 
conduct in helping the confederate, or to the desired result of that help (commission of 
the offense).  The new wording makes clear that only the conduct must be intentional.  
The culpability level as to the completed offense, on the other hand, is the same as it 
would be if the “helper” committed the offense herself.  Note also that in order to 
promote clarity on this point, Section 211(a)(1)(B)(ii)(bb) slightly rewords § 271(2)c.  
Yet, the substance of that provision is retained, and Subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii)(bb) makes 
clear that a failure to make a proper effort to prevent the commission of an offense by 
persons having a legal duty to do so, amounts to complicity under the Proposed Code. 
(2) The phrase “[a]ids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid” has been replaced with “aids, 
solicits, or conspires with” in Section 211(a)(1)(B)(ii)(aa).  “Conspires with” is a legal 
term of art that is defined elsewhere in the code, and is much more precise than “agrees.”  
“Counsel” is a form of aid, and is redundant with that concept except insofar as “counsel” 
can be construed as solicitation—counseling another to commit the crime, not how to 
commit the crime.  Therefore, “solicits” is substituted.  Finally, “attempts” to aid are now 
addressed in Section 211(g)-(h). 
Section 211(a)(2) directly corresponds to § 271(3). 
Section 211(b), setting out enumerated exceptions to accomplice liability under 
Subsection (a), is taken nearly verbatim from 11 Del.C. § 273.   
Section 211(c), though slightly reworded for clarity, is taken directly from 11 Del.C. 
§ 272(3).  Subsection (c) provides that a person who may have been legally incapable of 
committing an offense herself may still be convicted of the offense based on her accountability 
for the conduct of another who commits the offense.  However, the person nevertheless cannot 
be treated as an accomplice if that liability would be inconsistent with the purpose of the 
person’s legal incapacity.  For example, 11 Del.C. §§ 783(1) and 783A(1) criminalize 
kidnapping for ransom or reward.  The Delaware General Assembly has chosen (though not all 
states make the same choice) not to criminalize payment of the ransom demanded by kidnappers, 
but to only criminalize the demand for ransom.  Payment of the ransom, though, arguably could 
satisfy the requirements to be found liable as an accomplice to the kidnapping, since payment of 
the ransom intentionally aided completion of the offense.  But this use of accomplice liability 
circumvents a policy decision made by the General Assembly not to criminalize payment of 
ransom.  Subsection (c), in part, provides a statutory mechanism to avoid that improper outcome. 
Section 211(d) is largely the same as § 272(2), which provides that a person may be held 
legally accountable for the conduct of another, even if the other person is never prosecuted or 
convicted, is convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, or has been acquitted of the 
offense.  These categories are broad enough to capture other situations the current provision 
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makes explicit, such as the “immunity from prosecution” provision and all of § 272(1), because 
those merely lay out reasons why a person might not be prosecuted or convicted, or might be 
acquitted.  Therefore, those provisions are not retained in Subsection (d). 
Section 211(e), though restructured for clarity, directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 274.  
Subsection (e)(1) makes clear that only the principal’s conduct may be imputed to the defendant 
charged under Section 211(a)—not the principal’s culpability in committing the offense.  
Subsection (e)(2) makes clear that specific aggravating factors that may increase the grade of an 
offense, or brings the principal’s conduct under a different offense than the one contemplated by 
the accomplice, cannot be imputed to the accomplice.  For example, if an accomplice assists a 
principal in committing a robbery, but the principal unexpectedly displays a deadly weapon in 
commission of the robbery, only the principal could be convicted of aggravated robbery under 
proposed Section 1201.  The accomplice could only be held accountable for the robbery, not the 
aggravating circumstance of displaying a deadly weapon.  However, if the accomplice’s aid 
consisted of supplying the deadly weapon to the principal, then the accomplice would be 
personally accountable for the aggravating circumstance, allowing the accomplice to be 
convicted of aggravated robbery.   
Section 211(f) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 275.  Subsection (f) allows a person 
indicted as a principal to be convicted as an accomplice, and vice versa. 
Section 211(g) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 533.  Subsection (g) makes clear that 
liability (for an inchoate offense) is appropriate where a person satisfies the requirements of 
Section 211(a), even if the person for whose conduct she would have been accountable does not 
commit the offense.  Subsection (g) imposes reduced liability in recognition of the fact that the 
harm of the substantive offense does not occur in those situations.   
Section 211(h) has no corresponding provision in current Title 11.  Subsection (h) has 
been added mainly to clarify the Proposed Code’s position on a confusing issue of law—the 
interaction between attempt and complicity.  Section 211(h) is similar to 11 Del.C. § 271(2)b. in 
imposing liability for an “attempt to aid,” but with a few modifications.  Subsection (h) applies 
“whether or not the offense is attempted or committed by the other person,” thus clarifying that 
one is subject to liability for an unsuccessful attempt to aid, solicit, or conspire with another.  
Subsection (h) also imposes liability for attempts to solicit or conspire as well as attempts to aid.  
Finally, Subsection (h) recognizes—as current Delaware law generally does—that inchoate 
efforts toward an offense should not be sanctioned as severely as completed offenses.  Current 
§ 271(2)b. imposes liability for someone who “[a]ids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the 
other person,” implying that a failed attempt to aid might be punished as severely as the 
completed offense.  This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the approach taken in 11 
Del.C. § 533, discussed above, which imposes only attempt liability in cases of incomplete 
complicity.  Equal punishment based solely on the defendant’s blameworthy intent—a wholly 
subjective approach to punishment—was first established by the Model Penal Code.  Delaware 
generally adopted the Model Penal Code in its 1972 criminal code, but discarded many aspects 
of its subjectivist approach.  See, e.g., 11 Del.C. §§ 501–03, 511–13, 533 (punishing solicitation, 
conspiracy, and incomplete complicity less severely than the target offenses).  Subsection (h) 
improves consistency throughout the Code by eliminating a possible remnant of the subjectivism 
rejected by the General Assembly. Subsection (h) therefore reduces the liability for attempted 
complicity relative to actual complicity. 
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Comment on Section 212.  Voluntary Intoxication 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 421, 424 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision governs the imputation of culpability to a person who engages 
in offense conduct after voluntarily becoming intoxicated.  For conduct performed under the 
influence of involuntary intoxication, see proposed Section 404 and corresponding Commentary. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 212(a)-(b) seek to reestablish the availability 
and contours of a defense for voluntary intoxication as it was originally enacted with the 1972 
criminal code.  Proposed Section 212 provides that voluntary intoxication is a defense, but only 
to the extent it negates a culpability requirement greater than recklessness, as did the original 
§ 421 enacted in 1972 and the Delaware case law prior to that enactment.  Wyant v. State, 519 
A.2d 649, 655 (Del. 1986).  Once the rule was codified, however, it came under repeated attack.  
By 1976, the General Assembly settled upon the current rule, which provides that voluntary 
intoxication “is no defense to any criminal charge.”  11 Del.C. § 421.  “The consequence . . . is 
that the State is not required to prove that an intoxicated defendant possessed a particular state of 
mind . . . .”  Wyant, 419 A.2d at 658.  The General Assembly was no doubt concerned that 
opening the door to a statutory involuntary intoxication defense in any circumstance would result 
in defendants raising the issue of intoxication in every case.   
By removing the availability of the defense altogether, however, the General Assembly 
inadvertently created the possibility of a defendant who behaved recklessly being punished for 
knowing or intentional conduct.  Suppose a defendant killed another person while drunk.  
Suppose also that the defendant’s conduct was merely reckless, but the State nevertheless 
chooses to prosecute the defendant for aggravated murder.  The defendant may not raise the issue 
of his intoxication to explain why he did not have the required culpability for aggravated murder.  
If the defendant has no other evidence to present, then the State’s allegation of an intentional 
killing will go unchallenged by the defendant.  The State must still prove the defendant’s 
culpability beyond a reasonable doubt.  But if the defendant is unable to make a colorable 
defense, the State’s assertion is much more likely to be accepted, even if the defendant did not in 
fact have the required culpability, and would not even if he had been sober.  This same scenario 
could play out for any offense with knowing or intentional culpability. 
At the same time, a defendant should not be able to hide behind his intoxication when he 
would have had the required culpability for an offense but for the intoxication.  That is why 
Subsection (b) provides that recklessness may be imputed to any defendant who is voluntarily 
intoxicated, so long as the defendant would have been aware of the risks he took had he been 
sober.  In this way, Section 212 strikes a balance that helps ensure that the greatest number of 
blameworthy offenders will be held accountable, but without arbitrarily subjecting those people 
to heightened punishment against which they are unable to defend. 
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Comment on Section 213.  Divergence Between Consequences Intended or Risked and 
Actual Consequences 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 262, 263 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 213 addresses the “transferred intent” situation where a person 
intends, foresees, or risks one result that would be an offense, but ends up causing or risking 
another result that is also an offense.  In that case, liability may be imposed for the unintended 
offense that actually results.  Note that where a person causes both the intended result and 
another result that is also an offense, he or she may be held liable for both offenses.  Where the 
intended result does not occur, the person may be held liable for attempting to commit the 
intended offense as well as for committing the unintended offense. 
Section 213(a) uses the term “consequence” instead of “result” because, in some cases, it 
may not be immediately clear whether an offense element is a circumstance element or a result 
element, as those terms are defined in proposed Section 202.  For example, if an offense 
prohibits “sexual intercourse with a minor,” it is unclear whether the result requirement is 
“sexual intercourse” and the person’s age is merely an attendant specific circumstance, or 
whether the result requirement is “sexual intercourse with a minor” specifically.  Section 213(b) 
avoids this ambiguity by including the attendant circumstances within the definition of 
“consequence.”   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 213(a) is a combination of the current 
provisions for transferred intent in 11 Del.C. §§ 262-63, except for the portions dealing with 
proximate cause, which have been included in proposed Section 203.  As discussed above, and 
for those reasons, the term “consequence” is substituted for the current term “result.”  Note also 
that the language of Section 213(a)(2), addressing  the scope of the “risk the person was or 
should have been aware of,” is based on the language of 11 Del. C. § 263.  Although Section 
213(a)(3) uses the term “risked” instead, for clarity, the terminological change in Subsection 
(a)(3) is not intended to change current law’s meaning. 
 
 
Comment on Section 214.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 243, 424 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 214(a) defines a “circumstance element” as 
any objective element that is not a conduct or result element.  Most offenses will have one or 
more circumstance elements that define the requisite conditions for a given act and result to 
generate criminal liability.  For example, the offense of arson found in proposed Section 2301 
requires damage to a “building.”  The term is not specifically defined in current Delaware law.    
Section 214(b) defines a “conduct element” as any element of an offense that requires a 
person’s “act” (as defined in Section 204) or “failure to perform a legal duty.”  For example, 
under proposed Section 2301, the offense of arson requires that a person “damage[]” property; 
any physical act or failure to perform a legal duty leading to such damage will satisfy the 
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conduct element.  (The causation and culpability requirements, however, will operate to limit the 
range of conduct for which a person will be criminally liable.)  The term is not specifically 
defined in current Delaware law.  
Section 214(c) provides a definition of the term “consequence” that avoids the ambiguity 
between when an offense element is a result element or a circumstance element.  The term is not 
specifically defined in current Delaware law.  
Section 214(d) defines the term “inchoate offense.”  The term is not specifically defined 
in current Delaware law. 
Section 214(e) provides a definition of the term “intoxication” that directly corresponds 
to the definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 424.  However, based upon the Model Penal 
Code’s definition of “intoxication” in § 2.08(5)(a), the proposed definition provides that 
intoxication includes disturbance of physical capacity, not merely mental capacity.  This minor 
change takes into account the real-world possibility that an intoxicant affects a person’s ability to 
control his or her physical actions, regardless of what the person’s mental state might be 
otherwise. 
Section 214(f) provides a definition of a “negligent mistake” that requires that the actor 
be “negligent” in forming or holding an erroneous belief.   
Section 214(g) provides a definition of a “reasonable mistake” that applies to erroneous 
beliefs that an actor holds neither recklessly nor negligently.   
Section 214(h) provides a definition of a “reckless mistake” that requires that the actor be 
“reckless” in forming or holding an erroneous belief.  The definitions in Sections 214(f), (g), and 
(h) are intended to incorporate by reference Section 205(b)’s definitions of the culpability levels 
of recklessness and negligence.  Whether a mistake is reckless, negligent, or reasonable is to be 
determined with reference to the standards in Section 205(b)(3) and (b)(4).  None of the terms in 
Section 214(f), (g), and (h) are specifically defined in current Delaware law.    
Section 214(i) defines a “result element” as any change in the state of the world required 
to have been caused by a person’s conduct.  For example, the offense of arson found in proposed 
Section 2301 requires the result of damage.  The term is not specifically defined in current 
Delaware law. 
Section 214(j) defines the term “substantive offense.”  The term is not specifically 
defined in current Delaware law. 
Section 214(k) defines a “voluntary act” and, together with Section 204(c), directly 
corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 243. 
Section 214(l) provides a definition of the term “voluntary intoxication” that directly 
corresponds to the definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 424.   
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GENERAL DEFENSES 
 
CHAPTER 300.  JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES 
 
Section 300.  General Defenses 
Section 301.  General Provisions Governing Justification Defenses 
Section 302.  Choice of Evils 
Section 303.  Execution of Public Duty 
Section 304.  Law Enforcement Authority 
Section 305.  Conduct of Persons with Special Responsibility for Care, Discipline, or Safety of 
Others 
Section 306.  Defense of Person 
Section 307.  Defense of Property 
Section 308.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 300.  General Defenses 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): See 11 Del.C. §§ 461, 463 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision explains the implications of the existence of a defense for a 
person’s possible criminal liability.  Section 300 states a principle implicit in the notion of a 
“defense”: it applies even if one has done something that would otherwise constitute an offense. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 300’s rule reflects current law, under which 
defenses similarly preclude conviction even if all offense elements are satisfied.  This principle is 
contained in 11 Del.C. § 461, which broadly states that “justification . . . is a defense,” but § 461 
does not specify the practical effect of general defenses, and how they differ conceptually from 
affirmative defenses, for example.  Other defenses may operate by negating the defendant’s 
culpability, so that a successful defense means the defendant does not satisfy all elements of the 
offense.  General defenses, however, operate despite the defendant satisfying all elements of an 
offense.  That is why 11 Del.C. § 463 (Justification – Choice of evils) is phrased in the following 
terms: “conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable when . . . .”  But 
Choice of evils is not the only general defense that functions this way; indeed, all justification, 
excuse, and nonexculpatory defenses work the same way.  For that reason, Section 300 includes 
them all, from Chapters 300, 400, and 500. 
 
 
General Comment Regarding Justifications: 
Justifications differ from excuses in that they relate to specific conduct, not specific 
persons (although sometimes, only particular persons are authorized to perform the justified 
conduct).  In other words, an act is (or is not) justified, whereas an actor is (or is not) excused.  
Justifications exist independently of an actor’s state of mind: in common-law legal terms, a 
justification negates the existence of an actus reus, not the existence of a mens rea. 
This distinction is important because a defense’s status as a justification, an excuse, or a 
nonexculpatory defense has significant legal implications.  For example, a person acting in self-
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defense may be assisted by others, and may not lawfully be interfered with.  On the other hand, 
an aggressor is entitled to resist a person who mistakenly believes herself to be acting in self-
defense; that person, even if excused, is not justified.  Moreover, because justifications recognize 
conduct that is socially acceptable, and often desirable, it is sensible to require the prosecution to 
prove that conduct was not justified.  Excuses and nonexculpatory defenses, by contrast, operate 
to prevent liability for harmful conduct that would ordinarily constitute an offense.  Accordingly, 
and because the state-of-mind or other evidence relevant to an excuse or nonexculpatory defense 
is frequently within the control of the defendant, it is sensible to shift the burden of persuasion to 
the defendant for those defenses.  See proposed Sections 301, 401, and 501, and corresponding 
Commentary. 
Proposed Chapter 300 maintains the language of justification in current Delaware law, 
which already reflects this understanding of justification defenses.  For example, 11 Del.C. § 462 
(Justification – Public Duty) states that “conduct . . . is justifiable when . . . .” and § 467 
(Justification – Use of force in law enforcement), describing conduct, states that “[t]he use of 
force . . . is justifiable when . . . .”  This language reflects the distinction between justified 
conduct and excused persons—a distinction of considerable practical importance. 
Note that Delaware’s 1972 Criminal Code, mirroring the Model Penal Code on which it 
is based, does not use the terminology of “excuses” and “nonexculpatory defenses.”  In 1971, the 
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws released its Final Report, which 
pioneered the use of those terms.  This was widely considered an improvement upon the Model 
Penal Code because of the firm conceptual distinction it drew between justifications and other 
general defenses.  Beginning in 1971, this new terminology became ubiquitous in new criminal 
codes throughout the United States and criminal law scholarship.  Given that the project that 
generated the current criminal code began prior to 1971, it is understandable that it did not draw 
upon the National Commission’s innovations.  Today, however, these distinctions are so 
generally accepted that the terms “excuse” and “nonexculpatory” must be used in the Proposed 
Code. 
 
 
Comment on Section 301.  General Provisions Governing Justification Defenses 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 463, 470(b); see also §§ 464(d)-(e)(1), 
465(a), 467(a)(1) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision sets out several general rules applying to justification 
defenses.  Section 301(a) creates a rule mandating the supremacy of more specific justifications 
over more general ones.  This is because the more specific justifications set out in full the 
legislative determinations that have been made regarding liability for specific forms of conduct.  
To allow a more general provision to supersede or complement the more specific one would 
enable circumvention of the particular determinations the General Assembly has made regarding 
that conduct.  At the same time, Section 301(b) makes clear that conduct may relate to several 
justification rules at once—for example, an aggressor’s conduct may threaten both a person’s life 
and her property.  Where this is the case, the actor may act according to the allowances of any 
relevant justification.  In the above example, if the self-defense provision authorizes deadly 
force, the person may employ that level of force even though the defense of property provision, 
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standing alone, would not allow it.  Section 301(c) notes that justified conduct, beyond merely 
being non-criminal, merits heightened legal status: one person may lawfully assist, and may not 
lawfully seek to impede, another’s justified conduct.  Section 301(d) covers situations where an 
actor causes the circumstances that give rise to the justification for her conduct.  Section 301(e) 
specifies that justified conduct could still give rise to criminal liability where the conduct causes 
injury, or creates a risk of injury, to innocent persons unconnected to the circumstances that 
make the conduct justified.  Section 301(f) places the burden of disproving justifications upon 
the State by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 301(a) corresponds, in part, to 11 Del.C. 
§ 463, which only supplies a choice of evils defense as long as it is not “inconsistent with the 
ensuing sections of this Criminal Code defining justifiable use of physical force.”  Subsection (a) 
states the same basic principle of statutory construction that “the specific controls the general.”  
See, e.g., State v. Cook, 600 A.2d 352, 355 (Del. 1991).  However, it recognizes that lesser evil, 
or choice of evils, is not the only justification defense that should conceivably be supplanted by 
more specific justifications.  Section 301(a) denies any justification where the General Assembly 
has made a more nuanced decision that specific types of conduct are or are not justified, 
regardless of whether they satisfy the requirements of the more generalized “lesser evil” and 
public-duty justifications.  For example, proposed Section 307(d), which governs the defense of 
property, and proposed Section 306(c)(1), which governs the use of deadly force, together 
provide that using deadly force to protect only property is never justified.  Section 301(a) makes 
clear that—regardless of other interests involved—the lesser-evil justification can never be used 
to circumvent a more specific rule such as the one preventing the use of deadly force to protect 
only property.  Section 301(a) would, however, allow a defendant to raise both the lesser-evil 
justification and an asserted excuse defense.  Likewise, Section 303 is drawn in such broad terms 
that the rationale for limiting the applicability of the lesser-evil justification applies to it as well.   
Section 301(b), which provides that multiple justification defenses are available in 
situations not governed by Section 301(a), is in keeping with Delaware’s current treatment of 
specific justification defenses as components of one general defense of justification.  See 
Alexander v. Cahill, 829 A.2d 117, 128 (Del. 2003) (“The Justification defense in Delaware is a 
general defense that includes the specific defenses of Execution of a Public Duty (11 Del. C. 
§ 462), Choice of Evils (11 Del. C. § 463), and Self Defense (11 Del. C. § 464)”). 
Section 301(c)’s rule that one may not interfere with justified conduct is consistent with 
current Delaware law.  For example, under 11 Del.C. § 464(d), a person may not resist the 
justified use of force in effecting a lawful arrest.  The rule that justified conduct may be assisted 
finds support in current law as well.  For example, under 11 Del.C. § 467(a)(1), a civilian may 
assist a police officer to make an arrest, and under 11 Del.C. § 465(a), a person is justified in 
defending a third person against an aggressor to the same degree that the victim could defend 
herself.   
Section 301(d) has no directly corresponding provision in current Title 11, but two 
current provisions discuss the availability of justifications where the defendant herself has caused 
the justifying conditions.  See 11 Del.C. §§ 463 (“choice of evils” defense only available in “a 
situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the defendant”); 464(e)(1) (deadly force 
not justified if “[t]he defendant, with the purpose of causing death or serious physical injury, 
provoked the use of force against the defendant in the same encounter”).  Section 301(d) follows 
the same general rule as those provisions: where the defendant was not culpable in causing the 
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justifying circumstances, her conduct is justified; but where she was culpable, her conduct is not 
justified. 
Section 301(d) differs from the current rules governing causing the conditions of one’s 
own justification, however, in three ways.  First, the proposed provision sets forth rules applying 
to justification defenses generally, whereas the current provisions apply only to the self-defense 
and necessity justifications.  This broader scope enables consistent treatment of similar issues.  
For example, 11 Del.C. § 464(e)(1) only denies a justification for use of deadly force when the 
defendant provokes the aggressor’s use of force against the defendant.  This provocation 
provision is drawn narrowly, failing to deny a defense in other, very similar situations.  Most 
obviously, it does not deny a defense where the defendant intentionally provokes her attacker as 
an excuse to inflict harm, but only uses non-deadly force.  11 Del.C. § 464(e)(1) also clearly 
denies the defense-of-person justification where the defendant provokes the use of force against 
another person—for example, by accusing that person of a misdeed against the provoked 
individual—as an expedient for justifying her own use of force.   
Second, Section 301(d) provides that the availability of a justification defense uniformly 
depends on whether the defendant caused the justifying conditions with the culpability required 
by the charged offense.  The current provisions, by contrast, prescribe standards that are less 
consistent.  While 11 Del.C. § 464(e)(1) narrowly precludes the self-defense justification only 
where the defendant “provokes” the victim with the “intent” to cause the justifying conditions, 
11 Del.C. § 463 more broadly bars the choice of evils defense whenever the defendant is at 
“fault” for causing the situation.  Section 301(d)(2)’s formulation provides that the culpability 
required as to causing the justifying conditions should be the same as the culpability 
requirement(s) of the charged offense. 
Third, Section 301(d)(3) introduces a new rule recognizing the availability of general 
defenses in cases where the defendant causes the conditions of the person’s own justification 
defense.  Just as a person may have a justification, excuse, or nonexculpatory defense as to the 
offense itself, it is appropriate to allow such a defense as to a defendant’s conduct in causing the 
conditions of a justification.  For example, Section 301(d)(3) would allow a duress defense in a 
case where one is coerced at gunpoint to cause the conditions of a lesser-evil justification. 
Section 301(e) preserves 11 Del.C. § 470(b) in specifying that justified conduct may still 
give rise to criminal liability if it creates a risk to or injures innocent parties.  Subsection (e) 
differs from § 470(b) by removing the culpability requirement that the defendant “recklessly or 
negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to innocent persons.”  But this does not change the 
practical effect of the provision, since lesser culpability requirements are satisfied by proof of 
greater culpability requirements.  By specifying “recklessly or negligently,” the current 
formulation could be misinterpreted to exclude knowing injury of innocent persons, which is 
unlikely to have been intended by the General Assembly.  Note also that Section 301(e) does not 
destroy the defendant’s justification, but merely clarifies that the justification does not extend to 
any collateral effects of the defendant’s conduct towards persons other than the aggressor. 
Section 301(f) places the burden of persuasion upon the State to disprove all justification 
defenses by a preponderance of the evidence.  See proposed Section 106(b)(1)(B) and 
corresponding Commentary.  Note, however, that the defendant still bears the burden of 
production on justification defenses.  See proposed Section 106(b)(2) and corresponding 
Commentary. 
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Comment on Section 302.  Choice of Evils 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 463; see also §§ 464(a), 466(a), 467(a)(1) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision ensures that conduct will not give rise to criminal liability 
where the conduct is objectively necessary to avoid a threatened harm even greater than that 
caused by the conduct itself.  For example, an ambulance may exceed the speed limit or pass 
through a traffic light, or property may be destroyed to prevent the spread of a fire. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 302, in most ways, is functionally similar to 
11 Del.C. § 463.  They differ in three significant ways.  First, Section 302(a) provides that the 
conduct must be “immediately necessary to avoid a harm or wrong,” whereas § 463 requires that 
the conduct be “necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private 
injury.”  This shifts the requirement of immediacy from the threat to the need to respond to the 
threat.  Some threats, although foreseeable, may not become “imminent” for some time—at 
which point it may be too late to respond and prevent the treat.  For example, the crew on a ship 
that is leaking or has low rations, but whose captain refuses to return to port, may not face the 
imminent threat of capsizing or starvation for some time, at which point the ship may be too far 
out to return to shore.  At the same time, forbidding the crew to mutiny until such action 
becomes immediately necessary—until they have reached the “point of no return”—gives the 
captain time to relent.  This concept of “immediate necessity,” moreover, is more consistent with 
other justifications in current law.  See 11 Del.C. § 464(a) (“use of force . . . is justifiable 
when . . . such force is immediately necessary”) (emphasis added); § 466(a) (same); § 467(a)(1) 
(same).   
Second, Section 302(b) provides a simple requirement that “the harm or wrong to be 
avoided by the defendant’s conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law 
defining the offense charged.”  In contrast, 11 Del.C. § 463 provides a lengthy standard: the 
injury to be avoided must be “of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence 
and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the 
desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in 
issue.”  It is difficult to discern what exactly are the “ordinary standards of intelligence and 
morality,” so this requirement has been distilled into its basic function, which is to weigh the 
seriousness of the relative harms.   
Finally, Section 302(c) corresponds to the final sentence of 11 Del.C. § 463, but states a 
broader principle of exception, more simply.  Subsection (c) provides that any legislative 
purpose to exclude the claimed justification under Subsections (a)-(b) makes the justification 
unavailable.  This clearly encompasses § 463’s exception, which is that the existence of a law 
cannot itself be claimed as the “greater evil” to be avoided.  The fact that the General Assembly 
passes a law is evidence of legislative purpose that this kind of claimed justification not be 
available.  However, Subsection (c) also denies the general lesser-evil justification in other 
situations where the General Assembly has already made a more particular determination 
regarding the interests involved.  For example, Section 302(c) would deny the lesser-evil defense 
where an inmate has escaped from a correctional institution to avoid poor prison conditions.  The 
General Assembly’s decision to criminalize escape reflects a determination that the harms of that 
offense—public fear and institutional disorder—outweigh the harms associated with poor prison 
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conditions.  The proposed, broader limitation ensures that such a legislative determination is not 
defeated by the defendant’s own balancing of the interests involved. 
Section 302 omits 11 Del.C. 463’s requirement that the injury to be avoided come about 
through “a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the defendant,” which is instead 
addressed by proposed Section 301(d).   
 
 
Comment on Section 303.  Execution of Public Duty 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 462; see also 7 Del.C. § 724(e); 11 Del.C. 
§§ 271, 542, 770(b), 771(b), 1409; 24 Del.C. § 4604(b) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision provides a justification for conduct explicitly allowed by a 
governmental institution with the lawful power to authorize the conduct.  Section 303 
incorporates, rather than reiterates, the law governing public duties.  Section 303(a)(1) justifies 
conduct authorized by laws defining the powers and duties of public servants.  Section 303(a)(2) 
provides a defense for conduct authorized by laws governing the execution of legal process.  
Section 303(a)(3) immunizes conduct sanctioned by a court or tribunal.  Section 303(a)(4) is a 
catch-all provision justifying conduct authorized by other laws imposing public duties.  Section 
303(b) provides that the justification is available even if there is a defect in legal process, or the 
court lacks jurisdiction. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 303(a)(1)-(3) are substantially similar to 11 
Del.C. § 462(a)(1)-(3), (5).  Section 303(a)(4), the “catch-all” provision, is new, and is broad 
enough to cover § 462(a)(4), which relates to laws governing the military services and the 
conduct of war, since that subsection will likely apply so infrequently domestically that it need 
not be specifically provided for.  Section 303(b) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 462(b)(1), but adds 
the requirement that the defect be “unknown to the defendant” to prevent defendants from taking 
advantage of the mistakes of others.  The issue of a civilian’s belief when assisting an officer in 
§ 462(b)(2) is not incorporated, because this requirement is addressed by proposed Section 409’s 
excuse defense for mistakes as to justifications. 
Note that Section 303 renders unnecessary numerous exemptions, exceptions, and 
affirmative defenses for conduct authorized by laws imposing public duties.  See, e.g., 7 Del.C. 
§ 724(e); 11 Del.C. §§ 271, 542, 770(b), 771(b), 1409; 24 Del.C. § 4604(b). 
 
 
Comment on Section 304.  Law Enforcement Authority 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 467; see also § 466 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision provides a justification for conduct—specifically, use of 
force—necessary to bring a person into lawful custody, or prevent a person’s escape from 
custody. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 304(a) provides a justification for the conduct 
of a peace officer, or one assisting a peace officer, in making a lawful arrest or detention.  
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Section 304(a)(1) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 467(a)(1), but makes two modifications.  
First, Section 304(a)(1) applies to any “conduct” necessary to effect a lawful arrest or “lawful . . . 
detention,” whereas current law much more narrowly justifies only the “use of force . . . 
necessary to effect [an] arrest.”  The proposed provision’s broader language makes clear that the 
justification applies to conduct other than force—so that a peace officer is also justified in, for 
example, trespassing or speeding to effect an arrest—and that the justification applies to non-
arrest detentions, such as Terry stops.  Second, Section 304(a)(1) omits § 467(a)(1)’s 
requirement that the defendant “believes” the arrest is necessary.  This has been done in 
recognition of the applicability of proposed Section 409’s excuse defense for mistakes as to 
justifications. 
Section 304(a)(2) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 467(b)(1) in requiring that the 
arrestee or detainee must have been made aware of the purpose of the arrest or detention, if it is 
reasonable to do so, before use of force is justified.  Note that this only applies to use of force, 
not all conduct that could potentially be justified under Subsection (a)(1).   
Section 304(a)(3) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 467(c) in setting forth the conditions for 
deadly force to be authorized under Section 304.  Subsection (a)(3)(A) provides that “the force is 
necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape,” replacing the 
current requirement that “all other reasonable means of apprehension have been exhausted.”  In a 
sense, the proposed language achieves the same result: if other reasonable measures have not yet 
been tried, then use of deadly force is not necessary.  If no reasonable measures are left, then 
deadly force is necessary.  The concept of “necessity” is fundamental to the language of 
justifications in current Delaware law, and, to the extent possible, it is desirable to use consistent 
terminology to express these fundamentals. 
Section 304(a)(3)(B) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 467(c)(2).  Section 304(a)(3)(C) 
is a simplified version of § 467(c)(1), which requires that the arrestee have committed or 
attempted a violent felony in order to justify use of deadly force.  The requirement that the 
defendant “believes” that condition to be true has not been retained, in recognition of the 
applicability of proposed Section 409’s excuse defense for mistakes as to justifications.  Section 
304(a)(3)(D) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 467(c)(3).  Consistent with other instances in 
§ 467 and other current justification provisions, the requirement of the defendant’s belief has not 
been incorporated, due to proposed Section 409’s excuse defense for mistakes as to 
justifications.   
Section 304(a)(4) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 467(b)(2), but reframes the requirement that 
an officer believe a warrant to be valid.  Under Section 304(a)(1), a valid warrant would make an 
arrest lawful regardless of the peace officer’s belief about the warrant’s validity.  The issue of the 
officer’s belief would come into play only if the warrant is actually invalid, in which case 
proposed Section 409’s excuse defense for mistakes as to justifications would come into play.  
Subsection (a)(4) frames the issue by stipulating that proof that the officer knew a warrant to be 
invalid destroys the officer’s justification, rather than requiring the officer’s belief in the 
warrant’s validity to establish her justification. 
Section 304(b) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 467(d), with two minor changes.  
First, Subsection (b)(1) specifies a necessity requirement that exists in current law, but only 
appears by reading together the current statute’s requirements that the “force could justifiably 
have been employed to effect the arrest,” and that use of force to effect an arrest is only justified 
if it is “immediately necessary” under § 467(a)(1).  Second, Subsection (b)(2) more specifically 
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lays out what is meant by a person “charge with or convicted of” a crime.  Functionally, 
however, the provision is identical to current law. 
Hostage Provisions.  Section 304 does not retain 11 Del.C. § 467(a)(2) or (f), which deal 
with arrests in hostage situations.  To the extent these provisions are concerned with justifying a 
peace officer that makes an arrest, they are not necessary because the authorization in Section 
304(a)(1) already supplies that justification.  To the extent the hostage provisions are concerned 
with justifying use of force to protect the lives of the hostages, the provisions are redundant with 
the justification for defense of persons—including third persons, such as hostages—in Section 
306.  Furthermore, portions of § 467(f) only relate to the potentially mistaken belief of the 
defendant in the risks created by the hostage-taker.  Those provisions need not be incorporated 
because of the applicability of proposed Section 409’s excuse defense for mistakes as to 
justifications. 
Preventing Suicide.  Section 304 does not retain the portion of 11 Del.C. § 467(e) dealing 
with use of force to prevent another person from self-inflicting serious physical injury or 
committing suicide.  This justification does not appear to apply solely to peace officers, but to 
any person.  For that reason, this provision is better handled in Section 306 (defense of person). 
Preventing Breaches of the Peace, Riots, and Mutinies.  The remaining portions of 11 
Del.C. § 467(e) are not retained because they are redundant with other justification provisions 
that already exist.  Where rioters are threatening property, or are otherwise violating the law, use 
of force by law enforcement is already justified under either Section 303 (execution of public 
duty), Section 307 (defense of property), or Section 306 (defense of persons).  If rioters are 
threatening or attempting to commit a crime, then they have already committed the inchoate 
offense of attempt and may be lawfully arrested.  No additional justification is necessary for law 
enforcement.  However, where rioters’ or mutineers’ behavior rises to the level of danger that 
deadly force would be an appropriate response, it would already be justified under Section 306 
(defense of person).  If property protection were the only issue with which § 467(e)(1)-(2) were 
concerned, the use of deadly force could not be justified.  That would directly contradict the 
policy established more clearly in 11 Del.C. § 466, which does not authorize use of deadly force 
in any circumstance where only property is endangered.   
 
 
Comment on Section 305.  Conduct of Persons with Special Responsibility for Care, 
Discipline, or Safety of Others 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 468 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides a justification for use of force by those charged with a 
special responsibility for others.  This conduct—including parents’ or teachers’ authority to 
protect or discipline children; wardens’ authority to impose order on a prison population; and 
medical professionals’ need to administer care or restrain those posing a danger to others or 
themselves—might not otherwise fall within the scope of the justifications set out in this 
Chapter.  Each part of the provision specifies the categories of person to whom it applies and the 
range of conduct allowed.  For example, Section 305(a) applies to any of the persons specified in 
Subsections (a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), but imposes in Subsection (a)(1)(B) a general limitation on the 
acceptable use of force by those persons. 
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Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 305(a) makes a general introductory 
statement of justification in particular circumstances for groups of persons that are enumerated in 
its Subsections.  Those circumstances and groups are functionally identical to 11 Del.C. § 468.  
Note, however, that Subsection (a) does not incorporate any language from § 468 requiring that 
force used be “reasonable and moderate,” nor does it retain any of the language explaining what 
should be taken into account by the court to determine whether force is “reasonable and 
moderate.”  Instead, each justification in Section 305(a) is written to require that the force used 
be “necessary” to further some specific purpose.  Current law already does this, but does not 
highlight the practical effects of this structure.  If the parent, teacher, guardian, doctor, or other 
person is acting in furtherance of a proper purpose under the law, and the force used is necessary 
to further that purpose, then the force used will already be “reasonable and moderate.”  The 
reasonableness of force depends on it serving a proper purpose; the moderation of force depends 
upon the defendant using no more force than is necessary to achieve the lawful purpose.  It 
would be redundant to use both standards.  The concept of necessity was preserved instead of 
“reasonableness” and “moderation” because necessity is constantly reiterated in the language of 
justification defenses, promoting consistency with the rest of Chapter 300.  The factors currently 
used to determine whether force is “reasonable and moderate” can and should be used to weigh 
whether force is necessary.  But those factors need not be specified, since necessity is a “totality 
of the circumstances,” case-by-case determination.  
Note also that requirements of “belief” in the necessity of the force used throughout 11 
Del.C. § 468 are not retained, since proposed Section 409’s mistake as to justification provision 
deals with every instance of a defendant’s belief.   
Section 305(a)(1) provides a justification defense for persons responsible for the care and 
supervision of children, and persons in the custody of other persons or institutions.  Section 
305(a)(1)(A)(i) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 468(1).  An explicit necessity requirement has 
been added to Section 305(a)(1)(A)(i) in recognition of the fact that current law’s “reasonable 
and moderate” requirement is, in effect, a necessity requirement.  Otherwise, the current and 
proposed provisions are the same.  The persons in this Subsection have two abilities that other 
classes of persons in Section 305 do not.  First, only parents and guardians are given concurrent 
justification to use force for the other specific purposes justified for other classes.  For example, 
if a bus driver could use force upon a child who is being disorderly to maintain order on a bus, 
the child’s parent could also use force to maintain order for others—even though the use of force 
is not (strictly speaking) safeguarding the welfare of the child under Section 305(a)(1)(A)(i)(aa).  
Second, only parents and guardians may delegate their use of force to others who then benefit 
from their justification defense. 
Section 305(a)(1)(A)(ii) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 468(3), providing a 
justification for persons in charge of the general welfare of persons in their custody, including 
persons in institutional custody.  The phrase, “a person entrusted by authority of law to the 
custody of another person or to an institution” has been substituted for § 468(3)’s outdated term 
“incompetent person,” which requires a definition even if it were to be retained.   
Section 305(a)(1)(B) provides a general limitation on the use of force for the classes of 
persons in Subsection (a)(1)(A), based upon 11 Del.C. § 468(1)c. and (3)c.  Subsection (a)(1)(B) 
is a shortened summary of the language in § 468(1)c.  The list of unjustified acts contains a 
catch-all provision that all the specific acts fall into, so only the catch-all language is preserved 
in Subsection (a)(1)(B).  Additionally, disfigurement and death are included in the definition of 
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serious physical injury, which is itself included in the definition of physical injury, so that 
language has not been included.   
Section 305(a)(2) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 468(2), providing a justification for 
teachers and other persons similarly entrusted with the care of children for specific purposes.  
This authorization differs from the justification for parents and guardians in Subsection 
(a)(1)(A)(i) in one important way not already mentioned.  Although the use of force by these 
persons must be “consistent with the person’s welfare,” a general appeal to the person’s welfare 
is not enough to justify use of force.  Rather, the force must serve the special purpose for which 
the person has been entrusted with the child’s care.  Subsection (a)(2)(C) preserves the same 
general limitation from current law that is used in Subsection (a)(1)(B), which is based upon 
§ 468(2)b. 
Section 305(a)(3)’s justification defense applies to medical treatment by doctors and 
therapists or persons acting at the direction of doctors or therapists.  This provision directly 
corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 468(4).  Language regarding the defendant’s belief has been removed 
from Subsection (a)(2)(B)(ii) because of the applicability of the excuse defense for mistakes as to 
justifications, provided in Section 409.   
Section 305(a)(4) immunizes the use of force by a correctional officer to enforce the rules 
or procedures of a correctional institution.  Subsection (a)(3) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 468(5)-(5)a.  Current § 468(5)b. has not been included in Subsection (a)(3) because if “[t]he 
nature or degree of force used” is “forbidden by any statute governing the administration of the 
institution,” then that force cannot be necessary to enforce the rules or procedures of the 
institution.  Additionally, language regarding the defendant’s belief has been removed from 
Subsection (a)(3) because of the applicability of the excuse defense for mistakes as to 
justifications, provided in Section 409. 
Section 305(a)(5) provides a justification defense for persons who are responsible for the 
safety of common carriers, and directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 468(6)-(6)a.  “[V]essel or 
aircraft” in § 468(6)a. fails to account for other forms of travel that could be protected by 
responsible persons, so Subsection (a)(4) additionally includes trains, vehicles, and other 
carriers.  This makes the types of common carriers in both Subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) 
identical, improving consistency in Section 305. 
Section 305(a)(6) provides a justification defense for persons who are authorized or 
required by law to maintain order or decorum on a common carrier.  Subsection (a)(5) directly 
corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 468(7), but without any language regarding the defendant’s belief 
because of the applicability of the excuse defense for mistakes as to justifications, provided in 
Section 409. 
Section 305(b) provides a general limitation on the use of deadly force in any of 
situations described in Subsection (a).  This limitation is based upon 11 Del.C. § 468(5)c. and 
(6)b., as well as the general requirement that any force used be “reasonable and moderate;” or—
as Chapter 300 is worded—necessary for the purposes listed in Section 305.  On their face, 
deadly force should not be necessary for any of those purposes unless they involve protecting a 
person from death or serious physical injury.  In that case, use of deadly force is independently 
justified under Section 306. 
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Comment on Section 306.  Defense of Person 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 464, 465, 467(e); see also 469 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision entitles a person to use force to protect herself or another 
person from physical harm.  Subsection (a) sets the general authorization for use of force.  
Subsection (b) sets a limitation upon use of force in defense of another person, and sets an 
exception for use of force to resist arrest, including unlawful arrests.  Subsection (c) sets forth the 
more limited circumstances in which deadly force may be justified, which are the only 
circumstances justifying deadly force in Chapter 300 aside from the law enforcement authority 
justification in Section 304.  Subsection (c) includes Delaware’s rules as to when a person must 
retreat instead of using deadly force.  Subsection (d) provides a justification for use of force to 
prevent another person from committing suicide or self-inflicting serious physical injury. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Sections 306(a)-(c) combine the very similar elements 
of 11 Del.C. §§ 464-65 (Justification–Use of force in self-protection; Justification–Use of force 
for the protection of other persons).  Note that, throughout Section 306, language regarding the 
defendant’s belief in current law has not been included, due to the applicability of the excuse 
defense for mistakes as to justifications, provided in Section 409. 
Section 306(a) directly corresponds to the general authorizations for use of force in 11 
Del.C. §§ 464(a) and 465(a)(3).  Just like in current law, Subsection (a) requires that use of force 
be immediately necessary to protect oneself or another person.  The temporal focus of this 
requirement is not on the imminence of the threat, but is instead upon the last moment in time in 
which use of force can still effectively counter the aggressor’s attack. 
Section 306(b)(1) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 465(a)(1)-(2).  Subsection (b)(1) 
provides that a person can only justifiably act in defense of another person if two hypothetical 
conditions are satisfied: the defendant would have to be justified in using the force under 
Subsection (a) if she were the subject of the aggressor’s attack instead of the other person; and 
the other person would have to be justified in using the same level of force against the aggressor.  
This ensures that the defendant does not use more force than is actually necessary to repel the 
attack, and makes the defendant responsible for using any special skills or abilities she has that 
the other person does not.  For example, if the defendant is skilled in a martial art that would 
allow her to easily disable the attacker without using deadly force, she is not justified in using 
deadly force, even if the person she is defending would be justified in using deadly force on her 
own behalf.   
Section 306(b)(2) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 464(d), which creates an exception 
for use of force to resist arrests, even unlawful arrests.  The phrase “or assist another in resisting” 
has been added for comprehensiveness and clarifies that a person cannot come to the aid of 
another person who is being arrested.  This clarification is important because Section 306 
combines the justifications for self-defense and defense of another, which appear in different 
sections of current law. 
Section 306(c)(1) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 464(c), which provides that deadly 
force is only justified to protect against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, or sexual 
intercourse compelled by force or threat of force.  Note that these are the exclusive situations that 
justify use of deadly force outside of a law enforcement authority justification under Section 304.  
The phrase “sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat” is retained, rather than replacing it 
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with the simpler term “rape,” because rape is defined in Section 1301 to include nominally 
consensual sex that involves a young participant (though that “consent” is legally ineffective).  It 
would be beyond the scope of the General Assembly’s intent to allow a young person to 
“consent” to sex with an older person, then kill the older person to prevent consummation of the 
act.  The presence of force or threat of force would still be required before deadly force could be 
used. 
Section 306(c)(2) sets forth the circumstances in which retreat is required instead of using 
deadly force.  Note that because retreat is never required before use of non-deadly force may be 
justified, 11 Del. C. § 464(b) is not necessary.  Insofar as it purports to provide justification to 
the use of deadly force based on the defendant subjective and mistaken belief he is justified, it is 
inconsistent with and superseded by the excuse defense for mistakes as to justifications, provided 
in Section 409.  Insofar as it refers to the use of non-deadly force, it is not necessary, since retreat 
is never required before use of non-deadly force.  Subsection (c)(2)(A) corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§§ 464(e)(2) and 465(b).  The exceptions to the retreat rule in Subsection (c)(2)(B) correspond to 
11 Del.C. §§ 464(e)(2)a.-c. and 465(c)-(d).  Subsection (c)(2)(B)(iii) refers to the specific 
justification for law enforcement authority in Section 304, rather than describing that 
justification as in § 464(e)(2)c., to promote consistency within Chapter 300.  Note that this 
automatically includes both peace officers and persons directed to assist them. 
Section 306(d) corresponds to the part of 11 Del.C. § 467(e) that provides a justification 
for use of force to prevent suicide and self-infliction of serious physical injury.  Although that 
justification appears in the current section dealing with law enforcement authority, the 
justification does not appear to apply solely to peace officers.  Since preventing suicide or self-
harm is a form of defense of person, it has been put in Section 306 instead. 
Person Unlawfully in Dwelling.  Section 306 does not specifically incorporate 11 Del.C. 
§ 469.  To the extent § 469 describes the necessity of using force to repel a home invader, it is 
redundant with the justifications already provided by Section 306.  However, § 469 also 
describes some particular situations that speak to the reasonability of a person’s mistaken belief 
in the necessity of using force to repel a home invader.  Those situations are comprehensively 
covered by the excuse defense for mistakes as to justifications, provided in Section 409.  The 
factual situations described in § 469 can easily be factored into a determination of whether a 
person’s mistaken belief is excused. 
Provocation with Intent to Inflict Injury.  11 Del.C. § 464(e)(1) is not specifically 
incorporated into Section 306.  The general provision in Section 301(d) denies a justification to a 
person who causes the conditions that give rise to the need for justified conduct if they are 
caused with the culpability required by the offense.  Current § 464(e)(1) describes a specific 
instance of this general rule.  Furthermore, § 464(e)(1) requires a culpability of “intent.”  If the 
provoking defendant intends to harm the aggressor, then the culpability required by the offense 
will always be satisfied under Section 301(d). 
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Comment on Section 307.  Defense of Property 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 466, 840(c)-(d), 858(d)-(e), 1474 
 
Comment: 
Generally. This provision entitles the owner of property, or someone with a special 
relation to the owner, to use force to protect property from invasion, destruction, or theft. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 307 is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 466, but includes a related, but more specific, justification for merchants based upon the 
“shopkeeper’s privilege” provisions in 11 Del.C. §§ 840 and 858.  Note that, as for other 
justifications, all language regarding the defendant’s belief has been removed, due to the 
applicability of the excuse defense for mistakes as to justifications, provided in Section 409. 
Section 307(a) directly corresponds to the elements of the justification in 11 Del.C. 
§ 466(a)-(b).  Note that Subsection (a), following current law, only authorizes use of force to 
prevent the aggressor’s interference with property.  The justification does not allow a defendant 
to resort to self-help to retake or reenter her property.  See Yocum v. State, 777 A.2d 782, 784 
(Del. 2001) ("[T]he use of force in the protection of property does not extend to efforts to 
retrieve the property after the theft is accomplished. . . . To hold otherwise would sanction a form 
of vigilantism . . . .").   
Section 307(b) directly corresponds to the provision in 11 Del.C. § 466(b)(1)-(3) that the 
defendant, in certain circumstances, need not request that the aggressor desist before using force 
in protection of the property. 
Section 307(c) provides a justification for merchants or operators of lawful gambling 
facilities, based on the notion of a “shopkeeper’s privilege,” who detain shoplifters or cheaters 
for the purpose of summoning law enforcement.  Subsection (c) is based upon 11 Del.C. 
§§ 840(c) and 1474, but has reworded the current provision in the language of Section 308(c)’s 
justification defense for use of force, the definition of which includes “confinement” or 
“restraint.”  Because of this reframing, § 840(c)’s language regarding “probable cause” and 
“reasonable belief” is instead handled by the proposed excuse defense for mistakes as to 
justifications in Section 409.  Note that the limitation on civil liability in Section 307(e) is broad 
enough to cover § 840(d), and that both Subsection (e) and the breadth of the meaning of “theft” 
in Chapter 2100 should also cover the “shopkeeper’s privilege” provisions in 11 Del.C. § 858(d)-
(e).   
Section 307(d) is based upon 11 Del.C. § 466(c), which provides for use of deadly force 
in special circumstances of property protection, but gets to the same result through a different 
avenue.  Subsection (d) attempts to embody the principle underlying § 466(c), which is that 
defense of property, by itself, is not a sufficient basis to take another person’s life.  Current 
§ 466(c) describes situations where a person could reasonably believe that deadly force is 
necessary to protect human life, in addition to or at the same time as protecting property.  
However, the current provision makes this judgment inconsistently.  Killing to prevent 
dispossession of one’s home by force would be justified under Section 306 because retreat is not 
required before deadly force may be used in one’s own home.  But Section 306 still requires that 
the killing be necessary to prevent dispossession.  That necessity requirement is missing from 11 
Del.C. § 466(c), which appears to say that deadly force is automatically authorized to prevent 
dispossession, even if lesser force would work equally well.  That principle is inconsistent with 
the necessity requirement that underlies every justification defense in Chapter 300.  The other 
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offenses in § 466(c) (burglary, arson, robbery, etc.) require additional threats of force and 
necessity.  It is simpler to acknowledge—as Subsection (d) does—that Section 306’s defense of 
person is providing the justification for use of deadly force, not Section 307.  Note that, under 
Section 301(b), the same result would be reached by leaving Subsection (d) out of Section 307.  
But given the significance of the subject, it is appropriate to signal directly in the text how 
Sections 306 and 307 can work together. 
Section 307(e) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 466(d), which limits the civil liability 
of a person who is justified in using force in protection of property.  However, Subsection (e) 
rewords the current provision to explicitly extend the justification to civil damages.  The current 
formulation depends upon the lack of a conviction for an offense due to the force used.  But there 
are many reasons why a person might not be convicted that have nothing to do with the person’s 
conduct being justified.  The formulation in Subsection (e) clarifies the situation to prevent an 
unintended civil defense to unjustified conduct. 
 
 
Comment on Section 308.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 461, 471; 23 Del. C. § 2301(f) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines certain significant terms used throughout Chapter 300. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 308(a) defines “correctional officer,” which is 
a newly defined term that has been created to cover wardens, officers, and other similarly 
situated persons involved with jails, prisons, and juvenile detention.  Currently, this idea is 
spelled out several times in the criminal code, but not simplified through use of a defined term. 
Section 308(b) defines “deadly force,” which directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 471(a), 
but is broken up into its elements for easier reading and application.  The final sentence of 
§ 471(a) excluding “threats” from the definition has not been included, since “threats” are not 
included in the ordinary definition of force or its plain meaning. 
Section 308(c) defines “force,” which directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 471(c). 
Section 308(d) defines “justification defense,” which is based upon 11 Del.C. § 461’s 
statement that all the defenses together define what is a “justification.” 
Section 308(e) defines “unjustified” conduct, and has been created to clarify the 
difference between justified and unjustified conduct.   
Section 308(f) defines “vessel,” which directly corresponds to 23 Del.C. § 2301(f). 
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CHAPTER 400.  EXCUSE DEFENSES 
 
Section 401.  General Provisions Governing Excuse Defenses 
Section 402.  Involuntary Act; Involuntary Omission 
Section 403.  Mental Illness 
Section 404.  Involuntary Intoxication 
Section 405.  Duress 
Section 406.  Ignorance Due to Unavailable Law 
Section 407.  Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law 
Section 408.  Reasonable Mistake of Law Unavoidable by Due Diligence 
Section 409.  Mistake as to a Justification 
Section 410.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 401.  General Provisions Governing Excuse Defenses 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 431; see also 423 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 401 sets out general rules relating to all excuse defenses.  These rules 
are distinctly relevant to excuse defenses and may be articulated only in a Code that 
distinguishes excuses from other defenses.  See general commentary preceding commentary for 
proposed Section 301.   
Section 411(a) makes clear that excuses are different than justifications; justified conduct 
may be assisted and may not be resisted,4 while neither of these collateral rules applies where a 
person is excused, but not justified.  This is because it is not the act that is excused, but the actor; 
the act is still considered improper and undesirable. 
Section 401(b) states that a person’s excuse remains valid even if she created the 
conditions giving rise to the excuse, unless she did so with the same level of culpability required 
by the offense.  In that situation, the basis for criminal liability is not the conduct causing the 
offense (because that conduct is excused), but the actor’s earlier conduct in causing the 
conditions of her excuse.  For example, a young person may join a gang knowing that it 
frequently engages in criminal activity and, indeed, has its own “laws” requiring participation in 
criminal activity.  Later, the person may be forced by other gang members at gunpoint to commit 
a crime she would otherwise not commit.  Though the person might normally be eligible for a 
duress excuse because she was compelled to commit the crime,5 the fact that she knew about the 
gang’s customs and the likelihood that she would be forced into criminal activity vitiates the 
rationale behind the defense and supports holding the gang member liable for her offense.  This 
person, who knew of the gang’s tendencies, could be held liable for an offense requiring 
knowledge; a person who was reckless as to the gang’s involvement in crime would, under 
Section 401(b), be eligible for liability only for offenses requiring recklessness. 
Generally, one of three culpability rules is applied to a person’s conduct creating an 
excusing condition: a general culpability rule of negligence, a general culpability rule of 
recklessness, or a culpability rule tracking the culpability requirement for the (excused) offense 
                                                             
4 See proposed Section 301 and corresponding Commentary. 
5 See infra proposed Section 406 and corresponding Commentary. 
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ultimately committed.  Section 401(b)(2) follows the third rule, as it seems appropriate to require 
the culpability normally required by the offense committed, rather than an alternative, possibly 
conflicting requirement.  A contrary rule would effectively impute criminal responsibility to 
persons based on an actual level of culpability lower than that usually required for the offense in 
question.  However, as Section 401(b)(3) provides, the defendant may also have a defense for 
that earlier conduct, notwithstanding the fact that she had the requisite culpability when she 
performed that conduct.  For example, the gang member in the example above might have an 
insanity defense, or might have a defense of duress if she were forced against her will to join the 
gang in the first place.   
Section 401(c) states that a mistaken belief in an excuse, unlike a mistaken belief in a 
justification, cannot be a defense to criminal liability.  While justifications relate to the context 
and circumstances of an actor’s conduct, excuses relate to whether the actor suffers from a 
disability or is mistaken.  The actor’s own erroneous belief that such a disability or mistake 
exists (e.g., “I thought I was insane” or “I thought I was mistaken”) is not relevant to a 
determination of criminal liability.   
Section 401(d) states that the defendant has the burden of proving an excuse defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Relation to current Delaware law. Section 401(a)–(c) have no directly corresponding 
provisions in current law, other than Subsection (b)(2).  11 Del.C. § 431(b) denies a duress 
defense to a person who “recklessly placed himself or herself in a situation in which it was 
probable that the defendant would be subjected to duress,” reflecting the default rule of reckless 
causation that is not followed in Section 401(b)(2).  As discussed above, the Proposed Code 
would impose liability only when the defendant acted with the culpability required by the offense 
at the time she caused the excusing condition.  Where a defendant was reckless as to causing the 
circumstances of duress, liability would be possible only for offenses with culpability 
requirements that are satisfied by recklessness, such as manslaughter.6  
Section 401(d) embodies the same burden of persuasion currently followed in Delaware 
for some excuse defenses.  Current law treats some excuses as affirmative defenses, which must 
be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Foraker v. State, 394 A.2d 
208, 214 (Del. 1978) (“11 Del.C. § 431 categorizes duress as an affirmative defense, and as such, 
it must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also 11 Del.C. 
§ 401(a) (categorizing mental illness or psychiatric disorder as an affirmative defense).  Other 
excuses are not treated as affirmative defenses, such as involuntary intoxication, which is merely 
“a defense.”  See 11 Del.C. § 423.  These imply inconsistent evidentiary rules.  Excuse defenses 
are all the same in terms of both their underlying principles and their central evidentiary issue 
(the defendant’s state of mind).  Accordingly, they should be treated similarly with respect to the 
burden of proof.  Because excuses apply only to conduct normally considered criminal, and 
because all excuses involve information and evidence uniquely in the possession of the 
defendant, the Proposed Code shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant for all excuse 
defenses at the current level for affirmative defenses.   
 
 
                                                             
6 See proposed Section 1103 and corresponding Commentary. 
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Comment on Section 402.  Involuntary Act; Involuntary Omission 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 242, 243 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 402 provides a defense for persons whose conduct would normally 
constitute an offense, but was not voluntary and could not be controlled by the actor.  The 
involuntary act defense in Section 401(a) is applicable in cases where the defendant’s conduct is 
not the product of her effort or determination, such as where the defendant is sleepwalking or 
suffers a seizure.  This defense differs from the insanity defense (Section 403) in that the 
defendant’s lack of control of her conduct at the time of the offense need not result from a mental 
illness or serious mental disorder.  At the same time, in most cases addressed by proposed 
Section 403, the defendant’s impairment will not be so severe as to render her conduct 
completely involuntary.  Section 402(b) provides a similar defense in cases where liability is 
based on an omission. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 402 takes the voluntariness element from 
current 11 Del.C. §§ 242–43—the rest of which is addressed in proposed Section 204—and 
creates a distinct provision treating involuntariness as an excuse, rather than describing 
voluntariness as a basic offense requirement.  Voluntariness does not describe the harm or evil of 
the offense, nor is it a necessary component of the requirement of “an act” as opposed to an 
omission.  Rather, involuntariness indicates that a person is not blameworthy for her conduct, 
even though that conduct satisfies all requirements of an offense.  In other words, involuntariness 
is an excusing condition; it applies when special conditions or circumstances demonstrate an 
actor’s blamelessness for a violation of the rules of conduct.  Although current Title 11 merges 
voluntariness with the act requirement, Delaware case law reflects a view of the voluntariness 
issue as a potential excuse, rather than an offense requirement.  The courts have not treated 
voluntariness as an element of the offense, but have seen its absence as an “accident defense” 
rooted in the absence of criminal responsibility.7 
Section 402(a) defines involuntary acts as acts that are “not a product of the person’s 
effort or determination.”  11 Del.C. § 243 defines a “voluntary act,” and Subsection (a) is written 
to directly correspond to, but invert, that language.   
Section 402(b) provides a defense, like 11 Del.C. § 242 does in practice, to persons who 
are incapable of performing a required act.  The proposed provision expands the current rule to 
include cases where the person cannot reasonably be expected under the circumstances to 
perform, the omitted act.  Imposing liability on such persons is inconsistent with any basis for 
criminal punishment; granting a defense is consistent with similar provisions regarding 
incapacity to control one’s conduct, as set out in proposed Sections 403 and 404. 
 
 
                                                             
7 See, e.g., Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 144, 149–50 (Del. 2008) (“[W]e . . . define accident as an unforeseen, 
unplanned, fortuitous, sudden and unexpected event occurring without intent or volition due to carelessness, 
unawareness, ignorance or a combination of these which produces an unfortunate result. . . . [E]vidence of 
accident . . . could negate either or both the culpable state of mind and the voluntariness of the act.”) (citations 
omitted; emphasis in original).   
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Comment on Section 403.  Mental Illness 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 401(a); see also §§ 401(b), 402, 403, 404, 
405, 406, 408, 409 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision sets out a defense excusing persons who perform conduct 
constituting an offense, but do so under the influence of an uncontrollable mental illness or 
disorder, making criminal liability inappropriate.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 403(a)–(b) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 401(a).  Subsection (a)(2)(A) has no analogue in current Delaware law.  However, it covers the 
presumably uncontroversial situation where the defendant literally does not know what she is 
doing—or does not know the situation in which she is doing it.  For example, this would include 
a person who hallucinates that she is squeezing a lemon, and truly believes she is squeezing a 
lemon, but is in fact choking another person.   
Subsection (a)(2)(B) substantively corresponds to § 401(a), which excuses a person who 
“lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct.”  Note that a 
person who is excused under Subsection (a) is still required to be committed to an institution to 
undergo psychiatric treatment under current 11 Del.C. § 403.  Once the committed individual is 
released from treatment, however—and unlike a person found to be “guilty, but mentally ill” in 
current law—the individual is not imprisoned afterwards. 
Section 403 does not include the GBMI provisions in current 11 Del.C. §§ 401(b), 408, 
and 409.  This proposed change would substantially return the insanity excuse defense in 
Delaware to its state prior to its amendment in 1982, which created the GBMI verdict.8  The 
underlying basis for the GBMI verdict—that the insanity defense has been subject to abuse—is 
empirically unsound.  Indeed, following enactment of the GBMI verdict in some states, the 
number of insanity acquittals actually increased.9  In addition, allowing the verdict raises 
significant concerns.  It is problematic for the trier of fact (often a lay jury) to make a clinical 
determination of whether an offender is in need of psychiatric treatment.  The GBMI verdict also 
enables, and encourages, jurors to consider matters unrelated to guilt, when determination of 
guilt is their sole responsibility.  Finally, a jury faced with a choice between a verdict of “not 
guilty by reason of insanity” and GBMI may select the latter, not because it finds the offender 
blameworthy, but because it believes the offender needs confinement and treatment.  Such 
insane-but-dangerous offenders should be dealt with through civil commitment standards rather 
than the GBMI verdict.   
[Nevertheless, if the GBMI verdict were to be preserved, the provision could be written 
as follows: 
 
(b) Guilty, But Mentally Ill.   
                                                             
8 Cf. 11 Del.C. § 401(a) (1979) (“In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that, at the 
time of the conduct charged, as a result of mental illness or mental defect, the accused lacked substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or lacked sufficient willpower to choose whether he would do the act or 
refrain from doing it.”).   
9 See Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have 
Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 507 (1985). 
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(1) No Excuse.  A person is not excused for his or her offense, and the trier of fact 
may return a verdict of “guilty, but mentally ill,” if, at the time of the offense: 
(A) the defendant suffers from a mental illness or serious mental disorder, 
and 
(B) as a result, either: 
(i) the defendant’s thinking, feeling, or behavior is substantially 
disturbed; or 
(ii) the defendant lacks sufficient willpower to choose whether to 
engage in or refrain from the criminal conduct. 
(2) Verdict Option at the Request of the Defendant.  The jury shall be given the 
verdict option described in this Subsection only upon the request the defendant. 
(3) Additional Procedures.  A person found “guilty, but mentally ill” is subject to 
the procedures set forth in [current 11 Del.C. §§ 408–09]. 
Section 403(c) substantively corresponds to the GBMI provisions in current 11 Del.C. 
§§ 401(b), with an important modification.  While GBMI verdict has been vigorously and 
persuasively criticized as empirically unsound, confusing and impractical, this verdict option 
exists in current Delaware law and its supporters maintain it is even beneficial to the defendant.  
The nonpartisan consultative group supervising the drafting process for this Proposed Code has 
concluded that a compromise between these approaches on the GBMI verdict is necessary.  
Therefore, like current 11 Del.C. §§ 401(b), Section 403(c)(1) retains the GBMI verdict option.  
However, Section 403(c)(2) specifies that this option will only be made available to the trier of 
fact if  requested by the defendant.] 
Procedural Provisions Not Included.  Section 403 does not include 11 Del.C. §§ 402–
409, for various reasons.  11 Del.C. § 402 is redundant with D.R.E. 701–05, which relates to the 
testimony of expert witnesses.  D.R.E. 704 already permits an expert to testify as to an ultimate 
issue, which is what § 402(b) describes.  As discussed above, §§ 408–09 are not included 
because they apply to the GBMI verdict, which Section 403 proposes to eliminate.  The 
remaining current provisions refer to pretrial, trial, sentencing, prisoner transfer, probation, or 
parole procedures related to the mental state of the defendant.  These provisions are important, 
and must be preserved, but should be moved out of the Criminal Code, and into a subchapter of 
criminal procedure dedicated to mental illness.   
 
 
Comment on Section 404.  Involuntary Intoxication 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 423 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 404 provides a defense for a person who commits an offense while 
under the influence of a state of intoxication that she did not voluntarily create. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 404 is substantively similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 423.  Section 404(a) has been broken into its constituent elements to emphasize its inherent 
similarity with the insanity defense in Section 403(a).  For that reason, Subsection (a)(2)(A) has 
been added to maintain similarity between the two defenses.  Section 404(b) makes clear that, as 
with other excuse defenses, a person may be liable for an offense if she is culpable in causing her 
own involuntary intoxication.  See proposed Section 401(b) and corresponding Commentary. 
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Comment on Section 405.  Duress 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 431(a); see also 431(b) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 405 defines a defense for persons who were forced to perform a 
criminal act under coercion that an ordinary person would not be able to resist.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 405 is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 431(a), but with two changes.  First, Subsection (a) uses the phrase “person of reasonable 
firmness” in place of the “reasonable person” in § 431(a).  This is a more precise statement of 
what aspect of the person is being tested in a coercive situation, but maintains the principle of 
current law, which is to consider average ability as the standard against which a coerced person 
is judged.  Second, Subsection (b) has been added to clarify that, although average firmness is 
the default requirement in all cases, the defendant must still have been unable to resist the 
coercion that caused her to engage in the offense conduct.  In other words, a person who 
possesses more than reasonable firmness is required to resist to the limit of her ability before the 
duress excuse becomes available to her.   
Note that Section 405 does not include 11 Del.C. § 431(b) or (c).  Current § 431(b) is not 
included because the issue of culpable causation is covered generally, for all excuse defenses, in 
proposed Section 401(b).  Current § 431(c) is not included because its abolition of the antiquated 
duress defense for wives acting the presence of their husbands was effective.  That outdated 
defense is not revived in the Proposed Code simply because the statement of abolition is not 
preserved.   
 
 
Comment on Section 406.  Ignorance Due to Unavailable Law 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): none 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision upholds the legality principle of criminal law, which allows 
criminal liability only where a written statement of the law’s commands exists prior to the 
alleged violation of those commands.  While ignorance of the law is generally not an excuse, 
fairness dictates that individuals are not punished for conduct if the government provided 
inadequate notice of the conduct’s prohibition.  The rationales for criminal liability do not apply 
where the defendant did not know, and could not reasonable have known, that her conduct was 
criminal.   
Section 406(b) requires that the defendant not know that the conduct in question is 
criminal.  This prevents exploitation of the law’s unavailability by persons for whom that 
unavailability was irrelevant. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 406 has no analogue in current Delaware law, 
but the excuse defense for a reasonable mistake of law in Section 409 based upon current case 
law support its inclusion in Chapter 406.  See Section 409 and corresponding Commentary.  
Long v. State, 65 A.2d 489 (Del. 1949) established an uncodified mistake of law defense that 
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remains available currently in Delaware.  That defense, embodied in Section 409, gives an 
excuse defense to a person who is unable to ascertain the legality of her actions through diligent, 
good-faith inquiry.  If a person can be excused for not knowing her conduct is criminal after that 
law has been made available, it would be irrational to withhold a defense from a person when the 
law prohibiting her conduct is not yet made available. 
 
 
Comment on Section 407.  Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): none 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 407, like Section 507, upholds the legality principle, but instead of 
applying in the case where no statement of the law is available, it applies where an existing 
official statement of the law is inaccurate, and a person relies on that inaccurate statement. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 407 codifies a currently uncodified excuse 
defense that is available in Delaware whenever a person reasonably relies upon an official 
misstatement of that law.  See Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1988) (“A mistake of law 
defense is appropriately recognized when the defendant demonstrates that he has been misled by 
information received from the state.”); Bryson v. State, 840 A.2d 631, 634 (Del. 2003) (same).  It 
is preferable that all general defenses be contained within the criminal Code—where attorneys, 
defendants, law enforcement, and laypersons can readily identify them—rather than in case law.  
However, since the cases on which this defense is based do not clarify what sources of 
information would support it, Subsections (a)(1)–(4) have been added, based upon Model Penal 
Code § 2.04. 
 
 
Comment on Section 408.  Reasonable Mistake of Law Unavoidable by Due Diligence 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): none 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 408 codifies a defense for persons who, even after affirmatively 
seeking in good faith to determine the law’s requirements, make a reasonable mistake as to those 
requirements and unwittingly engage in prohibited conduct.  The defense is allowed only if the 
offender exercised due diligence in an effort to determine the law’s requirements, and only if the 
subsequent mistake is reasonable.  There is little likelihood that the defense would be subject to 
abuse, as (under proposed Section 401(d)) the defendant has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she exercised due diligence, that she was honestly mistaken, 
and that the mistake was reasonable. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 408 codifies a currently uncodified excuse 
defense that is available in Delaware whenever a person makes a reasonable mistake of law, 
being unable to ascertain the legality of her actions, after making a diligent, good-faith inquiry.  
See Long v. State, 65 A.2d 489, 497-98 (Del. 1949) (“[I]t seems to us significantly different to 
disallow mistake of law where . . . together with . . . [the defendant’s awareness of the existence 
of criminal law relating to the subject of such conduct and his erroneous conclusion (in good 
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faith) that his particular conduct is for some reason not subject to the operation of any criminal 
law], it appears that before engaging in the conduct, the defendant made a bona fide, diligent 
effort, adopting a course and resorting to sources and means at least as appropriate as any 
afforded under our legal system, to ascertain and abide by the law, and where he acted in good 
faith reliance upon the results of such effort.”).  As for the mistake of law provision in Section 
407, it is preferable that all general defenses be contained within the criminal Code—where 
attorneys, defendants, law enforcement, and laypersons can readily identify them—rather than in 
case law. 
 
 
Comment on Section 409.  Mistake as to a Justification 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 441, 464(a)&(c), 465(a), 466(a)–(c), 
467(a), 467(c)–(f), 468(2)a.,(5)a.,(6)a.,(7)a., 469, 470; 
see also § 441(3)  
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision sets out a defense for a person who performs conduct that 
constitutes an excuse defense because of the person’s mistaken impression that the conduct is 
legally justified in his or her situation.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 409 embodies the approach in current 
Delaware law toward persons who are mistaken regarding the fact that their conduct satisfies the 
elements of a justification defense in Chapter 300.  However, Section 409 simplifies the 
presentation of this approach, and should make it easier to understand.   
The majority of justification defenses in current law are defined purely in terms of the 
defendant’s subjective belief.  See 11 Del.C. §§ 464(a), 464(c); 465(a); 466(a)–(c); 467(a), 
467(c)–(f); 468(2)a., (5)a., (6)a., and (7)a.  Taken alone, this formulation would provide a 
justification for any person who believes her conduct is justified—even if the person is mistaken, 
no matter how culpable that mistake may be.  Critically, 11 Del.C. § 470 complements the purely 
subjective language of the individual justification provisions by denying a justification where the 
culpability of the defendant’s mistaken belief is equal to or greater than the culpability required 
for the offense.  This approach to mistake as to a justification is conceptually sound, but its 
expression invites confusion, since it requires the reader to read multiple statutes together to 
determine whether or not she satisfies the excuse defense. 
Instead, each justification defense in Chapter 300 is drafted in purely objective terms, and 
all necessary elements to determine whether a person has a valid excuse for a mistake as to a 
justification are collected into Section 409.  This arrangement is preferable to current Delaware 
practice because it is consistent with the distinction between justifications and excuses.  See 
General Comment Regarding Justifications following the Commentary to Section 300.  Justified 
conduct is socially desirable, may not be lawfully resisted, and may be lawfully assisted.  To 
make that fact clear, justification defenses should encourage only conduct that is socially 
desirable.  A mistaken belief that a justifying circumstance exists, however, is not socially 
desirable.  For example, it is not desirable that a person who is mistaken as to her right to act in 
self-defense should be assisted by others, or that the person she defends herself against should 
not be allowed to resist this mistaken use of force.  Unfortunately, expressing a justification 
defense in subjective terms sends that message by announcing an irrational rule of “acceptable” 
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conduct.  Excusing a defendant’s mistaken belief, rather than justifying the person’s conduct, 
removes this confusion and maintains conceptually consistency across all the excuse defenses.  
Section 409 makes clear that a person who is mistaken as to her belief in justification may not be 
lawfully assisted, and her conduct may be lawfully resisted.  See Section 401(a) and 
corresponding Commentary.  Note that this formulation makes 11 Del.C. § 441(3) unnecessary, 
since mistakes have nothing to do with justified conduct. 
Person Unlawfully in Dwelling.  11 Del.C. § 469 has not been specifically incorporated 
in the Proposed Code.  Current § 469 provides a defense for a defendant who kills or injures a 
home invader under a mistaken belief as to the necessity of the force used.  This specific defense 
provision is not necessary because proposed Section 409 provides a general defense that is broad 
enough to capture all cases of mistaken belief in a justification.   
 
 
Comment on Section 410.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 222(18)&(25), 401(c), 422, 423 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines certain significant terms used throughout Chapter 400. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 410(a) defines an “excuse defense” as any 
defense defined in Chapter 400. 
Section 410(b) directly corresponds to the language of the excuse defense in 11 Del.C. 
§ 423, though current law does not specifically define “involuntary intoxication.” 
Section 410(c) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 222(18)&(25) and 401(c).  
Subsection (c)(2) excludes intoxication altogether as a possible basis of the insanity defense 
because involuntary intoxication constitutes its own excuse defense in proposed Section 404.  
This makes 11 Del.C. § 422 unnecessary because if intoxication does not form a possible basis of 
an insanity defense, then evidence of intoxication is not relevant evidence, and therefore would 
not be admissible under the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence. 
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CHAPTER 500.  NONEXCULPATORY DEFENSES 
 
Section 501.  General Provisions Governing Nonexculpatory Defenses 
Section 502.  Prosecution Barred if Not Commenced Within Time Limitation Period 
Section 503.  Entrapment 
Section 504.  Prior Prosecution for Same Offense as a Bar to Present Prosecution 
Section 505.  Prior Prosecution for Different Offense as a Bar to Present Prosecution 
Section 506.  Prior Prosecution by Another Jurisdiction as a Bar to Present Prosecution 
Section 507.  Prosecution Not Barred Where Prior Prosecution Was Before a Court Lacking 
Jurisdiction, or Was Fraudulently Procured by Defendant, or Resulted in 
Conviction Held Invalid 
Section 508.  Prosecutorial Grant of Immunity 
Section 509.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 501.  General Provisions Governing Nonexculpatory Defenses 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 432(a), 475 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 501 describes the rules that govern the operation of the 
nonexculpatory defenses set out in Chapter 500.  Sections 501(a)-(b) parallel proposed Sections 
401(a) and (c).  Conduct subject to a nonexculpatory defense (such as conduct by one who has 
been entrapped) may be resisted, whereas justified conduct (such as the use of force in self-
defense) may not.  A person who is mistaken as to a nonexculpatory defense—who, for example, 
thinks she has been entrapped by the police when she has not—is not entitled to any defense. 
Section 501(c) provides a general rule that the defendant must prove all nonexculpatory 
defenses by a preponderance of the evidence.  Some, but not all, bars to prosecution in current 
law specify their burdens of proof.  However, if a burden-shifting rule is appropriate for some 
nonexculpatory defenses—under which the defendant makes no assertion of a lack of 
responsibility for her offense—it is appropriate for all nonexculpatory defenses.  These defenses 
are not based on a judgment that the underlying conduct is not harmful, or that the actor is not 
blameworthy.  Rather, they apply in situations involving conduct ordinarily subject to liability, 
but where some alternative social interest is deemed to override the assessment of criminal 
liability.  Because these defenses do not exculpate the defendant, the burden should be on the 
defendant to prove that one of them applies. 
Section 501(d) specifies that, unless expressly provided otherwise, nonexculpatory 
defenses are to be ruled on by the court rather than the jury.  As noted above, these defenses do 
not involve determinations of guilt, innocence, or moral blame, and accordingly do not demand 
jury resolution.  Resolution by the court will also be more expedient and may render unnecessary 
a full trial of the facts. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 501 has no directly corresponding provision 
in current Title 11, which does not recognize nonexculpatory defenses as a distinct class of 
defenses.  However, some Delaware law addresses the issue raised in Section 501(c).  For 
example, under 11 Del.C. §§ 432(a) and 475, current law shifts the burden of persuasion onto the 
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defendant to prove entrapment and a prosecutorial grant of immunity by a preponderance of the 
evidence, as both are treated as affirmative defenses.   
 
 
Comment on Section 502.  Prosecution Barred if Not Commenced Within Time Limitation 
Period 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 205 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 502 sets time limitations for bringing prosecutions and provides rules 
governing the operation of the limitations.  Time limitations encourage prompt investigation of 
crimes and prevent stale prosecutions.  This goal must be balanced against the goal of 
prosecuting blameworthy offenders, especially those who have committed serious crimes. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 502 is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 205, except in the ways discussed below. 
Section 502(a)(1) allows an indefinite period of limitation for all sexual offenses that are 
felonies, whereas current law in 11 Del.C. § 205(e) sets an unlimited time for prosecution of any 
sexual offense.  While sexual offenses are always detestable, misdemeanor offenses are, by 
definition, less serious than felonies.  No other misdemeanors are given unlimited limitations in 
current law, making current law’s treatment of misdemeanors internally inconsistent.  Instead, 
Subsection (a)(3) provides a 5-year limitation period for misdemeanor sexual offenses.  This 
recognizes the fact that victims of sexual offenses may require more time to press changes than 
victims of other kinds of offenses, but also treats misdemeanors, as a class of similarly serious 
offenses, more consistently.  Note that nearly all sexual offenses are already graded as felonies, 
so this change does not significantly narrow the class of offenses subject to an indefinite period 
of time for prosecution. 
Section 502(b)(1) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 205(c), but simplifies the current provision 
by broadening its application.  Under current law, a time limitation is only extended by a failure 
to discover the offense in situations involving intentionally concealed frauds by fiduciaries and 
similar parties.  This is irrationally narrow: an offender should not be allowed to profit from her 
ability to effectively conceal her crime, regardless of what the offense is or her relationship to the 
victim.  In any case, § 205(c)’s 3-year limitation on the extension is carried forward in Section 
502(b)(1), which keeps in balance the goals of prompt investigation and preventing stale 
prosecutions. 
Section 502(b)(3) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 205(e), but tries to express the concerns of 
§ 205(e) more rationally.  Current § 205(e) provides an indefinite limitations period for certain 
offenses involving minors, including human trafficking, sexual offenses involving children, child 
pornography offenses, and delivering obscenity to a minor.  11 Del.C. § 205(e) is both too broad 
and too narrow.  First, it is too narrow because the justification for extending the limitation 
period for child-victims applies to any offense, while the provision only applies to a certain 
subset of offenses involving minors.  A child’s immaturity may make the child unable to 
appreciate the extent of the wrong that was done to the child, and therefore unable to articulate 
the harm to bring charges against the offender.  Child-victims of any crime, not just a certain 
subset of crimes, should have the opportunity to bring charges as an adult.  Second, § 205(e) is 
too broad because it makes the limitation period indefinite for offenses that otherwise would 
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have a 5-year limitation period under Subsection (a)(2), simply because the victim is a minor.  
While child-victims deserve an opportunity to bring charges as an adult, providing for an 
indefinite limitation period for offenses that would otherwise have a 5-year limitation period 
does not strike a balance between the competing goals of repose and vindication, and opens the 
door to many stale prosecutions based upon scant evidence.  Giving a child-victim until age 20 to 
bring charges for any offense is a compromise that ensures those victims have ample time as 
adults to bring charges. 
11 Del.C. § 205(e) also limits prosecutions made over extended periods with the 
following provision: “No prosecution under this subsection shall be based upon the memory of 
the victim that has been recovered through psychotherapy unless there is some evidence of the 
corpus delicti independent of such repressed memory.”  This provision has not been retained for 
three related reasons.  First, the Proposed Code does not address specific procedural issues.  
Second, retaining this provision may lead to incongruous application of procedural rules on parts 
of the Proposed Code, and therefore undermine its clarity and efficiency.  Third, while the 
General Assembly enacted this provision in the context of current law’s statute of limitations 
scheme, it is unclear whether it would still deem the provision desirable in light of the Proposed 
Code’s different treatment of the issue.  Of course, if the General Assembly determines that such 
provision would be desirable, it could always be reinstated in the appropriate title of the 
Delaware Code. 
Section 502(d) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 205(j), but specifies a precise evidentiary 
burden on the State: that the application of a provision avoiding or extending the limitation 
period must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  By making a tolling or extension 
provision an element of the offense that the State must allege and prove, § 205(j) appears to 
implicitly require that element to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, that burden 
seems unnecessarily high, given that the application of a limitations period prevents prosecution 
of a defendant for reasons wholly unrelated to the defendant’s guilt or blameworthiness.  
Additionally, Subsection (d) does not retain the requirement that the application of a tolling or 
extension provision be alleged as an element of an offense, since the elements of offenses are 
defined solely within the Special Part of the Criminal Code.  Therefore, Subsection (d) makes the 
State’s burden explicit, but defines it more rationally. 
Section 502(g) is newly created, not based on current law.  It is intended to clarify the 
operation of periods of limitation, especially regarding the effect of appeals. 
 
 
Comment on Section 503.  Entrapment 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 432 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 503 sets out a defense covering cases where the defendant likely 
would not have committed the crime had law enforcement not induced the defendant to do so.  
This defense is meant to curb excessively coercive or manipulative police conduct.  It does not, 
however, suggest a lack of blameworthiness in the defendant, who has committed a crime under 
circumstances that would not provide a truly exculpating defense, like duress. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 503(a) is substantively similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 432(a), but with the new addition of Subsection (a)(2).  This limits the defense by requiring 
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that the government’s conduct have created a “substantial risk that a reasonable, law-abiding 
person” would also have been induced to commit the offense.  Subsection (a)(2)’s language 
makes clear that the entrapment defense does not apply in situations where a defendant is 
“induced” to commit an offense by governmental conduct that is neither coercive nor 
manipulative.  This is consistent with the explanatory language in the second part of § 432(a): 
The defense of entrapment as defined by this Criminal Code concedes the 
commission of the act charged but claims that it should not be punished because 
of the wrongdoing of the officer originates the idea of the crime and then induces 
the other person to engage in conduct constituting such a crime when the other 
person is not otherwise disposed to do so. 
Section 503(b) is substantively similar to 11 Del.C. § 432(b), providing an exception to 
the entrapment defense where the defendant threatens or causes physical injury.  However, 
Subsection (b) does not carry forward the exception to the exception, which would allow the 
entrapment defense where the defendant threatens or causes physical injury to the law 
enforcement officer or agent perpetuating the entrapment.  Allowing the entrapment defense in 
those cases is inconsistent with Delaware’s approach to entrapment generally, which focuses on 
the offender’s predisposition to commit an offense, rather than on the impropriety of law 
enforcement’s conduct.  The predisposition formulation accepts that having an entrapment 
defense is a useful device for shaping the conduct of police, but purposefully sets the bar higher 
than other formulations before the defense may be used by a defendant.  Carving cases of threats 
and physical injury against the entrapper goes against the purpose of having the predisposition 
formulation.  Furthermore, it is difficult to justify threats and violence for any reason, even if 
they are elicited by what would otherwise be entrapment. 
 
 
Comment on Section 504.  Prior Prosecution for Same Offense as a Bar to Present 
Prosecution 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 207 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 504 sets out the rules governing the effect of prior prosecutions for 
the same offense.  This provision protects a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to be tried or 
punished twice for the same offense. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 504 is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 207 
in all respects.  However, note that the definitions of “acquittal,” “conviction,” and “improperly 
terminated” have been moved to the definitions section for Chapter 500, Section 510, making it 
easier to refer to and apply those terms in Sections 505-07. 
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Comment on Section 505.  Prior Prosecution for Different Offense as a Bar to Present 
Prosecution 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 208 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 505 sets out the rules governing the effect of prior prosecutions for a 
different offense.  This provision requires, in certain circumstances, that different crimes arising 
out of the same conduct be tried together.  Like Section 504, this provision protects a defendant’s 
Fifth Amendment rights by preventing the prosecution from relitigating a factual issue decided in 
the defendant’s favor at a previous trial. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 505 is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 208 
in all respects. 
 
 
Comment on Section 506.  Prior Prosecution by Another Jurisdiction as a Bar to Present 
Prosecution 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 209 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 506 sets out the rules governing the effect of prior prosecutions by 
different jurisdictions.  Like Section 504, this provision protects defendants from multiple 
prosecutions for the same acts.  The rationale for this defense applies even though the 
prosecution occurred in a different jurisdiction. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 506 is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 209 
in all respects. 
 
 
Comment on Section 507.  Prosecution Not Barred Where Prior Prosecution Was Before a 
Court Lacking Jurisdiction, or Was Fraudulently Procured by 
Defendant, or Resulted in Conviction Held Invalid 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 210 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 507 excludes various cases where former prosecutions should not act 
as a bar to subsequent prosecutions, because either: (1) the original court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the case; (2) the defendant surreptitiously obtained the prior prosecution with the intent of 
avoiding a harsher sentence; or (3) the prior conviction was later invalidated. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 507 is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 210 
in all respects. 
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Comment on Section 508.  Prosecutorial Grant of Immunity 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 475; see also 16 Del.C. § 4769 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 508 provides a defense for a defendant who has been granted 
immunity from prosecution for an offense by the Attorney General, or otherwise by operation of 
law, but is nevertheless prosecuted for the immunized offense.  The defense is available both for 
the specific offense against which the defendant was immunized, as well as any offense that 
would have been barred from prosecution under proposed Section 505 had the defendant been 
prosecuted for the specific offense.  However, Section 508(b) allows the Attorney General, in 
granting immunity, to stipulate that the immunity only applies to the specific offense.  In that 
case, the defense under Section 508 is unavailable for any offense except the specifically 
immunized offense. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 508 is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 475, but with four minor changes.  First, based upon the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of § 475 in Collins v. State, Section 508 recognizes that the text of § 475 
accidentally omits a critical phrase that the General Assembly intended to be included.  420 A.2d 
170 (Del. 1980).  Therefore, Section 508 incorporates both 11 Del.C. § 475 and the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s holding in Collins v. State.  Second, Subsection (a) adds the phrase “or his or 
her designee” to make explicit something implied in § 475: that the Attorney General can 
delegate the power to grant immunity to Deputy Attorneys General or other proper individuals 
within the Department of Justice.  Third, Subsection (a) adds the phrase “or otherwise by 
operation of law” to include grants of immunity that arise automatically by operation of law.  
This gives effect, for example, to 16 Del.C. § 4769, incorporated into the Proposed Code in 
Section 5208, which grants immunity for certain drug- and alcohol-related offenses in life-
threatening emergencies.  This also makes it unnecessary to specify that grants of immunity may, 
in some cases, come from the Attorney General’s deputies or a court order: any immunity 
generated by an authorization provided elsewhere in the law is covered under Section 508.  
Finally, Section 508(b) interprets the following provision in § 475: “. . . provided, that the 
Attorney General or a Deputy Attorney General may, in granting immunity, stipulate that the 
immunity applies only to a specific offense, in which case effect shall be given to the 
stipulation.”  By following immediately after the provision enabling a grant of immunity to 
extend to other offenses in certain circumstances, this language appears to defeat that extension 
where stipulated.  Therefore, Section 508(b) more simply creates an exception to Subsection 
(a)(2) where that stipulation is made. 
Note that the burden of persuasion for this defense remains unchanged, despite the text of 
Subsection (a) stating “a person has a defense” instead of an “affirmative defense.”  Proposed 
Section 501(c) sets the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove all defenses and bars to 
prosecution in Chapter 500 by a preponderance of the evidence—the same as for affirmative 
defenses in current law. 
 
 
 
 365 
Comment on Section 509.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 207, 222(3) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines key terms introduced in Chapter 500. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 509(a)-(c), defining “acquittal,” “conviction,” 
and “improperly terminated,” directly corresponds to the definitions contained in the text of 11 
Del.C. § 207(1) and (3)-(4).  Section 509(b) also corresponds to 11 Del. C. § 222(3). 
Section 509(d), defining “nonexculpatory defense” to mean any defense or bar to 
prosecution, pleading, trial, or sentencing described in Chapter 500, is newly created.  
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LIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 
CHAPTER 600.  LIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Section 601.  Criminal Liability of Organizations 
Section 602.  Criminal Liability of an Individual for Organizational Conduct 
Section 603.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 601.  Criminal Liability of Organizations 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 281, 283 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 601 sets out the circumstances under which a corporation or other 
non-human entity may be held criminally liable for its actions.  Liability is imposed on 
organizations in certain circumstances to deter their agents from violating the law or failing to 
perform a legal duty.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 601(a) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 281, allowing an organization to be held criminally liable for its failure to perform an 
affirmative duty imposed by law, or for conduct caused or recklessly tolerated by managers or 
directors of the organization, or for conduct performed by agents of the organization in certain 
cases.   
Section 601(b) preserves the provision in 11 Del.C. § 283 that specifies that it is no 
defense to prosecution of an organization that the organization’s rules did not permit the conduct 
charged to constitute the offense.  This Section replaces the ambiguous term “impermissible 
organizational activity” with the clearer phrase “activity prohibited by the organization’s bylaws, 
policies, procedures, rules, or other standards of conduct,” but the provision is otherwise 
unchanged. 
 
 
Comment on Section 602.  Criminal Liability of an Individual for Organizational Conduct 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 282 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision prevents individuals from escaping liability by virtue of having acted 
on behalf of an organization, and establishes that individuals may be punished fully as 
individuals, even if their liability stems from the actions of the organization of which the 
individuals are members. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 602(a)(1) is the same as 11 Del.C. § 282, 
although it has been edited slightly for clarity.  Subsection (a)(2) has no corresponding provision 
in current law and has been added, based upon Model Penal Code § 2.07(6)(b), to clarify an 
ambiguity in § 282.  Current § 282 could be construed to only apply to commission liability, not 
omission liability.  Where criminal liability of an organization can be based on omission liability, 
that interpretation would shield an organization’s agent from individual liability.  However, that 
 
 367 
result seems inconsistent with the intent of § 282, which is to ensure organizational agents can be 
held personally responsible for their criminal acts on behalf of the organization.  The goal of 
Subsection (a)(2) is to stress that when a “duty to act is imposed by law upon an organization” a 
legal duty (as provided for in Section 204(b)) is also imposed on certain individuals in the 
organization.  Specifically, Subsection (a)(2) addresses high managerial agents of an 
organization having primary responsibility to perform, on behalf of the organization, the duties 
imposed by law upon the organization.  If an agent is at least reckless as to the fact that she has 
such primary responsibility, then she can be held legally accountable for the omission to the 
same extent as the organization.  Note, however, that Subsection (a)(2) only imposes a legal duty 
on the agent (as provided for in Section 204(b)).  The agent’s ultimate liability for her omission 
to act will be determined in accordance with the underlying offense.   
Section 602(b) has no corresponding provision in current law.  It clarifies an ambiguity in 
Subsection (a) about the proper punishment for an individual who is personally liable for conduct 
that also generates criminal liability for the individual’s organization.  Subsection (b) provides 
that the punishments prescribed for individuals violating a given offense will apply to these 
individuals as well, despite the fact that the prescribed punishment for an organization 
committing the same offense may be different, or even less severe.  This ensures that individuals 
who commit the same offense receive the same treatment, regardless of the particular reason why 
the offense is committed (i.e., for personal reasons or on behalf of an organization). 
 
 
Comment on Section 603.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 284 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision provides definitions for defined terms that are either first used 
in, or most closely related to, Chapter 600. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  These definitions are nearly identical to those in 11 
Del.C. § 284, though some are slightly reworded for clarity.  The current term “agent” has been 
replaced with “agent of the organization” for definition purposes to make sure that other uses of 
the word “agent” throughout the Proposed Code are not interpreted to have this specific 
meaning. 
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INCHOATE OFFENSES 
 
CHAPTER 700.  INCHOATE OFFENSES 
 
Section 701.  Criminal Attempt 
Section 702.  Criminal Solicitation 
Section 703.  Criminal Conspiracy 
Section 704.  Unconvictable Confederate No Defense 
Section 705.  Defense for Victims and for Conduct Inevitably Incident 
Section 706.  Defense for Renunciation Preventing Commission of the Offense 
Section 707.  Grading of Criminal Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy 
Section 708.  Possessing Instruments of Crime 
 
 
Comment on Section 701.  Criminal Attempt 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 531, 532; see also § 542 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 701 defines the requirements for liability for an attempt to commit an 
offense.  Attempts are subject to liability because, like completed offenses, they involve a 
culpable mental state and overt conduct.  Yet attempts differ from completed offenses in that, 
due either to fortuity of circumstance or the actor refraining from further conduct, the offense’s 
resulting harm does not occur, or occurs to a lesser extent. 
As defined in Section 701(a), attempt liability requires that a person engage in some 
conduct that would constitute a “substantial step toward commission of the offense.”  Attempt 
liability, like criminal liability generally, requires an overt act.  The general requirement of an act 
ensures that the criminal law does not punish “mere thoughts.”  The specific requirement of a 
“substantial step” ensures that the law does not punish “mere preparation,” where the actor still 
has an opportunity to recant and abandon her criminal plan.  This way, only would-be criminals 
who have shown a certain degree of firmness of criminal intent are subject to liability.  The 
performance of an over act amounting to a substantial step also supplies evidence that the actor 
did, in fact, have a culpable mental state. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 701(a) is very similar to 11 Del.C. § 531, but 
with two important differences.  First, Section 701(a) combines some of the language of 
§ 531(1)–(2), which present two alternative ways that a defendant could be found to have 
attempted an offense, resulting in a provision that is flexible enough to cover both.  The 
requirement of a “substantial step” in § 531(2) is applied to all attempts, but only the intent 
requirement of § 531(1) is retained, so that the defendant need only have intended to complete 
the offense.  The “substantial step” takes the place of the completed conduct in § 531(1).  
Second, Subsection (a)(1) is added to clarify an ambiguity in current law that may make it more 
difficult to prosecute some attempts than their corresponding completed crimes.  While § 531(1) 
requires that the defendant’s culpability as to the underlying offense conduct be “intentional,” 
current law is silent as to the defendant’s required culpability for circumstance and result 
elements of the offense.  But reading § 531 to require intent as to all elements of an offense leads 
to irrational, undesirable outcomes.  For example, many bases of rape and unlawful sexual 
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contact in current law depend upon the age of the victim.  11 Del.C. § 762(a) provides strict 
liability, for sexual offenses, as to the circumstance element of a victim being less than 16 years 
of age.  In other words, no culpability is required for that element.  However, if § 531 is read to 
raise the culpability of all elements to intent, a defendant would have to intend that the victim of 
rape be under age 16 in order to be found guilty of attempted rape.  To avoid these situations, 
Section 701(a)(1) specifies that, as to the result and circumstance elements of an offense, the 
defendant need only have the culpability required for the completed offense in order to be found 
guilty of the attempted offense. 
Section 701(a)(2) retains the language of 11 Del.C. § 531(2) that the intended conduct 
would be an offense “under the circumstances as the defendant believes them to be.”  This 
language allows for liability where, because the offender is mistaken as to the circumstances, the 
crime she attempts would be impossible to commit.  However, this must be read in conjunction 
with the rules governing mistakes in proposed Section 206 to ensure that a defendant’s mistaken 
belief that a circumstance does or does not exist only relieves her of liability if the mistake 
negates the culpability required by the offense.  For example, Subsection (a)(2) does not relieve a 
defendant of liability for attempting an offense that requires recklessness as to a circumstance 
element when the defendant’s mistake regarding that element is recklessly held.  As required by 
Section 206, the mistake must still be negligently or reasonably held to negate the recklessness 
required by the offense element. 
Section 701(b)(1) corresponds to the general definition of a “substantial step” in 11 
Del.C. § 532, but with a few changes.  First, “intention to commit the crime” in § 532 is replaced 
with “intention to engage in the offense conduct.”  This is done to avoid the same ambiguity, 
discussed above in the Commentary on Section 701(a)(1), regarding the required culpability for 
the result and circumstance elements of the completed offense.  Second, the language of the 
standard in § 532, that the evidence must leave “no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
intention to commit the crime which the defendant is charged with attempting,” has been altered 
to a standard of “strong corroboration.”  This change is not intended to change the function of the 
substantial step requirement, which is to prevent criminalization of mere thought and capture 
actual preparation for the offense.  But the requirement of leaving “no reasonable doubt,” using 
the State’s burden of persuasion as the relevant standard, seems to require that the State be able 
to actually prove the elements of the offense itself by the conduct constituting a substantial step 
towards its completion.  If so, the distinction between attempted and completed offenses, if any, 
would become meaningless.  The change in language is intended to remove the potential 
confusion that would impose a heightened burden on the State to prove an attempt.  Note that 
Delaware’s current definition of a “substantial step” is a unique outlier among criminal codes in 
the United States. 
Third, Section 701(b)(2) establishes that a person satisfies the substantial step 
requirement if she believes she has completed the conduct constituting an offense, or believes 
she has committed the last act needed to cause a prohibited result.  Subsection (b)(2) does not 
alter the standard of Subsection (b)(1), but merely establishes a bright-line rule that performing 
all the requisite conduct toward an offense will always meet the substantial step test.  There is no 
directly corresponding provision in current law.   
Grading criminal attempt.  The grade of the offense is contained in Section 707.  For a 
discussion of the proposed grade for criminal attempts, see the Commentary for Section 707. 
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Exemption of law enforcement officers.  11 Del.C. § 542 has not been included in Chapter 
700 because the justification defense for execution of a public duty in proposed Section 303 is 
sufficient to cover inchoate “offenses” by undercover agents. 
 
 
Comment on Section 702.  Criminal Solicitation 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 501, 502, 503 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 702 provides for liability for a person who solicits another person to 
commit an offense.  The offense of solicitation recognizes that a person who intends to promote 
an offense, and is willing to instigate such conduct, merits criminal liability.  The independent 
act of solicitation takes the place of the “substantial step” toward commission of the offense 
required for attempt liability, or the “overt act” toward commission of the offense required for 
conspiracy liability. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 702 is similar to 11 Del.C. §§ 501–03, but 
with one modification that tracks Section 701’s modifications to attempt.  See proposed Section 
701(a) and corresponding Commentary.  For offense elements other than conduct (which 
requires intent) the person need only act with the culpability required by the underlying offense.  
This language prevents an elevation of culpability levels for circumstance and result elements 
that could lead to undesirable outcomes.  The language in Section 702(a)(2) that the conduct 
“would constitute the offense under the circumstances as the defendant believes them to be,” 
should be interpreted the same both here and in Section 701(a)(2).  See Commentary to proposed 
Section 701(a)(2).   
Section 702(b) has no directly corresponding provision in current law.  Subsection (b) 
makes clear that a person need not actually communicate with another to be held liable for 
solicitation, provided the person’s conduct is designed to effect that communication.  The 
person’s endeavor to communicate her criminal intentions makes her culpability clear; it does 
not matter that, by chance, the communication was never received.  For example, under 
Subsection (b), a person sending a letter soliciting another to commit murder would not escape 
liability simply because the letter was not received.  This approach has the benefit of avoiding 
the need for, or possibility of, an offense for “attempted solicitation.”  Delaware courts have not 
expressly ruled on whether a solicitation must be successfully received or heard by the solicited 
person in order for a defendant to be found guilty of solicitation.  But Delaware law focuses on 
the solicitor himself, rather than the solicited person, so this rule is consistent with current law.  
Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 891 (Del. 1987).  Solicitation “does not require assent or 
agreement by the person solicited,” id. at 891, “[n]or does it require that the other party take any 
action pursuant to the solicitation.”  Id.  Instead, once the solicitor’s “momentary act of request 
or command” is complete, the offense “requires no subsequent act by the solicitor or by the 
person to whom the request was made.”  Id.  
Note that the language of complicity in 11 Del.C. §§ 501–03, “which would establish the 
other’s complicity in its commission or attempted commission,” is not included in Section 702.  
Instead, the interaction between complicity and inchoate offenses is included in Section 211, 
which governs all aspects of accountability for the conduct of another. 
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Grading criminal solicitation.  The grade of the offense is contained in Section 707.  For 
a discussion of the proposed grade for criminal solicitation, see the Commentary for Section 707. 
 
 
Comment on Section 703.  Criminal Conspiracy 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 511, 512, 513, 521, 522 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 703 establishes liability for the offense of conspiracy, which is 
committed when two or more persons enter into an agreement to commit a crime.  Conspiracy 
differs from other inchoate offenses in that criminal enterprises are considered harmful in and of 
themselves, rather than merely insofar as they are unsuccessful efforts to commit other 
substantive offenses.  Conspiracy liability, like attempt liability, requires more than mere intent 
to commit a crime; an “overt act” in furtherance of the conspiracy is also necessary.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 703 corresponds to the current conspiracy 
provisions in 11 Del.C. §§ 511–13 and 522.  Section 703(a) is similar to the current provisions, 
but includes the alterations reflected in the other proposed inchoate offenses: focusing on the 
conduct and culpability requirements defined in the underlying offense rather than imposing a 
uniform “intent” requirement, and denying an impossibility defense.  See Commentary for 
proposed Sections 701 and 702.  Like the proposed attempt and solicitation provisions, Section 
703(a)(2) imposes liability where the intended conduct “would constitute the offense under the 
circumstances as the defendant believes them to be.”  This reflects the current practice of 
Delaware to allow prosecution for unilateral agreements.  It imposes liability on any person who 
agrees with another to commit a crime, even if the agreement is that only one person will engage 
in conduct constituting a crime, and even if the other person does not actually agree to the 
conspiracy at all.  See Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 152, 154 (Del. 1975) (“Defendant argues that 
he cannot be guilty of conspiracy with an established police informer and an undercover agent 
who had not intention of committing the crime.  We find no merit to this argument. . . .”).  The 
Court in Saienni identified the possibility of unilateral conspiracies in 11 Del.C. § 523(2).  That 
provision, however, is incorporated in a different form in proposed Section 704.  This addition 
ensures that unilateral conspiracies continue to be prosecuted.   
Section 703(a)(4) explicitly applies the overt act requirement to all cases of conspiracy 
liability, an ambiguity in current law that was resolved in favor of this change in Weick v. State, 
420 A.2d 159, 164 (Del. 1980) (“[We agree that] the overt act requirement is applicable to both 
§ 512(a) and (2).”).  Note that the current language, that the overt act is performed “in pursuance 
of” the conspiracy, is replaced in Section 703(a)(4) with “in support of” the conspiracy to 
improve ease of reading.  It is not intended to substantively alter the nature of the relationship 
between the overt act and the conspiracy that current law requires. 
Section 703(b), providing that co-conspirators need not know each other’s identity so 
long as they have a known co-conspirator in common, directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 521(b). 
Section 703(c), setting rules of joinder and venue for conspiracy prosecutions and giving 
courts discretion to remedy prejudicial joinder, directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 522.  Some 
aspects of the current provision have been broken into their constituent elements for readability, 
but the substance of the provisions is identical. 
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Grading criminal conspiracy.  The grade of the offense is contained in Section 707.  For 
a discussion of the proposed grade for criminal conspiracy, see the Commentary for Section 707. 
Conspiracy with multiple criminal objectives.  11 Del.C. 521(a), barring multiple 
convictions for a single conspiracy to commit several offenses, has not been included in Section 
703.  This provision, taken directly from Model Penal Code § 5.03(3), is a conceptual error in the 
Model Penal Code that contradicts the principles underlying the function of the conspiracy 
inchoate offense in both the MPC and current Delaware law.  Delaware does not treat conspiracy 
as a substantive offense targeting the harm or evil of group criminality.  If it did, then conspiracy 
would not merge with the target offense of the conspiracy.  Instead, conspiracy is an inchoate 
offense, which merges with the target offense, and which seeks to cut off criminal activity in its 
preparation phase.  11 Del.C. § 521(a) makes sense if the group criminality of conspiracy were 
being punished independently: multiple objectives of the conspiracy would make no difference 
to the defendant’s blameworthiness, and multiple convictions would unjustly multiply 
punishment.  However, if conspiracy is an inchoate offense, it does make sense to punish 
conspiracies to commit each offense that is the target of a conspiracy.  It does not unjustly 
multiply punishment, since the “conspiracies” merge with each target offense, if completed.  To 
do otherwise would irrationally under-punish conspiracies when compared to other inchoate 
offenses.  For example, a defendant could be tried and convicted for attempted murder and 
attempted theft committed in the same course of conduct.  However, if that person conspired 
with another person to murder and steal, § 521(a) would only allow conviction for conspiracy to 
commit murder.  Given the common principles underlying inchoate offenses, in both current 
Delaware law and the Proposed Code, multiple convictions should be consistently available. 
 
 
Comment on Section 704.  Unconvictable Confederate No Defense 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 523 
 
Comment: 
Generally. Section 704 makes clear that a person may not escape liability for conspiracy 
or solicitation solely because the co-conspirator or solicited person is not subject to prosecution 
or conviction for the same offense.  An actor’s blameworthiness for an inchoate offense pursuing 
a criminal objective is not contingent on the status of any other person involved in the enterprise 
or endeavor.  For example, where one member of a conspiracy manipulates or coerces another 
person who lacks the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, the manipulator 
should not escape liability merely because the confederate cannot be found criminally liable.  
Indeed, the manipulative co-conspirator is arguably even more culpable in that situation.  This is 
consistent with the unilateral-agreement rule for conspiracy.  See Commentary for proposed 
Section 703(a).  Like current law, solicitation is also subject to Section 704, which makes clear 
that the solicitation is complete upon an attempt to communicate the solicitation, regardless of 
whether the communication is received, or whether the solicited person acts upon the defendant’s 
solicitation. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 704 corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 523, but is 
more general.  Current § 523 avoids limiting liability based on the status of another person 
involved in the inchoate offense, but does so by specifying the reasons why a co-conspirator or 
solicited person might fare differently than the defendant.  This creates the possibility for 
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confusion if the other person receives different treatment, but for a reason other than one 
expressly provided.  It is not clear under current law whether the reasons given are exclusive or 
not.  To avoid this possibility, Section 704 instead only specifies the ways in which the courts or 
law enforcement might treat another party differently, not the reasons for the different treatment.  
This way, the focus in a conspiracy or solicitation prosecution will remain on the defendant’s 
acts and culpability.   
 
 
Comment on Section 705.  Defense for Victims and for Conduct Inevitably Incident 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 521(c) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 705 provides a defense to the offenses of solicitation and conspiracy 
where the defendant is a victim of the offense, or her conduct is inevitably incident to its 
commission.  Section 705(a) protects people who are victims of the underlying offense—such as, 
for example, a person who agrees to pay money to an extortionist, thereby technically entering 
into a “conspiracy” with the extortionist. 
Section 705(b) covers situations where, because a person’s conduct is ancillary to the 
underlying crime, it is unclear whether the person should be held liable.  Current Delaware law 
makes a similar provision in the form of an exception to accomplice liability.  See Section 212(b) 
and its corresponding Commentary.  Extending a similar defense to solicitation and conspiracy 
can be useful in special situations.  For example, it is not clear whether an unmarried partner 
should be liable for conspiracy to commit bigamy, or whether the purchaser should be liable for 
conspiracy to traffic in stolen goods.  Under Section 705(2), the General Assembly would still be 
free to decide on a case-by-case basis that those people should be subject to liability by writing 
the specific underlying offense to reflect that understanding.  Conspiratorial associations are 
intended to be included in inevitably incident conduct, thereby allowing Section 705(2) to 
preserve Wharton’s Rule.  Wharton’s Rule prevents conviction for conspiracy to commit an 
offense if the elements of the offense require more than one person to commit it.  That reasoning 
applies as well to other inevitably incident conduct, both in conspiracy and solicitation, so the 
defense has been expanded. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Although no provision in Title 11 directly 
corresponds to Section 705, 11 Del.C. § 521(c) provides a statutory version of Wharton’s Rule in 
conspiracy liability 
 
Comment on Section 706.  Defense for Renunciation Preventing Commission of the Offense 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C § 541 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 706 provides a defense for persons who, after committing an inchoate 
offense, voluntarily renounce their criminal purpose and prevent the inchoate offense from 
becoming a completed offense.  As Section 706(b) makes clear, however, renunciation is not 
“voluntary” when it is merely a response to a fear of being caught, or a tactical decision to 
pursue the crime in a different way, or at a different time.     
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Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 706 is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 541.  Section 706(a) combines § 541(a)–(b) and has an identical effect: establishing a defense 
to an inchoate offense where, after satisfying the elements of an inchoate offense, the defendant 
prevents the commission of the offense because of a genuine motivation to renounce her criminal 
purpose.  Current § 541(b), dealing with attempts, specifies that merely abandoning the criminal 
activity may be sufficient for a renunciation defense.  But if that abandonment is sufficient to 
prevent commission of the offense, Section 706(a) produces the same result.   
Section 706(b) directly corresponds to § 541(c), defining when a renunciation is not 
considered “voluntary and complete.”  This provision makes clear that renunciation will not 
provide a defense if it is motivated by a fear of apprehension, or a decision to pursue the crime at 
another time or against a different victim.   
Note that by classifying this as a defense, the burden of persuasion is placed on the 
defendant to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence.  See proposed Section 106(b)(2) 
and corresponding Commentary. 
 
 
Comment on Section 707.  Grading of Criminal Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 501, 502, 503, 511, 512, 513, 521(a), 531 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 707 grades all inchoate offenses one grade lower than the most 
serious offense attempted, solicited, or agreed to.  This system relates the seriousness of the 
inchoate offense to that of the underlying offense, but recognizes that the inchoate offense does 
not generate the resulting harm with which the underlying offense is concerned. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 707 introduces consistency to the grading of 
inchoate offenses.  Current Delaware law does not have a single rule governing the proper grade 
for an inchoate offense relative to a completed offense, and instead provides separate grading 
rules for each type of inchoate offense.  The system in Section 707 follows two general 
principles that are present in the current grading system for conspiracy and solicitation, to 
varying extents.  The first principle is that the grade of the inchoate offense should vary 
according to the seriousness of the offense that the defendant intended should take place.  The 
second principle is that, since the harm of the underlying offense does not occur, the inchoate 
offense must be graded lower than the underlying offense.  However, the defendant’s full 
intention to see that harm brought about still requires significant punishment.   
In current law, these principles are all expressed, but are applied differently to each 
inchoate offense, resulting in inconsistent or disproportionate grading depending on the inchoate 
offense involved or the grade of the underlying offense.  Under current law, both solicitation and 
conspiracy of the first degree apply only to Class A felonies, and each inchoate offense is graded 
as a Class E felony.  See 11 Del.C. §§ 503 and 513.  This is a very significant discount in 
punishment given the egregious nature of the felony, and the defendant’s full intention to carry it 
out.  The second degrees of conspiracy and solicitation apply to all other felonies, from Classes 
B through G.  See 11 Del.C. §§ 502 and 512.  However, the inchoate offenses are each graded as 
Class F felonies, regardless of the specific grade of the underlying felony.  For Class B through E 
felonies, this creates a grade discount (and, paradoxically, the discount becomes larger the more 
serious the underlying felony involved).  But for Class F felonies, the inchoate offense is 
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punished identically; and for Class G felonies, the inchoate offense is punished more harshly 
than if the defendant had actually succeeded at completing the offense.  The same problem of 
over-punishment is also present in the third degrees of complicity and conspiracy, which are 
graded as Class A misdemeanors for any underlying misdemeanor offense, even Class B and 
unclassified misdemeanors.  See 11 Del.C. §§ 501 and 511.  If an inchoate offense is graded 
more harshly than the completed offense, it fails to create an incentive for a person to cease her 
course of criminal conduct.  In fact, it actually creates an incentive to make sure the offense is 
completed, because the defendant will be subject to lesser liability if prosecuted for the 
completed offense than the inchoate offense. 
Grading of criminal attempt in 11 Del.C. § 531 has the virtues of uniform grading for all 
attempts, and taking the defendant’s intent to complete the crime seriously.  However, the grade 
of an attempt under § 531 is always the same as the completed offense.  This approach, first 
introduced by the Model Penal Code, is one of the few aspects of the Model Code to be nearly 
universally rejected.  The reasons for its rejection have already been stated: it fails to take into 
account the lack of resulting harm from the completed offense.  Additionally, like over-
punishment, equal punishment fails to provide an incentive for the person to cease the course of 
conduct.  The renunciation defense in Section 706 provides some incentive here; however, if the 
person is not certain the renunciation will be successful, there is no difference in punishment to 
encourage the person to try anyway. 
Instead of these varying, contradictory approaches, Section 707 proposes a single, 
uniform rule: the inchoate offense is one grade lower than the completed offense.  This provides 
the same discount for resulting harm in all cases, does not allow a person to be punished more 
for failing than succeeding, and prevents defendants who intend to commit serious felonies from 
being punished too leniently.  Section 707 ensures that the grade of the inchoate offense is 
always based upon “the most serious offense attempted or solicited, or is an object of the 
conspiracy.”  This takes the current provision in 11 Del.C. § 521(a) regarding grading for 
conspiracy and applies it to all inchoate offenses for uniformity. 
Note that in 11 Del.C. §§ 502–03, the grade of the first and second degrees of criminal 
solicitation can be adjusted upward based upon the ages of the defendant and the person solicited 
to commit the offense conduct.  This adjustment is not preserved in Section 707 because, in the 
most serious cases, the proposed grading scheme already sets the grade of solicitation above 
what it would be with the adjustment.   
 
 
Comment on Section 708.  Possessing Instruments of Crime 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see, e.g., 11 Del.C. §§ 812(b), 828, 850(a)(1), 
860, 862, 937, 1401(a); 21 Del.C. §§ 4601, 4604, 6708, 
6710 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 708 establishes an offense for the possession of instruments of crime.  
Section 708(a) defines the offense to prohibit possession of an instrument of crime with intent to 
use it criminally, incorporating the definition of what is an “instrument of crime.”  Section 
708(b) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. 
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Relation to current Delaware law.  Title 11 includes no general possession offense, but 
includes numerous specific offenses criminalizing the possession of various instruments of 
crime.  See, e.g., 11 Del.C. § 812(b) (defining a Class B misdemeanor for possessing graffiti 
instruments); § 828 (defining a Class F felony for possessing burglar’s tools); § 829(a), (i) 
(defining the terms “burglar’s tools” and use of such tools under “circumstances evincing an 
intent to use or knowledge that some other person intends to use” them); § 850(a)(1) (defining an 
offense of variable grade for possessing devices to steal telecommunications services); § 860 
(defining a Class F felony for possessing shoplifter’s tools); § 862 (defining a Class G felony for 
possessing forgery devices); § 1401(a) (defining a Class A misdemeanor for possessing items for 
unlawful gambling).  Additionally, Title 21 on Motor Vehicles includes a handful of possession 
offenses that lend themselves to being combined with the Title 11 offenses into a general offense 
for possessing instruments of crime.  See, e.g., 21 Del.C. § 4601 (defining a Class E felony for 
sale and distribution of motor vehicle master keys); § 4604 (defining a class E felony for 
possessing motor vehicle master keys); § 6708 (defining a Class E felony for possessing blank 
title or registration instruments); § 6710 (defining a Class E felony for unlawfully possessing 
titles assigned to motor vehicles).  Section 708 replaces these offenses with one concise and 
consistent offense definition, which is based upon Model Penal Code § 5.06(1).   
Note, some provisions in Title 21 contain less demanding requirements than their 
counterpart provisions in Title 11.  For instance, 11 Del. C. §§ 828 and 860 prohibiting the 
possession of burglar’s or shoplifter’s tools (Class F felonies), require proof that these tools are 
possessed “under circumstances evincing an intent to use,” requiring, inter alia, a proximity in 
time and place to the commission of the offense.  Oddly, 21 Del. C. §§ 4601(a) and 4604(a), 
pertaining to motor vehicle master keys and lock picking tools, contain no similar requirement 
while imposing more serious punishment (5 years of imprisonment, equivalent to a Class E 
felony).  These provisions are outliers in current law.  Section 708 covers the criminal conduct 
prohibited by 21 Del. C. §§ 4601(a) and 4604(a) in a manner closely aligned with the 
requirements of 11 Del. C. §§ 828 and 860, promoting consistency in the punishment of similar 
conduct. Note also that 21 Del. C. § 4601(b) – making the dissemination of advertisements 
pertaining to motor vehicle master keys a class E felony – is an even greater outlier in current 
law.  It has no analogous provisions in Title 11 offenses prohibiting the possession of burglar’s 
or shoplifter’s tools, and is therefore not retained. 
Note that the exceptions to liability under 21 Del.C. §§ 4602 and 4604(b) are covered by 
Section 708 because the users included in the exception would not have the necessary intent to 
employ the master keys criminally.  Additionally, the requirement in 21 Del.C. § 6710 that the 
defendant fail to accompany the assigned title with 75% of the vehicle it applies to will, under 
Section 708, be treated as evidence of the defendant’s intent to employ the title fraudulently. 
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OFFENSE GRADES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
 
CHAPTER 800.  OFFENSE GRADES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
 
Section 801.  Offense Grades 
Section 802.  Authorized Terms of Imprisonment 
Section 803.  Authorized Fines; Restitution 
Section 804.  General Adjustments to Offense Grade 
Section 805.  Valuation of Property for the Purposes of Grading 
Section 806.  Definitions 
 
 
General Comments Regarding Chapter 800: 
 
Chapter 800 is not intended to address all issues regarding the sentencing and disposition 
of offenders.  It is anticipated that such issues will be more comprehensively dealt with in other 
statutory chapters on sentencing or in a set of sentencing guidelines.  Chapter 800 only deals 
with those basic issues necessary to clarify the meaning of the Proposed Code’s general scheme 
of offense grading.  Chapter’s 800’s silence as to more complex sentencing issues does not 
indicate a lack of awareness or concern about such issues, but an understanding that they are 
beyond the scope of the current phase of this project.  Therefore, Chapter 800 does not 
incorporate the sentencing or specialized procedural provisions currently found alongside the 
grading provisions in Chapter 42 of Title 11. 
 
 
Comment on Section 801.  Offense Grades 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 4201(a)–(b), 4202, 4203 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision provides a classification of all criminal offenses, as well as 
offenses defined outside the Code, into grades for purposes of determining the extent of liability. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 801(a) directly corresponds to the current 
system of grading offenses under Delaware law, found in 11 Del.C. §§ 4201–03.  However, the 
grade names and number have been changed in several ways.  First, to keep a consistent form 
with other grades authorizing imprisonment, “unclassified misdemeanors” have been changed to 
“Class D misdemeanors.”  More significantly, a new category of Class C misdemeanors has been 
added.  Current Delaware law does not contain a step in sentences between 30 days and 6 
months’ authorized imprisonment—a steep difference.  The Commentary to Section 802 explains 
the reasoning behind this addition. 
Second, the grades of felonies have been expanded in some ways, and condensed in 
others.  The felony classes have been given numerical designations instead of numbers to create 
a distinction between misdemeanor and felony designations, and to make it easier to set 
proportional maximum punishments at each grade level without forcing a comparison to those 
set under current law.  This Section proposes eight felony grade levels instead of seven, as under 
current law, to allow for a grading distinction to be made between the most serious felonies.  
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What are currently Class A and B felonies are proposed to be spread across felony Classes 1–4.  
The legislation authorizing this Proposed Code mandates that “disproportionate” statutes be 
identified and rectified.  The proportionality of an offense’s authorized punishment is directly 
tied to the grade assigned to that offense.  The nonpartisan consultative group supervising the 
drafting process for this Proposed Code has scrutinized the relative grading of all offenses, and 
has decided that the lack of grade distinctions at the high end of the felony classification scheme 
forces a number of offenses to be graded similarly that should not be.  The remaining four felony 
classes cover what are currently Class C–G felonies, condensing five current classes into four.  
This is because of the closeness of the maximum sentences of Class G and F felonies under 
current law (2 and 3 years, respectively).  As is discussed in the Commentary to Section 802, it is 
proposed that the maximum sentences all felony grades shift to accommodate these changes. 
Section 801(b) provides a system by which offenses defined outside the Code will be 
graded uniformly with offenses inside the Code.  The highest grade available for offenses 
defined only by terms of imprisonment is a Class A misdemeanor.  When combined with 
Subsection (b)(2)(A), the effect is to make it impossible for ad hoc administrative legislation to 
create felonies without consciously fitting them into the Code’s scheme.  This replaces 11 Del.C. 
§ 4201(b).  The same effect, replacing 11 Del. C. § 4202(b), is created by Subsection (b)(2)(B) 
for misdemeanors: serious misdemeanors cannot be created without consciously using the 
Code’s scheme.  Subsection (b)(3) follows the current code in § 4203 by treating all offenses 
without grades or sentences of imprisonment as misdemeanors, rather than violations. 
Note that § 4201(c)’ list designating certain felonies in Titles 11, 16 and 31 as “violent 
felonies” is unnecessary, and is not retained in Title 11.  All felonies in the Delaware Code, 
including the felonies listed in § 4201(c) have been incorporated into the Proposed Code, and the 
related provisions formerly relying on the term “violent felony,” have been substituted by the 
Proposed Code.  The Proposed Code does not rely on the term “violent felony,” at all.  For 
instance, while current law’s habitual offender criminal statute (11 Del. C. § 4214) applies to 
repeat felons who engage in “violent” felonies, the Proposed Code’s repeat offender grade 
adjustment in Section 804(a) can generally apply to any felony (see Commentary on Section 804 
[General Adjustments to Offense Grade]).  Note that insofar as some procedural provisions in the 
Delaware Code refer of will refer to “violent felony” this term should be interpreted in 
accordance to the general principles of statutory interpretation.  Note also that § 4201(d) 
designating an attempt to commit an offense listed in § 4201(c) as a violent felony is not 
retained.  § 4201(d) is both unnecessary because § 4201(c) is not retained, and inconsistent with 
the distinction made in the Proposed Code between inchoate and completed offenses (see 
Commentary on Section 707 [Grading of Criminal Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy]). 
 
 
Comment on Section 802.  Authorized Terms of Imprisonment 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 4205(b), 4206(a)–(c), 4207(a); see also 
§§ 234, 630(b), 630A(b), 633(d), 772(c), 778(6)b., 
825(b), 826(b), 826A(b), 832(b), 1254, 1447A(b)–(c), 
1448(e), 4205A,  4209(a); 21 Del.C. § 6702 
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Comment: 
Generally.  This provision establishes the maximum and, in some limited circumstances, 
minimum terms of imprisonment for each class of offenses. Although the working group 
proposes certain principled terms of imprisonment, they are left in brackets, signaling that the 
final decision on the exact amount of punishment should be made by the General Assembly. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 802 consolidates the authorized terms of 
imprisonment for felonies, misdemeanors, and violations, which are currently found in 11 Del.C. 
§§ 4205(b), 4206(a)–(c), and 4207(a).  Moreover, Section 802 proposes several changes, 
discussed below, which are due to the alterations to the grade scheme.  See Section 801 and 
corresponding Commentary.  All changes are proposed under the assumption that all offenses in 
the Proposed Code will be re-graded to ensure their maximum punishments are proportional to 
each other.  In general, the authorized terms of imprisonment in the proposed scheme follow an 
exponential scale, roughly doubling with each increase in grade, up through Class 2 felonies.  
This focuses energy on the correct grading of offenses in terms of their relative seriousness.  
Additionally, it ensures that a plea to a lesser offense will always represent a significant decrease 
in maximum punishment, encouraging offenders to assist the prosecution.  As noted above, the 
Proposed Code does not address issues regarding the disposition of offenders, including the 
levels of accountability that can be imposed for felonies, misdemeanors, and violations.  These 
levels are retained in 11 Del. C. §§ 4205(b), 4206, and 4207(b).  
Section 802(a)(1) proposes a new felony class, Class 1, which, like 11 Del.C. § 4209(a) 
requires at least [mandatory life in prison, but is also eligible for the death penalty].  Although 
the number of Class 1 felonies is small—in the Proposed Code, Aggravated Murder is the only 
Class 1 felony—it is useful to have a grade that distinguishes them from other Class A felonies 
under current law.  Class 1 felonies are qualitatively more serious than Class 2 felonies, 
reflecting the highest level of an offender’s blameworthiness and justifying life imprisonment as 
a guaranteed sentence.   
Section 802(a)(2), like 11 Del.C. § 4205(b)(1), sets the maximum sentence for Class 2 
felonies at life imprisonment.  It also sets the minimum sentence at [15] years’ imprisonment, 
following the minimum sentence for Class A felonies in current law. 
Section 802(a)(3) sets the maximum sentence for Class 3 felonies at [35] years.  Class 3 
is a newly proposed class of felonies, which contains offenses that are considered less serious 
than current Class A felonies, but more serious than current Class B felonies.  This provides 
useful additional nuance when setting the appropriate treatment of the most serious felonies.  The 
maximum sentence for Class 3 has been set to roughly split the difference between the maximum 
sentences for Class 2 and Class 4 felonies.   
Unlike Class 2 felonies, which have a minimum sentence for all offenses in the class due 
to their extreme seriousness, Class 3 and 4 felonies have minimum sentences in only certain, 
limited circumstances.  In these cases, a minimum sentence is applicable if the felony: (1) is 
defined to include an element of causing physical injury, engaging in sexual conduct, or use of a 
deadly weapon; and (2) the defendant knowingly commits the offense.  Note that “knowingly 
commits the elements of the offense” elevates culpability required as to every element of the 
offense or grade provision, not just the conduct element.  The minimum sentence provisions that 
appear in Section 802 are the only minimum sentences in the Proposed Code, and seek to 
rationalize and simplify the confusing array of disparate provisions scattered throughout current 
law.  They do so by distilling and then generally applying the principles that underlie current 
mandatory minimums.  First, current mandatory minimum sentences are reserved for the most 
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serious offenses—usually only Class A and Class B felonies.  Therefore, Section 802 only makes 
minimum sentences available for Class 1–4 felonies, which correspond to Class A and B felonies 
in current law (see the table at the end of this Section’s Commentary for a visual clarification of 
this point).  Second, the types of crimes that carry the greatest proportion of mandatory minimum 
sentences under current law are crimes involving violence and physical injury, crimes of a sexual 
nature, and crimes involving deadly weapons and firearms.  These are sensible categories of 
offenses to have minimum sentences, because they are offenses about which citizens are 
justifiably concerned about the consequences of under-sentencing, resulting in strong public 
support for minimum sentences in these areas.  Therefore, Section 802(a)(3) and (a)(4) apply 
minimum sentences to only these offenses, but all instances of these offenses, ensuring no 
offenses are accidentally left out through piecemeal application of minimum sentences in 
specific offense provisions.  Third, the current Delaware code is committed to the foundational 
principle of criminal liability that a defendant’s blameworthiness, and therefore appropriate 
punishment, is tied to the defendant’s culpable state of mind.  Therefore, Section 802(a)(3) and 
(a)(4) set a threshold culpability requirement for the defendant’s conduct at “knowing,” ensuring 
defendants subject to minimum sentences are blameworthy enough that a minimum sentence will 
not result in a miscarriage of justice.  By doing so, these Sections appropriately “split” offenses 
that may be committed with different levels of culpability, requiring the imposition of minimum 
sentences only on the more blameworthy offenders acting either knowingly or intentionally. 
The minimum sentence for Class 4 felonies is set at [3] years, [which is 50% more than 
the current mandatory minimum for all Class B felonies.  The minimum sentence is raised 
because of the stricter requirements that must be met before a minimum sentence may be 
imposed.]  The minimum sentence for Class 3 felonies is set at [5] years as a compromise 
position between Class 2 and Class 4, since Class 3 is a newly proposed class of felonies, as 
discussed above. 
Section 802(a)(4), like § 4205(b)(2), sets the maximum sentence for Class 4 felonies at 
[25] years.   
Section 802(a)(5) preserves the authorized [15]-year imprisonment term for Class 5 
felonies under § 4205(b)(3). 
Section 802(a)(6) preserves the authorized [8]-year imprisonment for term Class 6 
felonies under § 4205(b)(4). 
Section 802(a)(7) sets the maximum sentence for Class 7 felonies at [4] years—one year 
less than under § 4205(b)(5).  This change is proposed in order to ensure that maximum 
sentences roughly double for each grade increase.  As will be seen below, the authorized 
imprisonment for Class F felonies has been shifted down one year as well, and for the same 
reason.   
Section 802(a)(8) sets the maximum sentence for Class 8 felonies at [2] years—one year 
less than under § 4205(b)(6).  This change is proposed in order to ensure that maximum 
sentences roughly double for each grade increase.  Since this change makes the authorized 
imprisonment term for Class F felonies equal to that of Class G felonies under § 4205(b)(7), 
Class G has been eliminated from the proposed grading scheme. 
Section 802(a)(9) preserves the authorized [1]-year imprisonment term for Class A 
misdemeanors under § 4206(a). 
Section 802(a)(10) preserves the authorized [6]-month imprisonment term for Class B 
misdemeanors under § 4206(b). 
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Section 802(a)(11) proposes a new category of Class C misdemeanors, with a maximum 
authorized sentence of [3] months, for two reasons.  First, under current Delaware law, the step 
from unclassified misdemeanors to Class B misdemeanors is a six-fold increase in authorized 
imprisonment.  Having an intermediate grading step between them will be useful to more 
precisely grade offenses according to their relative seriousness.  Second, many unclassified 
offenses outside the current criminal code already have maximum sentences of 3 months.  See, 
e.g., 21 Del.C. § 6702 (Driving vehicle without consent of owner).   
Section 802(a)(12) preserves the default [30]-day imprisonment term authorized for 
unclassified misdemeanors under § 4206(c).  In the Proposed Code, the authorized sentences for 
all offenses are determined by grade.  No offenses have independently authorized terms of 
imprisonment contained within them.  For that reason, it is not necessary to carry forward the 
part of § 4206(c) recognizing such independent authorizations. 
Section 802(a)(13) preserves § 4207(a), which provides no authorized term of 
imprisonment for violations.  Violations are not crimes and therefore conceptually distinct from 
felonies and misdemeanors.  They are more similar to administrative violations for which a 
person may be issued a ticket.  As the Model Penal Code (from which the category of violations 
is derived) makes clear in § 1.04(5): ".... A violation does not constitute a crime and conviction 
of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a 
criminal offense."  Note also that under current law a violation grade entails additional important 
implications.  For instance, 11 Del. C. § 1904 authorizes law enforcement officers to make 
arrests without warrants in specified circumstances, but because it only applies to felonies and 
misdemeanors, officers lack the authority to arrest offenders committing violations. 
A summary table appears below, visually depicting how current offense grades relate to 
and are divided or combined differently in the proposed grade system: 
 
Current Grade/Maximum Sentence Proposed Grade/Maximum Sentence 
First Degree Murder 
Automatic life; death eligible 
Class 1 felony 
[Automatic life; death eligible] 
Class A felony 
Life imprisonment (min. 15 yrs.) 
Class 2 felony 
[Life imprisonment] (min. [15] yrs.) 
Class 3 felony 
[35] years (possible min. [5] yrs.) Class B felony 
25 years (min. 2 years) Class 4 felony 
[25] years (possible min. [3] yrs.) 
Class C felony 
15 years 
Class 5 felony 
[15] years 
Class D felony 
8 years 
Class 6 felony 
[8] years 
Class E felony 
5 years 
Class 7 felony 
[4] years 
Class F felony 
3 years Class 8 felony 
[2] years Class G felony 
2 years 
Class A misdemeanor 
1 year 
Class A misdemeanor 
[1] year 
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Class B misdemeanor 
6 months 
Class B misdemeanor 
[6] months 
Unclassified misdemeanor 
30 days 
Class C misdemeanor 
[3] months 
Class D misdemeanor 
[30] days 
Violation 
No imprisonment authorized 
Violation 
No imprisonment authorized 
 
 
Comment on Section 803.  Authorized Fines; Restitution 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 4204(c)(9), 4205(k), 4206, 4207, 4208; 
see also, e.g., 16 Del.C. § 4744(a)(2) & (d)(2) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision establishes the maximum fine for each class of offenses, as 
well as providing for mandatory restitution in certain cases.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 803(a) consolidates maximum fines for all 
felonies, misdemeanors, and violations.  This proposal would significantly change current law.  
The current code does not set default maximum fines for any felonies.  Regarding felony 
sentences, 11 Del.C. § 4205(k) provides that “[a] court may impose such fines . . . as it deems 
appropriate,” which implies that unless a specific offense provides a maximum fine, an offender 
could be fined any amount of money.  While a fine of unlimited size might be appropriate for a 
Class 1 felony, it is much harder to justify for a Class 8 felony.  Therefore, Section 803 proposes 
a new scheme of default maximum fines that follows the same policies as the maximum 
sentences proposed in Section 802.  The maximum fines follow an exponential scale, roughly 
doubling at each class, starting from $500 for violations.  As a result, in part, the maximum fines 
for violations and misdemeanors that currently exist in §§ 4206 and 4207 are marginally 
increased.  The maximum fines for serious felonies are still quite high, but since these are default 
maximums, a higher fine could be imposed by legislation if desired.  Note also that the 
maximum fines for misdemeanors and violations in Subsections (a)(9)–(a)(12) are roughly 
equivalent to the maximum fines in current law once they are adjusted for inflation into 2016 
dollars.  
Significant authorized fines for all offenses should be useful tools.  The punitive effect of 
a small fine would be felt keenly by a poor offender, but might be trivial to a wealthy offender.  
The range of authorized fines needs to go high enough to allow a sentencing judge to set a fine 
that will have a real punitive and deterrent effect upon any offender, no matter how wealthy he or 
she may be. Note that the proposed authorized fines are much higher than the highest maximum 
fines found throughout the current specific offenses.  See, e.g., 16 Del.C. § 4744(a)(2) and (d)(2) 
(setting maximum authorized fines of $100,000, $25,000, and $10,000, respectively, for Class A, 
D, and F felony violations of the Safe Internet Pharmacy Act). 
Section 803(b) directly corresponds to the organization fine structure in 11 Del.C. § 4208.  
However, Subsection (b) has been reworded to make clear that the greatest maximum fine 
generated by the alternative calculations is the one to be applied.  Note that Subsection (b)(1) 
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enables a judge to set a fine of any amount, no matter how high, when an organization’s offense 
results in death or serious physical injury. 
Section 803(c) directly corresponds to the current restitution requirement in § 4204(c)(9). 
 
 
Comment on Section 804.  General Adjustments to Offense Grade 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 616(c), 1105, 1239, 1304, 1449, 4214; see 
also §§ 607(a)(3), 776, 841B(c), 851, 852A, 1110, 
1114A(c), 1249(d), 1361(c), 1404, 1455; 16 Del.C. 
§ 4751B; 21 Del.C. § 4103; see also, e.g., 11 Del.C. 
§§ 605, 606, 841(c) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision allows for extended terms of imprisonment by increasing the 
grade of an offense by one grade where an enumerated aggravating factor is present.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Currently, Delaware does not have a General Part 
provision that aggravates grades of specific offenses in a consistent way.  However, numerous 
specific offenses include similar grade aggravations that have been collected and converted into 
the grade adjustments suggested in Section 804. 
Section 804(a) provides a single upward grade adjustment for felons who have previously 
been convicted of two felonies that are graded equally to or more seriously than the present 
felony.  Like the limited minimum sentence provisions in proposed Section 802(c) and (d), 
Subsection (a) seeks to rationalize and simplify the many repeat offender grade adjustment 
provisions scattered throughout current Delaware law.  It does this by distilling and generally 
applying the principles that underlie the use of such grade adjustments in current law.  Some of 
those provisions provide an upward adjustment for a third offense (for example, 11 Del.C. 
§ 841B(c)), while others are for second and subsequent offenses (for example, 11 Del.C. § 1455).  
Most offenses do not provide upward grade adjustments for repeat offenders, but no pattern 
emerges among the offenses having those grade adjustments such that a rational subset of 
offense types could be identified.  However, all of those offense-specific provisions are 
unnecessarily inflexible, because they only apply to offenders who repeat the same offense.  
Under that scheme, a person who is convicted at different times of theft, assault, kidnapping, and 
forgery would not be subject to an upward grade adjustment.  The person has a distinct pattern of 
repeating serious offenses, but not the same offenses.  This willingness to engage in many 
different serious offenses arguably makes that person more dangerous than the person who 
simply repeats the same kind of offense, but current law makes no provision for that person—
except under 11 Del.C. § 4214, the habitual criminal statute.   
Current § 4214(a)-(d), broadly speaking, imposes mandatory sentences, and either 
authorizes or mandates life imprisonment for repeat felons who engage in violent felonies, 
depending upon a number of factors relating to the person’s prior record.  This approach has the 
virtue of recognizing a repeat offender’s dangerousness across offenses.  However, § 4214 is 
limited due to its focus upon violent felonies.  As a result, it moves directly toward life 
sentences, without much middle ground for middle cases.  Current § 4214 is also lengthy and 
convoluted, making it difficult to apply.   
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Section 804(a) builds upon the virtues of § 4214 while seeking to maximize both 
flexibility and simplicity.  Subsection (a) provides for an increase of one grade—which can 
result in a life sentence if the present offense is a Class 3 felony, but not for lesser felonies.  
Instead, the resulting maximum sentence is proportional to the seriousness of the present offense.  
Also, it is irrelevant under Subsection (a) precisely what a defendant’s prior felonies were, so 
long as she has served time in prison for one of them during the past 10 years, and their grade is 
at least as high as the one for which she is presently being prosecuted.  This approach provides 
flexibility by limiting the long-term impact of stale prior offenses while ensuring that the 
defendant has engaged in a pattern of offending that is sufficiently serious to justify doubling 
maximum punishment for the present offense.  At the same time, Subsection (a) is simple and 
straightforward, and should be easy to apply.  Note that since most repeat offender provisions in 
current law deal with felonies (and giving special deference to § 4214), Subsection (a) only 
applies to repeat felons, not misdemeanants.  
Note that Section 804(a) makes the substantive provisions in current law’s habitual 
criminal statute (§ 4214(a)-(d)) unnecessary, and these provisions are not retained.  However, 
some provisions that are retained in Title 11 (see e.g., §§ 4214(e), 4215(b)) refer to the habitual 
criminal statute and provide special procedural and sentencing rules for habitual offenders.  
Naturally, the references to § 4214 in these provisions must be modified to refer to the grade 
adjustment provided by Section 804(a).  Moreover, applying these provisions’ procedural and 
sentencing rules to all offenses subject to Section 804(a) grade adjustment is unjustified.  Section 
804(a) is applicable to any felony and is therefore broader than current law’s habitual criminal 
statute.  In order to best approximate the serious felonies underlying the habitual criminal statute 
and the rationale for that statute’s corresponding procedural and sentencing provisions, these 
provisions should refer only to offenses subject to Section 804(a) that are graded Class 4 felonies 
or higher.  Note that the Class 4 felony threshold is consistent with the approach for the 
imposition of minimum terms of imprisonment adopted in the Proposed Code (see Commentary 
to Section 802). 
Section 804(b) most closely corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1105 (Crime against a vulnerable 
adult).  That provision enumerates a fairly comprehensive list of offenses, and makes it a further 
offense to commit any of those offenses against a “vulnerable adult.”  11 Del.C. § 1105(a).  
Current § 1105 is a hybrid between a specific offense and a general grade adjustment: it defines 
an offense that is separately charged, but the grade of that offense is determined by increasing 
the grade of the underlying offense by one.  Current § 1105(b)(3) further provides that a Class 6 
felony is the highest offense grade that can be aggravated by additionally charging § 1105.  
However, some of the enumerated underlying offenses are presently graded higher than Class 6.  
See, e.g., 11 Del.C. § 1105(f) (listing 11 Del.C. §§ 605–06—Abuse of a pregnant female—as an 
offense whose sentence may be aggravated).  This illustrates the problem with a hybrid 
approach.  If one of the enumerated offenses is amended with a higher grade, the underlying 
offense may no longer be eligible to be the basis of charging § 1105.  At the same time, however, 
the list of underlying offenses conspicuously omits the most serious degrees of all the offenses 
included—evidence that the General Assembly intended to place an upper limit on the § 1105 
grade increase.   
Proposed Section 804(b) eliminates the enumerated list of underlying offenses to avoid 
this confusion.  In recognition of both the legislative intent to limit application of the grade 
adjustment and the desire to retain application of the adjustment in serious cases, Subsection 
(e)(2) applies to unadjusted offense grades lower than Class 4 felonies, rather than Class C 
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felonies (roughly analogous to Class 5 under the proposed scheme) as under current law.  This 
way, the legislative intent to limit application will be consistent, even if the prevailing notion of 
the relative seriousness of specific offenses changes over time.  Note that this approach is also 
more consistent with other hybrid grade adjustment–offenses in current law.  See Section 
804(c)–(d) and corresponding Commentary. 
Section 804(c) establishes a grade adjustment for hate crimes, which directly corresponds 
to 11 Del.C. § 1304.  Like 11 Del.C. § 1105, § 1304 is a hybrid offense that determines the 
offense’s grade by increasing the grade of an underlying offense.  Rather than multiply the 
number of offenses involved (without increasing the defendant’s ultimate liability), § 1304 has 
been converted into a pure grade adjustment in Subsection (c).  The alternative elements of the 
grade adjustment are taken directly from the language in § 1304(a)(1)–(2).  The definitions of 
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity” in § 1304(a)(2) have been added, verbatim, to Section 
806.  Current § 1304(b) generally sets the grade of a hate crime at one grade higher than the 
underlying offense, but only for grades up to Class C felonies.  The same practice is preserved 
through the interaction of Subsections (c) and (e)(2). 
Section 804(d) establishes a grade adjustment for offenses committed by a criminal street 
gang, which corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 616(c).  Unlike 11 Del.C. §§ 1105 and 1304, § 616(c) is 
a pure grade adjustment that applies to Class C, D, or E felonies committed by a criminal street 
gang.  Subsection (d) maintains the same elements as § 616(c), but expands its reach to Class 8 
felonies and misdemeanors.  See Section 804(e)(2) and corresponding Commentary.  This 
improves consistency between Subsection (d) and the other general grade adjustments in Section 
804, which have no lower limit on their applicability. 
Section 804(e) establishes a grade adjustment for felonies committed by offenders 
wearing a disguise or body armor.  Subsection (e) is based upon 11 Del.C. §§ 1239 and 1449, but 
with significant changes.  The current offenses are not grade adjustments; they are separate 
offenses that can apply to any felony, depending upon how the felony is committed.  In that way, 
the offenses are similar to grade adjustments because they rely upon the commission of a 
predicate offense.  11 Del.C. § 1239 is a Class E felony, while § 1449 is a Class B felony.  Since 
they are both felonies, it is possible for other offenses requiring a predicate felony to apply to 
those offenses as well.  For example, under current law, an offender who wears a disguise and is 
armed with a firearm during commission of a burglary could be charged and convicted of 
burglary, wearing a disguise, and two separate counts of possessing a firearm during commission 
of a felony.  In other words, the current offenses multiply charges and convictions without 
necessarily increasing the available punishment for the offender (depending on the grade of the 
underlying felony).  Subsection (e) proposes a more consistent approach: increasing maximum 
punishment available for any felony committed while wearing a disguise or body armor, but 
without exposing the defendant to additional overlapping charges. 
Section 804(e)(1) does not include 11 Del.C. § 1239’s term “disguise,” which is not 
defined in the current criminal code, leaving it ambiguous exactly what the State has to prove.  
Instead, Subsection (e)(1) elaborates on what a disguise accomplishes by means of a requirement 
that the person wear a hood, mask, or other article “with intent to obscure the person’s 
identifying features.”  This provides useful, functional elements that can account for any kind of 
disguise.  Additionally, Subsection (e)(2) directly incorporates the definition of “body armor” 
from § 1449(e).  The minimum sentencing provisions in § 1449(b) have not been retained, 
because all minimum sentencing provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802.  
Moreover due to the conversion of §§ 1239 and 1449 to general grade adjustments, the 
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provisions in § 1239(b) and § 1449(c) and (f) – addressing conviction of a lesser included felony 
than the one originally charged, and concurrent sentencing – are unnecessary and not retained.  
Note that § 1449(d) allowing prosecution of minors as adults if they were wearing body armor 
during a commission of a felony has not been retained.  There is no justification to treat minor 
offenders wearing a body armor in a way that is unique and not applicable to other grade 
adjustments. 
Section 804(f) provides certain limitations for the grade adjustments in Section 804, or 
for grade adjustments generally.  Subsection (f)(1) ensures that the general grade adjustments in 
Section 804 are not “double counted” by denying the availability of the adjustment if the offense 
already takes into account the facts that must be proven to establish the adjustment.  Subsection 
(f)(2)(A) provides a ceiling upon the grade adjustments in Subsections (b)–(e), as discussed in 
the Commentary to those Subsections.  Subsection (f)(2)(B) provides a ceiling upon the 
application of all grade adjustments found throughout the Proposed Code.  This has been added 
to prevent Class 2 felonies from being “bumped up” into Class 1 felonies, which would 
(according to the scheme set forth in Section 802) make those offenses eligible for capital 
punishment.  Current Delaware law strictly reserves capital punishment for first-degree murder, 
and the Proposed Code carries that policy forward.  Subsection (f)(3) makes clear that, as a 
general matter, only one upward grade adjustment may be applied to an offense.  This applies 
both to the general grade adjustments in Section 804 and upward grade adjustments that appear 
in specific offense provisions.  This limitation is necessary to prevent a single instance of 
criminal conduct from generating liability greatly disproportionate to that intended by the 
General Assembly.  However, Subsection (f)(3) allows a specific offense provision to create an 
exception, allowing cumulative upward grade adjustments in particularly deserving cases. 
 
 
Comment on Section 805.  Valuation of Property for the Purposes of Grading 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 224, 849(d), 855(c), 863, 931(6), 931(14), 
939(g)–(h) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision establishes a uniform method of calculating the value of 
property whenever that value determines the grade of an offense, such as theft or criminal 
damage. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 805(a) and (b) set preferred valuation 
methods for different kinds of property.  Those methods correspond to 11 Del.C. § 224. 
Valuation of property, though the language and structure of § 224 has been altered slightly for 
easier reading and application.  The words “reproducing, or recovering” have been added to 
Subsection (a)(2) in order to account for valuation of intangible property, which is not easily 
replaced in the same way that tangible property might be.  For example, data stored in computers 
that have been damaged criminally under Section 2304 may be extremely valuable, but could not 
be replaced or given a readily ascertainable market value.  Digital information is sometimes 
recoverable even once damaged, but data recovery itself can be an expensive service.  Subsection 
(a)(2) allows the cost of that service to determine the grade of the offense.  If digital information 
is not recoverable, Subsection (a)(2) would allow the value of the property to be decided by the 
cost of reproducing the information anew.  That could be determined by the number of hours of 
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work required, multiplied by the value of each hour of work.  Note that this provision makes 
unnecessary 11 Del.C. § 849(d), which sets the method of valuing rented property for the 
purpose of theft. 
Section 805(c) collects various default values of property found throughout the current 
code.  Subsection (c)(1) directly corresponds to § 224(3).  Subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) directly 
correspond to § 939(g)–(h).   
Section 805(d), allowing aggregation of the property values involved in thefts and related 
offenses “committed in a single scheme or continuous course of conduct” for the purpose of 
grading, directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 855(c). 
Property Value as Element to be Proven.  Note that once an offense is charged based 
upon valuation of property, the method of determining the property’s value becomes a material 
allegation that must be proven by the State.  Keller v. State, 425 A.2d 152, 155-56 (Del. 1981). 
 
 
Comment on Section 806.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 863, 931, 1105(c), 1304(a)(2) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines all key terms introduced in Chapter 800. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 806(a) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 931(6). 
Section 806(b) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1304(a)(2). 
Section 806(c) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 931(14). 
Section 806(d) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1304(a)(2). 
Section 806(e), defining “vulnerable person,” expands the definition of a “vulnerable 
adult” from 11 Del.C. § 1105(c), so as to include some persons less than 18 years of age, persons 
who are disabled, and persons who are 62 years of age or older.  The former expansions upon 
§ 1105(c) are taken from the grade adjustments in 11 Del.C. § 841(c) for persons who are 
impaired or disabled.  The policy expressed in § 841(c) seems consistent with § 1105, so they 
were combined in this definition to apply in the general grade adjustment in Section 804(b).  
However, it is unclear why § 1105 specifically applies to adult victims, and not similarly situated 
child victims, so the proposed definition eliminates that distinction.  The latter expansion for 
persons 62 years of age or older has been made because nearly every specific offense in the 
current code already aggravates grading for older victims.  In this way, Section 804 provides 
more protection for older victims than current law by ensuring that a grade aggravation is 
available for all offenses, even new ones that may be added to the Code in the future.  However, 
it seems indefensible to aggravate an offense against an older person who is just as healthy and 
capable as a person under 62 years of age.  Adding older persons to the definition in Subsection 
(e)(1) requires demonstration of some objective evidence of vulnerability due to age in order to 
take advantage of the grade adjustment.   
Section 806(f) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 863. 
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PART II:  THE SPECIAL PART 
 
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
 
CHAPTER 1100.  HOMICIDE OFFENSES 
 
Section 1101. Aggravated Murder 
Section 1102. Murder 
Section 1103. Manslaughter 
Section 1104. Negligent Homicide 
Section 1105. Causing or Aiding Suicide  
Section 1106. Unlawful Abortion  
Section 1107. Definitions  
Section 1108. Procedures and Standards in Adjudication of Sentence for a Capital Offense  
 
 
Comment on Section 1101.  Aggravated Murder 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 636; see also 1339, 4209A 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1101 defines aggravated murder as intentionally causing the death of 
another person, and grades the offense as the most serious offense in the Proposed Code. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1101 is substantively similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 636(a)(1), and retains the attending grade and procedures found in § 636(b), since the offense 
reflects the highest culpability level in the Code as to causing death of another person.   
Section 1101 does not incorporate any of the alternative formulations of first-degree 
murder found in 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(2)–(6).  Current §§ 636(a)(2) and (a)(4)–(6) punish forms of 
reckless killing as first-degree murder, and are therefore eligible for the death penalty.  Treating 
reckless action as equally morally blameworthy as a knowing or intentional action is an anomaly 
under current Delaware law, taken as a whole.  The code’s scheme of culpability is designed to 
reflect the judgment that different levels of culpability are deserving of different amounts of 
punishment.  However, those situations are particularly condemnable and should be punished 
more harshly than ordinary manslaughter.  To promote consistent application of the principles 
present in the current code, § 636(4)–(6) have been moved to Section 1102, which treats them as 
second-degree murder.  11 Del.C. § 636(a)(2), a form of the traditional felony murder rule based 
on recklessly causing death, has not been included for the same reason. Delaware currently has 
two felony murder rules: recklessly causing death is punished as first-degree murder, while 
negligently causing death is punished as second-degree murder.  While causing death during 
commission of a felony is certainly blameworthy and deserving of punishment—hence the 
statutory aggravation the felony murder rule provides—reckless felony murder is currently 
eligible for the death penalty, like the other enumerated reckless killings.  By not including 
§ 636(a)(2), reckless and negligent felony murders will all be punished as murder.  Note that this 
is still a substantial grade increase over manslaughter or negligent homicide.  Note also that 
current Delaware law double counts § 636(a)(2)–(6) for the death penalty in its sentencing 
procedures.  11 Del.C. § 4209(e)(2) explicitly provides that a conviction under § 636(a)(2)–(6) 
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automatically establishes an aggravating factor under the death penalty procedures.  Since 
§ 636(a)(2)–(6) have not been included in Section 1101 for the reasons already stated, however, 
this double counting is not an issue.  Preserving the double counting would produce the irrational 
result of requiring no additional aggravating factor before the death penalty can be imposed for 
certain forms of manslaughter while requiring proof of an aggravating factor before imposing the 
death penalty for knowing and intentional murders.   
Section 1101(b) combines the references to sentencing provisions in § 636(b)(1)–(2).  
Section 1108, as discussed below, is reserved to set forth the revised procedures in § 4209, 
retaining here the exclusion of the death penalty from offenders who are minors.   Note also that 
the alternative provisions in § 4209A—setting a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life in prison 
for offenders who are minors have not been incorporated into the Proposed Code.  These 
provisions are likely to be affected by future decisions of the General Assembly pertaining to the 
death penalty and are therefore reserved, similarly to the provisions of § 4209 (see Commentary 
to Section 1108 [Procedures and Standards in Adjudication of Sentence for a Capital Offense]).  
Adulteration.  11 Del.C. § 1339 has not been included in Section 1101, or anywhere in 
Chapter 1100, for four reasons.  First, its culpability requirement is too narrow.  It only punishes 
intentional acts, whereas any culpable killing or injuring is punishable in Chapters 1100 and 
1200.  Second, if harm results from the adulteration, the offense is redundant with either murder 
or assault, but without increasing the punishment for those offenses.  Third, if harm does not 
result from the adulteration, the punishment for the offense (a Class G felony) is far less than 
attempt liability for homicide or assault.  Finally, it appears as though § 1339 has rarely, if ever, 
been used as the basis of prosecution, which calls its inherent usefulness into question. 
Aiding Suicide.  11 Del.C. § 636(a)(3) is not included in Section 1101 because all 
offenses involving suicide are collected and defined together in Section 1105. 
[Knowingly Causing Death.  A footnote to Section 1101 proposes changing the 
culpability requirement for aggravated murder from “intentionally” to “knowingly.”  If that were 
done, Section 1102(a)(1) would be eliminated, and the following commentary would be added to 
apply to Section 1101(a): Section 1101 proposes lowering the culpability requirement as to 
causing death from “intentionally” to “knowingly.”  “Knowing” culpability is underused in the 
current Delaware criminal code, which often distinguishes degrees of offenses based on the line 
between “intentional” and “reckless” conduct.  However, most jurisdictions do not distinguish 
between intentional and knowing culpability for aggravated (or first-degree) murder.  The reason 
for this is straightforward: the difference in blameworthiness between a person killing recklessly 
and knowingly is dramatic, whereas the difference between knowing and intentional is slight.  
Consider, for example, a defendant who blows up a building, knowing there is a person inside 
who will almost certainly be killed in the explosion.  The defendant does not want or intend that 
the person die; the defendant simply does not care.  This defendant is not materially less 
blameworthy just because she does not subjectively desire the victim’s death.  On the other hand, 
recklessly causing death—blowing up the building while aware of a risk that a person is inside, 
but not knowing one way or the other—is materially less blameworthy.  Under current Delaware 
law, a person who knew death was substantially certain to result from her act would be punished 
under manslaughter, not murder.  Section 1101 fills this gap in deserved punishment.] 
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Comment on Section 1102.  Murder 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 635, 636; see also 634 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines and grades the offense of murder.  Section 1102 
imposes an intermediate punishment for offenses that, though considered less serious than 
aggravated murder, are considered more serious than the reckless killings covered by Section 
1103.   
Relation to current Delaware law.   Section 1102 is substantially similar to the current 
provision for second-degree murder, 11 Del.C. § 635.  Otherwise, Section 1102 reflects a 
number of proposed changes to current law.  Subsection (a)(1) proposes to punish knowingly 
causing a person’s death as murder, rather than manslaughter.  Under current law, first degree 
murder requires the offender to intentionally cause death; manslaughter requires reckless 
causation; and second degree murder is only available as an aggravation from manslaughter or a 
mitigation from first degree murder.  Without an explicit intermediate punishment between 
manslaughter and first degree murder, an offender who was practically certain her conduct would 
result in death receives punishment that would be appropriate for a person who was merely 
reckless.  Subsection (a)(1) is proposed to ensure punishment that is equal to an offender’s higher 
blameworthiness.  Subsection (a)(2)(A) updates the language of § 635(1) to a simpler and more 
modern formulation, but is not intended to change the law’s meaning.  Subsection (a)(3) retains 
the felony murder rule of § 635(2), and is the only form of the felony murder rule proposed in 
Chapter 1100.  Any deaths caused negligently or recklessly by a person in commission of 
another felony will be aggravated to murder.  Subsection (a)(3) works two other minor changes.  
First, it inserts a direct reference to the inchoate offense of attempt in Section 701 for consistent 
application and interpretation of the law.  Second, it specifies that conduct resulting in death is 
not automatically treated as a homicide by operation of the felony murder rule.  The felony 
murder rule increases punishment for killing to account for two harms that are different in kind: 
the harm to the victim who dies, and the harm the underlying offense seeks to prevent or punish.  
Assault, reckless injuring, and homicide, however, punish varying degrees of one harm—
physical injury.  Applying the felony murder rule to underlying conduct causing death would not 
accomplish the rule’s purpose, but simply circumvent the culpability requirement for murder.  
This follows Delaware’s practice of only applying the felony murder rule to felonies causing a 
harm in addition to physical injury. 
Subsection (a)(2)(B)–(D) ensures that the especially egregious reckless killings currently 
treated as first-degree murder in §§ 636(a)(4)–(6) will be treated as murder, without having to go 
through the analysis of Subsection (a)(2)(A) to determine extreme indifference to the value of 
human life.  The reason for this addition is discussed in the Commentary to Section 1101, supra.  
Note, however, that the latter part of § 636(a)(6) need not be included because escape in the 
second degree is already a felony, which brings it under the felony murder rule in Subsection 
(a)(3). 
Section 1102(b) grades the offense as a Class 2 felony, and under the grading scheme in 
Section 802 the offense is subject to the same maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment as 
under current law. 
Murder by Abuse or Neglect.  Section 1102 does not incorporate 11 Del.C. § 634, which 
punishes the reckless killing of a child by abuse or neglect, or by a person who previously abused 
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or neglected the victim.  That provision is not necessary as a separate offense because the same 
result can be achieved through Section 1102.  Occupying a position of responsibility for the care 
of a child under 14; abusing or neglecting that child to the point of death; and any patterns of 
behavior establishing a history of such abuse or neglect are powerful circumstances tending to 
show extreme indifference to the value of human life under Section 1102(a)(2)(A).  Since §§ 634 
and 635 are graded the same, it is not necessary to make special provision for § 634. 
 
 
Comment on Section 1103.  Manslaughter 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 632, 641 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1103 punishes two forms of manslaughter: recklessly causing the 
death of another person; and mitigation for murder, where an offender acted under the influence 
of an extreme disturbance.  Although the influence of such a disturbance does not absolve all 
responsibility for the objectively harmful, and wrongful, act of killing another person, it is 
thought to reduce the offender’s blameworthiness relative to those who commit murders 
unattributable to any such influence.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1103(a)(1) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 632(1).  Subsection (a)(2) directly corresponds to § 632(3), as will be discussed below.  
However, Section 1103 does not incorporate § 632(2), (4), or (5).  11 Del.C. § 632(2) 
dramatically increases the available punishment for an assault where the offender displays 
ordinary—not criminal—negligence as to resulting death.  Ordinary negligence has been 
eliminated from the Proposed Code as an available culpability requirement, the reasons for 
which are explained in the Commentary to Section 205.  Even if criminal negligence were 
substituted, however, including § 632(2) would destroy the distinction between manslaughter 
and negligent homicide by effectively punishing both offenses the same.  Similarly, 
manslaughter under Section 1103(a)(1) cannot be committed with a culpability higher than 
recklessness, because knowing commission of the same conduct would be murder.  Therefore, 
recklessness is the only culpability level with which manslaughter under Section 1103(a)(1) can 
be committed.  11 Del.C. § 632(4) has not been included.  It punishes causing the death of a 
woman during an abortion.  However, it fails to specify a required culpability as to causing 
death.  Under both the current and Proposed codes, recklessness is read into the offense 
definition.  Since recklessness is already required by Section 1103(a)(1)—and § 632(1)—this 
additional language accomplishes nothing new.  11 Del.C. § 632(5) is not incorporated because 
all provisions pertaining to suicide are collected in Section 1105.   
Section 1103(a)(2) reflects the mitigation for murder due to extreme disturbance, found 
in § 632(3).  Some of the requirements in § 641 are worked into the mitigation definition, while 
other provisions are reserved for Section 1103(b).  The mitigation as it currently exists is 
materially preserved in Section 1103.  The mitigation is altered, though, in two ways.  First, 
Subsection (a)(1) expands application of the mitigation to both aggravated murder and murder, 
rather than just to intentional or knowing killings.  This change is necessary to avoid the 
anomalous and unintended result where a person suffering extreme disturbance is punished more 
harshly for a reckless or negligent killing than for an intentional or knowing killing.  Second, an 
explicit reference to “mental” disturbance has been added to the “emotional” disturbances 
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mentioned throughout current law.  11 Del.C. § 641, which expounds upon the disturbance 
mitigation in § 632, uses the terms “mental” and “emotional” seemingly interchangeably.  This 
suggests that although only the latter term is used in § 632, both concepts are intended to fall 
under the mitigation.  This policy makes sense because both cases produce the same effect—a 
less blameworthy homicide.  Note however that mental or emotional disturbance 
notwithstanding, manslaughter under Section 1103(a)(2) may be committed with a knowing or 
intentional culpability.  In these cases, it would be subject to the minimum authorized 
imprisonment terms under Section 802(a)(4). 
As previously mentioned, Section 1103(b) contains some of the provisions relating to 
mitigation currently found in § 641, including the provision excluding murderers who culpably 
cause the conditions that give rise to the mitigation.  However, Subsection (b)(2) states § 641’s 
exclusion more precisely.  Since murder requires that the offender “knowingly” cause death, the 
appropriate culpability level for the exclusion is also “knowingly” causing the mitigating 
conditions.  This wording is also more consistent with the rules applicable to excuse defenses 
found in proposed Section 401.  Subsection (b) does not include § 641’s provision regarding 
voluntary intoxication because all situations involving voluntary intoxication are governed by the 
General Part in Section 213. 
Section 1103(c) preserves the current grade for manslaughter. 
Mitigation for Attempted Murder.  The mitigation in Section 1103(a)(2) is intended to 
apply equally to murders and attempted murders.  Failing to apply it to attempted murder would 
produce an anomalous result that is not contemplated by current law.  Because attempted murder 
is a more serious offense than manslaughter, an offender experiencing extreme disturbance 
would be punished more severely if the intended victim lives than if the victim dies.  Section 
1103(a)(2), in conjunction with Section 701’s rules for attempt liability, avoids this anomaly by 
making it possible to be convicted of attempted manslaughter under the murder mitigation.  
 
 
Comment on Section 1104.  Negligent Homicide 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 630A, 631, 633, 1448(e)(2); see also 630; 
21 Del.C. § 4176A 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1104 defines the offense of negligent homicide.  Although criminal 
law generally considers recklessness the minimum culpability level for which liability is 
appropriate, Section 1104 departs from that usual standard.  Section 1104 recognizes that the 
harm involved—the death of a human being—is more grave than that punished by other 
offenses.  Note that the offense punishes criminal negligence, not ordinary or tort negligence.  
Section 205 eliminated ordinary negligence as a culpability requirement, and “negligence” in the 
Proposed Code has the same meaning as “criminal negligence” under current Delaware law. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1104(a) and (b)(2) directly correspond to 11 
Del.C. §§ 631 and 633, respectively.   
Section 1104(b)(1) corresponds to § 1448(e)(2), which increases punishment where the 
defendant caused death by use of a deadly weapon possessed in violation of proposed Section 
5104.  The minimum sentencing provisions have not been retained, because all minimum 
sentencing provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802. 
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Subsection (b)(2) corresponds to the punishment of homicide by child abuse in § 633.  
No additional offense definition is necessary due to the overlapping culpability and result 
elements between § 633 and negligent homicide.  However, the requirements of abuse or neglect 
of a child under 14 years of age are retained in this grading provision.  The definitions of “abuse” 
and “neglect” are incorporated by reference to 10 Del.C. § 901.  See proposed Section 1108.  
Section 1104 does not retain § 633’s alternative formulation, that the cause of death need not 
have been abuse or neglect, so long as the offender previously engaged in a pattern of abuse or 
neglect.  Current § 633 does not require that the offender have been previously convicted of that 
behavior in order to be guilty.  This authorizes increased punishment based upon facts that have 
not been proven in court beyond a reasonable doubt.  Punishment in those circumstances also 
disconnects the aggravating factor—abuse or neglect—from causing the necessary result of 
death.  Only few other offenses in the current code punish an offender more harshly for unproven 
past behavior, relying on the same flawed concept of “previous pattern” of abuse or neglect.  
Because this aspect of these offenses is so rare and represents such a great inconsistency with 
current law, it has not been retained – not only as to § 633, but also §§ 634, 1103 and 1103B.  
Finally, Section 1104 reduces the grade of § 633 by one level, as aggravating circumstances are 
used consistently throughout the Proposed Code to increase maximum punishment by only one 
grade.   
Vehicular Homicide.  11 Del.C. §§ 630–30A have not been specifically retained in 
Section 1104 because the Proposed Code already covers the situations they address.  11 Del.C. 
§ 630(a)(1) punishes causing death by criminally negligent driving as a Class D felony, which is 
identical to Section 1104.  In that case, no additional offense is necessary.  11 Del.C. § 630(a)(2), 
however, punishes causing death by driving with ordinary negligence under the influence.  As 
already discussed, ordinary negligence is not an available basis of criminal liability in the 
Proposed Code.  However, Section 212 imputes reckless culpability upon a voluntarily 
intoxicated defendant who would have been aware of the risks he took had he been sober.  In that 
case, someone who kills another person while driving under the influence will be liable for 
manslaughter—a two or three grade increase over the degrees of vehicular homicide.  That is 
also the reason why § 630A need not be included in Chapter 1100.  Because all substantive 
provisions in §§ 630–30A are covered by the Proposed Code, the specific sentencing provisions 
in §§ 630(c) and 630A(c) relating to prosecution of certain minors as adults cannot be retained. 
There is no basis in current law to broaden the application of these particularized provisions to 
the general negligent homicide offense.  On the other hand, retaining these provisions in Title 11 
and restricting them to their current field of application would require the creation of special 
carve-outs for “vehicular homicide” from the Section 1104.  Because the creation of such special 
carve-outs is antithetical to the Proposed Code’s goal of consolidation, these procedural 
provisions are not retained. 
Operation of a Vehicle Causing Death.  21 Del.C. § 4176A has not been incorporated 
into Chapter 1100, and it is recommended that the offense be removed from Title 21.  21 Del.C. 
§ 4176A punishes causing death while driving a motor vehicle.  However, it imposes strict 
liability as to causing death whenever a driver is committing a moving violation under the Motor 
Vehicle Code.  Although the offense is nominally called an unclassified misdemeanor, § 4176A 
authorizes up to 30 months’ imprisonment—more time than a Class 8 felony, under the proposed 
grading scheme.  The drafters could find no other strict liability offenses in current Delaware law 
that are punished as felonies.  This is not surprising, since strict liability is usually reserved for 
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minor regulatory offenses.  Since this offense is such a great departure from the policies 
underlying current Delaware law, it has not been retained in Chapter 1100. 
Note that imposing felony-level imprisonment under strict liability is a serious issue.  
Using the criminal law to punish acts without regard to culpability dilutes the moral credibility of 
the law, because it is wasted on something that is not truly blameworthy.  If the law’s credibility 
is impaired like that, its power to command public respect dwindles, and then cannot be brought 
to bear in situations where it is needed.   
 
 
Comment on Section 1105.  Causing or Aiding Suicide 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 632(5), 636(a)(3), 645 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1105 criminalizes causing or aiding a suicide.  Although Chapter 
1100 declines to recognize attempted suicide as an offense (homicide can only be committed 
against another person), Section 1105 recognizes there may be culpable involvement in another’s 
suicide.  Section 1105’s offenses clarify the availability of homicide liability for causing another 
to commit suicide, and they allow for liability analogous to inchoate or accomplice liability 
where one aids another to commit suicide. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1105(a)–(b) corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§§ 632(5) and 645, but with some slight changes.  The offense is defined according to “aiding” 
suicide only, but creates a grading distinction where the victim does attempt or commit suicide.  
In either case, however, the culpability requirement has been lowered from “intentional” to 
“knowing” causation, in recognition of the negligible moral distinction between the two when it 
comes to ending human life.  See Commentary to Section 1101.  However, the maximum 
punishment for causing suicide in Subsection (b)(1), when compared to § 632(5), is two grades 
lower.  This is in part due to the lessened culpability requirement, and partly due to the fact that, 
in the proposed grade provision, no proof of causation is required.  It is difficult to define 
causation in suicide, when every case necessarily involves the intervening acts and freedom of 
choice of the one committing suicide.  The case for causation is much clearer where the offender 
employs force, threats, or coercion—means calculated to override the victim’s freedom of 
choice.  In those cases, Subsection (c) equates causing suicide with homicide. Subsection (b)(2) 
punishes an offender one grade lower where the victim attempts suicide, but does not succeed, to 
account for the lesser resulting harm.  
Additionally, Subsection (b)(3) retains the grade for aiding suicide in § 645.  It punishes 
knowingly aiding a person to commit suicide, even if the suicide is never attempted.  The 
purpose of the provision is to punish a person who has materially advanced the likelihood that a 
person would attempt suicide—for example, by providing the person with enough pills to end 
her life, and knowing that they would be used for that purpose—even if the suicide is never 
actually attempted.  The discounted grade for “attempting to aid” suicide is the same grade that 
could be reached by applying the inchoate attempt offense in Section 701 to Section 1105(b)(2).  
However, this situation involves multiple layers of attempt conduct, given the third person’s 
potential, intervening suicidal act, which could create confusion.  To avoid ambiguity, 
Subsection (b)(3) makes explicit that liability still attaches to an attempt to aid suicide, which 
merely clarifies what current Delaware law already provides. 
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Section 1105(c) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(3), which made it an offense to 
intentionally cause another’s suicide by force or duress.  Use of force or duress could cause a 
suicide, however, even if the offender did not subjectively desire the suicide to occur.  Since the 
grade for causing suicide short of force or duress is so much lower than murder, many culpable 
killings-through-suicide would be punished too leniently without acknowledging that a person 
could be prosecuted for murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide in the proper 
circumstances.  For consistency of those circumstances, the term “coercion” is substituted for 
“duress” to maintain consistency within the Code, and incorporating by reference the definition 
of the coercion offense in Section 1404.  
 
 
Comment on Section 1106.  Unlawful Abortion 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 651–54, 222(28); see also 24 Del.C. 
§ 1790 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes performing or choosing to submit to an abortion 
that is performed in violation of the subchapter of Title 24 governing lawful abortions.  The 
offense is grouped with homicide offenses because abortion ends the biological functions of a 
human being, even if the definition of a “person” for the purpose of homicide does not include 
fetuses.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1106(a) directly corresponds to the offense 
definitions in 11 Del.C. §§ 651 and 652, combining their common elements and reserving their 
differences for grading in Subsection (d).  Subsection (a)(2) is intended to accomplish the 
purpose of the current law more precisely.  The previous offenses relied on definitions of 
“miscarriage” and “abortion” to define the end of a pregnancy; however, “abortion” was defined 
in § 654 by a “miscarriage,” and “miscarriage” inaccurately conveys behavior the offense intends 
to prohibit.  In common usage, a miscarriage is the termination of a pregnancy due to the death 
of a fetus prior to its viability outside the womb, while such termination after viability is 
commonly called a stillbirth.  On their face, then, §§ 651–52 appear to only prohibit unlawful 
abortions performed pre-viability.  A careful reading of 24 Del.C. § 1790, however, reveals that 
nearly every abortion performed after viability is prohibited in Delaware.  Therefore, Section 
1106(a)(2) has replaced use of the term “miscarriage”. 
Section 1106(b) preserves the offense in § 653 for issuing abortional articles as it is. 
Section 1106(c) preserves the grades of the offenses in §§ 651–53. 
 
 
Comment on Section 1107.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 654 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1107(a) provides a substitute definition of 
“abortion” instead of the current one in 11 Del.C. § 654, mainly because of that definition’s 
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dependence on the term “miscarriage,” which is not defined and the common use of which—as 
discussed in the Comment on Section 1106—appears inaccurate.  The new definition covers the 
same relevant behavior due to its focus on intent, rather than result.   
Section 1107(b) provides definitions of “attempt” and “attempting” that will be used 
throughout the Code by reference to the inchoate offense in Section 701. 
Section 1107(c) defines “coercion” by reference to the offense definition in Section 1404.   
Section 1107(d) adds a simple definition for “suicide,” which current law does not define.  
The definition is significant, however, because it requires that the one committing suicide do so 
intentionally. 
 
 
Comment on Section 1108.  Procedures and Standards in Adjudication of Sentence for a 
Capital Offense 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 4209 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision sets forth procedures and standards of adjudication for 
imposition of punishment by death for aggravated murders.   
Relation to current Delaware law. [This Section reflects a rationalized version of 
Delaware law and has been revised to conform with the requirements, as we understand them, of 
the recent US Supreme Court decision in Hurst v. State, 577 U.S. ____ (2016),  and the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s answers to the certified questions in Rauf v. State, No. 39, 2016, 
2016 WL 4224252 (Del. Aug. 2, 2016). The recommendation to adopt the procedures described 
in this Section is reserved, awaiting ongoing decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court and 
General Assembly.] The proposed Section 1108 is, in most respects, substantively the same as 11 
Del.C. § 4209.  The material in § 4209 is, in broad strokes, kept in the same order.  However, the 
material has been rearranged within subsections, and has been broken into more subsections and 
given many more descriptive headings to make important provisions easier to find.  The 
language has been edited for simplicity throughout.  Finally, explicit references to subsections 
within Section 1108 have been used as often as possible to promote consistent interpretation and 
application of the law.  Internal references also allow duplicative language to be removed, further 
improving simplicity and clarity.  Note in particular that the enumerated aggravating factors in 
§ 4209(e) have been grouped together under headings in Section 1108(f).  Additionally, 
references throughout § 4209 to “relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bear upon 
the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and 
propensities of the offender” have been removed, since evidence as to any relevant or admissible 
matter is already allowed by the sentencing procedures. 
The last clause of § 4209(e)(1), which imputes any enumerated aggravating circumstance 
found to exist in the case of a principal actor to any accomplices to the offense, has not been 
retained.  As discussed in the Commentary to Section 1101, a sentence of death is intended to be 
an extraordinary punishment, even for aggravated murder.  Current law requires proof of an 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt because something more than the 
circumstances of the commission of the offense must be present to justify sentencing a person to 
death.  In this way, proof of an aggravating factor personal to the defendant plays a critical 
gatekeeping function that only admits the most deserving individuals to a death sentence.  
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Imputing aggravating circumstances to accomplices dilutes this gatekeeping function, which is a 
key purpose of § 4209.   
Relatedly, § 4209(e)(2) has not been retained, for the reasons given in the Commentary to 
Section 1101.  That provision is technically moot, since Section 1101 does not include the 
alternative formulations of aggravated murder on which it relies.   
Section 1108(f)(2)(B) combines two former factors, § 4209(e)(1)q.–r., by reference to the 
definition of a “vulnerable person” in Section 804(d).  That definition more precisely articulates 
the policy underlying those aggravators, and using the same definition promotes consistent 
interpretation and application of the law. 
The reference to “sodomy” in § 4209(e)(1)j. has not been retained in Section 1108(f), 
since that offense no longer exists separate from rape and sexual assault. 
Some of the language in § 4209(e)(1)l. has been cut back in Section 1108(f)(6)(D) for 
two reasons.  First, the prior provision further defines “outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible 
or inhuman” as “involv[ing] torture, . . . use of an explosive device or poison”; therefore, the first 
clause has been removed.  Second, the possibility that the murder “involved . . . depravity of 
mind” is contrary to more concrete language in the provision, which specifies certain 
circumstances of the offense that demonstrate depravity of mind.    
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CHAPTER 1200.  ROBBERY, ASSAULT, ENDANGERMENT, AND THREAT OFFENSES 
 
Section 1201.  Robbery and Carjacking 
Section 1202.  Assault 
Section 1203.  Reckless Injuring 
Section 1204.  Reckless Endangerment 
Section 1205.  Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol 
Section 1206.  Genital Mutilation of a Female Minor 
Section 1207.  Terroristic Threats and Hoaxes 
Section 1208.  Unlawfully Administering Drugs 
Section 1209.  Reckless Infliction of Mental or Emotional Harm 
Section 1210.  Definitions 
 
 
General Comment Regarding Chapter 1200. 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 614, 1327 
 
Comment: 
Three current offenses are not retained in Chapter 1200: 11 Del.C. § 614, which prohibits 
abuse of a sports official, 11 Del.C. § 1327, which prohibits maintaining a dangerous animal, and 
11 Del. C. § 1334 which prohibits causing physical injury (or property damage) by unmanned 
aircraft systems.  
Abuse of a Sports Official.  Chapter 1200 does not retain 11 Del.C. § 614, which 
aggravates grading for other offenses that already exist, such as reckless endangering, assault, 
terroristic threatening, and criminal mischief, when the offenses are committed upon a sports 
official.  While Section 1202(b)(4) [Assault] contains a grade adjustment for special victims that 
could include be written to include sports officials, the status of those victims justifies the whole 
grade increase for reasons that do not apply to sports officials.  The victims in Section 1202(b)(4) 
are police, firefighters, emergency personnel, or correctional officers victimized in the line of 
duty—generally, persons engaged in a vital public service that the assault hinders, thus 
increasing the assault’s harm to society.  Sports officials may be victims of aggression more 
frequently than other citizens, so it does make sense to take their vulnerability into account.  As 
such, it would be appropriate to add a Sentencing Guideline that increases the sentence an 
offender will receive when sports officials are victims, but without doubling the maximum 
available punishment.  
Maintaining a Dangerous Animal.  Chapter 1200 does not retain 11 Del.C. § 1327, which 
prohibits maintaining a dangerous animal that causes death or physical injury to another person 
or animal.  While the current offense includes a detailed and very broad definition of what 
constitutes a “dangerous animal,” in reality the offense is merely a specific form of recklessness 
resulting in property damage, injury or death, that are caused by an animal rather than by a 
person.  The reckless causation of such harm should be treated similarly, regardless the 
instrumentality through which it was caused.  Current § 1327 also includes specific provisions 
about how to prove causation and culpability for the offense, but those issues are present in every 
offense and do not need to be specifically stated.  Instead, as in all other cases, courts can resolve 
issues of causation and culpability according to generally applicable principles in cases where 
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death or serious injury is caused by the failure of an owner to control his or her animal.  The 
grading of § 1327 is also inconsistent with the rest of the Proposed Code.  Specifically, the 
offense is graded lower than manslaughter, roughly equivalent to reckless injuring, and 
incompatible with property damage offenses – as it does not take into account the value of the 
damage done to the property.  Accordingly, it makes more sense to give § 1327 effect through 
the homicide, reckless injuring, and property offenses in Chapters 1100, 1200 and 1300 rather 
than retaining it as a separate offense.   
Causing Physical Injury or Property Damage Due to Unlawful Use of an Unmanned Aircraft 
System.  Chapter 1200 does not retain 11. Del. C. § 1334 which prohibits the use of unmanned 
aircraft systems under certain conditions.  Current § 1334 is a regulatory offense graded as 
unclassified misdemeanor and is retained unchanged for the most part in Title 11.  However, part 
of § 1334(d) provides that in cases where physical injury to a person (or property damage) occurs 
as a result of a violation of § 1334, the grade of the offense increases to a Class A misdemeanor.  
The provision is unnecessary, because causation of physical injury or damage to property is 
covered by the comprehensive schemes in Sections 1202, 1203 or 2304.  Note also, that the 
repeat offense grade provisions in § 1334(d) are not retained in Title 11 because Section 804 
contains a general adjustment for repeat offenses.  
 
 
Comment on Section 1201.  Robbery and Carjacking 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 831, 832, 835, 836 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1201 defines and grades the offenses of robbery and carjacking.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1201(a) creates a broad offense definition for 
both robbery and carjacking by combining the essential elements of 11 Del.C. §§ 831(a), 832(a), 
835(a), and 836(a) (first and second degree robbery and first and second degree carjacking) using 
more generalized language.  To unify the definitions of robbery and carjacking, Section 1201(a) 
makes some minor changes to the corresponding current offenses.  First, the offense definition in 
Section 1201(a) disconnects the offense from theft and, instead, describes the offense conduct as 
taking of property while in close proximity to the victim.  This change reflects the idea that the 
offense of robbery should involve some additional danger other than theft.  Second, the offense 
definition in Section 1201(a) simplifies the intent requirement of § 831(a)(1) so that the State no 
longer needs to prove the defendant’s intent to permanently deprive the victim of the property, or 
intent to overcome resistance to the taking.  As noted above, this change unifies the definition of 
robbery with that of carjacking, which does not require a particular showing of intent as to the 
victim’s property.  Note that these changes make the provisions in §§ 835(c) and 836(c) 
unnecessary; the offense no longer focuses on the offender’s possession or control of vehicle 
taken or his intent regarding the victim’s property—just the taking itself.  Third, Section 
1201(a)(2) retains the requirement in § 831(a) that the offender use force or a threat of force in 
carrying out the taking, but no longer requires that the threat be of the “immediate use of force.”  
Threats of future harm can be as coercive as threats of immediate harm. 
Section 1201(b) grades the various forms of robbery and carjacking.  Subsection (b)(1) 
grades carjacking, corresponding to §§ 835 and 836.  Note that Subsection (b)(1) defines the 
term “motor vehicle” within its description of carjacking and the term is also defined separately 
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in Chapter 21, meaning that the definition provision in 11 Del.C. § 837(b) is no longer necessary.   
Subsection (b)(1)(A) preserves the grade aggravation in § 836(a)(6) to a Class 4 felony where an 
occupant or passenger of the vehicle is fourteen years of age or younger.  However, Subsection 
(b)(1)(A) eliminates the grade adjustment in § 836(a)(6) where an occupant or passenger of the 
vehicle is over sixty two years old because the general grade adjustment in Section 804 covers 
this situation.  Subsection (b)(1)(B) preserves the grades for carjacking committed under the 
conditions set forth in § 836(a)(1)-(3).  Subsection (b)(1)(C) preserves the grade for carjacking 
committed under the conditions set forth in § 835(b)(2).  Subsection (b)(1)(D), corresponding to 
11 Del.C. § 835(b)(1), provides a default grade for all carjackings that do not have the 
aggravating circumstances listed in Subsection (b)(1)(A)–(C). 
Subsection (b)(2) grades aggravated robbery, corresponding to 11 Del. C. §§ 832(a)(1)-
(3) and 836(a)(4)-(5).  Note that despite the presence of a separate carjacking grading scheme in 
Subsection (b)(1), the aggravated robbery and robbery grading schemes in Subsections (b)(2)-(3) 
still apply to the taking of vehicles, if the taking was done in a manner described by those 
Subsections.  The grading schemes are different because Subsection (b)(1) only applies to the 
taking of vehicles and does not require any aggravating factor such as physical injury or the use 
of a weapon, while Subsections (b)(2)-(3) apply to the taking of any property and require such an 
aggravating factor.  Thus, a prosecutor handling a carjacking in which a deadly weapon was used 
would be able to apply either the carjacking or the aggravated robbery grading scheme.  
Subsection (b)(2)(A) preserves the grade of the offense conduct set forth in §§ 832(a)(1) and 
836(a)(5).  Subsections (b)(2)(B)-(C) preserve the grades of the offense conduct in §§ 832(a)(2) 
and 836(a)(4). 
Subsection (b)(3) grades all remaining forms of robbery, corresponding to 11 Del.C. 
§ 831(a) (second degree robbery).  
Special Provisions in 11 Del.C. §§ 835(d) and 836(d)-(f) Not Retained.  First, Section 
1201 does not include the provisions in 11 Del.C. §§ 835(d) and 836(f) relating to related or 
lesser offenses because the structure of the proposed offenses is such that a person can only be 
convicted of robbery or carjacking—not both.  Second, Section 1201 does not include the 
provision in § 836(d) relating to an offender’s lack of knowledge as to the age of his or her 
victim because knowledge as to age is dealt with by the mistake provisions in Section 206 of the 
General Part.  Finally, Section 1201 does not include the provision in § 836(e) for strict liability 
as to causing physical injury during carjacking.  This provision would be an anomaly if included 
in the Proposed Code, since the current code requires culpability to be proven in all other cases 
involving physical injury.  
 
 
Comment on Section 1202.  Assault 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 601, 606, 607, 611, 612, 613, 1103, 
1103B, 1114, 1114A, 1254, 1339; 7 Del.C. § 6013(c)-
(e) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines and grades the offense of assault.  Cases involving 
threats to commit assault are covered by Section 1207’s offense for terroristic threats.  Cases 
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involving reckless and negligent injuring, which are treated as assaults in the current code, are 
treated separately in Section 1203.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1202(a) defines the offense of assault.  
Subsection (a)(1) combines the essential elements of 11 Del.C. §§ 607 (strangulation), 611(1), 
612(a), and 613(a) (first, second, and third degrees of assault).  The variety of types of assault in 
current law are dealt with in this Section by variations in grading, rather than by changing the 
offense definition.  Subsection (a)(1) also covers 11 Del.C. §  1339 (adulteration) but makes 
some changes to this offense.  First, Subsection (a)(1) only incorporates the offense conduct in 
§ 1339 to the extent the adulteration causes physical injury; it does not cover adulteration 
causing death.  The offense of adulterating a substance with intent to cause death is better 
addressed by the homicide provisions in Chapter 1100.  Grading changes related to this 
Subsection are discussed below.  Second, in incorporating § 1339 into the proposed grading 
scheme of Section 1202, the grade of the offenses ends up being reduced one grade.  The grades 
of the current offense and proposed offense are too similar to justify a grading adjustment for 
using adulteration as the means of assault.  Consolidating these offenses improves the Code’s 
simplicity.  There is no reason to retain separate provisions for different means of assault when 
the culpability and result requirements are the same.  Subsection (a)(2) corresponds with 11 
Del.C. § 601 (offensive touching), but simplifies the offense definition by removing the 
distinction between offensive touching generally and touching with bodily excretions.   
Section 1202(b) grades the various forms of assault.  Subsection (b)(1) describes 
circumstances under which the offense will be graded as “enhanced aggravated assault,” 
corresponding to 11 Del.C. §§ 613(a)(2) & (a)(4) and 1103B. Note that, although not explicitly 
stated, Subsection (b)(1)(B) incorporates the offense conduct in 11 Del.C. § 606 (first degree 
abuse of a pregnant female), because, as it is defined in the Code, “serious physical injury” 
includes nonconsensual termination of pregnancy.  Subsection (b)(1)(C) corresponds to § 1103B 
(first degree child abuse) and preserves the grade.  Note that the terms “abuse of a child” and 
“neglect of a child” are defined in Section 1210, incorporating by reference the definitions 
provided in 10 Del.C. § 901(1).   
Section 1202(b)(2) describes the circumstances under which the offense will be graded as 
an “aggravated assault,” corresponding to 11 Del.C. § 612(a)(1) and (a)(10), and § 613(a)(1).  
Subsection (b)(2)(A) sets a higher grade where the offense involves use of a firearm or deadly 
weapon, corresponding to 11 Del.C. §§ 607(a)(3)a. and 613(a)(1).  Note that, as a result of 
consolidating these independently aggravated forms of assault in current law, the maximum 
punishment for aggravated strangulation is increased.  Note also that aggravated strangulation for 
causing serious physical injury under § 607(a)(3)b. is covered by Subsection (b)(2)(B)(i), which 
has the same maximum punishment.  
Subsection (b)(2)(B)(i) covers 7 Del.C. § 6013(c)-(d), which relates to environmental 
control.  Subsection (b)(2)(B)(i) adequately covers the offenses defined in § 6013(c)-(d) for three 
reasons.  First, although the offenses in § 6013(c)-(d) arguably do not have a culpability 
requirement as to causing injury and as a result recklessness is read in, some violators of § 6013, 
because of their relative sophistication, are likely to know with practical certainty that their 
conduct will cause injury.  Such knowledge is sufficient to show “knowing” culpability under 
proposed Section 205 and current Delaware law.10  Therefore, the current offenses in § 6013(c)-
(d) are appropriately defined in the Proposed Code with a “knowing” culpability requirement 
(and graded as a Class 6 felony).  Of course, insofar as some offenders are merely reckless with 
                                                             
10 See 11 Del. C. § 231(c)(2). 
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regard to causing serious physical injury, they may still be prosecuted for a Class 7 felony under 
Section 1203(b)(1)(B) [Reckless Injuring].  Second, the “serious harm to the environment” result 
contemplated by § 6013(c)-(d) necessarily incorporates serious physical injury to a person, 
whether that harm is past or prospective, so it is appropriate to define it as causing serious 
physical injury.  Finally, the grade of § 6013(c)-(d) is already identical to the grade in Subsection 
(b)(2)(A).  Note also that 7 Del. C. § 6013(e), which addresses the responsibility of 
organizational agents for authorizing certain environmental violations, is not retained.  The 
conduct prohibited by § 6013(e) is covered by Subsection (b)(2)(B)(i) – and, insofar as the 
conduct does not cause serious physical injury, by Sections 2202 [Fraudulent Tempering with 
Records], 3203 [Tampering with Public Records], or 3303 [Obstructing Administration of Law 
or Other Government Function] – coupled with the Proposed Code’s general rules for 
organizational liability and complicity.  [Note that the offenses in § 6013(c)-(e) only work within 
the scheme of Section 1202 if the culpability requirement for assault is changed from 
“intentional” to “knowing,” as proposed in the footnote to Section 1202(a). If “intentional” 
culpability is retained, changes may need to be made to the Proposed Code in order to 
accommodate § 6013(c)-(e) in a different way.]. 
Section 1202(b)(3)(A)(ii) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 611(1), grading simple assault.  
Subsection (b)(3)(A)(i) sets a higher grade, however, for assaults committed in particular ways.  
Subsection (b)(3)(A)(i)(aa) grades offenses committed by means of a firearm or other deadly 
weapon, corresponding to 11 Del.C. § 612(a)(2).  Subsection (b)(3)(A)(i)(bb) grades assaults 
committed by strangulation, corresponding to 11 Del.C. § 607(a)(2).  Subsection (b)(3)(B) 
grades an assault by offensive touching, corresponding to both forms of the current offense in 11 
Del.C. § 601.  
Section 1202(b)(4) converts some repeated, specialized offense definitions found 
throughout the current assault provisions—all of which deal with similar classes of special 
victims—into a broadly applicable grade adjustment for assault and aggravated assault.  
Subsections (b)(4)(A)-(C) correspond to the following current provisions: 11 Del.C. §§ 601(c); 
612(a)(3), (4),  (5), (7), (9), and (12); and 613(a)(5) and (6).  Note, however, that Subsections 
(b)(4)(A)-(C) do not retain the provision-specific aggravator in § 612(a)(12), requiring that 
physical injury to these classes of victims be caused “by means of an electronic control device,” 
to avoid unjustified overgeneralization and double counting of such requirement.  Subsection 
(b)(4)(D) corresponds to § 612(a)(11).  Subsection (b)(4)(E) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 1254 
(assault in a detention facility), with some minor changes.  First, Subsection (b)(4)(E) retains the 
one-level grade increase for assault done in a detention facility, but since assault is a Class 8 
felony under Section 1202(b)(3)(A)(ii) and this one grade adjustment results in a Class 7 felony,  
the grade of assault done in a detention facility is one level lower than current § 1254’s Class D 
felony grade.  The change results from the Proposed Code’s general policy of providing one 
grade increase per aggravating factor, absent a compelling justification for a greater increase.  
Providing a two-level grade increase for assault done in a detention facility (which is a four-fold 
increase in available punishment), while only providing a one-level grade increase for offenses 
involving police officers and emergency personnel who are victimized in the line of duty is 
disproportional and unjustified.  Second, Subsection (b)(4)(E) does not account for the 
mandatory minimum sentencing provision in § 1254.  All minimum sentencing provisions in the 
Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802. 
Note that the higher grades for victims 62 years of age or older, found in §§ 612(a)(6) and 
613(a)(7), are not retained.  An enormous number of current specific offenses contain such 
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grading provisions.  As a result, a generally applicable grade adjustment has been added to the 
General Part in Section 804 to deal with these situations.  
Assaults Involving a Disabling Spray during a Commission of a Crime. 11 Del. C. 
§ 612(a)(8) provides that using disabling chemical sprays or similar means during a commission 
of a crime amounts to assault in the second degree.  This provision is both too narrow 
(addressing a very specific means for assault), and too broad (applying to assault during a 
commission of any crime).  Moreover, unlike most other assault provisions, its lacks a result 
element (such as physical injury).  The combination of these factors leads to incoherent 
consequences under current law.  For instance, both a person that during a commission of a 
misdemeanor uses pepper spray without causing physical injury (§ 612(a)(8)), and a person using 
a firearm and causing a physical injury (§ 612(a)(2)), would be guilty of a Class D felony.  This 
result is inconsistent with general principles of criminal liability and perversely disincentivizes 
the use of non-lethal means such as disabling sprays.  For these reasons, § 612(a)(8) is not 
retained.  Note, however, that Section 1202(b)(1)(B) provides an enhanced grading for assaults 
causing serious physical injury during a commission of a felony.  
Strict Liability as to Knowing Victim’s Age or Pregnancy.  11 Del.C. §§ 612(a)(10), (b)-
(c) and 613(b), which impose strict liability as to knowledge of a victim’s age or status as a 
pregnant woman, are not retained in Section 1202.  General principles of criminal liability 
exemplified throughout the current Delaware code counsel that prosecution for all but the most 
minor infractions requires some showing of culpability.  Therefore, issues such as mistake as to 
age are governed by general mistake provisions in Section 206. 
Body-Piercing and Tongue-Splitting Offenses Not Retained.  Generally, proposed Section 
1202 does not retain 11 Del.C. § 1114 (body piercing) or 11 Del.C. § 1114A (tongue-splitting) 
because these offenses are given effect through a combination of the general assault offense in 
Section 1202 and General Part provisions relating to consent in Section 208.  The act 
criminalized by § 1114 is essentially standard assault, but sets forth certain situations where 
consent is not effective.  A combination of the proposed Section 1202 and Section 208 of the 
General Part will adequately cover these situations because Section 208 accounts for situations 
where consent is ineffective due to youth or intoxication.  The same is true for § 1114A(b) 
(tongue-splitting).  § 1114A(a), however, is different because it is a regulatory offense, dealing 
with situations where the person performing the act is not a doctor or dentist.  Yet, proposed 
Section 1202 does not include § 1114A(a) because it is unnecessary.  The definitions of assault 
and consent in the General Part are broad enough to provide that a person could not consent to a 
surgical procedure unless it is given to person who is licensed to perform it.  With respect to both 
§§ 1114(d)(2) and 1114A(d), the proposed Section 1202 does not retain the fake identification or 
mistake as to age provisions, since both of those situations are governed by the General Part as 
well, in Section 206.  Similarly, § 1114A(c) and the part of § 1114(d)(1) addressing repeat 
offense grade provisions are not retained, because the Proposed Code’s Section 804 contains a 
general adjustment for repeat offenses.  The part of § 1114(d)(1) addressing matters of 
jurisdiction is also not retained.  This provision adds to the inconsistencies in current law by 
referring only to § 1114 (but not to the comparable § 1114A), and is potentially incongruent with 
general jurisdictional rules that should apply to all similar cases.  Finally, note that §§ 1114(c), 
(e), (f) and 1114A (e), (f), (g), addressing matters related to notarization of the minor parents’ 
consent form, civil liability, licensing violations and definitions, have not been retained.  These 
provisions were designed to fit into a legislative scheme that contained separate criminal 
prohibitions on body-piercing and tongue-splitting.  However, there is no basis in current law to 
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broaden the application of these particularized provisions to the more general assault offense.  
On the other hand, retaining these provisions in Title 11 and restricting them to their current field 
of application, would amount to creating special carve-outs for these provisions, which 
undermines the goal of reducing inconsistencies in the law.  Of course, a different separate 
scheme of non-criminal regulation of body-piercing and tongue-splitting can be integrated into 
the appropriate title of the Delaware Code if the General Assembly deems it necessary 
Assaults Involving Use of Weapons.  Some forms of assault in Section 1202 are graded 
more harshly if they involve the use of firearms or deadly weapons.  Note that there is a separate 
offense for possession of a firearm during commission of a felony in proposed Section 5101, and 
that both 11 Del.C. § 206 and proposed Section 210 would prevent a defendant from being 
convicted of both that offense and an assault under either Section 1202(b)(2)(A) or (b)(3)(A)(i).   
 
 
Comment on Section 1203.  Reckless Injuring 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 603, 604, 605, 611, 612, 628, 628A, 629, 
1100(9), 1103, 1103A, 1103B, 1104, 1448; see also 2 
Del.C. § 309 and 21 Del.C. § 4134 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1203 defines and grades the offense of reckless injuring.  Section 
1203(a) criminalizes causing physical injury, while Section 1203(b) grades the offense as 
anything from a Class B misdemeanor to a Class 5 felony, depending on the extent of a victim’s 
injuries and the defendant’s culpability. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1203(a) is substantially similar to the current 
offense definitions in 11 Del.C. §§ 603(a)(1) and 604.  Those offenses deal with reckless 
endangerment, not injury.  However, in current law, assaults are defined to include reckless 
conduct.  This offense has been created to make a distinction in punishment between recklessly 
and knowingly causing injury—a significant difference in blameworthiness. 
Section 1203(b) grades reckless injuring, which, as mentioned above, is currently treated 
as equal to intentional assaults in 11 Del.C. §§ 611(1) and 612(a)(1), and intentional child abuse 
or neglect in 11 Del.C. § 1103B.  Subsection (b)(1) grades the offense involving serious physical 
injury and varies the grade depending on whether specific conditions are met.  Subsection 
(b)(1)(A)(i) corresponds with the reckless form of § 1103B (first degree child abuse); however, 
the grade has been reduced one level to reflect the difference in severity between reckless injury 
and knowing injury in Section 1202.  Subsection (b)(1)(A)(ii) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 605 
(second degree abuse of a pregnant female); however, the proposed Subsection does not require 
that the attack of the pregnant woman take place during the commission or attempted 
commission of or flight from another felony.  An attack on a pregnant woman is equally worthy 
of punishment whether or not the attack was committed in conjunction with another felony.  
Subsection (b)(1)(B) grades any other form of reckless injuring causing serious physical injury 
as a Class 7 felony. 
Section 1203(b)(2) grades the offense involving non-serious physical injury.  Subsection 
(b)(2)(A)(i) corresponds with the reckless form of 11 Del.C. § 1103A (second degree child 
abuse), but makes a few changes.  First, the proposed Subsection changes the age threshold in 
§ 1103A(a)(1) from three years of age or younger to less than four years of age to maintain a 
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consistent way of expressing age ranges in the Proposed Code.  Additionally, the proposed 
Subsection is given a different letter grade based on the proposed grading scheme, which no 
longer includes Class G felonies; [the maximum sentence, however, remains the same].  
Subsection (b)(2)(A)(ii) also incorporates the definition of “significant intellectual 
developmental disabilities” in 11 Del.C. § 1100(9).  Subsection (b)(2)(A)(iii) corresponds to 11 
Del.C. § 612(a)(2), but reduces the grade of the offense to reflect the distinction in 
blameworthiness between recklessness and knowledge or intent.  Subsection (b)(2)(B) grades 
any other form of reckless injuring causing physical injury as a Class B misdemeanor, 
corresponding with 11 Del.C. §§ 611(1) and 1103 (third degree child abuse); however, the grade 
of the offense has been reduced to reflect the distinction between reckless and knowing or 
intentional injury. 
Note that 11 Del.C. § 629, vehicular assault in the first degree, is effectively subsumed by 
Section 1203, despite using the lower culpability of ordinary negligence.  On one hand, this Code 
proposes to eliminate ordinary negligence as a culpable state of mind that can support criminal 
liability.  See proposed Section 205(b) and corresponding Commentary.  On the other hand, 
Section 212(b) imputes the culpability of recklessness to a voluntarily intoxicated defendant.  
Therefore, any case where a person driving under the influence causes physical injury, the 
defendant would be considered at least reckless.  This makes § 629 unnecessary, since the 
offense would automatically be treated as reckless injuring under proposed Section 1203. 
Negligent Injuring.  Current Delaware law contains a few specialized offenses that punish 
negligently causing injury.  Punishing negligent injury in a selective manner provides 
disproportionate punishment of a subset of defendants who are not even aware of a risk that their 
conduct would cause injury.  Negligent injury should either become a general offense, to avoid 
this disproportional, irrational selectivity, or it should not be a basis of liability at all.  Section 
1203 does not include those special cases because negligence is a slight culpability when dealing 
with a significant offense like causing serious or non-serious physical injury.  If a general 
negligent injury offense were to be added to Section 1203, its text would follow the footnote to 
Section 1203(b).  The following commentary would apply to that language, if added:  [Section 
1203(b)(2) pulls together some diverse provisions criminalizing negligent injuring. Subsection 
(b)(2)(A) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1448(e)(2), which increases punishment where the 
defendant caused serious physical injury by use of a firearm possessed in violation of proposed 
Section 5104.  The minimum sentencing provisions have not been retained, because all minimum 
sentencing provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802.  The grade of the 
offense in Subsection (b)(2)(A) has been reduced to reflect the distinction in blameworthiness 
between causing death and causing serious physical injury, which the current provision does not 
make.  Class 7 felony was used because, just as Class 4 felony is two grades higher than the 
default grade for negligently causing death in Section 1104(b)(3), Class 7 felony is two grades 
higher than the default grade for negligently causing serious physical injury in Section 
1203(b)(2)(B)(ii).  Subsections (b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) correspond to 11 Del.C. §§ 611(2) and 628A 
(second degree vehicular assault).  However, § 628A(1), which punishes causing serious 
physical injury through negligent driving, has been expanded by Subsection (b)(2)(A)(ii) to 
punish injuring by any means.  Subsection (b)(2)(C) expands upon 11 Del.C. § 628 (third degree 
vehicular assault) in the same manner.  Note that driving under the influence does not need to be 
dealt with under negligent injuring in Section 1203(b)(2) because reckless culpability will 
automatically be imputed under Section 213 for any offense involving voluntary intoxication.] 
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Regulatory Offenses Generally Incorporated.  Section 1203 generally covers two 
offenses currently codified in regulatory titles.  First, through its offenses of reckless and 
negligent injuring, Section 1203 covers 21 Del.C. § 4134 (operation of vehicles on approach of 
authorized emergency vehicles).  The offense defined in § 4134 makes it a crime for a person to 
hit an emergency responder with his or her vehicle as a result of not following designated traffic 
rules.  The grade of the offense, which is currently a Class F felony in all cases, will become 
more nuanced, depending on whether the resulting injury was serious and whether it was created 
recklessly or negligently. 
Second, through reckless endangerment and injuring offenses, Sections 1203 and 1204 
together cover 2 Del.C. § 309 (dangerous flying).  The offense defined in § 309 essentially 
amounts to reckless endangerment and, accordingly, it can be incorporated into the Section 
dealing with all other reckless endangerment offenses.  Note that, by incorporating § 309 into the 
proposed Section 1203, heavier punishments than those provided in § 309 may accompany a 
conviction for the offense.  Under Sections 1203 and 1204, the level of punishment authorized 
will depend on the nature of the risk involved and whether injury is actually caused by the 
offender’s reckless behavior.      
 
 
Comment on Section 1204.  Reckless Endangerment 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 7 Del.C. § 6309; 11 Del.C. §§ 603, 604, 613(a)(3), 
1104, 1322; see also § 1107 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1204 defines and grades the offense of reckless endangerment.  
Section 1204(a) criminalizes creating a risk of bodily harm to another person, even if the harm 
does not result. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1204(a) is substantially similar to the current 
offense definitions in 11 Del.C. §§ 603(a)(1) and 604 (reckless endangerment). 
Section 1204(b) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 603 and 604; however, the grade for 
Subsection (b)(1) has been reduced to reflect the lack of resulting harm.  Note that Subsection 
(b)(1) also covers 7 Del.C. § 6309(i) (hazardous waste), which makes it a crime to knowingly 
create a risk of death or serious physical injury by transporting, treating, storing, or disposing 
hazardous waste in an unsafe way.  Subsection (b)(1) does not need to make reference to the 
specific acts enumerated in § 6039(i) to fully account for the offense conduct because the manner 
in which someone creates a danger of death or serious physical injury is immaterial.  The 
resulting harm is the crux of a reckless endangerment offense.  One notable difference between 
Subsection (b)(1) and § 6309(i) is the grading.  Subsection (b)(1) grades the offense one level 
lower than § 6309(i).  This grade reduction is justified because there is no basis for aggravating 
reckless endangerment solely based on the manner in which it is caused.  Endangerment offenses 
do not deal with resulting harm, only with the creation of a risk of harm, and the grading of 
endangerment offenses already takes into account the severity of the risked harm, if the manner 
of endangerment is relevant to the degree of harm that is risked.  Note, however, that if the 
endangerment caused by the unlawful disposal of hazardous materials is particularly egregious 
because of the number of people it impacts, Section 2305 (causing/risking catastrophe) will 
apply to increase the grade attached to this offense conduct.  Finally, note that the offenses in 7 
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Del.C. § 6309(f)-(g) are not incorporated into the proposed Subsection (b)(1) because they are 
regulatory offenses that only give rise to misdemeanor level punishment.  These offenses will 
still be retained in Title 7. 
Section 1204(b)(2) grades reckless endangerment as a Class B misdemeanor in all cases 
not involving a substantial risk of death [or serious physical injury].  This covers 11 Del.C. 
§ 1322(1) (criminal nuisance) because the offense defined in § 1322(1) (recklessly creating a 
condition which endangers the safety or health of others) is practically identical to the offense of 
reckless endangerment defined in Section 1204(a) (recklessly creating a substantial risk of 
physical injury to others).  11 Del.C. § 1322(1) is graded in the current code as an unclassified 
misdemeanor.  
Section 1204(c) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1104, providing a defense to a 
prosecution under Section 1204(a) where the accused is a member of an organized religion and 
attempts to treat a child by prayer in accordance with the tenets of that religion.  Note that the 
current offense that § 1104 applies to, 11 Del.C. § 1102 (endangering the welfare of a child) has 
not been retained in the Proposed Code.  For a discussion of those reasons, see the General 
Commentary to Chapter 4400.  The situations to which § 1104 applies would, under the 
Proposed Code, be prosecuted as reckless endangerment rather than endangering the welfare of a 
child.  Therefore, the defense in § 1104 has been included here. 
Negligent Endangerment Not Included.  Two current offenses punishing negligent 
endangerment have not been included in Section 1204.  First, 11 Del.C. § 603(a)(2), punishing 
negligent endangerment involving possession of firearms, has not been included.  Second, 
11 Del.C. § 1107, punishing negligent endangerment of children, has not been included.  It is 
unusual to punish negligent injuring due to the relatively relaxed culpability requirement.  For 
that reason, negligence cannot support a charge of endangerment without resulting injury.  The 
situations contemplated by § 603(a)(2) and § 1107 are too specific to support a change to the 
current code’s broad policies against punishing negligent behavior except in exceptional 
circumstances the justify doing so.  
Reckless Endangerment Resulting in Serious Physical Injury.  11 Del.C. § 613(a)(3) 
combines reckless endangerment and serious reckless injuring into an additional, aggravated 
offense that is treated as a form of first-degree assault.  This form of assault is not specifically 
retained in Chapter 1200, because it violates a general assumption of criminal law, which is that 
culpability as to the manner or extent of harm is immaterial; only culpability as to causing harm 
is relevant.  However, since reckless injuring and endangerment are separate offenses under 
Sections 1203 and 1204, both offenses could be charged based on the same conduct in the proper 
circumstances.   
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Comment on Section 1205.  Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence of Drugs or 
Alcohol 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 21 Del.C. § 4177; 23 Del.C. §§ 2302, 2305 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1205 provides an offense for operating a boat, airplane, or vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.  
Relation to current Delaware Law.  Section 1205(a) defines the offense of operating a 
vehicle while chemically impaired.  Section 1205(a) combines essential elements of the offense 
definitions in 21 Del.C. § 4177(a) (driving a vehicle while under the influence or with prohibited 
alcohol or drug content) and 23 Del.C. § 2302(a) (operation of a vessel or boat while under the 
influence).  Note, however, that Section 1205 is not intended to replace those regulatory 
provisions altogether.  On the contrary, special care has been taken to preserve the complex 
“DUI”-related regulatory schemes in Title 21 and 23.  Section 1205 is meant to only replace the 
portions of those provisions that define a criminal offense.  “DUI” is a significant area of 
criminal law practice in Delaware.  As a matter of fair notice to the public of what conduct is 
prohibited, it is preferable that this offense definition appear in the criminal Code rather than 
regulatory titles, since it is invoked so frequently.  All the purely civil, procedural, or regulatory 
features of 21 Del.C. § 4177, 23 Del.C. § 2302, and related provisions in Titles 21 and 23 should 
remain where they are—along with any additional punishments and consequences of 
conviction—to be read in conjunction with Section 1205.  Note also, that the offense definition 
of Section 1205 uses the term “vehicle,” referring to and preserving current law’s distinctive 
definition of that term in 21 Del. C. § 4177(c)(1)(10), for purposes of DUI offenses. 
Section 1205(b) grades the offense as a Class B misdemeanor, which is one grade lower 
than current 21 Del.C. § 4177 and similar to 23 Del.C. § 2305.  The grade has been lowered one 
level to be consistent with the relative blameworthiness where injury does not result.  The 
offense in Section 1205 does not require that the offender cause physical injury to another 
through his or her actions—or even endanger the life or property of another person—and, 
accordingly, cannot be graded as harshly as an offense that does.  As a general matter, the current 
code always punishes causing injury more seriously than merely risking injury, and treats the 
former as more blameworthy conduct. Note that the addition of Section 1205 to Chapter 1200 
does not prevent the State from instead prosecuting an offender under Section 1203 (reckless 
injuring) or Section 1204 (reckless endangerment) when that offender operates a vehicle while 
chemically impaired and does cause physical injury to or endanger another person.   
Section 1205(c) cross-references to 21 Del.C. § 4177 to ensure the two Sections are read 
together, maintaining continuity with current practice as much as possible.  Additional provisions 
in § 4177 for any person convicted under Section 1205(a) include drug treatment programs, 
suspended sentences, and ignition interlock installation, among others.  Although the additional 
consequences provided for in § 4177 currently only apply to the offense of operating a vehicle 
while under the influence, in the proposed Section 1205 they apply to the operation of a boat, 
airplane, or vehicle while under the influence.  Operation of any vehicle while under the 
influence is especially dangerous, and people similarly situated should be subject to the same 
treatment and consequences, when practicable.  
Section 1205(d), providing a defense for a person who is chemically impaired due to 
taking a drug in accordance with an authorized prescription, corresponds to 21 Del.C. 
 
 409 
§ 4177(b)(3)b.  Note that according to § 4177(b)(3)(a) and § 4177(b)(3)(c) the defense applies 
only when prosecution is brought under the specific conditions of § 4177(a)(6) (when the content 
of the person's blood within 4 hours of driving contained any amount of drug taken prior or 
during driving).  However, Section 1205 provides no such limitation, because the logic of the 
defense applies to any prosecution involving chemical impairment due to taking of a drug in 
accordance with an authorized prescription.  Note that § 4177(b)(3)c. is therefore not retained. 
Note also that 23 Del. C. § 2302(c), providing that being legally entitled “to use alcohol or a 
drug” is not a defense to operating a vessel under the influence, is not retained.  With regard to 
drugs, 23 Del. C. § 2302(c) is inconsistent with the defense provided by 21 Del. C. § 4177(b)(3)b 
and Subsection (d).  With regard to alcohol, 23 Del. C. § 2302(c) is unnecessary, because Section 
1205(a) clearly applies to all cases in which the person was chemically impaired due to a lawful 
consumption of alcohol, besides the cases in which the defense in Subsection (d) applies.  
In addition, the categorization of Section 1205(d) as a defense applies the Proposed 
Code’s Section 106 burdens of proof, making the part of § 4177(c)(8) referring to the burdens of 
proof regarding the unlawful use of drugs unnecessary.  Note that 21 Del. C. § 4177(b)(1)–
(b)(3)a. (read in conjunction with the offense definition in § 4177(a)(5)-(6)), and 23 Del. C. 
§ 2302(d), though  framed as defenses, actually describe factual situations that fall outside of the 
offense definition, since chemical impairment occurred after the person operated a vehicle.  
Since these are matters dealt with in the normal course of establishing evidence to prove a case, 
those provisions are not necessary, and should not be retained.  Note also that insofar as 
§ 4177(a)(5)-(6), and 23 Del. C. § 2302(b) prohibit consumption of intoxicating substances prior 
or during driving even if they do not cause a person to be “chemically impaired” as defined in 
Section 1210, these provisions are not retained.  Section 1205 prohibition focuses on driving 
while chemically impaired.  Consumption of substances that are illegal per se is criminalized and 
can be prosecuted under Chapter 5200.  Finally, note that due to the changes in the structure of 
the offense, § 4177(b)(4) and 23 Del. C. § 2302(e) are unnecessary and not retained. 
Special Evidentiary and Jurisdictional Rules Not Incorporated.  The corresponding 
current provisions contain numerous special rules that apply to just one offense, and not others.  
For the simplicity of this Section and the uniformity of the Proposed Code, all special evidentiary 
and jurisdictional rules included in 21 Del.C. § 4177 and 23 Del.C. § 2305 should be removed.  
Having special rules in one case opens the door to having special rules in other cases, has the 
potential to dramatically complicate criminal litigation.  Instead, there should be a uniform rule 
on these issues to apply in all cases.  The Rules of Evidence are sufficiently broad to cover the 
offense of operating a vehicle while chemically impaired, and there are already general 
jurisdictional rules that determine how cases are distributed.  
Special Provisions Not Included in this Section.  Section 1205 does not incorporate any 
of the grading adjustments for repeat offenders currently provided in 21 Del.C. § 4177(d) and 23 
Del.C. § 2305(2)-(4).  In the Proposed Code, all general grade adjustments are dealt with in 
Section 804 of the General Part.  Additionally, Section 1205 does not incorporate the mandatory 
minimum punishment provisions provided in § 4177 or § 2305 because all minimum sentencing 
provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802.  Note also that the parts of 
§ 4177(d)(8) and 23 Del. C. § 2305(3)-(4) excluding felony level DUI offenses from serving as 
predicate felonies for the application of 11 Del. C. § 4214 (current law’s habitual criminal 
offense) are unnecessary and not retained.  While Section 804(a) substitutes 11 Del. C. § 4214 in 
addressing felony level recidivism, it is not applicable to an offense under Section 1205, 
allowing the Proposed Code to reach the same result as current law. 
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Offense in 11 Del.C. § 1249 Not Included in this Section.  Section 1205 does not include 
the offense of abetting a violation of driver’s license restrictions found in 11 Del.C. § 1249.  The 
offense conduct provided in § 1249(a)-(c) essentially amounts to aiding someone to drive while 
intoxicated and this will already be covered by General Part provisions in Section 702 
(solicitation) and Section 211 (complicity).  Accordingly, it would be redundant to include the 
specific offense in Section 1205.  Note also that § 1249(d), addressing special jurisdictional rule 
and grading provisions has not been retained for the reasons listed above. 
 
 
Comment on Section 1206.  Genital Mutilation of a Female Minor 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 780 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1206 defines an offense prohibiting persons from circumcising or 
otherwise mutilating the genitalia of a female under eighteen and prohibiting parents or legal 
guardians of females minors from allowing such acts to be performed on them.  The prohibition 
applies regardless of any custom, culture, or ritual that either requires or permits these 
procedures. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1206 corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 780.  
Section 1206(a) provides the offense definition, closely tracking § 780(a).  Section 1206(b) 
tracks § 780(c), but expands the “no defense” provision to provide that it is not a defense that the 
procedure was either required or permitted as a matter of custom, ritual, or standard practice.  
This captures more potential defenses than the current provision.  Section 1206(c) grades the 
offense as a Class 6 felony, tracking § 780(b). Although the proposed grade is not exactly the 
same as the current grade (Class E felony), it is justifiable because the act is essentially a serious 
assault without valid consent, making it akin to aggravated assault—a Class 6 felony in the 
Proposed Code. 
Note that, unlike § 780, the proposed Section 1206 does not raise lack of consent to the 
procedure as an issue because consent cannot be a defense to this offense.  Although the 
Proposed Code recognizes a general consent defense in Section 208, the defense would not apply 
to an offense under Section 1206 because of an important exception: a victim cannot consent to 
the infliction serious bodily injury.  Genital mutilation results in serious bodily injury because it 
involves the removal or damaging of a major organ in a woman’s body. 
Applicability to Adult Women.  Although the offense does not apply to adult women, the 
act of circumcision performed on adult women qualifies as a form of amputation covered by the 
offense of “heinous assault” in Section 1202(b)(1)(A). 
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Comment on Section 1207.  Terroristic Threats and Hoaxes; Menacing 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 602, 621, 622, 1240, 1301(1)g.; see also 
805 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1207 criminalizes causing fear and terror in other persons by 
threatening to commit a serious offense, menacing, or by terroristic hoax.  The offense addresses 
the grave fear for personal safety or security that such threats may cause, even when the 
threatened crime is not carried out, or even intended.  Although current law does not make the 
distinction, Subsection (b)(2)(A)(ii) refers to not a threat, but rather a terroristic hoax.  Section 
1207 has been titled to reflect the difference. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1207(a) combines the offense definitions in 
11 Del.C. §§ 602, 621(a)(1) & (3), 622, and 1240(a).  However, the offense definition leaves 
several distinctions in current law to be covered by grading, including the victim’s status as a 
public official or public servant, and the particular methods of creating fear under Subsection 
(a)(2).  Subsection (a)(1)(B) is substantially similar to the definition of terroristic threatening in 
11 Del.C. § 621(a)(1); however, Subsection (a)(1)(A) has been added to clarify requirements that 
are implicit in the current offense.  Current § 621(a)(1) provides no culpability requirement, 
meaning that recklessness is read into the provision under 11 Del.C. § 251(b).  But the current 
offense does not make clear in what way a person could recklessly make a terroristic threat, since 
the conduct of making a threat is usually, if not always, intentional.  More likely, a person could 
make a threat, while reckless as to whether the threat would cause another person to feel 
terrorized.  Subsection (a)(1)(A) reflects this understanding of the current offense.  But note that 
Subsection (a)(1)(A) does not add a result element, which is not present in current law—in other 
words, no one needs to actually feel terrorized by the defendant’s threat.  In making the threat, 
the defendant must consciously disregard a substantial risk that another person will experience 
extreme fear or distress because of the threat. 
Section 1207(b) grades the offenses combined in this Section.  Subsection (b) preserves 
the grades of the offenses in §§ 602, 621, 622, and 1240, except for Subsection (b)(2)(A)(i), 
which has been lowered one grade level because of the enormous gulf in grading between simple 
and aggravated menacing in current law.  Simple menacing is an unclassified misdemeanor with 
a maximum sentence of 30 days’ imprisonment, while aggravated menacing is a Class E felony, 
with a maximum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment—a 60-fold increase.  Subsection 
(b)(2)(A)(i) sets the grade of aggravated menacing at Class 8 felony to reduce this 
disproportionality, but still respect the decision of the General Assembly to make it a felony 
offense.   
Section 1207(b)(1)(A) corresponds to the terroristic threatening of public officials in 11 
Del.C. 1240.  Subsection (b)(1)(B) sets the default grade for terroristic threats, corresponding to 
§ 621(b).  Subsection (b)(2)(A)(ii) corresponds to § 622 (hoax device).  While the conduct 
covered is essentially the same, Subsection (a)(2) uses a more objective standard than § 622 for 
determining liability.  Unlike § 622, which requires a showing of intent by the offender to cause 
anxiety, unrest, fear, or personal discomfort through the offender’s use of a hoax substance or 
device, proposed Subsection (a)(2) focuses only on the offender’s intent to cause another 
person’s believe in exposure.  The proposed subsection’s focus on intentional causation by any 
means makes it unnecessary to retain the provisions of § 622 that enumerate specific conduct 
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(e.g., possesses, transports, etc.) and types of devices (e.g., destructive device, incendiary device, 
etc).  Thus, proposed Subsection (a)(2) incorporates a much simpler version of § 622 into the 
Code, while still retaining the same grade for the offense.  Note also that, like in many other 
offenses, if the resulting harm (belief in exposure) is not actually caused, then the offender will 
only be liable for the attempt under Section 701.  Note that Subsection (b)(2)(A)(ii) does not 
include the mandatory minimum fine provided in § 621(c) and (d).  All minimum sentencing 
provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802. 
Section 1207(b)(2)(B) incorporates 11 Del.C. § 1301(1)g., which makes it an offense to 
“[congregate] with other persons in a public place while wearing masks, hoods or other garments 
rendering their faces unrecognizable, for the purpose of and in a manner likely to imminently 
subject any person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States of America.”  By refocusing the offense upon the threat 
of imminent harm created by such behavior, Subsection (b)(2)(B) can grade the offense higher 
than it is under current law (an unclassified misdemeanor for disorderly conduct).  Subsection 
(b)(2)(C) preserves the default grade for menacing in current law. 
Cross Burning and Other True Threats.  Section 1207 implicitly covers cases that would 
currently be prosecuted under 11 Del.C. 805, which prohibits the burning of crosses or other 
religious symbols.  An individual who burns a cross or other religious symbol with the intent of 
communicating a threat of harm to others satisfies the elements of Section 1207.  Cross burnings 
carry a “long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.”  Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 363 (2003).  Such actions are not protected under the Constitution; cross burnings 
conducted with the intent to intimidate others are an example of a true threat, Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969), and “encompass[es] those statements where the speaker means 
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals.”  Black, 538 U.S. at 359.  States are permitted to 
ban such “true threats” as the prohibitions are not meant to regulate the content of any messages 
that might be conveyed through the cross burning, but are meant to “protect[] individuals from 
the fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders, as well as from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.”  Id. at 344. 
One does not burn a cross in full view of others lightly, and is at least “reckless as to 
causing another person to experience extreme fear or distress.”  Proposed Section 1207(a)(1)(A).  
Moreover, in light of the history associated with cross burnings, such actions, committed with 
the intent to intimidate carry an implicit “threat[] to commit any offense likely to result in death, 
or serious injury to person or property.”  Subsection 1207(a)(1)(B). 
Public Alarms Reserved.  11 Del.C. § 621(a)(2) defines as a part of terroristic threatening 
making false statements that are likely to cause evacuations and other public inconvenience.  
This has not been incorporated in Section 1207.  Such acts are more appropriately categorized in 
proposed Section 4102 as offenses against public safety, rather than threat offenses.  
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Comment on Section 1208.  Unlawfully Administering Drugs 
 
Corresponding current provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 625, 626 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1208 criminalizes administering drugs to another person and 
intentionally causing an alteration of that person’s physical or mental condition as a result. 
Relation to current Delaware Law.  Section 1208(a) combines the offense definitions in 
11 Del.C. §§ 625 and 626, but also makes a few changes to the current offense definitions.  First, 
Subsection (a)(1) does not include the language about controlled substances or counterfeit drugs 
that is included in the offense definition of § 626.  Currently, the only difference between an 
offense involving regular drugs (§ 625) and an offense involving controlled or counterfeit drugs 
(§ 626) is the grade; § 625 is a Class A misdemeanor, while § 626 is a Class F felony.  Section 
1208(a), however, does not need to distinguish between this offense conduct anymore because 
the grade for this offense has been raised to a Class 8 felony in Section 1208(b).  The grade has 
been changed to reflect the offense’s similarities to simple assault in Section 1202(a)(1), which is 
also graded as a Class 8 felony (except when committed by means of a firearm or other 
dangerous weapon).  Since this offense requires intentional culpability for what essentially 
amounts to a simple assault, i.e., causing physical injury, it should be graded similarly.  
Lesser Included Offense to Assault.  To the extent that Section 1208 deals with the 
administration of drugs that causes physical harm, it is a lesser included offense to assault.  It is 
only where the conduct causes an alteration of the victim’s mental condition, but no physical 
harm, that the offense is materially different from the general assault offense in Section 1202.  
 
 
Comment on Section 1209.  Reckless Infliction of Severe Mental or Emotional Harm 
 
Corresponding current provision(s): 14 Del.C. § 9302-03; 16 Del.C. §§ 1131, 1136; 
31 Del.C. §§ 3902, 3913 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1209 defines and grades the offenses of abuse of vulnerable persons 
and hazing.  Section 1209(a) defines the offense of abuse of vulnerable persons, which includes 
recklessly causing mental or emotional harm or failing to provide necessary care to especially 
vulnerable victims.  Section 1209(b) defines the offense of hazing, which includes recklessly 
creating a substantial risk of mental or emotional harm to another person for the purpose of 
initiating them into an organization.  Section 1209(c) grades both of these offenses. 
Relation to Current Delaware Law.  Section 1209(a) combines the neglect and emotional 
abuse element of the offenses in 16 Del.C. § 1136(a)-(b) and 31 Del.C. § 3913(a), (c) to create a 
new offense definition.  While the offense conduct remains largely the same, there are some 
differences between the current offenses and the proposed section that are important to note.  
First, Section 1209(a) only covers mental and emotional harm to vulnerable persons; it does not 
cover conduct that causes physical injury, death, or sexual offense to vulnerable persons because 
such offenses are covered elsewhere in Chapters 1100-1300.  (All offenses that apply specifically 
to vulnerable persons will receive a grade increase under the “vulnerable persons” provision in 
Section 804 of the General Part.)  Second, Section 1209(a) removes the word “knowingly” from 
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the current offense definition’s phrase “knowingly and recklessly,” stating the culpability 
requirement simply as “recklessly.”  Culpability requirements establish the minimum level of 
culpability that the State is required to prove in order to convict someone of the offense.  A 
person can thus always be convicted of an offense where he or she acted with a state of mind 
greater than the minimum level required in the offense definition.  Since “knowingly” is a higher 
level of culpability than “recklessly,” it is necessarily sufficient for conviction of an offense 
requiring “recklessly” and need not be stated explicitly in the offense definition.  Finally, Section 
1209(a) does not include a provision corresponding with § 1136(d) providing for special liability 
where directors or high managerial agents know that patients or residents of a facility are being 
abused and fail to take remedial action.  This provision is redundant with omission liability 
provided for in Section 204, which provides that omission may be the basis for a conviction 
where a defendant has a legal duty to prevent a harm but fails to do so.  In the case of vulnerable 
persons in facilities, it is fair to assume that directors or high managerial agents that have 
knowledge of abuse would be bound by a legal duty to prevent or remedy that abuse.  
Accordingly, a special provision relating to this situation in Section 1209(a) is unnecessary.  
Section 1209(a)(2)(A) provides that a person commits an offense under this Section if 
that person recklessly causes mental or emotional harm to a particular kind of victim.  Subsection 
(a)(2)(A) is intended to capture the resulting harm described in the “emotional abuse” provisions 
in 16 Del.C. § 1131(1)c. and 31 Del.C. § 3902(1)b.  
Section 1209(a)(3) lists the kinds of people an offender would have to abuse or neglect to 
be subject to a prosecution for an offense under this Section.  Subsection (a)(3)(A) includes 
“vulnerable persons” within the class of victims to whom this offense applies.  Note that under 
the proposed Section 1209, the term “vulnerable person” is given the more expansive definition 
provided in Section 804, instead of the one currently provided in § 3913, which defines a 
“vulnerable person” as an “adult who is impaired.”  This expanded definition allows the offense 
to capture more victims deserving of its protection.  Subsection (a)(3)(B) includes any “patient or 
resident of any facility where medical or personal care is provided,” within the class of victims to 
whom this offense applies.  The phrase “any facility where medical or personal care is provided” 
incorporates by reference the kinds of facilities enumerated in 16 Del.C. § 1131(4).  For the 
purposes of this Section, the term “medical care” includes psychiatric care, as provided in 
§ 1131(4).  
Section 1209(b) provides the offense definition for hazing, corresponding with 14 Del.C. 
§§ 9302 and 9303.  Section 1209(b) makes some changes to §§ 9302-03.  First, it does not 
address any part of the offense definition having to do with physical injury, since that is already 
covered by the assault and reckless injuring offense in Sections 1202-03, or property damage, 
since that is already covered by the criminal damage offense in Section 2304.  Note however, 
that because definition of the term “hazing” in § 9302 also serves a regulatory purpose in Title 
14, it should be retained in that title.  Second, the offense definition has been adjusted to make it 
more consistent with reckless endangerment.  Specifically, the offense definition no longer lists 
examples of particular activities that constitute hazing.  Under the proposed Section 1209(b), any 
activity that creates a substantial risk of mental or emotional harm constitutes hazing as long as it 
is done with the intent to initiate, admit, or renew membership of a person into an organization is 
met.  This subjective intent requirement in Subsection (b)(2) is fairly narrow to balance out the 
broad offense definition.  Note also that Subsection (b)(2) expands the types of organizations that 
can be involved in hazing to all organizations, rather than only organizations that are officially 
sanctioned or recognized by an institution of higher education, as § 9302 provides.  The potential 
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harm of pressuring an individual into an organization is equally blameworthy no matter what the 
organization is.  
Section 1209(c) preserves the grades for the offenses in §§ 1136, 3913, and 9302. 
Note that the term “severe mental or emotional harm” is not defined.  None of the 
provisions upon which Section 1209 is based provides guidance for a definition, which is 
probably because the concept is too situation-specific to be defined with satisfaction.  However, 
one factor that might suggest severity is whether the harm is the length of time that the harm 
persists. 
 
 
Comment on Section 1210.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding current provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 222, 3913; 21 Del.C. § 4177 
 
Comment:   
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1210(a) defines the term “chemically 
impaired,” which is used in the offense definition in Section 1205(a).  The definition directly 
corresponds to 21 Del.C. § 4177(a), (c)(1), (c)(7), and (c)(11) incorporating the standards used to 
define what is meant by “under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a prohibited alcohol or 
drug content.”  The term “chemically impaired” has been used instead because it is less 
cumbersome to read, making the offense (and others in the Proposed Code) easier to understand.  
Use of the general exception, “except as authorized by law” incorporates § 4177(c)(8).  Note that 
the phrase “or another intoxicating substance” in Subsection (a)(1)(B) is intended to capture any 
other substance that is capable of affecting a person’s judgment, control, or due care in a manner 
similar to alcohol and controlled substances.  This includes references in § 4177(6)-(7) to “any 
substance or preparation having the property of releasing vapors or fumes which may be used for 
the purpose of producing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, exhilaration, stupefaction or 
lethargy or for the purpose of dulling the brain or nervous system.”  Note also that the standards 
provided in 21 Del.C. § 4177(a) are identical to those in 23 Del.C. § 2302(a).  
Section 1210(b) provides a definition of “physical injury” that corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 222(23).  Yet, the definition has been extended to include physical harm that would normally 
cause substantial pain, even if such pain is not experienced by the particular victim of an offense.  
For instance, a victim’s sensitivity to pain may be dulled if he is chemically impaired, yet, 
infliction of physical harm that under normal conditions would have caused substantial pain 
would amount to physical injury under the Proposed Code. 
Section 1210(c) provides a definition of “serious physical injury” that is taken directly 
from 11 Del.C. § 222(26).  Note, however, that it includes the extended definition of serious 
injury from Section 1210(b). 
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CHAPTER 1300.  SEXUAL OFFENSES 
 
Section 1301.  Rape and Sexual Assault  
Section 1302.  Prohibited Sexual Contact by Persons in Positions of Trust 
Section 1303.  Bestiality 
Section 1304.  Prohibited Conduct by a Person Convicted of a Sexual Offense Against a Child 
Section 1305.  Sexual Harassment 
Section 1306.  General Provisions Relating to this Chapter 
Section 1307.  Definitions 
 
 
General Comment Regarding Chapter 1300: 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 777A, 1112A, 1112B, 4205A 
 
Comment: 
[There are a few provisions in the current Delaware law on sexual offenses that this draft 
of Chapter 1300 does not address. 
First, Chapter 1300 does not include 11 Del.C. § 777A, which makes it an aggravated 
offense for a sex offender to later commit an offense against a child.  Like the hate crime 
provision and offense against a vulnerable adult, § 777A is a hybrid between an offense and a 
general grade adjustment.  It is a separately charged offense, but the grade of the offense is 
reached by increasing the grade of an underlying offense.  The repeat offense grade provisions 
from § 777A are not included because proposed Section 804 contains a general adjustment for 
repeat offenses. 
Second, Chapter 1300 does not include 11 Del.C. § 1112A or 1112B, sexual solicitation 
of a child and promoting sexual solicitation of a child, respectively.  These provisions rely on 11 
Del. C. § 1100(7)’s definitions of “prohibited sexual act” that are not retained, being generally 
broader and less nuanced than those used in the Proposed Code.  Moreover, such offenses are 
unnecessary in the Specific Part of the Proposed Code, as solicitation to commit the acts 
prohibited by the Proposed Code would be covered by the application of its General Part.  For 
instance, solicitation of children to engage in sexual acts prohibited by the Proposed Code would 
be covered by the inchoate offense of solicitation in Section 702 combined with the relevant 
predicate offense prohibiting the conduct (such as sexual assault in Section 1301, public 
indecency in Section 1401, or creation of child pornography in Section 4204).  
Finally, Chapter 1300 does not include 11 Del.C. § 4205A, a minimum sentencing 
provision for repeat sex offenders and certain sexual offenses committed against children under 
14 years of age.  All minimum sentencing provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in 
Section 802. See the Commentary to Section 802 for a thorough explanation of the Proposed 
Code’s approach to minimum sentences. 
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Comment on Section 1301.  Rape and Sexual Assault 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 761, 762, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 
773, 774, 777, 778, 778A 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1301 creates an offense prohibiting persons from engaging in sexual 
contact, including intercourse, penetration, and other contact, with another person in situations 
that indicate not only a lack of consent, but that the offender is or ought to be aware of that lack 
of consent.  This includes situations where the offender has used force, coercion, or deception 
against the victim, where the offender has substantially impaired the victim’s power to control 
the victim’s own conduct by administering intoxicants or employing other means to prevent 
resistance, or where the victim is unable to understand or consent to the act due to immaturity, 
unconsciousness, or other impairment. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1301 brings together the four degrees of rape 
in 11 Del.C. §§ 770–73 and the three degrees of “unlawful sexual contact” in 11 Del.C. §§ 767-
69, as well as elements of other provisions that bear upon the grading or availability of defenses 
to these offense.  “Unlawful sexual contact” has also been renamed “sexual assault,” reflecting 
its similarity to assault in Section 1202.  The elements of the various forms of rape and sexual 
assault under current law are so many, and so varied, that they produce inconsistent results based 
on the precise nature of the sexual act performed and the relative ages of the victim and offender.  
Section 1301 seeks to preserve the policies underlying the current rape and sexual assault laws 
while reconciling inconsistencies as much as possible. 
Offense Definition.  Section 1301(a) contains the offense definition for rape, oral or 
object penetration, and sexual assault, which tracks all four current degrees of rape and three 
current degrees of “unlawful sexual contact.”  However, instead of using the phrase “without 
consent,” and then defining “without consent” in a separate subsection, the definition of “without 
consent” (and the inability to consent) in 11 Del.C. § 761(j)–(k) is incorporated into the offense 
definition.  Although that makes the offense definition of Section 1301 longer and more 
comprehensive than it might otherwise be, it allows the offense to function without muddying 
the definition of “consent” as it is used in Section 208 to apply to all offenses.  In Subsection 
(a)(1), the common requirement that the offender “intentionally” engage in sexual contact with 
the victim has been removed in order to make it clear that the offender need not intend that the 
contact be without the victim’s consent.  In practice, this missing culpability element will not 
create additional, undeserving offenders, because the additional offense elements are already 
rather demanding.  
In incorporating the definition of “without consent” into the offense definition, 
Subsection (a)(2) also consolidates inconsistent or redundant language currently included in the 
definition of “without consent” or in the §§ 767-773 offenses themselves.  For example, 
Subsection (a)(2)(A) removes the lengthy description in 11 Del.C. § 761(j) of what conduct 
constitutes coercion and simply refers to “coercion,” incorporating by reference the definition 
from proposed Section 1404, which includes use of force or threats against a third person.  
Similarly, Subsection (a)(2)(A) uses the term “deception” to capture all forms of deception 
described in § 761, including abuse of a position of trust in § 761(j)(4).  The offense definition in 
Section 1301(a) also removes the reference to victim resistance currently included in the 
definition of “without consent” because it is inconsistent with the clause about a reasonable 
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person: if the offender’s act would cause a reasonable person to submit, the victim’s reaction in 
the moment is immaterial.  The primary focus of this offense, as in all other offenses, is on the 
acts and culpability of the offender, not on the victim’s response.  The victim’s resistance, 
however, may be considered as a factor in determining the offender’s culpability, since it speaks 
to what the offender knew or risked while engaging in the offense conduct.  
Section 1301(a)(2)(B) corresponds to the situations described in 11 Del.C. § 761(j)(2)–
(3), where an offender knows a victim is unable to consent or does not understand the nature of 
the act, due to, inter alia, cognitive impairment or unconsciousness.  Subsection (a)(2)(C) covers 
the situation described in § 761(j)(5), where the offender has substantially impaired the victim’s 
ability to understand and control his or her own conduct through the use of intoxicants on the 
victim or other means of preventing the victim’s resistance.  Subsection (a)(2)(D) incorporates 
the age restriction on consent formerly included in the § 761(k) definition of “without consent,” 
as well as the age restriction in the offense definition in § 771(a)(1), which both cover conduct 
done to a child under sixteen.  Although § 771(a)(1) currently requires that the victim be less 
than sixteen years old and the offender be at least ten years older than the victim, § 761(k) only 
requires that the offender be at least four years older when the victim is less than sixteen and the 
distinction in age gaps is not significant enough to increase the grade of the offense—doubling 
maximum punishment—which is the smallest increase available.  Accordingly, the proposed 
Subsection (a)(2)(D) removes the distinction.  Subsection (a)(2)(D)(ii) creates another specific 
age restriction on consent where the victim is under twelve years old.  This corresponds with 
§ 769(a)(3), but changes the victim’s age from thirteen to twelve to make all the age cutoffs in 
this section consistent with § 773(a)(5), as well as with § 762(d).  Note that current law contains 
an ambiguity as to the age required for sexual contact with a person less than 12 years of age to 
constitute an offense.  Subsection (b)(1)(B), reflecting current law, aggravates rape where the 
offender is over 18 years of age; however, this implies that all persons under 18 would be guilty 
of base-line rape under Subsection (b)(3).  Note however, that issues pertaining to the treatment 
of minors are addressed outside of the Proposed Code, in Title 10. 
Grading.  Section 1301(b)–(d) grades the various forms of rape, oral or object 
penetration, and sexual assault.  Generally, each specific grade aggravation does not account for 
age, like the current offenses do, because a victim’s age is now captured within the offense 
definition in Subsection (a)(2)(D).  Note also that the grading scheme in Subsections (b)(1)-(3) 
apply not only to acts of sexual intercourse, but to oral or object penetration and sexual contact 
as well, unless specified otherwise.  In this way, aggravating factors can be consistently applied 
to any of the three different kinds of sexual conduct captured by Section 1301.  Subsections (c) 
and (d) increase the grade of the offense a set number of grades if the offense conduct is either 
sexual intercourse or oral or object penetration.  These provisions must always be read together 
to reach the ultimate grade of the offense.  This grading scheme is complex, but rational and 
comprehensive: every aggravation is consistently applied, and the relative blameworthiness of 
different sexual conduct is maintained in every case. 
Subsection (b)(1) describes circumstances under which the offense conduct will be 
graded most harshly as enhanced aggravated sexual assault, enhanced aggravated oral or object 
penetration, or enhanced aggravated rape.  Subsection (b)(1)(A)(i)(aa) corresponds with 
11 Del.C. §§ 772(a)(2)a., 772(a)(2)c., and 773(a)(1), providing a higher grade where the offender 
causes serious physical injury to the victim.  Note, however, that unlike in §§ 771(a)(2)a. and 
773(a)(1), mental or emotional injury are not included as a basis for aggravation because this 
kind of psychological injury is likely going to be present in every sexual offense.  Resulting 
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psychological harm is built into the offense by grading it severely.  Subsections (b)(1)(A)(i)(bb)-
(cc) correspond with §§ 769(a)(1), 773(a)(3), and 772(a)(2)d.-e. to create a higher grade for the 
display of deadly weapons and objects intended to appear as deadly weapons or the threat of 
possession of those objects.  Note, however, that there is a separate offense for possession of a 
firearm during commission of a felony in Section 5101, and that both 11 Del.C. § 206 and 
propose Section 210 would not allow a defendant to be convicted of both that offense and rape or 
sexual assault under Section 1301(b)(1)(A)(ii)(bb) (though a defendant could be charged with 
both).  Note also that the proposed Subsection (b)(1)(A)(i)(bb) makes a slight change to the 
language in the current sections about objects that “appear to be a deadly weapon,” requiring 
instead that the offender intend that the object appears to be a deadly weapon for the purposes of 
terrorizing the victim.  This intent requirement justifies the drastic grade increase of two grades 
where a deadly weapon is not actually present. Subsection (b)(1)(A)(ii) corresponds with the 
current provisions in §§ 773(a) and 772(a), providing that, to qualify for aggravated grading, all 
of the preceding conduct must take place during commission or attempted commission of, 
immediate flight from, or attempt to prevent reporting of, the offense.  
Subsection (b)(1)(B) corresponds with §§ 769(a)(3), 772(a)(2)g., and 773(a)(5).  
Subsection (b)(1)(C) corresponds with §§ 772(a)(2)f. and 773(a)(4), but is reworded slightly to 
distinguish between remote and immediate accomplices and capture the situation of “gang rape,” 
an especially heinous act deserving of greater punishment.  Unlike in other subsections, sexual 
intercourse and oral or object penetration are specified as offense conduct in Subsection 
(b)(1)(B) to make clear that, like under current law, liability is not increased for  what might be 
called gang “unlawful sexual conduct,” (or, in the Proposed Code, gang “sexual assault”).  Like 
in current law, sexual intercourse, and oral or object penetration are required for the increased 
liability under this Subsection. 
Note that the proposed grade of enhanced aggravated rape—a Class 3 felony—is roughly 
one grade lower than that provided in current law for similar conduct (Class A felony).  The 
legislation authorizing this Proposed Code mandates that “disproportionate” statutes be identified 
and rectified.  The proportionality of an offense’s authorized punishment is directly tied to the 
grade assigned to that offense.  An offense’s grade could be either disproportionately high or 
low.  The nonpartisan consultative group supervising the drafting process for this Proposed Code 
has scrutinized the relative grading of all offenses, and has decided that this offense’s grade is 
disproportionately high when compared to other offenses of the same grade in current law.  The 
grade of this offense has been changed to reflect that judgment. 
Subsection (b)(2) describes circumstances under which the offense conduct will be 
graded more harshly as aggravated sexual assault, aggravated oral or object penetration, or 
aggravated rape.  Subsection (b)(2)(A) corresponds with 11 Del.C. §§ 769(a)(1), 771(a)(2)a.–b., 
and 773(a)(1), establishing a grade increase where an offender causes physical injury to a victim 
during the commission or attempted commission of, flight from, or attempt to prevent the 
reporting of an offense.  Subsection (b)(2)(B) corresponds with § 771(a)(1), establishing a grade 
increase where the victim is under fourteen years old.  Note, however, that the proposed 
subsection removes the requirement in § 771(a)(1) that the offender be at least nineteen years 
old, because 11 Del.C. § 777(b) effectively amends the rape statute to require a smaller age 
differential and the Proposed Code preserves that part of § 777.  Subsection (b)(2)(C) 
corresponds with §§ 772(a)(2)b. and 773(a)(2)a., establishing an higher grade where the offense 
occurred during the commission or attempted commission of another felony.  Note, however, 
that the proposed Subsection removes the increased grading for an offense occurring the 
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commission or attempted commission of certain misdemeanors.  This is because misdemeanors 
are punished by, at most, one year of imprisonment, while this Subsection represents a fourfold 
increase in maximum punishment over the baseline rape offense.  Note also that for consistency, 
this grade increase applies to the offense of sexual assault, though current law does not provide 
for it.  Note that, when applied with Subsection (d) [sexual assault], the grade of the offense is a 
Class 7 felony—roughly one grade higher than that provided by current law for similar conduct.  
The legislation authorizing this Proposed Code mandates that “disproportionate” statutes be 
identified and rectified.  The proportionality of an offense’s authorized punishment is directly 
tied to the grade assigned to that offense.  An offense’s grade could be either disproportionately 
high or low.  The nonpartisan consultative group supervising the drafting process for this 
Proposed Code has scrutinized the relative grading of all offenses, and has decided that this 
offense’s grade is disproportionately low when compared to other offenses of the same grade in 
current law.  The grade of this offense has been changed to reflect that judgment. 
Subsection (b)(3) provides the baseline grade for the offense conduct in all other cases of 
rape: a Class 6 felony.  
When the offense under Section 1301(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3) does not involve sexual 
intercourse, but the less serious conduct of oral or object penetration or sexual contact, 
Subsections (c) and (d) provide a one or three grade downward adjustment, respectively.  These 
grade differences are consistent with the punishment levels present in current law and reflect the 
relatively more reprehensible nature of rape as compared to other sexual offenses.  Subsection 
(c) covers the offense conduct in 11 Del.C. §§ 770(a)(3), 771(a)(2), 772(a)(2), but sets the grade 
at one level lower than rape to reflect the important distinction between acts of sexual intercourse 
and those of oral or object penetration.  Subsection (d) covers the remaining offense conduct in 
11 Del.C. §§ 767–69 relating to sexual assault.  Note that the baseline offense grade for sexual 
assault, applying Subsections (b)(3) and (d) together, is a Class A misdemeanor—the same as 
under current law.  Retaining the Class A misdemeanor level of sexual assault has two key 
benefits: first, it assists with plea bargaining, and second, it avoids overinclusion in sex offender 
registrations. Subsection (b)(2)(B) creates an exception to the baseline grades of offenses where 
the defendant is over 18 years of age.  This “exception” ensures that the group of persons 
required to register as sex offenders would not be underinclusive, as that result would be 
inconsistent with current Delaware law.  Note also that the proposed offense definition and 
grading scheme for sexual assault eliminate the provision from 11 Del.C. § 767 that allows an 
offender’s knowledge that the sexual contact is “offensive to the victim” to be a basis for sexual 
assault liability.  Offensive, but non-coercive, contacts are still punishable under Section 1202 as 
assault.   
Section 1301(e) converts the specialized offense definitions in 11 Del.C. §§ 778 and 
778A(1) into a grade adjustment for any offense under Section 1301 committed by a person in a 
position of trust, authority, or supervision vis à vis a victim under sixteen years of age.  Using a 
general grade adjustment, rather than having separate offenses, allows the increased punishment 
to cover all of the individual scenarios present in Section 1301 without having to reproduce these 
scenarios or accidentally contradict them in a separate offense.  The proposed grade aggravation 
is consistent with the judgments made in § 778 because it preserves the most severe penalties 
envisioned by § 778 by increasing the grade to a Class 1 felony—enabling life imprisonment—in 
the most reprehensible scenarios.  However, Subsection (b)(6) is meaningfully different from 
§§ 778 and 778A(1) in that it applies only where the victim is less than sixteen years old, while 
some of §§ 778 and 778A’s provisions apply where the victim is between sixteen and eighteen 
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years old.  The provisions in §§ 778 and 778A that apply to victims between sixteen and eighteen 
years old are given effect in proposed Section 1302.  Section 1302(a)(2)(B) makes it an offense 
for a person who occupies a position of trust, authority, or supervision over a child under 
eighteen to engage in sexual contact with that child.  The grade of the offense in 
Section 1302(a)(2)(B) depends on the sexual act performed: Class 5 felony for intercourse, Class 
6 felony for oral or object penetration, and Class 8 felony for sexual contact.  
Other Provisions.  Section 1301(f) creates strict liability as to age where the victim is 
under fourteen years old.  This section is analogous to 11 Del.C. § 762(a), except that it changes 
the age where strict liability attaches from sixteen to fourteen.  When the victim is sixteen, there 
is a much greater likelihood of the offender making a genuine mistake as to the victim’s age, 
thereby negating culpability.  It is virtually impossible, however, for the offender to honestly 
believe that a fourteen-year-old child is the age of consent.  Note that it is uncommon for other 
jurisdictions in the United States to impose strict liability at all in the way Delaware does; and 
among those that do, age fourteen is the average age used for strict liability.  Note also that the 
proposed provision in Section 1307(a) balances out this proposed change to current law by 
establishing the lowest culpability requirement as to knowledge of the age of a victim between 
fourteen and sixteen years of age. 
Section 1301(g) is analogous to 11 Del.C. § 771(c), making it a requirement of a 
convicted offender’s probation to pay child support to the victim where the offense resulted in 
the birth of a child.   
Dangerous Crime Against a Child Provisions Not Incorporated.  Three provisions from 
11 Del.C. § 777 relating to dangerous crimes against a child have not been incorporated into this 
Proposed Code.  First, the provision in § 777(a), establishing an affirmative defense where the 
offender believed the victim was over the age of sixteen, is no longer necessary, since the age of 
strict liability has been lowered to twelve.  Second, the offense of sexual abuse by a person in a 
position of authority, trust, or supervision, to which § 777 generally applies, has already been 
taken into account in the Proposed Code as a grade aggravator and is no longer an independent 
offense.  Finally, the child pornography offense referenced as a predicate offense for liability 
under § 777 has been incorporated into Section 4204, where it is already a Class 4 felony.  Since 
the grade of the new offense in Section 4204 corresponds with § 777’s grading aggravation, the 
aggravation no longer has any effect except to allow multiple convictions for the same conduct.  
Sexual Extortion.  Chapter 1300 does not include 11 Del. C. § 774, which prohibits 
sexual extortion, as a separate offense.  It is not included for two reasons.  First, § 774 is 
redundant with the current definition of “without consent” used for the rape and “unlawful sexual 
contact” offenses.  Second, but related, all extorted sexual conduct—whether intercourse, 
penetration, or contact—is punished as a Class E felony under § 774, which either discounts or 
increases punishment depending on which conduct is at issue, when compared to the same 
conduct under the current rape or unlawful sexual contact offenses.  Because of these 
inconsistencies, § 774 is not given independent effect in the Proposed Code, but is covered 
entirely by Section 1301. 
Indecent Exposure Not Incorporated.  The provisions in 11 Del.C. § 778A prohibiting 
indecent exposure done to a minor victim by a person in a position of trust, authority, or 
supervision have not been incorporated because indecent exposure is not contained in Chapter 
1300.  Indecent exposure is now included in the Public Indecency offense in Section 4201.  
Although this offense is not contained within Chapter 1300 and thus, not incorporated into 
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Section 1301, the aggravation will still apply individually to the offense contained in the other 
chapter when done to a minor victim by a person in a position of trust, authority, or supervision.  
 
 
Comment on Section 1302.  Prohibited Sexual Contact by Persons in Positions of Trust 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 778, 1259; 16 Del.C. §§ 1131(1)b, 1136(a) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1302 proposes a new offense that prohibits persons from engaging in 
sexual contact with victims who are especially vulnerable to them.  This includes victims in 
custody at detention facilities where the offender works at the facility, children under eighteen 
where the offender is in a position of trust, authority, or supervision over them, and patients or 
residents of facilities providing medical or personal care where the offender works at the facility.  
As it is used in this offense, sexual contact is inclusive of sexual intercourse and oral or object 
penetration.  The grade of the offense depends on the particular sexual act performed. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Currently, Title 11 does not have an offense like 
Section 1302.  However, the current law does recognize special situations where even consensual 
sexual contact is wrongful because of the vulnerable relationship between the victim and the 
offender.  Unlike the current law, which carves out exemptions for these situations as 
“ineffective consent” and scatters them throughout various other offenses, the proposed Section 
1302 provides a unified offense capturing all of these special situations.  This provides clarity 
and avoids inconsistency and redundancy in the Chapter. 
Section 1302(a) defines the offense.  Note that lack of consent is not an element of the 
offense definition because a person can be liable for this offense whether or not consent is given.  
Where consent is given, it is nevertheless deemed ineffective because of the unequal nature of 
the relationship between the participants.  Subsection (a)(2)(A) corresponds with 11 Del.C. 
§ 1259, making it an offense for anyone working at a detention facility to engage in sexual 
contact with persons in custody there.  Subsection (a)(2)(B) corresponds with 11 Del.C. 
§ 778(3)-(4), making it an offense for persons in positions of trust, authority, or supervision over 
children under eighteen to engage in sexual contact with them.  Subsection (a)(2)(C) is based on 
the “sexual abuse” offense in 16 Del.C. §§ 1131(1)b. and 1136(a), making it an offense for 
anyone working in a facility that provides medical or personal care to engage in sexual contact 
with residents or patient of the facility.  “Facility” is given the meaning provided in the definition 
in 16 Del.C. § 1131(4).  Note that “medical care” includes psychiatric care. 
Section 1302(b) grades the offense depending on the sexual act performed upon the 
victim.  Subsection (b)(1) provides that the offense is a Class 5 felony if it involves sexual 
intercourse.  Subsection (b)(2) provides that it is a Class 6 felony if it involves only oral or object 
penetration.  Subsection (b)(3) provides that it is a Class 8 felony if it involves only sexual 
contact.  These grades do not align precisely with the grades of the current underlying offenses 
because some of the current offenses punish all sexual conduct the same, or punish one kind of 
sexual conduct but not another.  However, the new grading scheme is preferable for three 
reasons.  First, it unifies the currently scattered offenses and their grading.  Second, having a 
unified scheme of grading based on the sexual conduct performed is important for the 
consistency of the Chapter as a whole, the clarity of Section 1302, and the preservation of 
Delaware’s current policy that an offender’s blameworthiness depends, in part, on the relative 
 
 423 
level of intrusiveness of the sexual act he has committed.  Finally, it makes sense for the grades 
here to match the baseline grades of the three kinds of offense conduct (sexual intercourse, oral 
or object penetration, and sexual contact) in Section 1301, since the offenses in this Section 
cover situations where consent may have been given, but is essentially ineffective because of the 
special relationship between the victim and the offender.  While sexual contact in these situations 
where consent is ineffective is certainly blameworthy, it is materially less blameworthy than 
sexual contact committed under the circumstances required for aggravated grading provided in 
Section 1301.  
 
 
Comment on Section 1303.  Bestiality 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 775  
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1303 creates an offense prohibiting persons from engaging in sexual 
contact with animals.  This offense also covers situations where a person causes another to 
engage in sexual contact with an animal for his or her own sexual gratification. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1303 directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 775 
and is graded the same, but with some slight differences.  First, the offense definition has been 
broken into its constituent elements for easier reading and application.  Second, as is the case 
throughout the proposed Chapter 1300, the phrase “sexual contact” is used alone to refer not only 
to intentional sexual touching or undressing of another, but also sexual intercourse and oral or 
object penetration.   
 
 
Comment on Section 1304.  Prohibited Conduct by a Person Convicted of a Sexual Offense 
Against a Child 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1112, 777A, 4121; see also 11 Del.C. § 
4122 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1304 defines an offense prohibiting persons previously convicted of a 
sexual offense against a child from residing or loitering on or around the property of a school.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1304 corresponds closely with 
11 Del.C. § 1112 with a few differences.  First, Section 1304(a) breaks the offense definition 
down into its constituent elements for easier reading and application with the grading contained 
in a separate subsection.  The offense definition also now includes § 4121(a)(4)’s definition of 
“sexual offender” as an element of the offense, rather than using the term  “sexual offender” in 
the offense definition and defining it elsewhere.  Under Subsection (a)(1), to commit this offense 
a person must have previously been convicted of any of the offenses enumerated in Subsections 
(a)(1)(A)-(F) against a person under sixteen years old.  The enumerated offenses correspond with 
those provided in 11 Del.C. §§ 4121(a)(4) and 777A, and include offenses, such as child 
pornography, that have been relocated to other Chapters in the Proposed Code.  Finally, 
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Subsection (a)(2) includes a simplified definition of “school” within the offense definition, rather 
than defining the term in a separate subsection, as in § 1112(b)(3).  
Section 1304(b) grades the offense as a Class 8 felony.  Rather than grading the offense 
depending upon whether the offender “loiters” or “resides,” like in § 1112(a), the proposed 
Section 1304(b) provides only one grade for engaging in either act.  Under the current grading 
scheme, an offender would receive less punishment for residing permanently on or near school 
property than temporarily loitering there.  Section 1304(b) eliminates a grade discount for what 
essentially amounts to permanent loitering.  The combined grade aims to be a middle ground 
between the punishment levels provided in the current scheme.  Section 1304(c) does not provide 
a definition for “loiter,” because the term has already been defined in Section 4108(a). 
Notice Requirement.  Section 1304, reflecting current law, does not contain a requirement 
that the offender have been put on notice that he or she is subject to this offense.  The United 
States Supreme Court has required notice in cases involving similar criminal statutes.  In 
Lambert v. People of the State of California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the Court reversed the 
defendant’s conviction under a felon registration statute on due process grounds because she had 
no actual knowledge of her duty to register.  To avoid the possibility of Section 1304 being 
invalidated as unconstitutional, it may be beneficial to include a notice requirement.  The 
language can be added to Subsection (a)(1), which would read: “the person has been previously 
convicted . . . and has been notified that they are subject to this offense . . . .” 
 
 
Comment on Section 1305.  Sexual Harassment 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 763, 778A(3), 1311(a)(4) 
 
Comment:  
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of sexual harassment. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1305(a) corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 763, the 
current offense that criminalizes sexual harassment, and 1311(a)(4).  The language of Subsection 
(a) is largely incorporated from § 763 and maintains the same conduct and culpability 
requirements.  While current § 763(2) requires that the person know that the actor is “thereby 
likely to cause annoyance, offense, or alarm to that person” and the proposed offense just 
requires that the person “knowingly” cause annoyance, offense, or alarm to that person, the 
“knowing” requirement of Subsection (a)(2)(A) includes “knowledge of high likelihood,” as 
provided in proposed Section 205(b)(2). 
Section 1305(b)(2)(B) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 763 and maintains the same relative 
grade (Class D misdemeanor) as the current sexual harassment offense.  Subsection (b)(2)(A) 
sets a portion of the offense at Class A misdemeanor, as break from current law.  This grade is 
higher than current law provides for the same conduct.  The legislation authorizing this Proposed 
Code mandates that “disproportionate” statutes be identified and rectified.  The proportionality 
of an offense’s authorized punishment is directly tied to the grade assigned to that offense.  An 
offense’s grade could be either disproportionately high or low.  The nonpartisan consultative 
group supervising the drafting process for this Proposed Code has scrutinized the relative 
grading of all offenses, and has decided that this offense’s grade is disproportionately low when 
compared to other offenses of the same grade in current law, especially ordinary harassment.  
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The grade of this offense has been changed to reflect that judgment.  Subsection (b)(1)’s Class 8 
felony aggravation corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 778A(3) and (4)c.. 
 
 
Comment on Section 1306.  General Provisions Relating to this Chapter 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 761, 762, 770, 771, 778, 778A, 780  
 
Comment:  
Generally.  This section collects the provisions that apply generally to offenses in 
Chapter 1300.  This includes special culpability requirements and exemptions from liability. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1306(a) provides that the State need only 
prove that the defendant was negligent as to the victim’s age where the underlying offense 
requires the victim be under a certain age.  The proposed Section is based on 11 Del.C. § 762(a), 
but has some important differences.  First, Section 1306(a)’s negligence culpability requirement 
applies to any age mentioned in an offense definition, whereas § 762(a) only applies to offenses 
requiring that a victim be under sixteen.  Second, Section 1306(a) provides a negligence 
culpability level, while § 762(a) provides for strict liability as to age where the offense requires 
that the victim be under sixteen, stating that a defendant’s reasonable belief that the victim was 
over sixteen is not a defense.  Section 1306(a) heightens the culpability requirement slightly to 
balance out the fact that it now applies to victims over sixteen as well.  As a practical matter, 
strict liability is appropriate where the victim is under twelve because a mistake as to such a 
young child’s age would amount to negligence per se.  However, the same cannot be said for all 
victims less than sixteen years of age.  When the victim is older, the need to demonstrate an 
offender’s culpability as to that victim’s age is more acute, as it is more likely the offender in 
that situation could have made an honest mistake as to whether the victim was the age of 
consent.  Culpability is an essential element for criminal liability under Delaware law; strict 
liability is rarely used, and usually only in minor regulatory offenses.  Lowering the age where 
strict liability attaches improves consistency with that practice in Delaware.  
Section 1306(b) incorporates portions of 11 Del.C. §§ 761(d), 770(b), 771(b), and 780(d), 
to provide that medical examinations or procedures do not constitute offenses under Chapter 
1300 when they are conducted with intent to provide diagnosis or treatment, by a licensed 
medical professional, parent, or guardian, and in a manner consistent with reasonable medical 
standards.  The proposed section collects the medical treatment exemptions scattered throughout 
the current chapter and, closely tracking the current language, combines them into one general 
exemption applicable to all offenses under proposed Chapter 1300.  
Note that Section 1306 does not include § 762(c), which makes clear that separate acts of 
sexual conduct can support multiple charges of the same offense; however, it does not contain an 
affirmative authorization.  Current law, 11 Del.C. § 762(c), permits multiple charges, but relies 
upon general principles of what is or is not continuing conduct to determine what conduct would 
count as an “act.”  However, as judges will make the determination of how to separate a 
defendant’s conduct into separate chargeable offenses regardless of the nature of the offense, it is 
always possible to charge a defendant with multiple counts of the same offense if there are 
separate acts.  As these general principles apply to all offenses, their availability need not be 
specified in Section 1306.   
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Comment on Section 1307.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 761, 1112 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter.  For 
simplicity and clarity, the definitions have been slightly reworded from their sources in current 
law. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1307(a) defines “genitalia,” a term used in 
current law, but not defined.  The term has been given a generally-accepted medical definition. 
Section 1307(b) defines “oral or object penetration,” tracking the current definition of 
“sexual penetration” in 11 Del.C. § 761(i).  The term itself has been altered to make it more 
descriptive, for the purpose of avoiding confusion between the meaning of “penetration” and 
“intercourse.”  The term “sexual device,” used in the term’s definition in current law, is 
substituted with “any object . . . intending the act to be sexual in nature” to provide a functional 
standard with which to judge between “sexual devices” and other objects.  Also, Subsection (b) 
does not include any form of oral sex, unlike § 761(i)(2).  Instead, the term “sexual intercourse” 
is defined to include all forms of oral sex.  The two terms’ definitions in current law seemed to 
define oral sex differently depending upon whether the defendant was the one giving or receiving 
oral sex.  This distinction leads to variations in punishment without proper justification.  The 
legislation authorizing this Proposed Code mandates that “disproportionate” statutes be identified 
and rectified.  The nonpartisan consultative group supervising the drafting process for this 
Proposed Code has scrutinized the relative grading of all offenses, and has decided that assigning 
different punishments for different forms of oral sex provides disproportionately low 
punishments in some cases.  To the extent the discrepancy between “sexual intercourse” and 
“sexual penetration” in current law embodies an outdated social norm, the legislation authorizing 
this Proposed Code supports the change on this basis as well. 
Section 1307(c) defines a person in a “position of trust, authority, or supervision” over 
children, tracking the current definition in 11 Del.C. § 761(e).  Although the proposed definition 
is based upon the catch-all provision in § 761(e)(7), it is intended to capture all of the specific 
examples from 11 Del.C. § 761(e)(1)-(6) as well.  The changes are meant only to simplify the 
definition, not alter the meaning of current law.   
Section 1304(d) defines the term “reside,” corresponding directly with 11 Del.C. 
§ 1112(b)(2).  
Section 1307(e) defines “sexual contact,” tracking the current definition in 11 Del.C. 
§ 761(f).  The proposed definition retains the requirement that the act be “intentionally sexual in 
nature,” but broadens the scope of the definition to make it more thorough.  The greater breadth 
of conduct covered by the proposed definition balances out the high bar set by the “intentionally 
sexual” requirement.  The proposed definition of “sexual contact” also makes it clear that the 
term includes acts of sexual intercourse and oral or object penetration.  Accordingly, when 
“sexual contact” is referenced in other offenses in the Chapter, it refers not only to the 
intentionally sexual touching or undressing of another, but to intercourse and penetration as well.   
Section 1307(f) defines “sexual intercourse,” breaking it down into its constituent 
elements.  Subsection (e)(1) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 761(g)(1).  Subsection (e)(2) 
corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 761(b), (c), and (g)(2), but has been reworded slightly to include 
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all forms of oral sex—cunnilingus or fellatio, whether the defendant is giving or receiving the 
sexual act.  Subsection (e)(3) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 761(g)(1). 
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CHAPTER 1400.  KIDNAPPING, COERCION, RESTRAINT, AND RELATED OFFENSES 
 
Section 1401.  Kidnapping and Unlawful Restraint 
Section 1402.  Human Trafficking 
Section 1403.  Coercion 
Section 1404.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 1401.  Kidnapping and Unlawful Restraint 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 781, 782, 783, 783A, 784, 786; 16 Del.C. 
§§ 2223, 5023; see also 11 Del.C. §§ 840, 858      
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1401 establishes the offenses of kidnapping and unlawful restraint, 
which cover the offense conduct set forth in the current offenses of kidnapping and unlawful 
imprisonment.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1401(a) corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 781 and 
782, by combining their nearly identical offense definitions and incorporating the definition of 
“restrain” currently found in 11 Del.C. § 786(c) to define the offense of unlawful restraint.  
Section 1401(a) makes some minor changes to the current definition of “restrain,” including 
removing the explanation of what “without consent” means, because Section 208 establishes 
general conditions where consent is ineffective that cover the same ground.  For clarity and 
easier application, the new offense definition in Section 1401(a) also slightly rewords the offense 
definition in §§ 781 and 782 by using the phrase “except as authorized by law,” rather than 
“unlawfully,” to indicate that the behavior is normally unlawful except where contradicted 
elsewhere in the Code.  Note that the offense conduct covered by this new offense definition is 
broad enough to cover the offense conduct currently found in 16 Del.C. §§ 2223 (Unwarranted 
Confinement in a Substance Abuse Treatment Facility) and 5023 (Unwarranted Hospitalization 
in Delaware Psychiatric Center), rendering those offenses unnecessary. 
Section 1401(b) corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 783 and 783A, combining their nearly 
identical offense definitions to define the offense of kidnapping.  The current distinction between 
first and second degree kidnapping is retained, however, in the grading distinctions in Section 
1401(c).  Note that the limitation “and the person is not a relative of the victim” has been added 
to Subsection (b)(6) to incorporate 11 Del.C. § 784.  Current § 784 is an affirmative defense that 
functionally redirects a prosecution for unlawful imprisonment or kidnapping to interference 
with custody in appropriate circumstances.  The elements of interference with custody and 
kidnapping are fundamentally inconsistent with each other, except at Subsection (b)(6).  By 
excluding all relatives from Subsection (b)(6), the intent and function of current § 784 is 
maintained more simply.  It is not necessary to provide an exception for unlawful restraint 
because, as under current law, it has the same grade as interference with custody (organized in 
Chapter 4400 in the Proposed Code).  Also note that under Section 210, a defendant could not be 
convicted of both offenses based upon the same act.   
Section 1401(c) corresponds to the grading schemes in 11 Del.C. §§ 781, 782, 783, and 
783A.  Note that, although not explicitly stated, the harm referenced in Section 1401(c)(2)(A) 
includes unlawful sexual contact.  Unlawful sexual contact need not be explicitly stated in the 
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grading scheme, as it is in § 786(a), because a victim of a sexual offense would clearly not return 
from kidnapping “unharmed.” 
Section 1401(d) describes the relationship between kidnapping and interference with 
custody, performing a similar cross-referential function to 11 Del.C. § 784.  The substance of 
§ 784 is not necessary to retain, for the reasons described above; but the cross-reference remains 
useful because the Proposed Code organizes interference with custody in Chapter 4400 (Offenses 
Against the Family) instead of Chapter 1400. 
Shopkeeper’s Privilege.  11 Del.C. §§ 840(c) and (d), and 858(d)-(f), have not been 
incorporated into Section 1401.  Although these provisions deal with detaining persons who have 
violated the law, they are more appropriately placed in the Defense of Property justification 
defense in Section 307 of the Proposed Code, rather than as a specific defense to the kidnapping 
and unlawful restraint offenses in Section 1401. 
 
 
Comment on Section 1402.  Human Trafficking 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 787, 1100A 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1402 creates the offense of human trafficking, which covers the 
offense conduct set forth in the current offenses of trafficking an individual, forced labor and 
sexual servitude, and dealing in children.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1402 corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 787 and 
1100A.  Section 1402(a) defines the offense by breaking it into its elements for easier reading 
and application.   
Subsection (a)(1) corresponds to § 1100A, but expands it to prohibit dealing not only in 
children, but in adults as well.  The grade adjustment for minor victims in Subsection (b)(4)(A) 
allows the grade of the offense in Subsection (a)(1) to correspond to the grade of § 1100A where 
it involved children.11  Note that the offense conduct in Subsection (a)(1) is graded less harshly 
than the offense conduct in Subsections (a)(2)–(4) to reflect the fact that, unlike those 
subsections, Subsection (a)(1) does not require proof of the purpose of the dealing (e.g., 
furthering forced labor).   
Subsection (a)(2) combines § 787(b)(2) and (3) (forced labor and sexual servitude).  It is 
unnecessary to keep § 787(b)(2) and (3) separate because they cover the same basic conduct, the 
only difference being that § 787(b)(2) covers the provision of generalized labor or services, 
while § 787(b)(3) only covers a particular kind of service: sexual service.  To eliminate 
redundancy, but ensure that it is clear that sexual service, i.e., prostitution, is included within any 
“labor or service,” the two sections have been combined and the phrase “including prostitution” 
has been added to the proposed Subsection (a)(2).  Note that § 787(b)(3)a.1. has not been 
incorporated into Subsection (a)(2) because it is redundant with the portion of Section 4203 
                                                             
11 Currently, 11 Del.C. § 1100A grades dealing in children as a Class E felony.  Proposed Section 
1402(b)(3) also grades Section 1402(a)(1) (dealing in persons) as a Class E felony.  With the grade adjustment in 
Section 1402(b)(4)(A), at first glance the Proposed Code seems to set the grade for dealing in children one grade 
higher than it is in current law.  However, under current law, Class E felonies have a five-year maximum sentence, 
whereas the proposed grading scheme provides a four-year maximum sentence for Class E felonies. Therefore, the 
grade adjustment for minor victims in proposed Section 1402(b)(4)(A) allows the grade of the offense in Section 
1402(a)(1) to correspond more closely to the grade of 11 Del.C. § 1100A where it involved children. 
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(Promoting Prostitution) that already covers prostitution of minors and does so with more 
nuance, by distinguishing between prostitution of persons less than sixteen years of age and 
persons at least sixteen years of age but less than eighteen.   
Subsection (a)(3)(A) corresponds to § 787(b)(1) and Subsection (a)(3)(B) corresponds to 
§ 787(b)(5)a., with no significant changes.   
Subsection (a)(4) corresponds to § 787(b)(5)b., but makes two changes.  First, it 
eliminates the current provision noting that the offense does not apply to organ donation, since 
donation (by definition) is not the sale of body parts.  Second, it defines the “knowledge” 
requirement for this offense in a more concrete and practical way, stating that the defendant must 
have knowledge that the venture the person is benefitting financially from engages in acts 
constituting an offense under Subsection (a)(3)(B).  Note that this provision does not require the 
person to know that the sale of human body parts is prohibited to satisfy the “knowledge” 
culpability requirement. 
Section 1402(b) grades the offenses defined in Section 1402(a), corresponding closely to 
the current grades in 11 Del.C. §§ 787 and 1100A.  The grades under Subsection (b)(1) is lower 
than under current law (Class A felony), and the grades under Subsections (b)(2)–(3) are higher 
than under current law (Class C and F felonies).  The legislation authorizing this Proposed Code 
mandates that “disproportionate” statutes be identified and rectified.  The proportionality of an 
offense’s authorized punishment is directly tied to the grade assigned to that offense.  An 
offense’s grade could be either disproportionately high or low.  The nonpartisan consultative 
group supervising the drafting process for this Proposed Code has scrutinized the relative 
grading of all offenses, and has decided that this offense’s grades were disproportionately high or 
low, respectively, when compared to other offenses of the same grade in current law.  The grade 
of these offense has been changed to reflect that judgment.  Subsection (b)(4) provides grade 
adjustments consistent with those in § 787(b)(6)a., but unlike § 787(b)(6)a., it applies the 
aggravations to all offenses in the Section.  Currently, offenses dealing with body part sales in 
§ 787(5) cannot be aggravated because the offenses already have the highest grade available: 
Class 2 felony.  By creating a Class 1 felony above Class 2, this Code allows aggravations to be 
applied to even those offenses currently graded as Class A felonies.  Note that the grade 
aggravation set forth in § 787(b)(6)b. has not been included because the use of threats of force 
has been built into the offense definition.    
Section 1402(c) establishes an exception to prosecution for offenses under Subsection 
(a)(1), corresponding directly to § 1100A. 
Section 1402(d) provides additional penalties that may apply to offenses committed 
under this Section.  Subsection (d)(1)(A) corresponds to § 787(e)(1), but makes forfeiture an 
automatic penalty, rather than one that can only be issued after a motion is made for it.  Note that 
Subsection (d)(1)(A) does not include the provisions in § 787(e)(2)-(3) because they are 
procedural provisions regarding forfeiture that belong in a general provision governing all 
forfeiture proceedings, not just those that relate to offenses in this Section.  Subsection (d)(1)(B) 
corresponds to § 787(c)(2) to provide for organizational forfeiture as a penalty, but does not 
include the additional fines for organizations provided for in § 787(c)(2)a. because the default 
organizational fines laid out in proposed Section 803(b) are already sufficiently high to serve the 
goals of both § 787(c)(2)a. and the Proposed Code.  Note that since the definition of “person” in 
Section 107 includes non-natural legal persons, such as corporations and partnerships, both 
individuals and organizations can be convicted under Section 1402 and must forfeit the property 
specified in (d)(1)(A).  Organizations are subject to additional discretionary forfeiture under 
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Subsection (d)(1)(B), which is justifiable since organized trafficking likely utilizes a greater 
number of tainted assets and contracts.  Section 1402(d)(2) corresponds to § 787(d), providing 
for restitution for violations of this Section. 
Section 1402(e)(1) provides procedures for seeking to vacate a judgment of conviction 
for certain offenses that were committed as a direct result of the person being a victim of human 
trafficking.  Subsection (e)(2) specifies that a person can make use of the procedures set forth 
elsewhere in Title 11 to seek mandatory expungement of criminal record information related to a 
conviction vacated under Subsection (e)(1).  These provisions directly correspond to 11 Del.C. 
§ 787(j)(2)–(4).   
Consent and Belief Regarding Age. 11 Del.C. § 787(b)(3)c. and (b)(4) have not been 
incorporated into the proposed Section 1402 for two reasons.  First, Section 208 of the general 
part already makes consent to prostitution by a minor ineffective.  Second, the general mistake 
provisions in Section 206 cover issues of mistaken age. 
Other Provisions Not Included.  Some provisions in 11 Del.C. § 787 should be relocated 
to other titles.  11 Del.C. § 787(g) should be relocated to a title dealing with child welfare and 
delinquency proceedings.  11 Del.C. § 787(i) should be relocated to a title dealing with child 
proceedings, though related civil proceedings are generally authorized by proposed Section 104.  
11 Del.C. § 787(k)-(n) should be relocated to a title more appropriately suited to their regulatory 
nature.  
Evidence of Victim’s Past Sexual Behavior.  11 Del.C. § 787(f) has not been included in 
Section 1402.  To the extent § 787(f) deals in related civil proceedings, it should be relocated to a 
portion of the Delaware Code that deals in civil litigation.  The provision is retained in Title 11, 
though it appears to be redundant with the general rules governing this kind of evidence in 11 
Del.C. §§ 3508-09.   
Pardon and Expungement for Victims.  11 Del.C. § 787(j) has not been included in 
Section 1402.  The general provisions governing expungement and pardon discussed in it are 
available for all persons and offenses, and do not require an affirmative authorization. 
 
 
Comment on Section 1403.  Coercion 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 791, 792 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 1403 defines and grades the offense of coercion. This Section also 
provides a defense to any prosecution for coercion committed by means of threatening that the 
victim or another person be charged with a crime where the defendant believed the threatened 
charge was true and his only intention in telling the victim was to induce the victim to take 
reasonable action to rectify the wrong associated with the threatened charge. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1403(a) and (c) directly correspond to 
11 Del.C. § 791, but slightly reword the language at the beginning of Subsection (a) for greater 
clarity. 
Section 1403(b) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 792. 
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Comment on Section 1404.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 786(b) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This section provides the definition of the term “relative” as it is used in the 
Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 1404 directly corresponds to the definition of 
“relative” set forth in 11 Del.C. § 786(b), with one minor change.  While the current definition 
uses the term “ancestor,” the proposed definition substitutes in the term “grandparent.”  The term 
“ancestor” is ambiguous as to which degree of ancestors are included in the definition, and any 
ancestors further removed than grandparents are unlikely to be involved in custody disputes.  For 
clarity, the terms currently defined in § 786(b) and (c) have been incorporated into the offense 
definitions to which they specific relate. 
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PROPERTY OFFENSES 
 
CHAPTER 2100.  THEFT OFFENSES 
 
Section 2101.  Consolidation of Theft Offenses 
Section 2102.  Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition 
Section 2103.  Theft by Deception 
Section 2104.  Theft by Extortion 
Section 2105.  Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mistake  
Section 2106.  Theft of Services 
Section 2107.  Receiving Stolen Property 
Section 2108.  Unauthorized Distribution of Protected Works 
Section 2109.  Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle 
Section 2110.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 2101.  Consolidation of Theft Offenses 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 840, 841(c), 841A, 841C, 846, 847(a), 
849(d), 855, 939, 1450, 1451; see also 841B, 859, 1105 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision assures that the offense definitions in Chapter 2100 and the 
grading provisions in this Section are read together as applying to different forms of the same 
offense.  The consolidation of theft offenses enables unified grading and defense provisions, 
which are included in this Section.  Note that making theft a single offense does not preclude the 
possibility of charging multiple counts of theft. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2101(a) corresponds to the current 
consolidation provisions found in 11 Del.C. §§ 841(a) and 855(a)–(b).  The purpose and function 
of the current provisions are maintained here, but simplified into a single Subsection.  This 
consolidation makes § 856 unnecessary, as a conviction for either theft or receiving stolen 
property will result in a theft conviction, and will be graded the same in either case. 
Section 2101(b) corresponds to the core grading scheme found in the current § 841(c), 
but changes some of the value thresholds at each grade.  At the highest end of the spectrum, a 
grade threshold has been added for thefts of $1,000,000 or more.  Currently, any theft of 
$100,000 or more receives identical treatment.  This higher threshold recognizes the changing 
value of money due to inflation, the as well as the real difference in seriousness between a theft 
of $100,000 and a theft of ten times that value—something that could very well be achieved 
through some variety of white-collar crime.  A $25,000 threshold has been substituted for the 
current $50,000 threshold to maintain a consistently significant increase in value between every 
grade, justifying heightened punishment.  Overall, the grades of theft based on amount are lower 
than in the current code.  For example, theft of $100,000 was punishable by a minimum of 2 and 
maximum of 25 years’ imprisonment.  It is likely that the only times such a theft was punished 
close to its maximum was in cases with especially vulnerable victims.  Such cases, however, will 
receive aggravated grading under the general adjustments in proposed Section 804, making large 
default maximum penalties unnecessary.  Note that the threshold for Class 8 felony theft in 
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Section 2101(b)(4) is $5,000, instead of the current threshold of $1,500.  The felony threshold 
has been raised for the reasons stated above, but to address disproportional grading in the 
Proposed Code.  Raising a value threshold for grading effectively lowers the punishment 
attached to a theft of a particular amount.  The legislation authorizing this Proposed Code 
mandates that “disproportionate” statutes be identified and rectified.  The proportionality of an 
offense’s authorized punishment is directly tied to the grade assigned to that offense.  An 
offense’s grade could be either disproportionately high or low.  The nonpartisan consultative 
group supervising the drafting process for this Proposed Code has scrutinized the relative 
grading of all offenses, and has decided that the value threshold for felony theft is too low, 
leading to disproportionately high punishment when compared to other offenses of the same 
grade in current law.  The value threshold has been changed to reflect that judgment.  Note that 
property damage offenses already use the $5,000 threshold, lending support to the notion that 
$1,500 is too low for theft.  As discussed in the Commentary to Section 2304, the Proposed Code 
uses the same value thresholds for grades of property offenses, regardless of whether the 
defendant takes, damages, or destroys the property.  Currently, criminal mischief in 11 Del.C. 
§ 811(b)(1) uses $5,000 as the threshold between misdemeanor and felony grades—a much 
higher threshold than is currently used for theft.   
Piecemeal grading provisions found throughout other current theft provisions have been 
consolidated in Subsection (b) to the extent they are necessary.  Some of those provisions are 
identical to the scheme in 11 Del.C. § 841(c) and need not be separately addressed in the Code.  
For example, § 840 (shoplifting) is graded as a Class A misdemeanor or Class G felony, 
depending on the value of the merchandise stolen.  Identical to § 841(c), shoplifting uses $1,500 
as the cut-off between the two grades.   
Several specialized theft offenses in the current code do not meaningfully differ from the 
current Theft by taking or Receiving stolen property, except that they are graded more harshly.  
Instead of creating independent offenses in Chapter 2100, Section 2101(b) incorporates the grade 
adjustments from those provisions, but applies them to all forms of theft.  Otherwise, the 
provisions are not retained.  Those provisions are: §§ 841A (theft of a motor vehicle), though 
note that if the prosecution can prove that a stolen motor vehicle is worth $25,000 or more, 
higher grades are always available; 841C (possession or theft of a prescription form or pad); 939 
(penalties for § 933, theft of computer services); 1450 (receiving stolen firearm); and 1451 (theft 
of a firearm).  However, compare § 841A to 21 Del.C. § 6702 (receiving or transferring stolen 
vehicle).  The latter offense grades receipt and transfer of stolen vehicles 2 levels more harshly 
than stealing a vehicle, even though those criminal behaviors (receipt and taking) are treated 
equally by the Title 11 theft offenses in the current code.  Also, the grade adjustment is the only 
part of § 841C retained in Chapter 2100, because the rest of it is directed at drug diversion, and 
belongs in a separate Chapter dedicated to drug offenses.    
Grade adjustments for elderly or disabled victims currently found in 11 Del.C. 
§§ 841(c)(1)–(2) and 846 have not been included.  That is because there is now a General Part 
grade adjustment provision for older and especially vulnerable victims, based upon scattered 
Special Part grade adjustments and § 1105 (crime against a vulnerable adult), in proposed 
Section 804. 
Finally, two additional grades of misdemeanor theft has been added in Section 
2101(b)(6)–(7).  Currently, all thefts valued at less than $1,500 are graded as Class A 
misdemeanors.  This results in disproportionate maximum imprisonment and authorized fines for 
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minor thefts, especially retail theft.  Having additional grades punishes minor thefts more 
equitably, creating an incentive to stop stealing.   
Section 2101(c) creates a grade adjustment for extortion, rather than by separately 
grading it, as is the case in 11 Del.C. § 846.  This way, extortion of large amounts of money will 
not be graded too leniently, and extortion of small amounts of money will not be graded too 
harshly.  But in all cases, the use of coercion will net a heavier punishment for the offender. 
Section 2101(d) maintains the claim of right defense to theft offenses from the current 
code.   But, in the current code, the defense is located in § 847(a) and even though it applies to 
all forms of theft, it is confusingly followed by a separate, extortion-specific defense in § 847(b).   
Placing the claim of right defense in the consolidation section makes its general application to all 
theft offenses clear.  Note also that the Proposed Code’s claim of right defense applies only to a 
narrow category of cases in which a person reasonably believes he had a right to use or possess 
the property.  Current law’s claim of right is based on the Model Penal Code’s version of that 
defense in § 223.1.(3)(b) that focuses on the actor’s subjective belief that he has certain rights 
associated with the property.  While Delaware generally adopted the Model Penal Code, it 
discarded many aspects of its subjectivist approach.  See, e.g., 11 Del. C. §§ 501–03, 511–13, 
533 (punishing solicitation, conspiracy, and incomplete complicity less severely than the target 
offenses).  The Proposed Code follows suit by adding an objective requirement to the defense, 
ensuring that only those who reasonably believe to have the right to use or possess a property 
could raise the defense. 
Section 2101(e) incorporates some definitions that are necessary to make sense of the 
grade adjustments from certain current provisions.  However, see the footnote to Section 
2101(c)(1) for an additional matter regarding aggregation for grading. 
Organized Retail Theft.  11 Del.C. § 841B (organized retail theft) has not been included 
in Chapter 2100.  That is because every part of it is already accounted for elsewhere in the 
Proposed Code.  Insofar as it punishes group criminal activity, conspiracy liability in the General 
Part will increase liability beyond what §841B provides.  Grade adjustments for repeat offenders 
are dealt with in proposed Section 804 by a general adjustment that applies to all, or at least 
most, offenses. 
Possession of Shoplifter’s Tools.  11 Del.C. § 860 (possession of shoplifter’s tools) has 
not been included in Chapter 2100.  That is because the General Part includes a new inchoate 
offense for Possession of Instruments of Crime that is broad enough to include this and many 
other, similar forms of possession. 
Damage to Computer Equipment.  The increased grades for damage to computer 
equipment, found in the current 11 Del.C. §§ 931, 936, and 939, have not been retained in 
Chapter 2300.  Presumably, the justification for setting a lower threshold in this case is to 
account for intangible losses, such as lost digital files and information.  However, the method of 
valuing property in proposed Section 805 does take intangible losses into account, which more 
accurately accomplishes the aims of the current law.  Therefore, separate grade thresholds are 
unnecessary. 
Larceny of Livestock.  11 Del.C. § 859, making it a Class G felony to steal livestock, has 
not been retained in Chapter 2100.  When the offense was first adopted in 1953, Delaware may 
have faced a serious threat to agriculture stemming from animal thefts, requiring harsh 
punishment for that activity.  However, no such threat faces the State today that would justify a 
separate offense.  Under Chapter 2100, the market value of animals stolen would be aggregated 
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to reach the appropriate offense grade.  Note that since livestock can be quite valuable, it is 
possible for an animal theft to receive the same grade as § 859. 
Theft of Motor Vehicles.  As noted above, theft of motor vehicles is treated like any other 
form of theft, though Section 2101(b)(4)(B) provides an absolute floor on grading of motor 
vehicle thefts.  . 
 
 
Comment on Section 2102.  Theft by Taking or Disposition 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 813, 840, 841; see also 11 Del. C. § 853; 
31 Del.C. § 3913 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the most straightforward form of theft: knowingly 
taking property that belongs to another person. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2102(a) corresponds to and combines current 
11 Del.C. §§ 813 and 841, but with three organizational and substantive changes.  First, Section 
2102(a) breaks the offense into its elements for easier reading and application.  Second, the 
culpability term “knowingly” is added to Subsection (a)(1), because the current § 841(a) does not 
specify a required level of culpability as to the taking.  Third, the term “without consent” is 
added to Subsection (a)(1).  Adding this term is essential to clarify the unlawful nature of the 
taking.  The Model Penal Code’s corresponding offense (§ 223.2 “Theft by Unlawful Taking or 
Disposition”), explicitly states that: “A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or 
exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with purpose to deprive him 
thereof....”  The Model Code’s commentary to § 223.2 explains that the word “unlawful” in that 
context implies the lack of consent.  The Proposed Code reaches the same result by explicitly 
incorporating consent into the offense definition.  Doing so also ensures that the culpability 
requirement of the offense will apply to this element.  That is, to satisfy the offense 
requirements, the defendant must know that he acts without consent.  Note that adding the 
element of consent to this provision is also consistent with current law.  For instance, this 
element is explicitly included in 11 Del. C. § 853, a related provision dealing with unauthorized 
use of vehicle.  See commentary to Section 2109 on the connection between these provisions.  
Shoplifting.  11 Del.C. § 840 (shoplifting) has been abandoned in the Proposed Code as 
separate offense from theft because its offense definition is coextensive with theft by taking.  The 
basic form of shoplifting requires that the actor “remove” goods from a retail establishment 
“with intent to appropriate” the goods, or “to deprive the owner of . . . possession thereof.”  
Compare that to Section 2102(a), which has a lower culpability level of “knowingly” taking, 
obtaining, or exerting unauthorized influence over another’s property, but with an identical intent 
to deprive the other person of possession.  Shoplifting takes a few additional forms, but each of 
them is either really a form of fraud—which is incorporated into Chapter 2200—or a form of 
attempt liability based on concealing merchandise or tampering with labels and price tags.  
Attempted theft in the Proposed Code will achieve the same result.  However, § 840 does contain 
a permissive inference that Section 2102(b)(1) retains because of its high probative value.  
Furthermore, Subsection (b)(2) creates a new permissive inference based upon the offense 
definitions of shoplifting in § 840(a)(4)–(5) that are similar to attempt liability.   
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Restitution.  The restitution requirement in current § 841(d) has been relocated to Section 
803(c) in the General Part.  Additionally, the offenses in §§ 854 and 854A (relating to identity 
theft) are not incorporated into Chapter 2100, because the offense is really a form of fraud.  It 
will be addressed in Chapter 2200. 
Administrative Financial Exploitation Offense.  The penalties for financially exploiting 
an “adult who is impaired” in 31 Del.C. § 3913(b) are already covered by the various theft 
provisions in Chapter 2100.  Whether exploitation takes the form of extortion, deception, or 
exertion of unauthorized control, theft offenses can already accomplish what § 3913 sets out to 
do.  Furthermore, the levels of grading in § 3913 based upon amount spent roughly correspond 
with the grading scheme in Section 2101, and those grades will automatically be increased by 
one level due to the victim’s status as a “vulnerable person” as defined in proposed Section 
804(b).  For these reasons, § 3913(b) should be eliminated as a separate offense.   
Conversion of Payment Offense. 31 Del. C. § 1006 criminalizes converting benefits or 
payments received from public assistance programs for uses other than the benefit of their 
intended recipient.  Such conduct constitutes exercise of unauthorized control over the property 
of another prohibited by Section 2202.  For regulatory purposes, however, § 1006 can be retained 
in Title 31 as a separate offense requiring only a reckless culpability and graded as Class A 
misdemeanor (31 Del. C. § 1007(a)).  Note however, that if the conversion of benefits is 
committed in violation of the requirements of Section 2202, higher grades of punishment may be 
available according to the grading scheme in Section 2101.  
Note, also, that § 1007(a)’s felony grading of the conversion offense, based on the value 
of the benefits converted, cannot be retained for two reasons.  First, the value thresholds in 
§ 1007(a) are inconsistent with the grading scheme of Section 2101.  Second, recall that Section 
801(b)(2) provides a Class A misdemeanor ceiling on all offenses outside the code declaring 
themselves to be felonies. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2103.  Theft by Deception 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 843, 844, 848, 849 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision covers situations where the offender knowingly obtains the 
property of another by means of trickery or falsehood, rather than by “taking” it outright, as in 
proposed Section 2102.  Section 2103 is the general offense for fraud because the offense 
governs the legitimate or illegitimate processes by which an interest in property is transferred.  
Theft by deception is designed to regulate the methods by which the transfer of a legal interest in 
property is achieved.  The term “deception” in Subsection 2103(d)(1) includes 
misrepresentations of value, law, opinion, intention, or other state of mind, as well as certain 
cases where the actor knowingly takes advantage of another’s misinformation, though she may 
not be responsible for it.  There is no requirement that the deception is material, or that it would 
have deceived a reasonable person.  It suffices for conviction that the deception was effective, 
whether alone or with other influences, in securing the property for the actor.    
Thus, Section 2103 covers more generalized instances of fraud not covered by the more 
specialized Chapter 2200.  Under to Subsection 2103(a), a defendant must “intentionally obtain 
the property of another person” by “by deceiving the other person or a third person.”  Theft by 
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deception under Section 2103 requires proof of intent.  The defendant must have the intent to 
obtain the property of another, and she must deceive the other person.  
For an example of the breadth of coverage of Section 2103, consider healthcare fraud.  
Under current law, a defendant is guilty of healthcare fraud when she knowingly “[p]resents or 
causes to be presented any fraudulent health care claim to any health care benefit program.”  11 
Del.C. § 913A(a)(1).  A fraudulent health care claim is defined as one “which is made as part of 
or in support of a claim or request for payment . . . when such [claim] knowingly contains false, 
incomplete or misleading information.”  11 Del.C. § 913A(b)(1).  Under current law, a defendant 
must knowingly deceive a health care benefit program by knowingly submitting information 
containing false, incomplete or misleading information with the ultimate goal of obtaining 
payment.  Section 2103 easily covers this behavior with a generalized provision, as well as 
numerous other current fraud provisions.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2103(a) corresponds to current 11 Del.C. 
§§ 843 and 844, but with significant structural and substantive changes.  Current § 843 is Theft 
by false pretenses, and its highly specific offense definition has been converted into the 
definition of “deceiving” in Subsection (d)(1).  However, Subsection (d)(1) has been broadened 
beyond the offense definition in current § 843 by allowing a false impression as to “any fact,” 
rather than only “present or past” facts.  These changes have two advantages.  First, they 
simplify the offense definition in Section 2103(a).  Second, they allow the combination of 
multiple current offenses.  Current § 844, Theft by false promise, is made redundant because any 
false promise to do something in the future is a “fact” covered by Subsection (d)(1).  
Additionally, the definitions of “obtain,” “property of another,” and “deceive” are broad enough 
to make the offense definitions of the current §§ 848 (misapplication of property) and 849 (theft 
of rented property) redundant. 
Finally, the phrase “or a third person” is not found in the current offense definitions.  It 
has been added to Subsection (a)(2) in order to capture situations where the offender deceives a 
person to whom property has been entrusted, but who is not the true owner of the property 
obtained. 
Section 2103(b) retains provisions regarding inferences from the current offenses.  
Subsection (b)(1) corresponds to the permissive inference and explanatory provisions in the 
current § 849(b)–(c).  However, whereas § 849(b) permits the finder of fact to “presume intent to 
commit theft,” Subsection (b)(1) permits it to “infer the deception required” by the offense 
definition.  Subsection (b)(2)(A) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 844.  Subsection (b)(2)(B) 
has been added to account for common situations where businesses commit fraud against clients, 
but claim they merely breached a contract without intent to defraud.  Home improvement fraud is 
the most common scenario to which this provision applies.  Since many fraud provisions in 
current law are subsumed by Section 2103, this is the only place where an exception to this 
general rule can be located.  See General Commentary to Chapter 2200. 
Section 2103(c) directly corresponds to the current § 849(e), with a minor change.  
Whereas § 849(e) creates for lessors and renters a defense against “prosecution for theft,” 
Subsection (c) specifies that it is a defense specifically against theft by deception.  This has been 
added to recognize the fact that subsequent theft of property that has been properly leased or 
rented will always fall under theft by deception. 
Embezzlement.  Note that the current Delaware code does not have an embezzlement 
offense.  Presumably, such behavior would nevertheless fall under Section 2103. 
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Comment on Section 2104.  Theft by Extortion 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 846, 847(b) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision covers situations where the offender obtains another person’s 
property by means of a threat rather than by outright taking (Section 2102) or deception (Section 
2103).   
Relation to current Delaware law.  All of Section 2104 corresponds directly to the 
current §§ 846 and 847.  There are a few significant changes.  A defense for theft based on claim 
of right has been moved out of theft by extortion, as it was in § 847(a), and into Section 2101(d).  
Additionally, although the current § 841 says that extortion is a consolidated form of theft and 
subject to its unified grading scheme, § 846 treats extortion as though it is a separate offense 
from theft, particularly by grading it more harshly.  This probably reflects the fact that extortion 
is a combined offense (theft + threat), and therefore the higher grade is translated into a grade 
adjustment in Section 2101(b).  This increases the severity of punishment due to the use of 
threats.  Finally, the wording of subsection (a) is different from § 846.  § 846 includes an “intent” 
to deprive, that that “the person compels or induces another person to deliver property to the 
person or a third person” by threat.  Subsection (a) ignores the issue of to whom the property is 
delivered, since the victim is deprived of his property—and the offense elements are satisfied—
regardless of precisely who receives the property extorted. 
Most notably, the enumerated types of threats forming the basis of extortion have been 
replaced with reference to the criminal coercion statute.  Those statutes are worded identically.  
Incorporating that provision by reference will both enable more consistent interpretation and 
application of the two offenses, and make clear that coercion is a lesser-included offense to 
extortion. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2105.  Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mistake 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 842 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines as theft the unlawful retention of property that the 
possessor knows to belong to someone else.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2105 is very similar to the current § 842, but 
with three minor changes.  First, the offense definition is broken into its elements for easier 
reading and application.  Second, the phrase “comes into possession” is substituted for the 
current language, “exercises control over,” which made the offense too similar to Theft by 
unlawful taking or disposition.   
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Comment on Section 2106.  Theft of Services 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 845, 933; see also § 850 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision makes clear that, as with other forms of property, it is theft to 
obtain unlawfully another person’s labor or services. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2106(a) corresponds to and combines 11 
Del.C. §§ 845(a) and 933, with some minor structural changes.  The offense definition is broken 
up into its elements for easier reading and application.  The term “without consent” is added to 
Subsection (a)(1), to clarify the unlawful nature of the taking.  See commentary to Section 2102.   
Most significantly, the methods of obtaining services in Subsection (a)(2) are broken up into two 
categories visually.  Although those categories are not mutually exclusive, they reflect the fact 
that there are two different kinds of services that can be stolen under this Section: personal 
services and utility-type services.  One is more likely to be stolen by deception, while the other is 
more likely to be stolen through unlawful physical access.   
Section 2106(b) corresponds to the rebuttable presumptions and exception in the current 
§ 845(b)–(c); however, the presumptions have been converted into permissive inferences.  That 
change was made because of concerns that the rebuttable presumptions that currently exist 
unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof onto the defendant.  Additionally, Subsection (b)(1) 
attempts to simplify the old presumptions into a single provision, though it retains two distinct 
inferences.  Subsection (b)(2), creating an exception to the permissive inferences in Subsection 
(b)(a) directly corresponds to the § 845(d). 
Theft of Telecommunication Services.  Note that § 850 (use, possession, manufacture . . . 
unlawful telecommunication and access devices) has not been included in Chapter 2100, for 
several reasons.  First, all the substantive provisions of § 850(a) are already captured by other 
Sections of the Proposed Code.  Theft of services is captured by Section 2106 [Theft of 
Services].  Possession of devices or materials with intent to steal telecommunication services is 
captured by inchoate offenses and accomplice liability in the General Part, as well as the new  
Section 708 [Possessing Instruments of Crime].  Concealing information about 
telecommunication devices from lawful authorities in order to use them for the commission of an 
offense is captured by Section 3301 [Obstructing Justice].  Note also that inchoate and 
accomplice liability will increase punishment for theft of services in a manner similar to the 
increased grading scheme of § 850 compared to theft of services.   
Because all substantive provisions in § 850 are covered by the Proposed Code’s General 
Part and specific offenses, § 850(e) (definitions) is unnecessary and not retained.  Moreover, the 
specific procedural provisions in § 850(b)-(d) (criminal penalties, venue and civil action) cannot 
be retained.  There is no basis in current law to broaden the application of these particularized 
provisions to the more general theft of services, possession of instruments of crime or 
obstruction of justice offenses.  On the other hand, retaining these provisions in Title 11 and 
restricting them to their current field of application, would require the creation of special carve-
outs for “communication services” from the abovementioned offenses in the Proposed Code.  
Because the creation of such special carve-outs is antithetical to the Proposed Code’s goal of 
consolidation, these procedural provisions are not retained. 
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Comment on Section 2107.  Receiving Stolen Property 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 851, 852, 21 Del. C. § 6704; see also 
852A, 1450; 21 Del. C. § 6705(d) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision punishes the intent to deprive another person of property, 
whether or not the offender actually stole that property, by governing receipt and possession of 
stolen property.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2107(a) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 851, but 
with one change.  Subsection (a)(3) has been substituted for the current requirement that the 
offender have the “intent to deprive the owner.”  This change is made because the intent to 
deprive is already implicit in Subsection (a)(1)–(2), except in the situation present in (a)(3).  In 
this way, the new offense definition is more precise. 
Section 2107(b) directly corresponds to the presumptions in 11 Del.C. § 852.  See also 
commentaries to Sections 2203 [Fraudulent Treatment of Public Record] and 3203 [Tampering 
with Public Records]. 
Receiving Stolen Firearms and Vehicles.  The criminal acts described in 11 Del.C. § 1450 
(receiving stolen firearm) and 21 Del. C. § 6704 (receiving or transferring stolen vehicle) are 
redundant with Section 2107; however, a grade adjustment based upon the former provision is 
included in Section 2101(b). 
Consolidation.  Receiving stolen property has been consolidated with other forms of theft 
in order to both unify grading and make clear that a person could not be convicted of both theft 
and receiving stolen property based upon the same act.  However, to avoid confusion, Section 
2107(a) does not label the offense as a form of theft. 
Selling Stolen Property.  Note that § 852A has not been included in Chapter 2100, for 
two reasons.  First, the criminal acts that must be proved in § 852A are identical to § 852 
(receiving stolen property), so it need not be a separate offense.  Second, current § 852A has not 
been included to make clear that a defendant cannot be convicted of both theft and selling stolen 
property based on the same act. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2108.  Unauthorized Distribution of Protected Works 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 858, 920 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This offense criminalizes the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted 
materials.  The offense attempts to strike a balance between two competing concerns.  On one 
hand, copyright holders are deprived of income when their works are illegally copied and 
distributed for free.  This loss is akin to theft, which is why this offense is located in Chapter 
2100.  On the other hand, the ease of distributing copyrighted works to multitudes of anonymous 
recipients on the Internet makes it possible for a single act of uploading a work to be construed 
as thousands of “distributions.”  Disproportionate punishment could easily result in that case.  
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Therefore, while Section 2108 makes unauthorized distribution of any copyrighted work a 
general offense, its grading is limited by the number of recipients of the work. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Current Delaware law has no general offense 
criminalizing unauthorized distribution of copyrighted materials.  Instead, Delaware has a few 
outdated offenses dealing with specific kinds of copyright infringement.  11 Del.C. § 858 
criminalizes use of recording equipment inside a movie theater, but does not address any other 
forms of unauthorized duplication, and fails to account for visual works other than films.  11 
Del.C. § 920 criminalizes unauthorized transfer of any recorded sounds, but requires that the 
transfer be made with intent to sell the copy.  Today, there is no “market” for pirated films, 
music, or television: everything is shared for free on the Internet.   
Section 2108 attempts to generalize unauthorized duplication and distribution for all 
copyrighted works.  However, the desirability of generally criminalizing this behavior is 
controversial, and may not be a step Delaware wants to take at this time.  If that is the case, then 
Section 2108 should not be included with the Proposed Code.  In either case, 11 Del.C. §§ 858 
and 920 should not be retained, since they are outdated and lead to disproportional punishment of 
select copyright infringers without touching others. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2109.  Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 853; see also 21 Del.C. § 6702 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines as a criminal offense the use or retention of a vehicle 
without consent.  Section 2108 covers cases where the offender lacks the intent to permanently 
deprive the owner of the vehicle and therefore has not committed theft. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2108(a) corresponds almost directly to 11 
Del.C. § 853, with two changes.  First, Subsection (a)(1) omits the activities of “taking” or 
“exercising control over” the vehicle, both because those activities are confusingly similar to 
theft by taking, and because to the extent they are different from theft by taking, are not 
meaningfully different from “operating” the vehicle.  Note, however, that the current offense 
does include “rides in” as prohibited activity, raising the question as to whether a mere passenger 
could commit this offense.   
Second, 11 Del.C. § 853(4) has not been included, because that subsection prohibits 
transfer of a vehicle or a responsibility for paying a debt when the person knows that the vehicle 
is the primary security for a debt owed to a creditor.  This activity is really a form a fraud, and 
will therefore be more properly addressed in Chapter 2200. 
Section 2108(b) retains the same grade as 11 Del.C. § 853.  However, note the existence 
of a regulatory motor vehicles offense that is functionally identical to § 853, 21 Del.C. § 6702 
(driving vehicle without consent of owner).  The regulatory offense is defined much more simply 
than § 853, and its punishment is equivalent to what we are calling a Class C misdemeanor—two 
grades lower than § 853.  Note also that § 6702 predates § 853 by more than forty years (1929 
vs. 1972). 
Defined Terms.  Note that the terms “motor vehicle, airplane, vessel or other vehicle” are 
used here, whereas 11 Del.C. § 841A (theft of a motor vehicle) uses and defines only the term 
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“motor vehicle.”  The Proposed Code uses more encompassing definitions to capture broader 
forms of unauthorized use, particularly those concerning aircraft and vessels. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2110.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 813, 841A, 841C, 843, 857, 931, 933 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2110(a) provides a definition of “dealer” that 
corresponds to the definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 857(2). 
Section 2210(b) provides a definition of “deceiving” that is based on the theft offense 
currently found in 11 Del.C. § 843.  The definition of “deceiving” has been broadened beyond 
the offense definition in current § 843 by allowing a false impression as to “any fact,” rather than 
only “present or past” facts, which simplifies the offense definition in Section 2103(a) and 
allows the combination of multiple current offenses. 
Section 2110(c) provides a definition of “deprive” that corresponds to the definition 
currently found in 11 Del.C. § 857(3). 
Section 2210(d) provides a definition of “motor vehicle” that corresponds to the 
definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 841A(b) 
Section 2110(e) provides a definition of “obtain” that corresponds to the definition 
currently found in 11 Del.C. § 857(4).  However, since 11 Del.C. definition does not specify a 
meaning in relation to services, that additional meaning has been added for clarity based upon 
Model Penal Code § 223.0(5). 
Section 2110(f) provides a definition of “owner” that corresponds to the definition 
currently found in 11 Del.C. § 857(5).  The definitions of “owner” has been changed to make 
clear that illegally obtained property can be stolen, and thus give rise to criminal liability.  The 
change is based on current § 841(b).   
Section 2210(g) provides a definition of “practitioner” that corresponds to the definition 
currently found in 11 Del.C. § 841C(b)(1). 
Section 2110(h) provides a definition of “property of another” that corresponds to the 
definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 857(7).  Like the definition of “owner,” the definition of 
“property of another” has been changed to make clear that illegally obtained property can be 
stolen, and thus give rise to criminal liability.  The change is based on current § 841(b).  
Additionally, the definition of “property of another” expands upon the current definition in 
§ 857(7) by doing two things.  First, it acknowledges that legal persons can be victims of theft.  
Second, it makes it possible to accomplish the purpose of current § 813 (theft from a cemetery) 
without creating an additional offense, by saying that property left at a cemetery is not 
abandoned property. 
Section 2107(i) provides a definition of “receive” that has been added anew, as it is not 
defined in the current statutes. 
Section 2110(j) provides a definition of “service” that corresponds to the definitions in 11 
Del.C. §§ 857(8) and 931(6).  Specifically, “computer services” are added to the definition of 
“services.”  By so doing, the separate offense in 11 Del.C. § 933 (theft of computer services) is 
rendered unnecessary. 
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Section 2110(k) provides a definition of “stolen” that has been added anew, as it is not 
defined in the current statutes. 
Section 2110(l) states that the “value” of property is calculated as provided in Section 
805.  
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CHAPTER 2200.  FORGERY AND FRAUDULENT PRACTICES 
 
Section 2201.  Forgery and Counterfeiting 
Section 2202.  Fraudulent Tampering with Records 
Section 2203.  Fraudulent Treatment of Public Records 
Section 2204.  Issuing a Bad Check 
Section 2205.  Unlawful Use of a Payment Card 
Section 2206.  Deceptive Business Practices 
Section 2207.  Defrauding Secured Creditors 
Section 2208.  Fraud in Insolvency 
Section 2209.  Identity Theft 
Section 2210.  Commercial Bribery 
Section 2211.  Fraudulent Conveyance or Receipt of Public Lands 
Section 2212.  Unauthorized Impersonation 
Section 2213.  Definitions 
 
 
General Comment on Chapter 2200 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 840, 908, 913, 913A, 916, 917, 918, 
920, 921, 923, 924, 924A; 12 Del.C. § 210; 21 
Del.C. §§ 6708, 6710; 31 Del.C. § 1003 
 
Comment:  
Ticket scalping.  11 Del.C. § 918, criminalizing ticket scalping, has not been included in 
the Proposed Code because it is not an offense of general application relating to all ticket resales.  
The offense prohibits selling, reselling, or exchanging any tickets to events occurring at only two 
specific venues in Delaware.  If these provisions are to be retained, they should be relocated to a 
regulatory title dealing with entertainment venues, due to their highly specialized application. 
Transfer of recorded sounds.  11 Del.C. §§ 920 and 921, concerning the transfer of 
recorded sounds, are replaced by proposed Section 2108.  Under Delaware law, individuals 
cannot appropriate recorded “sounds” for purposes of profit without the consent of the sounds’ 
owner.  Proposed Section 2108, criminalizing the unauthorized distribution of protected works, 
encompasses existing Delaware provisions 11 Del.C. §§ 920 and 921; the definition of 
“distribute” in proposed Section 2108(d)(1), which includes “mak[ing] available [protected 
works],” is broad enough to include advertising or offering to sale or resell protected works.   
11 Del.C. §§ 923, 924, 924A have not been included in the Proposed Code because these 
provisions are essentially regulatory provisions defining the class of exceptions, the rights of 
parties in civil litigation, and forfeiture proceedings.  They are not included in Chapter 2200 
because the exceptions and forfeiture provisions are not necessary in light of the way the offense 
provisions in Chapter 2200 are drafted, and civil litigation is not properly addressed in a criminal 
code. 
Shoplifting.  11 Del.C. § 840(a)(2) criminalizes the possession of any goods by charging 
them to another person without that person’s authority, or by charging them to a fictitious 
person.  While the use of a fictitious person or the fraudulent charging of merchandise to another 
without their permission is fraudulent, the proposed theft by deception offense in Section 2103 is 
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broad enough to include situations where the offender knowingly obtains the property of another 
by means of this type of fraud.  Therefore, § 840(a)(2) need not be included in Chapter 2200. 
Theft by deception.  Proposed Section 2103, the provision for theft by deception, 
concerns situations where the offender knowingly obtains the property of another by means of 
trickery or falsehood.  Many of the current fraud provisions are adequately addressed through the 
broad language of Section 2103.  These include: insurance fraud, 11 Del.C. § 913; health care 
fraud, 11 Del.C. § 913A; home improvement fraud, 11 Del.C. § 916; new home construction 
fraud, 11 Del.C. § 917; and welfare fraud, 31 Del.C. § 1003.  All of these frauds involve the use 
of deception to obtain an unearned benefit from another, and are therefore properly characterized 
as theft offenses.12 
Concealment or alteration of a will.  11 Del.C. § 908 and 12 Del.C. § 210 concerns the 
concealment, alteration, theft, or destruction of a will.  These offenses, like many others, are 
adequately addressed by proposed Section 2103, theft by deception.  Since the most logical 
reason that one would conceal, alter, steal, or destroy a will is to cause someone to take more 
from the testator than he or she would otherwise be entitled to, the conduct prohibited by 12 
Del.C. § 210 is better addressed by the theft by deception offense in proposed Section 2103.  
Possession of blank titles and registration cards.  21 Del.C. §§ 6708 and 6710, 
criminalizing the possession of blank titles and registration cards, have not been included in 
Section 2200.  Assuming that blank titles and registration cards are intended to be used for a 
criminal purpose, 21 Del.C. §§ 6708 and 6710 are adequately covered by proposed Section 708’s 
general inchoate offense of possession of instruments of crime.  While the current offenses 
prohibit mere possession of blank titles and registration cards, adding an intent requirement is 
justifiable because the harm arises when the items are used or are intended to be used to commit 
a future offense, such as facilitating the sale of stolen cars.  The act of possessing blank titles and 
registration cards is not harmful in itself.  
 
 
Comment on Section 2201.  Forgery and Counterfeiting 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 861, 926; 21 Del.C. §§ 2316, 2751(g), 
2760(a)-(c), (e). 
 
Comment: 
Generally.   Section 2201 creates a general prohibition on forgery and counterfeiting by 
consolidating a number of separate offenses present in current Delaware law.  Section 2201 
includes two sub-offenses: forgery and counterfeiting.  Like other offenses prohibited in Chapter 
2200, forgery and counterfeiting are typically performed for the purpose of consummating a 
theft.  Section 2201 treats forgery and counterfeiting as independent offenses, however, 
recognizing that: (1) forged and counterfeited items are often used to accomplish especially far-
reaching fraudulent activities, and (2) beyond the specific theft achieved or attempted, these 
offenses impose the additional discrete harm of reducing public confidence in the forged item 
(for example, undermining trust in paper currency and the monetary system). 
                                                             
12 While nearly all frauds can be considered theft by deception in a sense, the Proposed Code follows both 
traditional practice and current Delaware law by separating most common forms of fraud into a separate Chapter 
dealing with fraud offenses. 
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Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2201(a) corresponds to current 11 Del.C. 
§§ 861(a)(1), (a)(2), and(a)(3).  Section 2201(a)’s comprehensive formulation consolidates and 
replaces various scattered offenses, including: the general forgery offense (11 Del.C. § 861), the 
forgery or fraudulent alteration of vehicle identification documents (21 Del.C. § 2316), and the 
forgery or fraudulent alteration of driver’s licenses or identification cards (21 Del.C. §§ 2751(g), 
2760(a)-(c)).   
Subsections (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) correspond to 11 Del.C. §§ 861(a)(1), (a)(2) and 
(a)(3) respectively.  Subsection (a)(4) is a new provision: the phrase “puts forward” should be 
interpreted broadly and is intended to cover situations where one uses a forged writing, but does 
not necessarily dispose of it, such as by displaying it.   
Subsection (b) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 926(a) (trademark counterfeiting), except that 
the provision does not criminalize “offer[ing to sell]” any item or service bearing or identified by 
a counterfeit mark.  The omitted language concerns conduct that is more preliminary than actual 
forgery or counterfeiting and is therefore more appropriately covered under attempt liability in 
proposed Section 701.   
Section 2201(c)(1) introduces three separate levels of grading the forgery offense 
depending on the nature of the written instrument: Class 7 felonies for issues of money, stamps, 
securities, or other valuable instruments issued by the government; or part of an issue of stock, 
bonds, or other instruments representing interests in or claims against any property or enterprise 
(Subsection (c)(1)(A); Class 8 felonies for deeds, wills, codicils, contracts, releases, assignments, 
commercial instruments, checks, or other instrument evidencing, creating, transferring, 
terminating, or otherwise affecting a legal right, interest, obligation, or status (Subsection 
(c)(1)(B); and Class A misdemeanors for all other cases (Subsection (c)(1)(C)).  The grading of 
Subsection (c)(1)(A) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 861(b)(1), except that the grading has been 
elevated to a Class 7 felony.  The grading of Subsection  (c)(1)(B) corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 861(b)(2), except that the grading has been altered to a Class 8 felony, which is the lowest 
felony grade in the Proposed Code, to achieve consistency between current law and the proposed 
grading scheme.  The grading of Subsection  (c)(1)(C) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 861(b)(3).    
The grading scheme in Section 2201(c)(2)(A) has been set according to the grade 
thresholds in Section 2101(b) for theft offenses.  Because fraud is a species of theft, it promotes 
consistency and proportionality in the Proposed Code for all fraud and theft offenses, as much as 
possible, to be graded in the same way.  This change makes available additional felony and 
misdemeanor grades, allowing more nuanced grading based on the seriousness of the offense, 
when compared to 11 Del. C. § 926.  Section 2201(c)(2)(A)(i) corresponds to § 926(b)(3) 
providing that when items bearing a counterfeit mark are components of a finished product, the 
value of the entire product should be taken into account for valuation purposes.  Note however, 
that the part of § 926(b)(3) providing that the retail value of an item is the counterfeiter’s regular 
price for the item, as well as § 926(e) concerning value aggregation have not been retained, 
because Section 805 contains a general scheme for valuation of property under the Proposed 
Code.    
Section 2201(c) corresponds to the rebuttable presumption in 11 Del. C. § 926(c), but the 
presumption have been converted into permissive inference.  Note that § 11 Del. C. § 861(c) 
restitution requirement has not been incorporated into the Proposed Code, because restitution is 
already generally required where applicable by Section 803.  Similarly, the aggravating factors in 
11 Del. C. § 926(d)(2)-(3) are not retained.  11 Del. C. §§ 926(d)(2)a. and  926(d)(3)b. 
concerning repeat offense provision are not included, because proposed Section 804 contains a 
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general adjustment for repeat offenses.  11 Del. C. §§ 926(d)(3)b. providing aggravation for 
manufacturing or production of items bearing a counterfeit mark, is not retained as this conduct 
will be graded consistently with the other counterfeiting activities mentioned in the offense 
definition.  §§ 11 Del. C. §§ 926(d)(2)b. and 926(d)(3)c. providing an aggravation according to 
the amount or value of counterfeit items involved in the violation, are also not retained, because 
they are inconsistent with the general valuation scheme in Subsection (c)(2).  Note also that 11 
Del. C. § 926(f) concerning mandatory and enhanced fines is not retained because all minimum 
penalty provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802, and maximum fines are set 
in Section 803. §§ 926 (g)-(h) are not incorporated into the Proposed Code.  These provisions 
address forfeiture and evidentiary matters, and should be retained in the appropriate regulatory 
title.  
Finally, note that special care has been taken to preserve the complex regulatory schemes 
in Title 21, the incorporation of the criminal provisions of that Title into the Proposed Code 
notwithstanding.  Therefore, the part of 21 Del. C. § 2760(e)(1), addressing suspension of 
driving license or privileges upon violation of §2760(a) and (c) has been retained in Title 21, and 
although the prohibitions in §2760(a) and (c) have been incorporated into the more general 
criminal prohibition in Section 2201, for regulatory purposes, the specific content of these 
provisions was added to 21 Del. C. § 2760(e).  
 
 
Comment on Section 2202.  Fraudulent Tampering with Records 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 840A, 871, 872, 876, 877, 878, 909; 6 
Del. C. § 5128(f); 21 Del. C. §§ 2751(a)-(b), 
6705(b), (e), (f), (h); 31 Del.C. § 1004, 1007 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes both fraudulently tampering with records and 
inviting reliance on records one knows to have been fraudulently tampered with.  Section 2202 
supplements proposed Section 3203 and applies to records that may not qualify as “public 
records.”   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2202 corresponds to and consolidates 
numerous existing offenses: 11 Del.C. § 840A(a) (the fraudulent creation or alteration of retail 
sales receipts); 11 Del.C. § 871 (falsifying business records); 11 Del.C. § 872 (the affirmative 
defense for employees who merely executed the orders of an employer); 11 Del.C. § 876 
(tampering with public records); 11 Del.C. § 877 (offering a false instrument for filing); 11 
Del.C. § 878 (issuing a false certificate); 11 Del.C. § 909 (securing execution of documents by 
deception); 6 Del. C. § 5128(f) (unlawful alteration of delivery ticket for fuel oil or propane); 21 
Del. C. §§ 2751(a)-(b) (unlawful application for or use of license or identification card), 6705(b), 
(e) (falsification, or unauthorized placement or removal of vehicle identification numbers with 
intent to misrepresent identity), and 31 Del.C. § 1004 (tampering with documents to be filed with 
public assistance programs).   
Because Section 2202 is a consolidated provision, the offense is meant to broadly capture 
conduct.  Section 2202 does not distinguish between categories of documents, whether they are 
for public or private use; instead all “records” are captured under Section 2202.  Subsection 
(a)(1) prohibits tampering with or failing to properly maintain records and corresponds to 
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offenses like tampering with business records, tampering with public records, and presenting 
false reports to public assistance programs. 
Section 2202(a)(2) prohibits issuing, offering, or presenting an instrument that contains 
false statements or false information.  Subsection (a)(2) covers such documents and offenses like 
illegitimate sales receipts, offering a false instrument for filing, issuing a false certificate, and 
securing execution of documents by misrepresenting the nature of the document. 
Section 2202(b) sets the grading level for this offense at a Class 8 felony.  Current 
Delaware law assigns different grades depending on the nature of the document.  For instance, 
issuing a false certificate is a Class G felony, false business records are a Class A misdemeanor, 
tampering with documents to be filed with public assistance programs can be a Class A 
misdemeanor or a Class E felony, and tampering with public records is a Class E felony.  Instead 
of attempting to delineate every kind of document for which there is a different grading level, 
Section 2202(b) unifies and consolidates the offense as a Class 8 felony, which is appropriate 
because of the relatively strict offense requirement that the defendant have the intent to defraud. 
Subsequently, the corresponding grading provisions in current law have not been retained (see 
e.g., 21 Del. C. § 6705(h), the restitution part of which is also not retained, because it is 
addressed by Section 803(c) in the General Part).  Note, however, that if intent to defraud does 
not exist, the offense may still be prosecuted under Section 3203 [Tampering with Public 
Records]. 
Note that the affirmative defense for employees found in 11 Del.C. § 872 has not been 
retained.  An employee acting under orders of a superior is unlikely to have the “intent to 
defraud” required by the offense definition, making an affirmative defense unnecessary.  
Furthermore, an employee who does meet the intent requirement does not deserve to be shielded 
from liability simply because her employer-superior shares her intent to defraud.  Similarly, 21 
Del. C. § 6705(f) – providing that placement or restoration of identification numbers on vehicles 
according to authorization by the Division of Motor Vehicles or by manufacturers during the 
regular course of business is not an offense under 6705 and that such identification numbers are 
not falsified – is not retained.  It is clear that identification numbers mentioned in this provision 
are not falsified, and such conduct is unlikely to be accompanied by “intent to defraud” required 
by the offense definition.   
 
 
Comment on Section 2203.  Fraudulent Treatment of Public Records 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 21 Del.C. §§ 2751(c)-(f) (h)-(p), (r), 6705(d) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 2203 criminalizes fraudulently obtaining, displaying, or possessing 
an official document.  This provision is similar to, but conceptually distinct from, Section 2202.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2203 is meant to capture several 
circumstances not included in Sections 2201 and 2202: (1) where individuals may have 
fraudulently procured official documents, but may not have necessarily offered false information 
or forged any of the documents (see 21 Del.C. § 2751(f) “A person shall not display, cause or 
permit to be displayed, any fictitious license or identification card”); and (2) where individuals 
display, possess, or refuse to surrender fraudulent documents.  See 21 Del.C. § 2751(o) (“A 
person shall not fail or refuse to surrender to the Department on its lawful demand any license or 
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identification card that has been suspended, revoked, canceled, altered or otherwise fraudulently 
obtained.”).  Note also that the prohibitions on lending or permitting the use of one’s license in 
21 Del. C. § 2751(m) and (p), are also covered by this Section and the Proposed Code’s rules for 
complicity. 
Section 2203(b) sets the grade of this new offense as a Class A misdemeanor.  This grade 
is not based on the current provisions that are being consolidated.  (Current § 2751 is graded as a 
Class B misdemeanor or a violation, depending on the circumstances of the offense; (§ 2751(r)); 
and § 6705(d) are graded as a Class E felony.)  The Class A misdemeanor grade of Section 
2203(b) has been adopted: (1) for consistency in consolidating currently separate offenses, and 
(2) to establish a proportional grade when compared to the more serious offenses in Section 
2202.  A defendant who violates Section 2203 is guilty of fraudulently obtaining an official 
document or displaying, possessing, or refusing to surrender fraudulent documents, but is not 
guilty of tampering with or offering fraudulent information. 
Note, some current law’s fraudulent treatment offenses may be consistent with other 
criminal conduct.  For instance, 21 Del. C. § 6705(d), prohibiting receiving, retaining or 
disposing of vehicles while knowing their identification number has been removed or falsified, 
may be consistent with Section 2207 [Receiving Stolen Property], and prosecuted accordingly.  
Note also that the part of 21 Del. C. § 2751(r) grading display or possession of licenses 
suspended or revoked due to a variety statutory provisions in Delaware Code as violation, is not 
retained.  This provision’s significant reduction in punishment may lead to inconsistency, 
especially bearing in mind that the listed statutory provisions are different in kind.  Moreover, in 
order to receive the reduction, § 2751(r) requires a proof of reasonable unawareness to the 
suspension of a license.  Yet, this requirement is inconsistent with the culpability level of the 
offense. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2204.  Issuing a Bad Check 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 900, 902; see also 900A 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes the issuing or passing bad checks.  Although they 
are often used as a means of avoiding paying for property or services, bad checks cause 
additional harm not addressed by Chapter 2100’s theft offenses: they disrupt ordinary commerce 
by being negotiated by the payee and subsequent holders for value, and they undermine the 
public’s confidence in checks and the checking system generally. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2204 corresponds to large portions of 11 
Del.C. §§ 900 and 902.  Section 2204(a), the offense definition, corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 900(a).  11 Del.C. § 900(b), authorizing law enforcement to refuse to investigate instances of 
issuing a bad check when a commercial entity fails to ask for and record personal identifying 
information, has not been included.  Authorizing law enforcement to refuse to investigate 
violations of § 900 due to the mistake or vulnerability of a commercial entity effectively 
exculpates the offender for reasons unrelated to the offender’s wrongdoing or blameworthiness.  
This is likely the only instance of such an authorization in the current criminal code, making it a 
singular and material deviation from general principles.   
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Section 2204(b) correspond in part to the grading scheme in 11 Del.C. § 900.  However, 
the grade of the offense, based upon the value of the check involved, is set according to the grade 
thresholds in Section 2101(b) for theft offenses.  Since fraud is a species of theft, it promotes 
consistency and proportionality in the Proposed Code for all fraud and theft offenses, as much as 
possible, to be graded in the same way.  This change makes available additional felony and 
misdemeanor grades, allowing more nuanced grading based on the seriousness of the offense.   
Section 2204(c) provides the trier of fact with a permissive inference regarding the issuer 
of a bad check’s knowledge when either of two factors are met.  Section 2204(c) corresponds to 
11 Del.C. § 900(a), with two minor changes.  First, § 900(a) frames the permissive inference 
factors as providing prima facie evidence of the issuer’s knowledge, rather than merely providing 
the trier of fact with a permissive inference.  The change from providing prima facie evidence to 
providing a permissive inference follows the general practice of the Proposed Code, as laid out in 
proposed Section 106(d).  Second, the language excluding cases involving postdated checks, 
which in § 900(a) applies to both of the section’s prima facie evidence factors, now only applies 
to the second factor (Section 2204(c)(2)).  Proposed Section 2204(c)(1) does not retain the 
exception for cases involving postdated checks currently contained in § 900(a) because the trier 
of fact should be allowed to infer that an issuer knew the bad check would not be honored if the 
issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check was issued.  Generally, an issuer 
cannot issue a postdated check if the issuer does not have an account with a drawee bank at the 
time the check was issued, although one could do so if the drawee account existed previously but 
was closed by the time the postdated check was issued.  Since the issuer of the bad postdated 
check would know, by definition, that the check would not be honored because the issuer had no 
account with the drawee at the time the check was issued, but such knowledge would be difficult 
for the State to prove, a permissive inference is appropriate.  
Current Provisions Not Included.  11 Del.C. § 900A, concerning conditional discharges 
for first-time offenders, has not been included in Section 2204 as it concerns criminal procedure, 
and should be relocated to a portion of the Delaware Code dealing in procedure.  The affirmative 
defense for employees acting as agents, in 11 Del.C. § 902, has not been retained, either.  An 
employee who issues a check at the behest of her employer is unlikely to know that the check 
will not be honored, making the affirmative defense unnecessary. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2205.  Unlawful Use of a Payment Card 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 903, 905 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes the unlawful use of payment cards, including 
credit and debit cards.  Payment cards are often fraudulently used for the purpose of wrongfully 
acquiring property.  Nevertheless, payment card fraud creates harm not addressed by Chapter 
2100’s prohibitions against theft.  As is the case with passing bad checks, payment card fraud 
undermines confidence in payment systems and is harmful to the ordinary operation of 
commerce. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2205(a) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. 
§ 903, but with four changes.  First, § 903(b)(1) has been omitted.  “Making” or “possessing” an 
unlawful payment card is an inchoate offense covered by Section 700, while “selling,” “giving,” 
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or “transferring” an unlawful payment card is properly covered by general principles of 
accomplice liability.  Second, § 903(b)(2) (publishing a payment card or code) has not been 
included as that provision is also covered by the general accomplice liability principles in 
proposed Section 211.  Third, § 903(e) (procedures for prosecution) has not been included as it 
concerns criminal procedure, and should be relocated to a portion of the Delaware Code dealing 
in procedure.  Fourth, the culpability requirements have been heightened from § 903(a)’s 
“knowingly permit[ting] or encourage[ing] another to use a payment card for the purpose of 
obtaining money” to the proposed provision’s “intent to obtain property or services.”  The 
alteration also expands the offense by broadening what can be obtained to satisfy the offense 
definition.  
Sections 2205(a)(1) through (a)(3) correspond to current §§ 903(a)(1) through (a)(4).  
Subsection (a)(3) is a consolidation of current §§ 903(a)(2) and (a)(4). 
Sections 2205(b)(1) corresponds in part to 11 Del.C. § 903(c).  However, the grade of the 
offense, based upon the amount of property obtained by unlawful use of the payment card, is set 
according to the grade thresholds in Section 2101(b) for theft offenses.  Since fraud is a species 
of theft, it promotes consistency and proportionality in the Proposed Code for all fraud and theft 
offenses, as much as possible, to be graded in the same way.  This change makes available 
additional felony and misdemeanor grades, allowing more nuanced grading based on the 
seriousness of the offense.  The grade provisions involving victims over 62 years of age have not 
been included in Section 2205 because Section 804 contains a general grade adjustment for 
“vulnerable persons,” including persons over 62 years of age that applies to all offenses.  The 
aggregation provision, including Subsection (b)(2), corresponds to current § 903(d).     
Note that the affirmative defense in 11 Del.C. § 905, for defendants who have the intent 
and ability to meet obligations to the issuer that arise out of the defendant’s unlawful use of a 
payment card has not been retained.   
The harm of the offense is completed at the time the payment card is used; any repayment 
after the offense is restitution, which is not related to blameworthiness or criminal liability.  
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the defendant’s ability to pay will likely be the only evidence 
of intent to pay, making the affirmative defense available only to defendants of means.  
 
 
Comment on Section 2206.  Deceptive Business Practices 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 906, 922 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes several common deceptive business practices that 
operate to cheat others.  Section 2206 supplements Chapter 2100’s theft offenses by prohibiting 
inherently deceptive conduct that, even under proposed Section 701’s “substantial step” test, may 
not constitute attempted theft.  Section 2206 removes any doubt that these practices are criminal, 
and addresses them in a single provision to ensure they are defined and graded consistently.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2206 criminalizes a variety of deceptive 
business practices and the improper labeling of products for sale.  Section 2206 corresponds, in 
large part, to 11 Del.C. §§ 906 and 922.  Current § 906 is the general deceptive business 
practices provision and § 922 is the provision prohibiting the improper labeling of sound 
recordings. 
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Section 2206(a) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 906.  The conduct requirements in 
Subsections (a)(1) through (a)(7) correspond to 11 Del.C. §§ 906(1) through (7), respectively.  
However, three minor changes have been made.  In Subsection (a)(1), the “possesses for use” 
language found in § 906(1) has not been included because possession of instruments of crime is 
separately covered by the newly proposed general inchoate offense in Section 708.  Second, the 
“knowingly or recklessly” culpability requirement that applies to all of current § 906 has not 
been retained because each individual subsection comprising Section 2206(a) contains its own 
individual culpability requirement.  Third, Subsection (a)(3) omits the “attempts to take” 
language found in § 906(3) because attempt liability is covered by the inchoate provisions in 
proposed Section 701.  
The republication exception in Section 2206(b) corresponds to the exception in 11 Del.C. 
§ 906.  That provision provides an exception to criminal prosecution for the publication, 
broadcast, or reproduction of material by those engaged in the dissemination of information 
without knowledge of the material’s deceptive character.  
The grading scheme in Section 2206(c) has been set according to the grade thresholds in 
Section 2101(b) for theft offenses.  Since fraud is a species of theft, it promotes consistency and 
proportionality in the Proposed Code for all fraud and theft offenses, as much as possible, to be 
graded in the same way.  This change makes available additional felony and misdemeanor 
grades, allowing more nuanced grading based on the seriousness of the offense, when compared 
to 11 Del.C. § 906 (Class A misdemeanor) and 11 Del.C. § 922 (Class G or F felony).  
 
 
Comment on Section 2207.  Defrauding Secured Creditors 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 853, 891, 893, 910 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes dealing with property for the purpose of 
hindering a secured creditor’s interest in the property.  Section 2207 will often apply to debtors 
who fraudulently deal with collateral in their rightful possession.  Section 2207 complements 
proposed Chapters 2100 and 2300; the definition of “property” makes it so that a defendant’s 
own interest in property that is subject to a security interest will not preclude liability for theft or 
property damage.  Section 2207 independently addresses security interests for those cases in 
which the debtor does not appropriate or damage the collateral or satisfy another requirement of 
a theft or property offense, but does unlawfully hinder enforcement of the security interest.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2207(a) prohibits destroying, removing, 
concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise dealing with property subject to a security 
interest with the intent to hinder the enforcement of that interest.  Section 2207 corresponds, in 
large part, to 11 Del.C. § 891, except that “hinder” has been used instead of the current “defeat” 
language, thereby broadening the offense.  This change is intended to cover situations where a 
person seeks to delay enforcement of a security interest, but not defeat it altogether.  Such 
persons should not escape liability. 
Section 2207, with its expanded coverage, also incorporates 11 Del.C. § 853(4) (the 
unlawful possession and transfer of a vehicle to a third party, without regard to the existence of 
creditors who are entitled to receive payments on a debt where the vehicle is a security); 11 
Del.C. § 893 (the alteration or destruction of levied-upon property that a person knows has been 
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levied upon or seized under execution, attachment process, or distress for rent); and 11 Del.C. 
§ 910 (an unlawful debt adjustment to deprive creditors of collections).   
Section 2207(b) sets the offense grading scheme according to the grade thresholds in 
Section 2101(b) for theft offenses.  Since fraud is a species of theft, it promotes consistency and 
proportionality in the Proposed Code for all fraud and theft offenses, as much as possible, to be 
graded in the same way.  This change makes available additional felony and misdemeanor 
grades, allowing more nuanced grading based on the seriousness of the offense, when compared 
to 11 Del.C. §§ 891, 853, 893 (Class A misdemeanors), and 910 (Class B misdemeanor). 
 
 
Comment on Section 2208.  Fraud in Insolvency 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 892 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes fraudulent conduct by one who knows that certain 
proceedings for the benefit of creditors, such as liquidation proceedings or proceedings seeking 
the appointment of a receiver, have been or are about to be instituted. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2208 incorporates, in large part, 11 Del.C. 
§ 892, except that Section 2208(a)(2) allows the fraud to have occurred when the offender knows 
that proceedings have been or about to be instituted, rather than once a receiver has been 
appointed or a liquidation has been made.  The rationale for the change is that one motivated to 
commit the fraud might not wait until the appointment or disposition has already been made, but 
might act quickly and prospectively.  The intent requirements of Subsection (a)(1) corresponds to 
that of current § 892.  Subsection (a)(3)(A), (a)(3)(B), (a)(3)(C), and (a)3)(D) correspond to 
current §§ 892(1), 892(2), 892(3), and 892(4), respectively.   
Section 2208(b) sets the offense grade according to the grade thresholds in Section 
2101(b) for theft offenses.  Since fraud is a species of theft, it promotes consistency and 
proportionality in the Proposed Code for all fraud and theft offenses, as much as possible, to be 
graded in the same way.  This change makes available additional felony and misdemeanor 
grades, allowing more nuanced grading based on the seriousness of the offense, when compared 
to 11 Del.C. § 892 (Class A misdemeanor). 
 
 
Comment on Section 2209.  Identity Theft 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 854, 854A, 903A, 914, 915, 915A 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes identity fraud and other improper uses of 
consumer identification information.  Although the offense does not describe “theft” as it is 
defined in Chapter 2100, the title “identity theft” is popularly understood to convey this offense 
conduct.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2209 corresponds to current 11 Del.C. §§ 854 
(the general identity theft provision), 854A (the regulatory scheme concerning the identity theft 
passport), 903A (the unlawful use of scanning devices), 914 (the unlawful use of consumer 
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identification information), 915 (the unlawful use of credit card information), and 915A (the 
unlawful use of credit and debit card transaction receipts). 
Section 2209(a)(1) corresponds to current § 854(a) and (b), with several changes detailed 
in the following paragraphs.  Section 2209(a)(2) and (a)(3) correspond to current §§ 903A(a) and 
903A(b), respectively.  Section 2209(a)(4) corresponds to the conduct elements of current 
§§ 914, 915, and 915A, which have been consolidated.  The exception provisions in Sections 
2209(a)(4)(A) and (B) directly correspond to current §§ 914(b)(1) and (2), respectively. 
While Section 2209 generally corresponds to the current identity theft and improper uses 
of consumer identification information offenses, there are several substantive changes between 
the current code and the Proposed code.  First, Section 2209 adopts a singular culpability 
requirement of intent to defraud, which improves consistency with other offenses in Chapter 
2200.  Current Delaware provisions contain different culpability requirements.  For instance, 11 
Del.C. § 854 (identity theft) requires that the person “knowingly or recklessly” obtain or produce 
personal identifying information with the intent to use such information to commit or facilitate 
any crimes, while conviction under the unlawful use of reencoder and scanning devices requires 
the defendant to “knowingly, willfully, and with the intent to defraud” possess or use a scanning 
device.  To consolidate the offenses, and allow for consistency and clarity, the singular 
culpability requirement of “intent to defraud” has been adopted. 
Second, the requirement that the actor know that the illegally-obtained personal 
identifying information will be used by a third party to commit or facilitate any crime contained 
in 11 Del.C. § 854(b) has not been included in Section 2209.  The knowledge requirement in the 
current provision is redundant with the “intent to defraud” culpability in Section 2209(a).  If the 
defendant intends to defraud the victim by transferring that person’s personal information, then 
the defendant knows how that information is likely to be used.  Under the Proposed Code, 
identity theft will only require that the actor: (1) illegally obtain or transfer personal identifying 
information, (2) without the consent of the owner.   
11 Del.C. § 854A, the regulatory scheme concerning identity theft passports, has not been 
included in this Section.  That provision does not contain any criminal offenses, but rather 
describes the procedure through which a victim of identity theft obtains an identity theft passport 
through the Office of the Attorney General.  It should be relocated to a more appropriate part of 
the Delaware Code. 
Section 2209(b) sets two different grading levels: offenses under Subsections (a)(1), 
(a)(2), or (a)(3) as a Class 7 felony; and the offense under Subsection (a)(4) as a Class D 
misdemeanor.  Subsection (b)(1) (Class 7 felonies) is roughly one grade higher than that 
provided in its source statutes: 11 Del.C. § 854(d) (identity theft); 11 Del.C. § 903A(a) 
(possession or use of a scanning device); and 11 Del.C. § 903A(b) (possession or use of a 
reencoder).  The legislation authorizing this Proposed Code mandates that “disproportionate” 
statutes be identified and rectified.  The proportionality of an offense’s authorized punishment is 
directly tied to the grade assigned to that offense.  An offense’s grade could be either 
disproportionately high or low.  The nonpartisan consultative group supervising the drafting 
process for this Proposed Code has scrutinized the relative grading of all offenses, and has 
decided that this offense’s grade is disproportionately high when compared to other offenses of 
the same grade in current law.  The grade of this offense has been changed to reflect that 
judgment.  Subsection (b)(2) (Class D misdemeanors) corresponds to offenses under current 
Delaware law that are graded as unclassified misdemeanors: 11 Del.C. § 914(c), 11 Del.C. 
§ 915(d), and 11 Del.C. § 915A(c).  Because the Proposed Code does not grade offenses as 
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“unclassified misdemeanors,” grading has been set to a Class D misdemeanor (30 days 
imprisonment) to maintain internal consistency.  
 
 
Comment on Section 2210.  Commercial Bribery 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 881, 882; see also, 31 Del.C. § 1005 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes the offer of a bribe to influence or receipt of a 
bribe to be influenced in matters relating to one’s duty of fidelity in a statutorily enumerated 
position or relationship.  Section 2210 is distinct from the bribery provisions in Section 3101 
because those offenses cover the use of property or personal advantage to influence a public 
servant in the performance of the public servant’s duties, while this Section relates to persons in 
positions of trust other than public officials.  Section 2210 defines a commercial bribery offense, 
while Section 3101 deals with bribery in the context of public administration.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2210 corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 881 and 
882.  
Section 2210(a)(1) creates a broadly applicable intent requirement to both offering and 
receiving a bribe.  Subsection (a) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 881.  Current § 881 distinguishes 
between various intent requirements based on the individual that the defendant is bribing.  For 
instance, when bribing a sports official, the defendant must act “with intent to influence the 
official to perform duties improperly,” while bribing a participant in a sports contest requires the 
defendant to act “with intent to influence that . . . participant not to give [the participant’s] best 
effort.”  Subsection (a)(1) replaces these idiosyncratic intent requirements with a general “intent 
to influence another . . . or be influenced by another in any respect to any of the person’s acts, 
decisions, or duties.”  This intent requirement is broad enough to encompass the individual intent 
requirements in § 881, but narrow enough as to not substantively change the meaning of those 
intent requirements. 
Subsection (a)(2) prohibits offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer any benefit on 
another with the intent to influence that person’s acts, decisions, or duties; and soliciting, 
accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit on another with the intent to be influenced by 
another in any respect to one’s acts, decisions, or duties.  Subsections (a)(2)(A) through (E) 
correspond to 11 Del.C. §§ 881 and 882, except that the categories of individuals who can bribe 
or be bribed have been expanded.  The proposed provision maintains certain categories of 
individuals, such as employees, agents, fiduciaries, and sports participants and officials, but also 
adds new categories of individuals such as lawyers, physicians, officers, directors, and the like 
who hold positions of public trust and duties of fidelity and who may be susceptible to 
commercial bribery. 
Section 2210(b) grades the commercial bribery offenses as a Class A misdemeanor.  
Subsection (b) corresponds to the grading levels of 11 Del.C. §§ 881 and 882.   
Current Provisions Not Included. 31 Del. C. § 1005 is a regulatory offense addressing 
various kickback schemes related to medical assistance programs.  § 1005(a)-(b) criminalize the 
solicitation or receipt by any person of any remuneration for particular benefits, including 
referrals to medical providers and engaging in transactions involving property for which payment 
may be made under public assistance programs, § 1005(c) criminalizes solicitation or receipt by 
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medical providers of remuneration beyond the rates established by the State, and § 1005(d) lists 
various exceptions to these provisions.  While 31 Del. C. § 1005 refers to a conduct similar in 
nature to commercial bribery offense, it is different in several respects.  First, its culpability level 
is substantially lower, requiring recklessness, rather than intent.  Second, it requires no violation 
of fiduciary duty.  Third, the focus of this provision (and its specific exceptions) is limited to the 
regulatory content of Title 31.  For these reasons § 1005 should remain in Title 31.  However, 31 
Del. C. § 1007(c) grades it as a Class E felony.  This grading is disproportionately high.  Current 
law and the Proposed Code grade commercial bribery offences as Class A misdemeanors, despite 
their higher culpability level and more stringent objective requirements.  The Class E felony 
grade for this regulatory offense is also inconsistent with the Class 7 felony grading of the more 
serious conduct of bribing witnesses, jurors, and government officials in Section 3101.  
Therefore, the grade of § 1005 should be set as no higher than a Class A misdemeanor – the 
highest grade available for offenses outside the Proposed Code (Section 801(b)(2)). 
 
 
Comment on Section 2211.  Fraudulent Conveyance or Receipt of Public Lands 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 911, 912 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes the fraudulent conveyance or receipt of public 
lands. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2211 corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 911 and 
912.  Current §§ 911 and 912 prohibit executing or receiving any deed or other written 
instrument purporting to convey an interest in land any part of which is public land in Delaware 
when the defendant does not have any legal or equitable interest in the land. 
Section 2211(a) introduces an “intent to defraud” culpability requirement.  The 
requirement is newly introduced as current §§ 911 and 912 have no explicit culpability 
requirement.  Section 2211 also separates the offense into its constituent elements for easier 
reading and application.   
Section 2211(b) corresponds to the grading provisions of §§ 911 and 912, which grade 
the offense as a Class G felony, but sets the grading level as a Class 8 felony since Class 8 is the 
lowest felony grade in the Proposed Code. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2212.  Unauthorized Impersonation 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 907, 907A, 18 Del.C. § 4354 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes the unauthorized impersonation of another person 
in order to injure or defraud another person.  While impersonation, like other conduct prohibited 
in Chapter 2200, is often used to achieve theft, Section 2212 serves two functions that 
complement Chapter 2100’s prohibitions against theft.  First, Section 2212(a)(1) can punish 
injury to impersonated persons, such as injury to reputation, which theft offenses do not address.  
Second, where one impersonates another to steal property whose value is low or difficult to 
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determine, Section 2212(b)(1) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor; where more serious 
violations can be proven, more severe sanctions are available under Chapter 2100.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2212 corresponds, in large part, to 11 Del.C. 
§§ 907 and 907A.  Section 2212(a)(1) corresponds directly to § 907(1) and (2).  The intent 
requirement of Subsection (a)(1), “with intent to obtain a benefit, or to injure or defraud another 
person,” directly corresponds to that of § 907(1) and (2).  Note that while 11 Del.C. § 907(3) 
prohibits impersonating a public servant, such conduct is prohibited by proposed Section 
3204(a)(1).  
Section 2212(a)(2) prohibits impersonating a bail bond agent and corresponds to 18 
Del.C. § 4354(a). 
Section 2212(a)(3) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 907A.  Subsections (a)(3)(A) and (B) 
combine the conduct requirements found in current § 907A, but instead of either “knowingly 
pretend[ing] to have been someone other than the driver of the vehicle the person was operating” 
or “knowingly pretend[ing] to have been a driver of one of the vehicles involved in the 
accident,” Subsection (a)(3) criminalizes falsely representing that the defendant was or was not 
operating a motor vehicle involved in the accident. 
Section 2212(b)(1) corresponds to the grading provisions in 11 Del.C. § 907 and 18 
Del.C. § 4354.  Current § 907 grades criminal impersonation as a Class A misdemeanor, while 
current § 4354(a) grades the criminal impersonation of a bail bond agent as a Class F felony.  
Subsection (b)(1) grades both offenses as a Class A misdemeanor, so as to maintain consistency 
between these very similar offenses.  Subsection (b)(2) corresponds to current § 907A and grades 
the offense as a Class 8 felony, the lowest possible felony grade in the Proposed Code.  
 
 
Comment on Section 2213.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 222(6)&(13), 854, 901, 903A, 904, 
906, 926   
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.   
Section 2213(a) provides a definition for “adulterated,” which corresponds to the existing 
definition found in 11 Del.C. § 906(4). 
Section 2213(b) provides a definition for “counterfeit mark,” which corresponds to the 
existing definition found in 11 Del.C. § 926(b)(1). 
Section 2213(c) provides a newly-introduced definition for “defraud.”  “Defraud” is 
defined to uniformly mean “to obtain anything of value through deception.”  Currently, 
“defraud” and “fraud” are separately defined in 11 Del.C. §§ 222(6) and (13), respectively.  
Simplifying the definition to that of Section 2201(c)(1) eliminates the need to refer to two 
different definitions to give content to a single, key concept and defines fraud by relying upon a 
better understood concept that is already used widely—deception. 
Section 2213(d) provides a definition for “issu[ing]” a check, which corresponds to the 
existing definition found in 11 Del.C. § 901(a). 
Section 2213(e) provides a definition for “mislabeled,” which corresponds to the existing 
definition found in 11 Del.C. § 906(4). 
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Section 2213(f) provides a definition for “pass[ing]” a check, which corresponds to the 
existing definition found in 11 Del.C. § 901(b). 
Section 2213(g) provides a definition for “payment card,” which corresponds to the 
existing definition found in 11 Del.C. § 904. 
Section 2213(h) provides a definition for “personal identifying information,” which 
corresponds to the existing definition found in 11 Del.C. § 854(c) 
Section 2213(i) provides a new definition for “put forward” and is intended to encompass 
a variety of actions, ultimately done with the aim of giving currency to an item. 
Section 2213(j) provides a definition for “reencoder,” which corresponds to the existing 
definition found in 11 Del.C. § 903A(e)(1). 
Section 2213(k) provides a definition for “scanning device,” which corresponds to the 
existing definition found in 11 Del.C. § 903A(e)(2). 
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CHAPTER 2300.  ARSON AND OTHER PROPERTY DAMAGE OFFENSES 
 
Section 2301.  Arson 
Section 2302.  Endangering by Fire or Explosion 
Section 2303.  Unlawful Incendiary Devices 
Section 2304.  Criminal Damage 
Section 2305.  Causing or Risking Catastrophe; Ecological Catastrophe 
Section 2306.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 2301.  Arson 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 801, 802, 803 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of arson, a crime that combines the harms 
of two separate offenses: damaging property and endangering life.  Like the current Delaware 
arson offenses, Section 2301 is restricted to situations where damage results to buildings, and not 
other kinds of property, due to the heightened risk of injury to persons present within those 
buildings.  Other kinds of property damage are covered by the criminal damage offense in 
Section 2304. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Delaware currently has three degrees of arson spread 
across three provisions.  Section 2301 combines these into a single offense, but preserves the 
distinctions present in current law by varying grading based upon the culpability of the 
defendant.  Section 2301(a) combines the common elements of the offense definitions of 
§§ 801–03.  The variations in required culpability are moved into the grading provisions of 
Subsection (b). 
Section 2302(b)(1) preserves the grades for damaging a building with a culpability higher 
than recklessness from 11 Del.C. §§ 802(a) and 803.  Subsection (b)(1)(B), however, reinterprets 
the culpability as to another’s presence in § 803(1)–(2) as recklessness.  Those provisions impose 
liability for first-degree arson on a defendant who either knew another person was present in the 
damaged building, or knew of circumstances rendering such presence a “reasonable possibility.”  
The definition of reckless action in the current § 231 applies when “the person is aware of and 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element exists or will result 
from the conduct.”  The requirements in § 231 and § 803(2) are two ways of expressing the same 
idea.  On the other hand, 11 Del.C. § 803 treats separately the defendant’s knowledge or 
recklessness as to a person’s presence in the building, despite applying the same grade to both.  
Therefore, Subsection (b)(1)(A) has been added to account for the materially more blameworthy 
case where a defendant knows a person is inside the building, making arson akin to attempted 
murder.  Subsection (b)(2), additionally, preserves the grading from § 801 for a defendant who is 
merely reckless as to the resulting damage to a building.  For an additional matter concerning 
culpability in Section 2301, see the footnote to Section 2301(b)(1). 
Section 2301(c) preserves the defense in §§ 801(b) and 802(b)(1) for defendants who 
choose to damage buildings that solely belong to them.  Presumably, in such situations, the 
defendant would have first-hand knowledge as to whether persons are present in the building, 
making it much less likely that human life would be endangered.  However, an ownership 
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defense cannot extend to situations where the defendant is reckless as to other persons’ presence, 
which Subsection (c) specifies.  Note that the owner-defendant could still commit a reckless 
endangerment offense under proposed Section 1203 if the burning creates a risk of injury to 
persons not present in the defendant’s building.  Additionally, Subsection (c) does not retain the 
references in current law to acquiring consent from other owners of the building, since there is a 
general defense based on consent in proposed Section 208.   
Lawful Purpose.  Section 2301 has not retained the defense in § 802(b)(2) for a defendant 
whose “sole intent was to destroy or damage the building for a lawful purpose,” because in such 
situations, the defendant would be covered by a justification defense, a consent defense, or under 
proposed Section 209 because the harm caused was not the one contemplated by the General 
Assembly when creating an arson offense. 
Reasonable Belief as Defense.  Section 2301 has not retained the defense in § 802(b)(3) 
for a defendant who “has no reasonable ground to believe that the conduct might endanger the 
life or safety of another person or damage another building.”  There are a few reasons for its 
omission.  First, the defense only applies to second-degree arson.  If such a defense should exist 
at all, it should apply to all forms of arson, since the reason the offense exists separately from 
criminal damage is to punish endangerment of human life.  Second, the defense assumes an 
offense element—negligence as to endangerment of life or property—that does not appear in any 
degree of arson, and is inconsistent with the culpability levels required as to resulting damage.  
Since Section 1203 covers endangerment of life, and Sections 2302 and 2304 cover 
endangerment of property, there is no reason to complicate the arson offense by including 
conflicting endangerment requirements, or defenses to them. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2302.  Endangering by Fire or Explosion 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 804 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This offense generally covers conduct that creates a risk of harm to property 
by fire or explosion.  Unlike arson, this offense does not require that damage to another’s 
property result from an offender’s dangerous activity, and has a lower culpability requirement.  
Additionally, Section 2302 does not contemplate risk of injury to persons, which is left for the 
reckless endangerment offense in proposed Section 1203.  For those reasons, this offense is 
graded less harshly than arson. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2302 is substantially the same as the current 
§ 804 (reckless burning or exploding), but with three differences.  First, the offense definition 
has been broken into its elements for easier reading and application.  Second, and more 
significantly, Section 2302(a) removes endangerment of human life as a basis for liability.  Such 
risks are already handled with more subtlety and precision in Section 1203’s reckless 
endangerment offense.  Unless the defendant’s activity also damages property, § 804 is only a 
Class A misdemeanor, no matter how egregious a risk to human life the defendant creates.  The 
means by which life is endangered should not affect the grade of the offense.  Third, the offense 
grade has been disconnected from resulting harm.  If harm did result from conduct prohibited by 
§ 804, the offense would be redundant with both the current criminal mischief offense and 
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proposed Section 2304.  Instead, the offense has been given the grade the current offense would 
have if no damage resulted. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2303.  Unlawful Incendiary Devices 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 1338 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Ordinarily, possession offenses will be covered by the proposed inchoate 
offense for possessing instruments of crime.  See proposed Section 708.  This provision, 
however, covers the unusually serious situation where possession of the object in question may 
itself pose an inherent danger. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2303 directly corresponds to the current 
§ 1338 (bombs, incendiary devices, Molotov cocktails, and explosive devices), and is graded the 
same.  However, several portions of § 1338 have not been retained. 
First, only the “possession” and “manufacture” elements of the offense definition in 
§ 1338(a) have been retained.  “Transfer”, “use”, and “transportation” of incendiary devices 
would already be covered by arson, endangering by fire or explosion, assault, or attempt liability 
for any of those offenses.  Furthermore, the grading would be similar to § 1338. 
Second, § 1338(c), requiring that all defendants over age 16 be prosecuted as adults, has 
not been retained.  Issues of adult prosecution are addressed outside of the Proposed Code in 
Title 10.  
Third, § 1338(d) is not retained because it is an unconstitutional shift of the prosecution’s 
burden of proof to a defendant.  11 Del.C. § 1338(d) provides that “it is prima facie evidence of 
intent to cause bodily harm or damage to any property or thing if the accused had possession of 
the [bomb or incendiary device] prescribed by this section.”  The current law thus allows the 
prosecution to shift its burden of proof as to the culpability of the defendant in the commission of 
a crime to the defendant.  In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 217 (1977), the United States 
Supreme Court forbade any such burden-shifting and held that “a State must prove every 
ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and . . . it may not shift the burden of proof 
to the defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense.”  
Delaware’s attempt to assume that an intent to cause bodily harm or damage to any property or 
thing when the possession element of the offense is satisfied impermissibly shifts the burden of 
proof of an element of the offense—culpability—to the defendant.  The prosecution “must prove 
every ingredient of an offense.”  432 U.S. at 217.    
Regulation of Explosives.  16 Del.C. § 7101, et seq. comprehensively regulates licensure, 
trade, transportation, and use of explosives in Delaware.  Some of the penalties of violating the 
prohibitions in Title 16 are redundant with Section 2303 and other offenses in the Proposed 
Code.  The following provisions should be removed from Title 16: 
 16 Del.C. § 7113(2)–(4).  These provisions punish sale, purchase, possession, receipt, or 
use of regulated explosives “with the knowledge or intent that any explosive material 
involved was to be used to kill, injure or intimidate any person or unlawfully to damage 
any real or personal property.”  The maximum sentence for this offense increases in 
Subsection (3) if physical injury results, and increases further in Subsection (4) if death 
results.  For situations where explosive materials were used by the defendant to kill, 
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injure, intimidate, or damage, the defendant’s conduct is already accounted for in the 
Proposed Code by homicide (Sections 1101–04), assault (Section 1202), reckless injuring 
or endangerment (Section 1203), coercion (Section 1404), arson (Section 2301), or 
criminal damage (Section 2304).  Where the explosive materials are possessed with intent 
to injure or damage, the conduct is covered by this Section, 2303.  Where a supplier of 
explosives intends that the materials be used to commit an offense, accomplice liability 
under Section 212 will make the supplier liable for the intended offense. 
 16 Del.C. § 7109(c).  This provision punishes making a false entry in records that the 
same Section requires be kept by persons dealing in licensed explosives.  However, this 
conduct is entirely covered by the offense for tampering with public records in Section 
3203, and is graded the same. 
Additionally, the offenses in 16 Del.C. § 7103, under certain circumstances, could be 
prosecuted as reckless endangerment under proposed Section 1203.  Since the regulatory 
offenses are not entirely covered by Section 1203, it is recommended that the regulatory offenses 
remain as they are.  However, under proposed Section 211, it would be inappropriate for a 
person to be convicted of both reckless endangerment and an offense under 11 Del.C. § 7103 
based on the same conduct. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2304.  Criminal Damage 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 805, 811, 812, 849, 934, 936, 939; see 
also 804(b), 941; 3 Del.C. §§ 1041, 1045; 7 Del.C. 
§ 706; 21 Del.C. §§ 4201, 6701, 6703, 6707 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines and grades the offense of criminal property damage.  
The offense is graded differently depending on the amount of pecuniary loss caused by the 
offense, as well as the culpability with which the damage is caused or risked.  The offense has 
been renamed from “Criminal Mischief” because “Criminal Damage” more concretely describes 
the kinds of activities prohibited by the offense. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Current Title 11—as well as a number of other 
administrative Titles—contains various provisions that define different types of property 
damage, and each provision has its own grading section.  The nature of the act underlying these 
offenses is the same.  To the extent the current offense grades of these offenses are the same, 
they are superfluous; to the extent they differ, they are inconsistent.  Therefore, the proposed 
Chapter 2300 employs a single criminal damage offense. 
Section 2304(a) defines the offense almost identically to the definition of the current 
criminal mischief offense in 11 Del.C. § 811(a).  The few changes, however, are significant.  
First, Subsection (a)(2) removes the reference in § 811(a)(2) to creating a risk of danger to 
persons.  That is because this portion of the offense is redundant with Section 1203(b)(2) 
(reckless endangerment).  Furthermore, § 811 grades endangering persons much more leniently, 
reflecting a discounted seriousness for risks to persons created through interference with 
property.  Such a discount is unjustifiable, and to preserve it would preserve inconsistencies in 
the Code.  Second, by adding the word “unlawfully” in Subsection (a)(3), the affirmative defense 
for conduct pursuant to a lawful purpose from § 811(a)(3) is preserved in a simpler form. 
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Section 2304(b) grades the offense according to the pecuniary loss caused, and the 
culpability of the defendant.  The proposed scheme follows two principles present in 11 Del.C. 
§§ 804(b) (reckless burning or exploding), 811(b), and 812(a)(2) (graffiti), but articulates those 
principles differently.  The first principle is the grading distinction between different culpability 
levels as to causing damage.  The distinction between reckless and intentional damaging in 
§ 811(b)(1)–(2) is sensible; however, the distinction is not made consistently.  Additionally, its 
failure to address “knowing” culpability as to damage creates ambiguity.  “Knowingly” 
damaging property is much more similar to intentional than reckless damaging, but under current 
11 Del.C. § 253, “knowing” culpability would be punished the same as reckless damaging.  For 
these reasons, Subsection (b)(2) sets “knowingly” as the highest culpability necessary to commit 
an offense under Section 2304 by providing an upward grade adjustment.  Subsection (b)(1) sets 
the default culpability as recklessness only because the general approach to grading the Proposed 
Code is to define offenses according to their most basic conduct and provide for grade increases 
as necessary.  It would give a false impression that a reckless offense is not serious if Subsection 
(b) was defined primarily in terms of knowing causation, and reckless causation was framed as a 
“grade discount.”  
The second principle is to grade the offense differently according to the pecuniary loss 
caused by the defendant.  11 Del.C. §§ 804, 811, and 812 all do this, but the value thresholds for 
grades are inconsistent.  Therefore, Subsection (b) unifies the grade thresholds for all property 
damage, and does so by following the same thresholds as the theft grading scheme in Section 
2101(b).  Under current law, in most cases, a defendant prosecuted for criminal mischief would 
be eligible for a much lower maximum penalty for destroying another person’s property rather 
than stealing it.  The harm of both offenses, however, is similar: the victim loses value or use of 
her property.  Therefore, the same thresholds are used both here and in Section 2101(b).  Note, 
however, that the grade adjustment for knowing causation in Subsection (b)(2) must be taken 
into account in order for the grade thresholds for criminal damage to result in the same offense 
grade as theft in Section 2101(b).  For additional discussion of those thresholds, see the 
Commentary to Section 2101. 
Subsection (b)(1)(G), increased to a Class D misdemeanor for knowing causation by the 
grade adjustment in Subsection (b)(2), follows current § 811(b)(3) by setting 30 days’ 
imprisonment as the maximum penalty for violations of Section 2304 that do not result in 
damage to property. 
Reasonable Belief in Right.  The current criminal mischief offense, in 11 Del.C. § 811(c), 
contains a defense for a defendant who “has reasonable ground to believe” that she has “a right 
to engage in the conduct.”  This defense has not been included in Section 2304 for two reasons.  
First, to the extent that the defense does not apply to other, similar criminal damage provisions, 
the defense is inconsistent.  Second, mistakes negating culpability are treated generally in 
Section 206, and need not be specifically reiterated here. 
Additional Provisions Not Incorporated.  Section 2304 does not include the minimum 
fines or community service provisions in 11 Del.C. §§ 811(b)(4) and 812(a)(2).  All minimum 
sentencing provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802.  11 Del.C. § 812(b), 
dealing with possession of graffiti instruments, is not addressed here.  It has been incorporated 
into Section 708, a new inchoate offense punishing possession of instruments of crime. 
Destruction of Rental Property, Computer Equipment and Interruption of Computer 
Services.  11 Del. C. § 849(a) punishes as theft any destruction of rented property that is done in 
order to avoid payment for the lease or rental.  It is not necessary to specifically provide for this 
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situation in Section 2304 because Section 2304 is already defined broadly enough to cover that 
situation.  Furthermore, since theft and criminal damage are graded the same, there is no 
inconsistency with current law.  Similarly, Section 2304 covers the offenses of interruption of 
computer services and destruction of computer equipment in 11 Del. C §§ 934 and 936 (see also, 
Commentary to Section 2306). 
Damage to Computer Equipment and Other Computer Crime Provisions.  The increased 
grades for damage to computer equipment, found in the current § 939, have not been retained in 
Chapter 2300.  Presumably, the justification for setting a lower threshold in this case is to 
account for intangible losses, such as lost digital files and information.  However, the method of 
valuing property in proposed Section 805 does take intangible losses into account, which more 
accurately accomplishes the aims of the current law.  Therefore, separate grade thresholds are 
unnecessary.  Additionally, 11 Del.C. § 941, specifying civil remedies for computer crimes, has 
not been incorporated into the Proposed Code because it is not directly relevant to criminal 
liability.   Moreover, it cannot be retained in Title 11.  There is no basis in current law to broaden 
the application of this particularized provision to all offenses involving theft of services, or 
criminal damage.  On the other hand, retaining this provision in Title 11 and restricting it to its 
current field of application, would require the creation of special carve-out for “computer 
crimes” from the abovementioned offenses in the Proposed Code.  Because the creation of such 
special carve-outs is antithetical to the Proposed Code’s goal of consolidation, this provision is 
not retained 
Regulatory Offenses Not Incorporated.  There are numerous regulatory offenses 
prohibiting specific forms of property damage.  Most of those are graded similarly to the scheme 
proposed in Section 2304(b), and the language in Section 2304(a) covers the activities they 
prohibit.  Therefore, any such offenses scattered throughout the Delaware Code could be 
eliminated.  See, e.g., 3 Del.C. §§ 1041, 1045; 7 Del.C. § 706; 21 Del.C. §§ 6701, 6703, 6707. 
Failure to Report Accidental Damage.  21 Del.C. § 4201 makes it an offense to fail to 
report property damage caused by the defendant’s driving.  It is punishable as a Class B 
misdemeanor.  Such an offense could be created in Chapter 2300 to account for this, but it 
should not.  Such an offense is inherently bound up in its regulatory framework, is malum 
prohibitum, and too minor in any case to warrant relocation to the Proposed Code. 
Cross or Religious Symbol Burning.  11 Del.C. § 805, concerning the burning of crosses 
or other religious symbols, has not been included in this Chapter.  Instead, cross burnings, if 
conducted with an intent to intimidate, are punishable under proposed Section 1207 (Terroristic 
Threats).  Flatly banning all instances of the burning of crosses or other religious symbols, 
without any qualifying language regarding the motivations of the actors, is likely overbroad and, 
depending on the actor’s motives, potentially unconstitutional.  For instance, in Virginia v. 
Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), the United States Supreme Court overturned a Virginia law that 
prohibited burning “a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place . . . with 
the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons.”  Id. at 348.  While permitting states to 
prohibit cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because of the practice’s “long and 
pernicious history as a signal of impending violence,” 538 U.S. at 363, and because the practice 
was considered a “true threat,” 538 U.S. at 359-60, outside the protections of the First 
Amendment, the Court did not allow the prohibition against cross burnings to reach instances of 
messages other than intimidation; for example, the Ku Klux Klan had used cross burnings as 
“messages of shared ideology.”  538 U.S. at 354.  As such, a provision like current § 805, which 
does not divine the message at the heart of the act of burning religious symbols, would go against 
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the Court’s holding that a “State [may] choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that 
are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.”  538 U.S. at 363.  For a discussion of cross 
burnings that would satisfy the definition of terroristic threats, see the Commentary to proposed 
Section 1207.  
 
 
Comment on Section 2305.  Causing or Risking Catastrophe; Ecological Catastrophe 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): See 7 Del.C. §§ 6071–74, 6309(h) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision proposes a new offense that imposes serious criminal liability 
for persons who cause or risk severe harm to numerous individuals, numerous buildings, or a 
vital public facility.  Additionally, the provision would impose similar but much less severe 
criminal liability for causing or risking harm to marine environments and other protected 
ecological zones. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Currently, Title 11 contains no offense that is similar 
to the proposed Section 2305(a)–(d).  The Model Penal Code and many other states’ criminal 
codes, however, contain offenses for causing or risking catastrophe.  The harm caused or risked 
under Section 2305 is so severe, is so likely to induce public panic if threatened, and reflects 
such a heinous disregard for the value of human life as to warrant significant criminal liability 
that other offenses may not impose simply by conviction of multiple counts.  When the current 
Delaware criminal code was enacted in 1972, catastrophes of the sort contemplated by Section 
2305(a)–(d) may have seemed so unlikely to occur as to not require separate treatment.  
However, in the era of modern terrorism, we know that catastrophic loss of life and damage to 
buildings and domestic infrastructure are possible events that the criminal law ought to take into 
account.  Therefore, Section 2305(a)–(d) proposes a related collection of related offenses based 
on causing, risking, threatening, or conspicuously failing to prevent a catastrophe. 
Section 2305(a) imposes the most serious liability where a catastrophe has actually been 
caused.  Subsection (a)(1) provides a non-exclusive list of possible means by which catastrophe 
may be caused.  Liability under Subsection (a)(2) depends upon whether the actor caused the 
catastrophe knowingly or recklessly.  Both situations are graded very seriously.  Considering the 
definition of a “catastrophe” in Subsection (f)(1), however, the available sentences are 
proportionate to the harm caused. 
Section 2305(b) provides lesser punishment for recklessly risking a catastrophe, but 
where no catastrophe actually results.  Liability under Subsection (b)(2) is less severe than under 
Subsection (a)(2), but is more severe than other forms of reckless endangerment under Section 
1203(b) because of the magnitude of the harm risked. 
Section 2305(c) punishes threatening to cause a catastrophe, independent of whether 
catastrophe is actually caused.  Subsection (c) is different from Section 1204(a)(1) (terroristic 
threats) only in the magnitude of the harm threatened.  For that reason, it is graded one level 
more harshly than terroristic threats. 
Section 2305(d) punishes reckless failure to prevent a catastrophe where the person is 
uniquely situated to do so, either by virtue of official or contractual position, or relationship to 
the actor creating the catastrophe.  Criminal law generally hesitates to punish inaction.  However, 
because of the severity of the harm posed by a catastrophe, it is morally blameworthy for a 
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person in a position to prevent a catastrophe to recklessly disregard a substantial risk that it could 
occur, thereby allowing it to occur. 
Section 2305(e) provides lesser, but similarly graduated, liability for actors who cause, 
risk, threaten, or fail to prevent ecological catastrophes.  Subsection (e) corresponds to, but 
expands upon, the current offenses for ocean dumping found in 7 Del.C. §§ 6071–74, and for 
improper disposal of hazardous waste in 7 Del.C. § 6309(h).  Normally, environmental offenses 
would be left in their respective regulatory Titles.  However, both §§ 6074 and 6309(h) punish 
improper disposal with substantial fines and felony levels of imprisonment.  Such serious 
penalties ought to be incorporated into the Code.  Subsection (e) broadens those offenses by 
imposing liability for damaging marine environments by any inherently dangerous means, and 
not simply by dumping solid waste.  Note, however, that unlike proposed Section 2305(e), 
§ 6074 imposes criminal liability for ordinary negligence.  Even criminal negligence is too slight 
a culpability requirement to support liability for this kind of behavior, especially given the 
sizable fines available under Subsection (e)(2).  Therefore, like the rest of Section 2305, reckless 
activity is the least culpable behavior punished by Subsection (e).  Subsection (e) graduates 
liability by reference to Subsections (a)–(d), allowing punishment for causing, risking, 
threatening, or failing to prevent ecological catastrophes.  This is an expansion upon current 
liability for ecological disasters, particularly concerning threats or failure of prevention, which 
has been done for consistency.  The lesser seriousness of an ecological catastrophe is taken into 
account by lowering the grade of these offenses 3 or 4 levels.  Subsection 2305(e)(2) specifies 
that a maximum fine of twice that provided for the grade of an offense under Section 803(a) will 
be levied for each day that activity causing or risking ecological catastrophe continues.  This 
provision is incorporated from 7 Del.C. § 6074(b), except that current fine parameters of “not 
less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation,” 6 Del.C. § 6074(b), has been 
changed to the proposed “twice that provided for the grade of an offense under Section 803(a).”  
However, it is not necessary for all the activities in Subsections (a)–(d) to also be punished for 
ecological catastrophes.  Note also that the special provisions pertaining to jurisdiction and 
suspension of fines in § 6074(c)-(d) are not retained.  There is no basis in current law to broaden 
the application of these particularized provisions to the general ecological catastrophe offense. 
Section 2305(f) clarifies that the proposed Section 210 may prohibit convictions under 
Section 2305 and another offense based upon the same conduct.  This provision, however, does 
not prohibit charging under both Section 2305 and another offense. 
 The definitions of “catastrophe,” “catastrophic agent,” and “ecological catastrophe” 
contained in Section 2306 precisely set forth the type of harms caused or risked that deserve the 
increased punishment of this Section. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2306.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 811, 934, 1338; 7 Del.C. § 6071 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Sections 2306(a), (b), and (d) provide definitions of 
“catastrophe,” “catastrophic agent,” and “ecological catastrophe,” respectively.  “Catastrophe” 
has been defined to require serious harm to five or more victims or buildings to distinguish the 
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severity of offenses in Section 2305 from assault in proposed Section 1202.  Because Title 11 
contains no offense that is similar to Sections 2305(a)-(d), the definitions are newly created, 
although the definition of “ecological catastrophe” corresponds to the purposes of the ocean 
dumping offense found in 7 Del.C. § 6071.  See 7 Del.C. § 6071 (“Therefore, it is the intent of 
the General Assembly [of Delaware] to prohibit the disposal of solid wastes in the ocean and 
other waters of the State.”).  However, the definition allows the General Assembly to specify 
other ecological zones for protection under Section 2305(e) besides marine environments.   
Section 2306(c) provides a definition of “damage.”  The term is newly defined to ensure 
that digital property damage and impairment of computer services, as criminalized by 11 Del.C. 
§ 934, are covered by Section 2304.  Additionally, the enumerated services in 11 Del.C. 
§ 811(a)(3) are placed here to make the offense definition in Section 2304 cleaner. 
Section 2306(e) provides a definition of “incendiary device” that corresponds to the 
definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 1338(a)(1).  The definition has been simplified to its 
essential parts to make the Section 2303(a) offense definition easier to understand. 
Section 2306(f) provides a definition of “public service” that corresponds to the language 
listing various utilities contained in 11 Del.C. § 811(a)(3) and (b)(1).  
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CHAPTER 2400.  BURGLARY AND OTHER CRIMINAL TRESPASS OFFENSES 
 
Section 2401.  Burglary and Home Invasion 
Section 2402.  Criminal Trespass 
Section 2403.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 2401.  Burglary and Home Invasion 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 824, 825, 826, 826A, 827, 829 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offenses of burglary and home invasion, which 
punish trespassers who possess an additional criminal intent.  Home invasion imposes harsher 
punishment where the additional intent is to commit a violent offense, and an attempt is made to 
satisfy that intention.  These distinct offenses recognize the independent harm caused by the fear 
and intrusion that may be created by an intruder who invades another’s property to commit an 
offense. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2401(a) corresponds to the offense definitions 
for the current three degrees of burglary, plus home invasion.  Instead of defining each as a 
separate offense, the common elements to all four offenses are distilled, and the differences are 
reserved to determine the grade of the offense.  Structurally, the elements have been broken into 
different subsections for easier reading and application.   
Section 2401(b) corresponds to 11 Del. C. § 829(d), defining the term “enters or remains 
unlawfully” and providing within that definition what is functionally an exception to liability. 
Rather than relying on a defined term, Subsection (b) preserves § 829(d) in the form of an 
exception to liability.  Subsection (b) states that it is an exception to liability under Subsection 
(a) to enter or remain upon premises that appear to be open to the public, unless it defies a lawful 
order of the owner or another authorized person.  It also clarifies that the exception is 
inapplicable if in a building that is partially open to the public, a person enters or remains in a 
part of a building that is not open to the public.  
As previously mentioned, Section 2401(c) maintains the distinctions between the current 
offenses through grading.  However, the structure of those offenses has been changed.  
Subsection (c)(1) retains the heading of “home invasion” for its familiarity.  In reality, home 
invasion has been broadened to include more behavior, but at varying grades.  The current home 
invasion statute corresponds to Subsection (c)(1), plus the grade adjustment in Subsection (c)(4).  
Behavior short of the grade adjustment is still punishable at a higher grade than burglary, which 
is not the case under current Delaware law.  Subsection (b)(2) corresponds to the current 
§ 825(a)(1) (second degree burglary) when combined with the grade adjustment in Subsection 
(b)(4).  Committing aggravated burglary at night has been turned into an independent factor 
increasing the grade of the offense, which creates more grading options than under current law.  
Currently, first degree burglary in 11 Del.C. § 826(a) requires three aggravating factors to be 
present, in addition to the basic requirements of burglary: the offense must be committed in a 
dwelling, it must be committed at night, and the defendant must be armed or cause physical 
injury to someone.  Adding the grade adjustment in Subsection (c)(4) to Subsection (c)(2)(A) 
produces the same effect as § 826(a).  Subsection (c)(3) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 824 (third 
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degree burglary).  Adding the grade adjustment to it produces the same effect as § 825(a)(2) 
(second degree burglary). 
Note that Subsections (c)(4)(A) and (c)(4)(B) require proof of the same elements as 
weapons possession and assault, respectively.  Both 11 Del.C. § 206 and proposed Section 210  
would not allow a defendant to be convicted of burglary with the aggravations in Subsection 
(c)(4) and either weapon possession or assault, though the defendant could be charged with both.  
Note also that the language in Subsection (c)(4)(A) is broad enough to include defendants who 
do not bring weapons with them, but arm themselves with weapons found while committing or 
fleeing from a burglary or home invasion. 
Section 2401(d) directly corresponds to the current § 827.   
Formation of Intent.  Note that the 11 Del.C. § 829(e) has not been retained.  That 
provision changed the classic burglary intent formulation—that the intent to commit the offense 
be formed prior to or concurrent with entry—to allow the intent to be formed after entry.13  
Under the classic intent formulation, later-formed intent could still produce liability for the 
attempt or additional offense, and the entry itself would be punishable as criminal trespass.  In 
reality, “burglary” need not be an offense at all; it exists because society recognizes that a 
criminal trespass motivated by the intention to commit an offense is more dangerous, and more 
deserving of punishment, than criminal trespass.  The trespass is not motivated by the intent, 
however, if the intent is formed after the trespass is already complete.  11 Del.C. § 829(e) 
destroyed the essential nature of burglary as a separate offense from criminal trespass.  For these 
reasons, § 829(e) is not retained.   
However, no provision has been added to explicitly restate the ordinary burglary intent 
formulation.  It is expected that that formulation will be revived by the removal of § 829(e), 
considering how firmly entrenched is the formulation in the history of criminal law. 
 
 
Comment on Section 2402.  Criminal Trespass 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 820, 821, 822, 823; see also 7 Del.C. 
§ 714 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines and grades the offense of criminal trespass, which 
prohibits a person’s unlawful presence on another’s property. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 2402(a) corresponds to the offense definitions 
for the three current degrees of criminal trespass, as well as trespassing with intent to peer or 
peep into a window.  As with Section 2401, the common elements to those offenses have been 
distilled and divided according to those elements, and the differences have been retained in the 
grading provisions.  The offense definition has been worded and structured to make it obvious 
that criminal trespass is a lesser-included offense to burglary.   
 Similarly to Section 2401(b), Section 2402(b) corresponds to 11 Del. C. § 829(d), 
defining the term “enters or remains unlawfully” and providing within that definition what is 
                                                             
13 Subsection (e) was added to 11 Del.C. § 829 in response to Dolan v. State, 925 A.2d 495 (Del. 2007), 
where the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that a defendant could not, as a matter of law, be found guilty of burglary 
if he formed the intent to commit an offense only after trespassing.  Note that the defendant in Dolan was also found 
guilty of theft, the offense committed during the trespass. 
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functionally an exception to liability.  Rather than relying on a defined term, Subsection (b) 
preserves § 829(d) in the form of an exception to liability.  Subsection (b) states that it is an 
exception to liability under Subsection (a) to enter or remain upon premises that appear to be 
open to the public, unless it defies a lawful order of the owner or another authorized person.  It 
also clarifies that the exception is inapplicable if in a building that is partially open to the public, 
a person enters or remains in a part of a building that is not open to the public. 
Section 2402(c) maintains the grading distinctions between the various combined 
offenses.  Note that current § 820 (trespass with intent to peep), though it requires a trespass, is 
an aggravation based upon an invasion of privacy.  For that reason, it could be categorized with 
other privacy offenses.  For more invasion of privacy offenses, see Chapter 4300. 
Hunters’ Trespass.  Note the existence of 7 Del.C. § 714.  It is a trespassing offense 
committed by hunters who fail to obtain permission to hunt on private property.  It has not been 
specifically incorporated into Section 2402 for two reasons.  First, it is redundant with Section 
2402.  Second, it is graded as a class C environmental violation, which is roughly equivalent to a 
criminal violation—the same as Subsection (c)(4).  As Section 2402 covers the same ground, 
§ 714 could be omitted from Title 7. 
Trespass Among Livestock.  Under 11 Del.C. § 823, first-degree trespass, a trespass in a 
“building used to shelter, house, milk, raise, feed, breed, study or exhibit animals” is treated 
equally with trespass in a dwelling.  Despite the significance of Delaware’s livestock, those 
situations simply are not equally blameworthy for the purpose of criminal liability.  When § 823 
was amended to include trespass among livestock, it is possible that Delaware faced a serious 
threat to agriculture due to trespassers.  However, no such threat is present today that would 
justify a separate offense or grade level for trespasses of that kind.  Under Section 2402, 
trespasses among livestock would be punished as a Class D misdemeanor, since animal pens or 
housing would be “fenced or enclosed in a manner manifestly designed to exclude intruders.” 
 
 
Comment on Section 2403.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 829 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Sections 2403(a), (b) and (c) provide definitions of 
“dwelling,” “entry” and “night” that correspond to current 11 Del.C. §§ 829(b), (c) and (f).  The 
remaining definitions in § 829 are unnecessary, in part due to the fact that some terms’ meanings 
are readily apparent, or has not been retained (e.g., § 829(e)), and in part due to the fact that 
§ 828 (possession of burglar’s tools) has been incorporated into proposed Section 708, a new 
inchoate offense for possessing instruments of crime.  The definition of “dwelling” has been 
reworded to make clear that offenses involving them need not be committed at night, as well as 
to take into account other non-buildings used as dwellings that are equally entitled to privacy. 
Section 2403(d) defines the term “real property” in a common way, to make sure 
buildings and other structures are included. 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
 
CHAPTER 3100.  BRIBERY, IMPROPER INFLUENCE, AND OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
Section 3101.  Bribery 
Section 3102.  Improper Influence 
Section 3103.  Official Misconduct 
Section 3104.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 3101.  Bribery 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 
1209, 1261, 1262, 1264, 1265; see also 1502(3), 
1504(b)(1) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision creates an offense covering the use of property or personal 
advantage to influence a public servant in the performance of their duties.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3101(a) corresponds with the current bribery 
provisions found in 11 Del.C. §§ 1201 and 1205.   Currently, offering a bribe and receiving a 
bribe are prohibited by different sections of the Delaware Code.  Section 3101(a) promotes 
clarity by defining the offense of offering a bribe immediately before the offense of receiving a 
bribe.  For the reasons discussed below, the conduct previously punished by § 1205 is now 
punishable as a Class 7 felony, like the conduct previously punished by § 1201, and not as a 
Class A misdemeanor.  Subsection (a)(2) changes current law by punishing the offender for 
believing acceptance of the bribe to be an offense.  Under Subsection (a)(3), the offense requires 
that the recipient of a bribe must not be authorized to receive the bribe.  So the act of offering the 
bribe—even if the intended recipient does not accept it, or does accept it but is not influenced by 
it—is still punishable under the law.  This formulation focuses on proving the defendant’s 
subjective belief of wrongdoing, rather than the wrongdoing of another person who may or may 
not be a defendant.  The elements of (1) influencing the performance of an act of another and (2) 
that the personal benefit not be authorized by law, are identical to those in Subsection (b).  These 
elements are intended to have the same meaning, and should be construed identically in practice.  
Note also that Section 3101(a)(2)(c) includes witnesses in the offense. This simple addition 
makes the independent offense in 11 Del. C. § 1261 unnecessary.  Note that this offense is 
graded the same as Section 3101. 
Section 3101(b) corresponds with the current bribery provisions found in 11 Del.C. 
§§ 1203 and 1206.  The purpose and function of the current provisions are maintained here, but 
are simplified into a single Subsection.  The proposed formulation alters the current provisions in 
four minor respects.   
First, Section 3101(b) combines the offenses covered by §§ 1203 and 1206. Receiving a 
“bribe” and an “unlawful gratuity” are not so different as to warrant separate provisions and 
different maximum penalties.  Rather, both involve a public servant’s acceptance of a benefit 
meant to influence the public servant in the performance of the public servant’s duties.  The fact 
that the public servant is “required or authorized” to perform the official conduct for which the 
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public servant receives an “illegal gratuity” should not entitle the offender to a lesser grade.  
Section 3101(b) eliminates the “illegal gratuity” distinction and punishes a public servant who 
extracts a bribery payment for completing the public servant’s required or authorized duties to 
the same degree as a public servant who accepts a bribery payment meant to influence the public 
servant’s judgment or exercise of discretion.  The result is that the conduct previously punished 
by § 1206 is now punishable as a Class 7 felony, like the conduct previously punished by § 1203, 
and not as a Class A misdemeanor.  
Second, Section 3101(b) requires that the offender act knowingly in soliciting or offering 
the bribe.  The current bribery offenses do not specify a culpability requirement.  Section 
3101(b) requires only that the person be “knowing” as to the benefit’s serving as “consideration 
for influencing or agreeing to influence” an official’s performance.  This formulation captures all 
cases in which the offender understands the improper nature of the transaction, while avoiding 
the ambiguity that can result from a provision lacking a stated culpability requirement.  
Third, Section 3101(b) summarizes the enumerated examples found in § 1203 (e.g., 
“vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision, or exercise of discretion”).  The new language is not 
meant to effect a substantive change in the law, but rather intends to convey the former language 
in a simpler form.  
Fourth, Section 3101(b) includes witnesses in the offense.  This simple addition makes 
the independent offense in 11 Del.C. § 1262 unnecessary.  Note that this offense is graded the 
same as Section 3101. 
Section 3101(c)(2) maintains the grading provisions found in §§ 1201 and 1203, but 
subject to the changes discussed above.  Section 3101(c)(1) preserves the defense found in 
§ 1202 for defendants who offer, confer, or agree to confer a benefit upon a public servant as a 
result of the public servant’s theft, but in the form of a grade adjustment.  Subsection (c)(1) is 
broader than § 1202 as it applies to all cases when the defendants’ conduct was in direct response 
to any wrongdoing (not only theft) by the bribe recipient.  Bribing a public servant in response to 
the public servant’s own wrongdoing is less blameworthy, due to the offeror’s status as a victim.  
However, the complete defense in current law is redundant with general defenses that apply in all 
cases.  The proposed general defenses for duress in Section 406 and lesser evil in Section 302 are 
robust enough to provide a complete defense to liability where the public servant’s threats and 
misfeasance are truly coercive, or present an imminent threat to the public or a private party.  
Short of that, people have recourse to law enforcement authorities when public servants are 
extracting bribes by wrongful means, including the means described in § 1202.  Additionally, the 
references to attempts and coercion in § 1202 have been removed for the reasons already 
mentioned.  Furthermore, attempted theft as a motivator for a bribe appears to more closely 
resemble official misconduct, which is a form of “wrongful conduct” covered by the language of 
Subsection (c)(1).  Finally, the Proposed Code eliminates the language contained in § 1204 
stating that the affirmative defense does not apply to the conduct covered by Subsection (b).  The 
fact that Section 3101(c)(1) specifically applies only to Subsection (a) implies that it is not 
applicable to Subsection (b). 
Section 3101(d) establishes an additional consequence of conviction, requiring forfeiture of 
office for a public servant convicted of an offense under this Section.  Current law does not have 
such a provision for bribery.  However, current law does provide for forfeiture in 11 Del.C. 
§ 1504(b)(1), which requires a person convicted of racketeering to forfeit any position or office 
in an enterprise that is “acquired or maintained” in violation of the racketeering statute.  
Furthermore, 11 Del.C. § 1502(3) defines “enterprise” to include governmental entities.  
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Subsection (d) has been added for consistency with that principle.  Note, upon conviction (as the 
term defined in Section 509(b) [Definitions]), the office is forfeited immediately. See also 
Commentary to Section 3103(d) [Official Misconduct]. 
Bribing a Juror and Bribe Receiving by a Juror.  11 Del.C. §§ 1264–65 have not been 
specifically included in the Proposed Code because a “public servant” is defined in Section 
3104(d) to include jurors.  Given that the grade of §§ 1264–65 are graded the same as in Section 
3101, those offenses are redundant. 
 
 
Comment on Section 3102.  Improper Influence 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1207, 1208 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision creates an offense covering the use of coercion to influence a 
person’s decision, opinion, vote, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant, party officer, 
or voter.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3102 is substantially the same as the current 
§ 1207, with two minor differences.  First, Section 3102(a) utilizes the phrase “uses coercion 
with intent to influence another person’s decision, opinion, vote, or other exercise of discretion” 
instead of § 1207’s  “threatens unlawful harm” language.  Threatening unlawful harm is an 
unduly narrow construction of essentially what the offense of coercion prohibits, and defining 
the improper influence offense in a broader way improves consistency.  Second, Section 3102(a) 
omits § 1207(2)’s language (“The person threatens unlawful harm to any public servant or party 
officer with intent to influence that public servant or party officer to violate that public servant's 
or party officer's duty as a public servant or party officer.”) because the conduct prohibited by 
that subsection is adequately prohibited by the language of § 1207(1), which is incorporated as 
Section 3102(a).  
Note that Section 3102(a) can overlap with Section 3308 when the target of the improper 
influence is a juror.  For example, a defendant might be liable for attempting to influence a juror 
under both Sections 3102(a) (“A person commits an offense if he or she uses coercion with intent 
to influence another person’s decision, opinion, vote . . . .”) or 3308(a) (“A person commits an 
offense if: (1) with intent to: (A) influence the performance of a juror’s duties . . . (2) he or she: 
(B) deceives, persuades, or commits an offense against the person . . . .”).  To the extent that the 
two offenses overlap regarding jurors, Section 3102 is a lesser included offense of Section 3308, 
and a defendant could not be convicted of both under Section 210.   
Section 3102(b) preserves the 11 Del.C. § 1208, which denies a defense based on a defect 
in office. 
Section 3102(c) increases the grade of the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a 
Class 8 felony.  The current Delaware coercion offense in 11 Del.C. § 792 is a Class A 
misdemeanor by itself.  The use of coercion to affect public affairs brings about a greater societal 
harm than coercion standing alone, justifying more serious punishment.  
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Comment on Section 3103.  Official Misconduct 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1209, 1211, 1212, 1213 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision creates a general offense covering situations in which public 
employees or officials abuse their positions by acting outside their lawful authority. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3103(a) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 1211, with three minor differences.  First, the language of § 1211 is streamlined for 
consistency and simplicity.  The current provision uses the term “public servant” when defining 
who can commit the offense, but Section 3103(a) uses the broader term “person.”  The lengthy 
language in § 1211(3) is simplified in Section 3103(a)(3).  Second, Section 3103(a)(2) includes 
the additional clause, “even if such duty is not directly related to the public servant’s official 
functions.”  The addition was made in light of the Delaware Supreme Court’s holdings in Howell 
v. State, 421 A.2d 892, 897 (Del. 1980).  In Howell, the Court held that the “clearly inherent in 
the nature of the office” clause should be read broadly, and the current § 1211(2) (proposed 
Section 3103(a)(2)) is not confined to the failure of a public servant to perform her official 
powers, functions, or duties.  Third, the extensive considerations in § 1211(3) applying to 
benefits to the public servant’s property have been simplified.  Subsection (a)(3) contains the 
same substance as § 1211(3), albeit with an “intentional” culpability.  11 Del.C. § 1211 predates 
the current Delaware criminal code, before the code contained a robust definition of its 
culpability requirements.  At that time, the considerations contained in § 1211(3) were probably 
necessary in capture the seriousness of the public servant’s intentions.  However, they are not 
necessary today.  The proposed and current definitions of “intent” regarding results are the same; 
in either case, it must be the actor’s conscious object and subjective purpose to accomplish the 
stated end.  “Intent” is a rigorous culpability requirement.  Applied to this case, even a public 
servant who knows her property will benefit would not be guilty, if it were not also the 
subjective purpose for which the activity was undertaken.  In those cases, no further 
considerations are necessary to demonstrate malfeasance.   
Note that Subsection (a) does not include in the definition of official misconduct any 
threat to violate Section 3103.  Threats relating to official misconduct are dealt with in the 
definition of the coercion offense in Section 1404(a)(7).  That way, other offenses defined by use 
of “coercion”—such as extortion in Section 2104—automatically include threats to violate 
public trust without the need to reference additional offenses. 
Section 3103(b) corresponds to current § 1212, with no substantive differences.  
However, note that since the definition of a “personal benefit” has been expanded, the situations 
in which a person could be convicted of profiteering have likewise expanded.   
Section 3103(c) maintains § 1212’s Class A misdemeanor grade for offenses under 
Section 3103(b) (profiteering).  However, while § 1211 grades offenses of official misconduct as 
Class A misdemeanors, Section 3103(c) grades offenses under Section 3103(a) as Class 7 
felonies.  The grade of the official misconduct offense has been raised as the offense involves a 
significant violation of public trust that seems equivalent to, not less serious than, receiving a 
bribe.   
Additionally, Section 3103(d) requires that a public servant who is convicted of violating 
any provision of Section 3103 forfeit his office or employment.  While this provision does not 
appear in the current Delaware Code, a public servant convicted of an official misconduct 
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offense should not be allowed to continue in office.  Other offenses in Delaware already have 
forfeiture-of-office provisions; for instance, 11 Del.C. § 1504(b)(1) requires a person convicted 
of racketeering to forfeit any position or office in an enterprise that is “acquired or maintained” 
in violation of the racketeering statute.  Since Section 3103 concerns a breach of public trust, and 
since an offense of racketeering (which does not necessarily involve public trust) already 
contains a forfeiture-of-office provision, extending a forfeiture provision to official misconduct 
improves the Code’s consistency.  Note, upon conviction (as the term defined in Section 509(b) 
[Definitions]), the office is forfeited immediately.  See also commentary to Section 3101(d) 
[Bribery].  
Section 3103(d), like Section 3101(d), has been added for consistency with 11 Del.C. 
§§ 1502(3) and 1504(b)(1).  See Section 3101(d) and corresponding Commentary. 
 
 
Comment on Section 3104.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1209, 1213 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3104(a) provides a definition of “harm to 
another person” that is taken directly from 11 Del.C. § 1209(1).  
Section 3104(b) provides a definition of “party officer” that is taken directly from 11 
Del.C. § 1209(2). 
Section 3104(c) provides a definition of “personal benefit.”  The definition corresponds 
to 11 Del.C. § 1209(3), but is modified in three minor ways.  First, the definition eliminates the 
clause “anything regarded by the recipient” because it makes the definition subjective in a way 
that would be unnecessarily difficult to prove.  Second, the proposed definition eliminates a 
clause stating that “personal benefit” does not include a “gain or advantage promised generally to 
a group or class of voters as a consequence of public measures which a candidate engages to 
support or oppose,” because the definition as a whole makes clear that a gain or advantage 
promised to a class generally would not constitute a personal benefit.  The removal of the clause 
is not intended to change current law.  Third, the narrow connection between the offender and a 
benefit given to a third person has been broadened.  Previously, the benefit had to be conferred 
on the offender’s behalf, or at the offender’s request:this fails to capture situations where a 
benefit is given to a third person under a wholly silent understanding, but which still accrues 
ultimately, and unlawfully, to the offender. 
Section 3104(d) provides a definition of “public servant” that is taken directly from 11 
Del.C. § 1209(4). 
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CHAPTER 3200.  PERJURY AND OTHER OFFICIAL FALSIFICATION OFFENSES 
 
Section 3201.  Perjury 
Section 3202.  Falsification Under Penalty 
Section 3203.  Tampering with Public Records 
Section 3204.  Criminal Impersonation 
Section 3205.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 3201.  Perjury 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1209(4), 1222, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1231, 
1232, 1234, 1235(c), 1235(f) 21 Del. C. §§ 2620(a), 
2752, 3107; see also 11 Del. C. § 1221 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of perjury, which, like other offenses in 
Chapter 3200, aims to protect the integrity of information relied on during an official proceeding.  
Perjury is an especially serious offense because it involves falsification under an oath or 
equivalent affirmation. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  The offense definition in Section 3201(a) is 
substantially the same as the current perjury offenses in 11 Del.C. §§ 1222 and 1223, but 
incorporates the definition of “swears falsely” in § 1224 as part of the offense definition itself.  
The distinctions between §§ 1222 and 1223 are retained for grading purposes. 
Section 3201(b) grades perjury differently depending on whether the false statement is 
made during live testimony or in a written instrument, and whether or not the statement is 
material.  Subsection (b)(1) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1223, but directly incorporates the 
definition of “testimony” from § 1235(f).  Subsection (b)(2) corresponds to § 1222.  However, 
Subsection (b)(2)(A) directly incorporates the definition of “oath required by law” from 
§ 1235(c), which makes the actual “required by law” clause unnecessary.  Subsection (b)(2)(B) 
incorporates the “delivery” requirement from § 1224.  Combining “publish as true” with the 
“intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of official functions” is unwieldy, so the 
two phrases were replaced with the more straightforward, “to deceive a public servant.”  
Misleading “in the performance of official functions,” additionally, is too narrow, since it 
appears to require an additional element: proof of an effect on the public servant’s function.  
Note that since the maximum sentences attached to grade levels have changed in the Proposed 
Code, the 3-year maximum is no longer available.  The maximum sentence either had to go up to 
[4] years (Class 7 felony) or down to [2] years (Class 8 felony).  Class 7 felony was chosen to 
avoid having too big a divide between testimonial and written perjury, and to allow Section 3203 
to be graded lower than written perjury, but still be a felony.  Subsection (b)(3) directly 
corresponds to § 1221, which punishes at a lower grade false statements made under oath that are 
immaterial to the proceeding or matter.  
Section 3201(c) directly corresponds to the affirmative defense in 11 Del.C. § 1231. 
Section 3201(d) directly corresponds to the restrictions upon available defenses in 11 
Del.C. § 1232. 
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Section 3201(e) directly corresponds to the evidentiary rules in 11 Del.C. §§ 1225 and 
1234, though they have been reworded for simplicity. 
 
 
Comment on Section 3202.  Written Falsification Under Penalty 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1233, 1234 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 3202 criminalizes making a false written statement in an instrument 
bearing legally authorized notice that the false statement is punishable. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3202(a) corresponds directly to the current 
offense definition in 11 Del.C. § 1233 (making a false written statement).  The offense has been 
retitled to help distinguish this offense from written perjury.  Subsection (a)(2) drops the 
alternative culpability requirement, that the defendant “knows” the statement is false, because 
any time a person knows something to be false, the person necessarily also believes it to be false.  
11 Del.C. § 1233 provides that “[a] person is guilty of making a false written statement when the 
person makes a false statement which [(1)] the person knows to be false or [(2)] does not believe 
to be true in a written instrument bearing a notice . . . .”  (emphases added).  It is unnecessary to 
have both “knows” and “believes” as alternative elements of the offense: an individual can 
believe something that is not true, and so can “believe” without satisfying a culpability 
requirement of “knowing.”  However, if someone knows, factually, that something is true, then 
the person necessarily also believes it to be true.  Thus, the use of “believes” in the draft text 
covers both situations enumerated in current law.  Chapter 3200 primarily punishes a defendant’s 
subjective belief in a statement’s falsehood, rather than the objective truth or falsehood of the 
statement. 
Section 3202(b) directly corresponds to the evidentiary rule in 11 Del.C. § 1234 requiring 
corroborated testimony to support conviction under Section 3202. 
Section 3202(c) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, following 11 Del.C. 
§ 1233.  It is appropriate to grade Section 3202 lower than the written form of perjury in Section 
3201 because of the different types of affirmations—required, or authorized but voluntary—
involved in the two offenses. 
 
 
Comment on Section 3203.  Tampering with Public Records 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 873; 16 Del.C. § 4740(g); 21 Del.C. 
§ 4603; see also 6 Del. C. § 5128(f); 7 Del.C. 
§§ 6013(b)(1), 6309(j); 11 Del.C. § 876; 16 Del.C. 
§§7109(c); 21 Del.C. §§ 2315, 2610(g), 2620(b),  
6705(a), (g), 6709 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes activity impairing the integrity of writings relied 
upon during official proceedings and the tampering with public records. 
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Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3203(a), defining an offense involving false 
entries in and alterations to public documents, as well as the removal, mutilation, destruction, 
and concealment of public records, corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 873.  Sections 3203 and 2202 
(Fraudulent Tampering with Records) are similar, yet distinct in an important way.  Section 3203 
criminalizes tampering with public records.  If a defendant satisfies the elements of Section 
3203, and has the additional intent to defraud, then the person would be liable instead under 
2202.  Section 3203 is, in essence, an included offense of 2202.  Section 2202 supplements 
proposed Section 3203 and applies to records that may not qualify as “public records.”  Under 
current Delaware law, there are two degrees of tampering with public records.  The first degree, 
11 Del.C. § 876, involves the “intent to defraud,” while the second, 11 Del.C. § 873, does not.  
The two offenses have been segregated to maintain consistency amongst the proposed Chapters.   
However, Section 3203(a) expands the current statute in two ways.  First, Subsection 
(a)(1)(B) explicitly makes a natural extension of what it means to make a false entry by capturing 
the knowing failure to make an entry into a public record when one is required by law to do so.  
This generalizes some regulatory offenses that criminalize this behavior already, such as 16 
Del.C. § 4740(g) (knowing failure to keep records of sales of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine) and 
21 Del.C. § 4603 (knowing failure to submit a record of possession of a vehicle master key).  
Second, Subsection (a)(2)(B) makes it an offense to tamper with records that are required by law 
to be kept by private actors for the use or information of the government.  The harm in this 
situation and current law is the same: the actor causes the government to receive disinformation.  
It does not matter who holds the record subject to tampering. 
Section 3203(b) keeps the grade of the current offense. 
Regulatory Offenses.  Regulatory regimes depend upon submission of truthful records by 
regulated parties.  To help ensure truthful submissions, there are several regulatory offenses 
punishing falsifying records either independently, or by equating that activity with perjury.  
Section 3203 is intended to replace all of these provisions.  This is preferable to the current 
selection of regulatory offenses for two reasons.  First, it ensures uniform punishment of all 
people who falsify public records.  Take, for example, 21 Del.C. §§ 2610 and 6705.  Section 
2610(g) provides that whoever knowingly falsifies information in a commercial driver’s license 
is “guilty of perjury,” which is punishable by up to 3 years’ imprisonment for written 
falsifications.  Section 6705(a) and (h), by contrast, provide that whoever intentionally falsifies 
vehicle identification numbers is “guilty of a misdemeanor” and punishable by between 30 days 
and 6 months of imprisonment.  Between these two provisions, what is essentially the same 
behavior, as far as public records are concerned, is punished by two different maximum 
sentences using two different culpability requirements.  These situations should be treated the 
same.  Second, equating falsification of public records with perjury muddies the definition of 
perjury.  By definition, perjury takes place under oath or affirmation—but public records kept or 
submitted are not necessarily made under oath.  It is clearer to have separate offenses for these 
very different situations.  Section 3203(b) grades the offense the same as the lowest grade of 
perjury.  However, Section 3201 remains available as an alternative offense for regulatory 
falsifications that rise to the higher grades of perjury.  
Note also that Section 3203 makes the regulatory offenses such as 21 Del. C. §§ 6705(g) 
and 6709 unnecessary.  These offenses prohibit removing or altering without the appropriate 
authorization license/registration plates, warranty, certification stickers or confidential vehicle 
identification from any vehicle or possessing such vehicles.  However, removing or altering 
vehicle documentation constitutes tampering with public records.  Note also that the possession 
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of such vehicles may be consistent with other criminal conduct covered by the Proposed Code 
(see, e.g., Section 2207 [Receiving Stolen Property]), and prosecuted accordingly.  
First Degree Tampering with Public Records.  11 Del.C. § 876, tamping with public 
records in the first degree, has not been included in Section 3203.  Due its additional element of 
fraudulent intent, that offense is included in proposed Section 2202 (Fraudulent Tampering with 
Records). 
 
 
Comment on Section 3204.  Criminal Impersonation 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 907(3), 907B; see also 6 Del.C. § 5133 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines two offenses dealing with the criminal impersonation 
of public servants and law enforcement or emergency personnel. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3204 consolidates three current provisions 
dealing with criminal impersonation.  Subsection (a)(1) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 907(3), with the general introductory language of “falsely represents” covering false 
identifications, badges, and uniforms specified in the current offense.  Note that §§ 907(1)–(2) 
are not incorporated here, but are instead incorporated into Chapter 2200 due to their additional 
intent to defraud.  Subsection (a)(2) directly incorporates 11 Del.C. § 907B, which prohibits 
impersonating law enforcement or emergency personnel for the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of an offense or enabling flight from an offense.  The terms and grading provisions 
from § 907B incorporated without substantive changes. .   
Administrative Impersonation.  6 Del.C. § 5133, which prohibits impersonating and 
acting in certain ways that carry the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture, has not been 
incorporated into the Proposed Code.  It is redundant with both the current offense for 
impersonating public servants, as well as Section 3204.  Furthermore, the offenses are graded 
differently, with § 5133 as a Class B misdemeanor and § 907 as a Class A misdemeanor.  For 
these reasons, the offense should be eliminated from Title 6. 
 
 
Comment on Section 3205.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 222(2), 1235 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3205(a) provides a definition of “oath” that 
directly corresponds to the definition in 11 Del.C. §1235(b).  The definition of “oath or 
affirmation” in § 222(20) is not incorporated because it only applies to warrant issues not 
contained in the Proposed Code.  The definition should instead be moved to another part of the 
Delaware Code dealing with warrants. 
Section 3205(b) provides a definition of “statement is material” that directly corresponds 
to the definition in 11 Del.C. § 1235(a). 
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CHAPTER 3300.  OFFENSES INVOLVING OBSTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS; 
ESCAPE 
 
Section 3301.  Obstructing Justice 
Section 3302.  Resisting or Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer 
Section 3303.  Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Government Function 
Section 3304.  Refusing to Aid an Officer 
Section 3305.  Escape 
Section 3306.  Prohibited Conduct Related to Official Custody 
Section 3307.  Intimidating, Improperly Influencing, or Retaliating Against a Witness, Juror, or 
Victim 
Section 3308.  Criminal Contempt 
Section 3309.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 3301.  Obstructing Justice 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1244, 1245A, 1246, 1247, 1269, 1274;  
see also 11 Del.C. §§ 850, 937; 21 Del.C. § 4202 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of obstructing justice. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3301(a)(1) corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 1245A(a), with one minor change.  While the current provision stipulates that the defendant 
must have an intent to prevent, hinder, or delay “the investigation of any crime or offense by a 
law-enforcement officer or agency,” 11 Del.C. § 1245A(a), the proposed provision stipulates that 
the defendant must have an intent to prevent, hinder, or delay “the investigation, discovery, 
apprehension, prosecution, or defense of any person.”  In an effort to consolidate as many current 
provisions as possible and to recognize the fact that investigation is not the only stage of the law 
enforcement process that can be delayed or derailed by obstruction, the language of the proposed 
provision broadens the current provision and addresses an inconsistency within the current law, 
where certain obstructing actions are not adequately covered.  “Any person” includes the 
defendant herself. 
Section 3301(a)(2)(A) also corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1245A(a), with two minor 
changes.  First, the proposed provision replaces the current provision’s clause prohibiting any 
“false written or oral statement” to a law enforcement officer or agency when such statement is 
material to the investigation, with a clause prohibiting any “false, misleading, or incomplete” 
such statement.  The alteration reflects an incorporation of the definition of “false” currently 
contained in 11 Del.C. § 1245A(b)(2).  Second, the proposed provision does not include 
§ 1245A(b)(1) because the meaning of “statement” is apparent, or §§ 1245A(b)(3)–(4) because 
the definition of “statement is material” covers those definitions.  
Section 3301(a)(2)(B), (C), (D), and (E) correspond to 11 Del.C. §§ 1244(a)(1), (2), (3), 
and (4), respectively, with four minor changes.  First, the proposed provisions remove the current 
provisions’ requirement that the person has committed a crime or is being sought by law 
enforcement because that requirement is implied by the current provisions’ requirement that the 
person intend to “prevent, hinder, or delay the investigation, discovery, apprehension, 
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prosecution, or defense of any person.”  Second, Subsection (a)(2)(E) streamlines the language 
contained in 11 Del.C. § 1244(a)(4).  Third, the proposed provisions do not include 11 Del.C. 
§ 1244(a)(6)’s prohibition of aiding the person “to protect or profit expeditiously from an 
advantage derived from the person’s crime” because the prohibition overlaps with accomplice 
liability to the extent that protecting the criminal’s “advantage” is itself an offense.  Finally, the 
term “discovery,” used in § 1244, has been omitted from Subsections (a)(2)(C)–(E) because it is 
unnecessary given the way Section 3301 is drafted.  The offense can be satisfied by the 
defendant hindering or delaying apprehension of another person, and aiding the person to evade 
discovery by law enforcement hinders or delays apprehension.   
Section 3301(a)(2)(F) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1246, with three minor changes.  First, 
the proposed provision removes the current provision’s “offer” and “agree” language because 
solicitation and conspiracy are covered by the inchoate offenses in Chapter 700.  Second, the 
proposed provision removes the current provision’s sentence adjustment language because that 
language is redundant with the bribery offense in Section 3101, which is already graded higher.  
This form of obstruction only differs from bribery if it is the victim or a similarly situated 
civilian who is affecting the prosecution, rather than a public servant.  The phrase “not being a 
public servant” has been added to this Subsection to clarify the distinction between this offense 
and bribery.  Third, while the current provision is only a class A misdemeanor, the proposed 
provision is graded the same as the other forms of obstruction, given its similarity to those 
provisions.  
Section 3301(a)(2)(G) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1244(a)(5) and 11 Del.C. § 1269, 
which one minor change.  The proposed provision does not specifically incorporate the current 
provisions’ culpability requirements because those requirements are redundant in light of the 
proposed provision’s overall requirement that the defendant have “intent to prevent, hinder, or 
delay the investigation, discovery, apprehension, prosecution, or defense of any person.”  
Section 3301(a)(2)(H) is based upon 11 Del.C. § 850(a)(1)b. and 11 Del.C. §§ 937(2)-(4).  
The unifying features of those provisions add up to an electronic obstruction of justice offense, 
which is lacking in the current criminal code.  
Section 3301(a)(2)(I) is a summary of 21 Del.C. §§ 4202(a)-(c), with two minor changes.  
First, the proposed provision adds this Section’s overall intent requirement.  21 Del.C. § 
4202 does not have an explicit culpability requirement, but by virtue of its inclusion in Section 
3301, the general culpability requirement in Subsection (a)(1) applies to it.  Adding an intent 
requirement to a hit and run offense does not substantially alter the purpose of the law, since 
individuals “run” during a hit and run because they intend to avoid questioning and investigation 
by law enforcement.  Second, the proposed provision does not include the current provision’s 
duty to aid requirement.  21 Del.C. § 4202 is ambiguous in that it appears to contain two separate 
issues: (1) evading investigation (i.e., obstruction), and (2) a duty to render aid to the person 
injured.  However, Delaware does not appear to impose a general duty to aid victims of one’s 
injurious behavior.  Based on a search of applicable case law, 21 Del.C. § 4202 is used 
predominately to prosecute individuals for fleeing, not for failure to render aid.  Therefore, only 
the flight aspect of § 4202 is maintained in the proposed provision.  
Section 3301(b) maintains the grading provisions set forth in 11 Del.C. §§ 1244(b)-(c) 
and § 1245A, except as noted above. 
Section 3301(c) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 1247.  
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Comment on Section 3302.  Resisting or Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1243, 1250, 1257, 1257A, 1458;  
21 Del.C. § 4103(b) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes resisting, obstructing, or interfering with a law 
enforcement officer.  The proposed offense is a generalization based upon the above referenced 
current provisions; it captures much more behavior than the few scattered, overly specific 
offenses currently do, promoting comprehensive protection of law enforcement and emergency 
personnel.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3302(a) covers broad behaviors, including 
resisting arrest.  The proposed provision does not specify who the target of the official’s action 
is, so the offense of interfering with the arrest of another person currently prohibited by 11 
Del.C. § 1257 is captured by Section 3302(a)(1).  Note that the act being resisted or obstructed 
need only be within the scope of the official’s employment, not be specifically authorized in the 
instance involved in the offense.  This means that a person who resists an unlawful arrest by a 
peace officer (who would also be a law enforcement officer, and thus include in the prohibitions 
in Section 3302) may still be prosecuted under Section 3302—preserving Delaware’s current 
rule—so long as the official’s employment generally authorizes him or her to make arrests.  The 
same rationale applies to other key acts of law enforcement officers, correctional officers, 
firefighters, and emergency personnel, in addition to arrests by peace officers. 
Knowledge of the law enforcement officer’s identity is required by Section 3302(a)(2), in 
accord with the requirement of 11 Del.C. § 1458(a)(1) and the implied requirement of 21 Del.C. 
§ 4103(b).  Extending the knowledge requirement to other offenses falling within this Section 
promotes consistency with other current obstruction provisions.  
Section 3302(a) captures the offenses against law enforcement animals prohibited by 11 
Del.C. § 1250 to the extent that the conduct obstructs a law enforcement officer in charge of the 
animal.  To the extent that § 1250 is concerned merely with injury to animals, proposed Section 
4207 (Cruelty to Animals) is available.  Section 3302(a) also captures 11 Del.C. § 1257A’s 
offense of using an animal to avoid capture, including its grading provision that deals with 
injuring a law enforcement officer.  
Section 3302(b) maintains the grading provisions set forth in the current criminal code, 
except as noted below.  Section 3302(b)(1) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1458(a).  The word 
“weapon,” without qualification, is used in place of the list of possible weapons in § 1458(a) to 
emphasize the fact that it is the person being disarmed that makes this such a serious offense.  
The particular weapon the officer is disarmed of is irrelevant; disarming an officer of any 
weapon makes the officer more vulnerable to attack or interference, whether it be a firearm, 
Taser, pepper spray, or anything else.  Section 3302(b)(2) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1257(a).  
The proposed Section 3302(b)(2) summarizes the behavior listed in the current § 1257(a).  In 
keeping with this offense’s general character, this grade provision no longer applies only to 
arrests.  Section 3302(b)(3) corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 1243 and 1257(b) and 21 Del.C. 
§ 4103(b).  11 Del.C. § 1243, which prohibits obstructing firefighting, and 11 Del.C. § 1257(b), 
which prohibits resisting arrest, are class A misdemeanors, while 21 Del.C. § 4103(b) is a class 
G felony.  The lower grade is appropriate because the scope of the proposed offense has been 
expanded to capture more conduct.  The repeat offense grade provisions from 21 Del.C. 
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§ 4103(b) are not included because proposed Section 804 contains a general adjustment for 
repeat offenses.   
Note, however, that special care has been taken to preserve the complex regulatory 
schemes in Title 21, the incorporation of the criminal provisions of that Title into the Proposed 
Code notwithstanding.  Therefore, the part of § 4103(b) addressing license revocation as an 
additional penalty in motor vehicle cases, should remain in Title 21.  Similarly, the part of 
§ 4103(b) providing a defense for a driver proceeding “at or below the posted speed limit to a 
safe location or, at nighttime to a well-lit reasonable location and stops the vehicle at that point,” 
should also remain in Title 21.  Note also, that due to the incorporation of part of 21 Del. C. 
§ 4103(b) into Section 3302, the rebuttable presumption in 21 Del. C. § 4103(c) regarding the 
identity of the person witnessed by a police officer violating § 4103(b) refers only to the 
regulatory part of that provision retained in Title 21.  It does not affect Section 3302. 
 
 
Comment on Section 3303.  Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Government 
Function 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  6 Del.C. § 5132; 7 Del. C. §§ 6013(b)(2), 6309(j); 11 
Del.C. §§ 1248, 1267, 1273; 16 Del.C. § 4759; 18 
Del. C. § 4354(a) 
 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of obstructing administration of law or 
other government function.  It criminalizes intentionally interfering with government functions 
by physical means, breach of an official duty, or an unlawful act.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Delaware does not currently have a general offense 
dealing with obstruction of administration of law or other government function, but instead has 
several specific statutes dealing with particular instances of obstruction.  Those offenses speak to 
a core concern of the General Assembly that would be better served by a general offense, since 
relying upon specialized statutes results in gaps in criminalization.  The core concern of 
governmental obstruction is blameworthy regardless of the particular form it takes.   
Section 3303(a) corresponds to, but generalizes, the conduct currently prohibited by 6 
Del.C. § 5132, which relates to obstructing the enforcement powers of the Department of 
Agriculture; 11 Del.C. § 1248, which relates to obstructing the control and suppression of rabies; 
11 Del.C. § 1267, which relates to misconduct by a juror; and 11 Del.C. § 1273, which relates to 
unlawful grand jury disclosure.   
Subsections (a)(2) and (b)(3) correspond to 11 Del.C. § 1267, as jurors have official 
duties of secrecy and impartiality, and 11 Del.C. § 1273, as long as the duty of grand jury 
secrecy is defined elsewhere in Delaware law.  (Current § 1273 requires that the matter be 
“required by law to be kept secret,” which points to another source of law.)  11 Del.C. § 1268, 
which relates to communication between jurors, is not included because a juror’s duty of secrecy 
does not prohibit communication among jurors “in the same proceeding with regard to matters 
admitted as evidence in the proceeding.”   
Section 3303(b) generally maintains the grading provisions set forth in the current code.  
Section 3303(b)(1) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1248, relating to the suppression and control of 
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rabies outbreaks, but generalizes current law to include obstruction of official action to address 
any viral outbreak or other, similarly serious public health emergencies. It also corresponds to 11 
Del. C. § 1509(e), relating to the obstruction of compliance with a duly served “investigative 
demand” of the Attorney General under 11 Del. C. § 1509, in an investigation for violation of 
Section 5301 [Organized Crime and Racketeering]. 
 Section 3303(b)(2) directly corresponds to 16 Del.C. § 4759(a)(4).  Section 3303(b)(3) 
directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1267.  The default grading provision contained in Section 
3303(b)(4) corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 1273 and 1248(b).  The conduct currently covered by 6 
Del.C. § 5132 also falls under this default grading provision, though the result is that the 
maximum punishment for that conduct is raised by three months.  Similarly, this provision 
covers the prohibition in 18 Del. C. § 4354(a), insofar as it pertains to the exercise of bail bond 
agents powers by persons who fall short of the qualification and licensing requirements in 
Chapter 43 of Title 18.  This aspect of § 4354(a) is predominantly regulatory, and its grading as 
Class F felony is disproportionally high (recall, Section 801(b)(2) provides a Class A 
misdemeanor ceiling on all offenses outside the code declaring themselves to be felonies).  
Therefore, this regulatory aspect of § 4354(a) is appropriately lowered to that of similar offenses.  
Note however, that insofar as § 4354(a) pertains to unauthorized impersonation, it graded as 
Class A misdemeanor and covered by Section 2212 [Unauthorized Impersonation]. 
 
 
Comment on Section 3304.  Refusing to Aid an Officer 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1241, 1242 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes the knowing failure to provide reasonable 
assistance to a law enforcement officer in apprehending a person or preventing an offense when 
so commanded.  
 Relation to current Delaware law.  Sections 3304(a) and (b) directly correspond to 11 
Del.C. § 1241, except with an alteration in the reasonableness requirement in rendering aid.  11 
Del.C. §1241 prohibits an “unreasonabl[e] fail[ure] or refus[al] to aid . . . [a] police officer [upon 
a lawful command to do so] in effecting an arrest, or in preventing the commission by another 
person of any offense.”  Thus, under current Delaware law, the failure to render aid must not be 
unreasonable.  However, proposed Section 3304(a)(1) moves the reasonableness requirement to 
the aid itself; under the proposed section, the aid rendered must itself be reasonable.  An 
“unreasonable” failure to render aid would include every instance of culpable failure, including 
negligence.  Under § 1241, a person who fails to render aid due to her own negligence could be 
liable.  But if the officer identifies himself, or is identifiable as an officer; the officer commands 
a person to render aid; and the defendant subsequently refuses to do so, the defendant would, at 
minimum, knowingly fail to assist the officer.  The reasonableness requirement has been moved 
to the aid itself because: (1) negligence is a disfavored culpability in criminal law, and was 
probably not intended by the General Assembly to apply to § 1241; and (2) it would be irrational 
for the law to require an individual to render more than reasonable assistance, which could 
include putting himself or herself in harm’s way. 
Section 3304(c) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1242, with two minor changes.  First, the 
proposed provision does not include the current provision’s clause “provided, that the person 
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employs means which would have been employed by a reasonable person under the 
circumstances known to the person at the time” because the proposed offense already requires 
the aid to have been reasonable.  Second, the proposed provision does not include 11 Del.C. 
§ 1242(b) because that provision should be included in a regulatory title dealing with blood-
alcohol tests, such as Title 21.  Section 1242(b) has no relationship to this offense or to the 
current criminal code.  
 
 
Comment on Section 3305.  Escape 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1251, 1252, 1253, 1258 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes escaping from custody.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Current escape provisions are unnecessarily 
convoluted.  For example, the current provisions use the term “custody” to mean several 
different things, despite it being a defined term.  Section 3305(a) represents an attempt to 
maintain current law while creating rational distinctions between the different forms of 
confinement.  
Section 3305(a)(1)(A) is based upon 11 Del.C. § 1253 and the definition of “detention 
facility” in 11 Del.C. § 1258(3).  The term “imprisoned” is used to emphasize a distinction 
between Subsection (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) regarding the kinds of penal custody that may be 
involved.  Subsection (a)(1)(A) is intended to apply only to escape from incarceration, whereas 
Subsection (a)(1)(B) applies more broadly to other kinds of penal custody, such as house arrest 
or work release. 
Section 3305(a)(1)(B) is based upon 11 Del.C. § 1252 and the definition of “detention 
facility” in 11 Del.C. § 1258(3). 
Sections 3305(a)(1)(C) and (D) are based upon 11 Del.C. § 1251 and the definition of 
“custody” in 11 Del.C. § 1258(2).  
The requirement in Section 3305(a)(2) that the person must know that he or she is not 
permitted to escape is based on the definition of “escape” in 11 Del.C. § 1258(4) and its 
requirement that the actor have knowledge that the escape is not permitted.  
Section 3305(b)(1) maintains the grading provisions set forth in 11 Del.C. § 1253.  
Section 3305(b)(2) maintains the grading provisions set forth in 11 Del.C. § 1252.  Section 
3305(b)(3) maintains the grading provisions set forth in 11 Del.C. § 1251.   
 
 
Comment on Section 3306.  Prohibited Conduct Related to Official Custody 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1256, 1258, 1260 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes possessing prison contraband and misusing 
prisoner mail.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3306(a) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1256, 
with two minor changes.  First, the proposed provision’s knowledge requirement is reworked to 
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make more sense in context.  While current § 1256 uses “knowingly and unlawfully” to qualify 
“introduces any contraband” and “makes, obtains, or possesses any contraband,” Section 
3306(a)(1)  incorporates the knowledge requirement by using the phrase “what the person knows 
to be contraband.”  Second, Section 3306(a) converts “unlawfully” into “except as authorized by 
law,” because this default is more logical than forcing prosecutors to prove outright that the 
contraband was unlawful.  
Section 3306(b) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1260, with one minor change.  Current § 
1260’s repeat offense provision is not included as proposed Section 804 contains a general 
adjustment for repeat offenses. 
Section 3306(c) maintains the grades from 11 Del.C. §§ 1256 and 1260, with the 
exception of the repeat offense provision, as noted above.  However, Subsection (c)(1) proposes 
a higher grade for introducing deadly weapons as contraband, since having a deadly weapon in 
prison is a much more serious threat to others’ safety than having a mobile phone.   
 
 
Comment on Section 3307.  Intimidating, Improperly Influencing, or Retaliating Against a 
Witness, Juror, or Victim 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1263, 1263A, 1266, 1268, 3531, 3532, 
3533, 3534 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes the performance of certain conduct that harmfully 
interferes with the duties of public servants, witnesses, jurors, and voters.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  The proposed offense is a composite offense that 
generalizes portions of the current offenses of witness intimidation (11 Del.C. §§ 3532, 3533, 
and 3534), witness tampering (11 Del.C. §§ 1263 and 1263A), and juror tampering (11 Del.C. 
§ 1266).  Generally, this Section expands conduct which was previously limited to a narrower 
subset of targets; for instance,  intimidation, deception, persuasion, and retaliation, which 
currently only apply to witnesses, has been expanded to encompass jurors, and unauthorized 
communication, which currently only applies to jurors, can now apply to witnesses. 
Section 3307(a)(1)(A) is based upon 11 Del.C. § 1263(1).  
Section 3307(a)(1)(B) is based upon 11 Del.C. §§ 1263(1), 1263A(a), and 3532.  
“Testifying freely” includes influencing the witness’s availability. 
Section 3307(a)(1)(C) is based upon 11 Del.C. § 3532.  The proposed clause “annoy, 
harass, intimidate” is largely based on the definition of malice currently set forth in 11 Del.C. 
§ 3531(1).  
Section 3307(a)(1)(D) is based upon 11 Del.C. §§ 3532(1)–(3). 
Section 3307(a)(2)(A) is based upon 11 Del.C. §§ 1263(2) and 3533(1), the grades for 
which diverge.  The proposed provision preserves the higher grading of Class 4 felony for this 
conduct.  “Anyone” includes any witness, juror, or third person.  
Section 3307(a)(2)(B) is based upon 11 Del.C. § 1263.  The proposed clause “commits an 
offense” includes property damage, which is referenced in 11 Del.C. § 1263(2).  
Section 3307(a)(2)(C) is based upon 11 Del.C. § 1266(1).  11 Del.C. § 1266(2) is not 
included because bribing a juror to violate a duty of confidentiality would be covered by Section 
4304(a)(2)’s prohibition on disclosing confidential information and Section 211 (Liability for the 
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Conduct of Another), and in certain cases will fall under the general bribery provision set forth in 
Section 3101, where it is punished more harshly.  
Section 3307(b) preserves the exception for juror deliberations set forth in 11 Del.C. 
§ 1268.   
Several current provisions are not included in the proposed provisions.  First, 11 Del.C. 
§ 1263A, which relates to tampering with child witnesses, is not included because the activity is 
already covered by the general offenses in this Section.   In addition, the current offense of child 
tampering is punished less harshly than the offense of tampering with adult witnesses, even when 
the child witness is the complaining witness.  Second, 11 Del.C. § 3533(3) is not included 
because proposed Section 804 contains a general adjustment for repeat offenses.  Third, 11 
Del.C. § 3534, which prohibits an attempt to intimidate a witness, victim, or juror, is not 
included because attempt liability is covered comprehensively by proposed Section 701.  
Section 3307(c) seeks to generally preserve the grading of current offenses based on the 
conduct involved, not the status of the victim.  Where the current grades conflict, the proposed 
provision incorporates the lower grade.  The lower grade was chosen as a proportionality 
judgment by the nonpartisan consultative group supervising the drafting process for this 
Proposed Code.  That group has scrutinized the relative grading of all offenses, and has decided 
that this offense’s grade would otherwise be disproportionately high when compared to other 
offenses of the same grade in current law.  Note that the legislation authorizing this Proposed 
Code mandates that “disproportionate” statutes be identified and rectified.   
 
 
Comment on Section 3308.  Criminal Contempt 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1271, 1271A, 1272 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of criminal contempt.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 3308(a) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1271, 
with one minor change.  Section 3308(a)(8) adds for clarity the word “order” to the current 
provision’s clause “process, injunction or other mandate of a court” because orders are common 
court mandates.  Because this Subsection specifies that the disobedience of any order of any 
court forms the basis of contempt, 11 Del.C. § 1271A is unnecessary except under the 
aggravating conditions of § 1271A(c).  Therefore, § 1271A has been included only as a grade 
aggravation.  Note also that § 3536(b)(2) – providing that while a person violating a protective 
order issued in the context of Section 3307 [Intimidating, Improperly Influencing, or Retaliating 
Against a Witness, Juror, or Victim] may be convicted for contempt, a conviction or acquittal for 
a substantive offense shall bar a subsequent punishment for contempt – is not retained.  
Retaining this offense-specific provision may lead to incongruous application of procedural rules 
on different parts of the Proposed Code, and therefore undermine its clarity and efficiency.  On 
the other hand, there is no basis in current law to broaden its application to the general contempt 
offense 
Section 3308(b) maintains the grading provisions set forth in 11 Del.C. §§ 1271 and 
1271A.  The proposed provision does not specify that the conduct must have occurred in 
Delaware, as § 1271A does, because Section 105 covers all territorial and jurisdictional issues.  
 
 489 
In addition, the proposed provision does not include §§ 1271A(d)-(e) because all minimum 
sentencing provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802. 
Section 3308(c) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1272.  
 
 
Comment on Section 3309.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 222(15), 1251, 1252, 1253, 1258, 1266, 
1274, 3531 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law 
Section 3309(a) corresponds to the definition of “contraband” in 11 Del.C. § 1258(1), 
with one minor difference.  The proposed definition adds “mobile phone or other electronic 
device” to the list of items that constitute contraband because of those devices’ use in grading 11 
Del.C. § 1256. 
Section 3309(b) directly corresponds to the definition of “juror” in 11 Del.C. § 1266.  
Including this definition is necessary because it expands the apparent meaning of juror from one 
who is actually chosen to serve on a jury to one who has received notice of summons to appear 
for jury service.   
Section 3309(c) is a generalization of all the specific examples of persons who constitute 
a “law enforcement officer” in 11 Del.C. § 222(15).  With this generalization and the removal of 
a specifically enumerated list of persons who qualify as law enforcement officers, no person who 
should fall under this title will be inadvertently omitted.  Note that this is intended to be a very 
broad group of people, whereas “peace officers”—a subset of law enforcement officers—are 
defined much more narrowly as a class.  Note that the part of § 222(15) containing provisions 
related to the arrest authority of sheriffs has not included because it addresses purely procedural 
issues that are best collected with others like it in the part of Title 11 dealing with criminal 
procedure. 
Section 3309(d) provides a newly-promulgated definition of “peace officer,” which has 
been created to capture a useful description of a peace officer based upon peace officers’ unique 
duties and source of authority.  “Peace officers” are a subset of “law enforcement officers,” and 
are generally understood to be “charged . . . with the maintenance of the public peace and order 
[and] . . . the preservation of the safety of person and property within their jurisdiction,”  State v. 
Wyatt, 27 Del. 473, 89 A. 217, 219 (Gen. Sess. 1913), and “ha[ve] the right to seize and search 
any person whom the officer observes breaking the law.”  Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 872 
(Del. 1999).  Peace officers are mainly distinguished by their arrest authority, regardless of 
whether that authority extends to all or a limited number of offenses, and regardless the 
jurisdiction where that arrest authority is established.  On the other hand, a “law enforcement 
officer” can be anyone directly involved in the criminal justice system, whether that means the 
prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of offenses. 
Section 3309(e) provides a definition of “penal custody,” which is based upon the forms 
of correctional custody described in 11 Del.C. §§ 1251–53. 
Section 3309(f) directly corresponds to the definition of “physical evidence” in 11 Del.C. 
§ 1274(3).   
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Section 3309(g) summarizes the definition of “witness” set forth in 11 Del.C. § 3531(3). 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH, ORDER, AND DECENCY 
 
CHAPTER 4100.  OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY 
 
Section 4101.  Riot; Disorderly Conduct; Failure to Disperse 
Section 4102.  Public Alarms 
Section 4103.  Stalking; Harassment 
Section 4104.  Public Intoxication 
Section 4105.  Loitering 
Section 4106.  Obstructing Public Ways 
Section 4107.  Desecration 
Section 4108.  Definitions 
 
 
General Comment on Chapter 4100.   
 
Current Provisions Not Incorporated.  Several current provisions have not been 
incorporated into this Chapter.  First, the current offense criminalizing hate crimes, 11 Del.C. 
§ 1304, has not been included in this Chapter and has instead been incorporated in Section 804 as 
a general grade adjustment.  Second, the offenses criminalizing the willful obstruction of 
hunting, 7 Del.C. § 724, and hunting from aircraft, 2 Del.C. § 310, have not been included in the 
Proposed Code, since the two offenses are regulatory in nature and should remain in a regulatory 
part of the Delaware Code.  Third, the offense criminalizing the maintenance of dangerous 
animals, 11 Del.C. § 1327, has not been included in this Chapter because the offense is already 
adequately addressed by various proposed offenses dealing with cruelty to animals, assault, 
homicide, endangerment, and property damage.  Fourth, 11 Del.C. § 1316, providing for 
registration of out-of-state liquor agents and violations for failure to register, is not really a 
criminal law provision at all.  It is a regulation of liquor sales, and no criminal penalties are 
authorized for its violation.  This provision should be moved to a regulatory title dealing with 
liquor. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4101.  Riot; Disorderly Conduct; Failure to Disperse 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1301, 1302, 1303 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines and criminalizes disorderly conduct, the failure to 
disperse, and riot, which are distinct but closely related offenses.   
Disorderly conduct defines an offense to cover situations where persons engage in public 
conduct that is intended to cause or create a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. 
Failure to disperse defines an offense in situations where a group of two or more persons 
engaged in a course of disorderly conduct likely to cause substantial harm, inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm fail to disperse upon order by law enforcement authorities. 
The proposed riot offense, which is framed as an aggravated form of disorderly conduct, 
punishes two or more people who engage in disorderly conduct with intent to commit or 
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facilitate the commission of an offense, with intent to prevent or coerce official action, or in 
which the person knows a firearm or other deadly weapon will be used.  Riot need not be defined 
as a separate offense because the offenses of disorderly conduct, conspiracy, and attempt 
adequately cover the riot offense’s elements of creating a public disturbance and collaboration 
toward a criminal end.  Riot is included as a grading adjustment to reflect the greater threat of 
danger posed by disorderly conduct in which persons involved have intent to commit a crime, 
intent to prevent or coerce official action, or in which the person knows a deadly weapon will be 
used.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4101 combines the disorderly conduct, failure 
to disperse, and riot offenses, which current Delaware law separates, into one provision. 
Section 4101(a) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1301, with one change.  While 11 Del.C. 
§§ 1301(1)a.-c. and (1)f. are incorporated verbatim in Subsections (a)(1)-(4), §§ 1301(1)d., (1)e., 
and (1)g. have not been included in this Subsection.  11 Del.C. § 1301(1)d.’s prohibition on 
obstructing vehicular or pedestrian traffic is incorporated into proposed Section 4108(b)’s 
definition of “public passage.”  11 Del.C. §§ 1301(1)e. has not been included in this Subsection 
as the offense has been replaced by Section 4101(b), which deals with failure to disperse. 
Section 4101(b) criminalizes, for a person participating in an offense under Subsection 
(a), refusing to obey the order of a peace officer to disperse.  Section 4101(b) corresponds to 11 
Del.C. § 1301(2), with substantially similar offense and culpability requirements.  However, the 
phrase “that is likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm” 
has not been included.  The phrase is substantially the same as the definition of Disorderly 
Conduct, making it redundant.  The only difference is the use of the adjectives “substantial” and 
“serious,” which could be interpreted to require extra-disorderly conduct.  That interpretation 
produces the irrational result of failing to criminalize Failure to Disperse following a normal 
Disorderly Conduct offense. 
Section 4101(c) corresponds largely to 11 Del.C. §§ 1302 and 1303.  Section 4101(c)(1) 
corresponds to § 1302, which has been incorporated as a grade adjustment to the overall 
disorderly conduct offense, instead of as a separate offense altogether.  The offense 
requirements, culpability requirements, and grading of Section 4101(c)(1) and § 1302 are 
identical. 
Section 4101(c)(2) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1303, with three alterations.  First, 
§ 1303(b) has not been included because its stipulation that the offense “applies to conduct 
within 1 hour preceding, during, and within 2 hours after a funeral, memorial service, funeral 
procession, or burial” is unnecessary in light of the text of the proposed offense.  Since the 
proposed offense only applies when a person “intentionally disturbs or disrupts a funeral, 
memorial service, or funeral procession” or “directs abusive epithets or makes threatening 
gestures, knowing that the speech or conduct is likely to provoke a violent reaction,” the offense 
need not include additional specific temporal restrictions.   Second, § 1303(c)’s additional 
penalty for second or subsequent offenses has not been retained.  All repeat offender grade 
adjustments are addressed by a general adjustment in Section 804 of the Proposed Code that 
applies to all offenses generally.  Third, § 1303(d) has not been included.  There is no need to 
preclude any county or municipality from legislating or enforcing stricter laws as the Proposed 
Code has no default setting of preclusion that would make this necessary.  Apart from these 
differences, Section 4101(c)(2) adopts the spatial requirements and grading levels of § 1303. 
The grading of the base disorderly conduct offense contained in proposed Section 
4101(c)(4) is a Class D misdemeanor, which corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1301.  The change in 
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grade from an unclassified misdemeanor to a Class D misdemeanor is one of form, not 
substance, since Class D misdemeanors in the Proposed Code represent the same grade as an 
unclassified misdemeanor in the current code.  However, the grading of the failure to disperse 
offense in proposed Section 4101(c)(3) has been raised from a Class D misdemeanor, the grade 
provided for in 11 Del.C. §1301, to a Class C misdemeanor.  The failure to disperse offense 
defines a narrower and more harmful subset of behavior than does the disorderly conduct offense 
(conduct under Subsection (a) “likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm” as compared to conduct that creates or is intended to create “a risk of 
public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm”).  Accordingly, the failure to disperse offense should 
be graded more seriously than the disorderly conduct offense.  This grade difference appears in 
the Model Penal Code, on which § 1301 is based, so it seems likely that a drafting error is 
responsible for § 1301 grading disorderly conduct and failure to disperse the same. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4102.  Public Alarms 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 1245; see also 11 Del.C. §§ 621, 1313  
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes falsely reporting public alarms and making false 
statements which are likely to cause serious public inconvenience.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4102 corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 621, 1245, 
and 1313.  The intent requirement in Section 4102(a), that the defendant know that the report, 
warning, or call is false or baseless, directly corresponds to § 1245.   
Section 4102(a)(1) and Subsection (a)(1)(A) correspond directly to 11 Del.C. § 1245(1).  
Subsection (a)(1)(A) also incorporates 11 Del.C. § 621(a)(2)a.-c., which criminalize making 
false statements that are likely to cause an evacuation of a building or cause serious 
inconvenience.  The “law enforcement officer, agency, or other public safety official” found in 
Subsection (a)(1)(B) is the equivalent of § 1245(2)’s “organization having the function of 
dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property.”  Subsection (a)(2) directly 
corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1245(4).  
Section 4102(b) maintains 11 Del.C. § 1245’s Class A misdemeanor grade.  Mandatory 
fines or repeat offense grades are handled by the general provisions in Chapter 800. 
 Current Provisions Not Incorporated.  11 Del.C. § 1313(b), which criminalizes the 
malicious interference with emergency communications, has not been included in this Section 
because the conduct constituting the offense is adequately criminalized by proposed Section 
3304(a)(1).  That Section prohibits “knowingly obstruct[ing], impair[ing], or pervert[ing] the 
administration of law or other governmental function” and requires a lower culpability level than 
the “intent[]” specified in current §§ 1313(b)(1) and (2).   
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Comment on Section 4103.  Stalking; Harassment 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1311, 1312 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes harassment and stalking.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4103 corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 1311 and 
1312.  Subsection (a)(1) corresponds to § 1311(a)(1)–(2) and (5), but is framed more broadly 
than the current provisions for two reasons.  While current § 1311(a) specifies certain vehicles of 
harassment, including through a telephone, telegraph, mail, or other form of written or electronic 
communication, the proposed provision criminalizes all “communications” meant to harass, 
annoy, or alarm another to ensure that all kinds of communications are captured.  Limiting the 
offense to the enumerated forms of communication is too specific and other means of harassing 
communications are worthy of punishment.  Second, Subsection (a)(1)(A) has been framed in 
more precise language, in order to differentiate the offense from the more general catch-all 
provision of Subsection (a)(1)(B).   
Subsection (a)(2) corresponds to elements of the stalking offense in 11 Del. C. § 1312.  
As stalking is a specific form of harassment, Subsection (a)(2) incorporates the definition of 
stalking from § 1312(a) and (e)(1).  Under current law, knowingly interfering with the activities 
or property of another in a manner that would cause a reasonable person fear of physical injury 
or substantial mental distress is neither stalking (as it requires three separate incidents), nor 
harassment (as it requires intent to harass or annoy).  Subsection (a)(2) makes clear that such 
conduct constitutes harassment under the Proposed Code. 
Note that § 1311(a)(3) has not been included in Section 4103.  Current § 1311(a)(3)’s 
prohibition on knowingly permitting a telephone under a person’s control to be used for a 
purpose prohibited by this Section has not been retained.  If a person permits his or her telephone 
to be used for harassment, sexual harassment, or stalking, intending that the telephone be used 
for that purpose, then the person is subject to accomplice liability under proposed Section 211.  
Current § 1311(a)(3) essentially circumvents the requirements of complicity by lowering the 
culpability requirement to “knowing,” but the requirements of complicity are important to 
maintain because they define the minimum amount of involvement and culpability necessary to 
justifiably hold someone accountable for another person’s conduct.  There is no compelling 
justification for an exception to the general principles of accomplice liability in this case.  
Section 4103(a)(3) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1312(i), which provides an affirmative 
defense for defendants engaged in lawful picketing.  The defense has been made applicable to 
the entire Subsection criminalizing stalking and harassment. 
Section 4103(b)(1) corresponds to the remaining elements of the stalking offense in 11 
Del.C. § 1312.  As stalking is a specific form of harassment, the Proposed Code treats stalking as 
an aggravated grade of harassment and maintains the current offense’s Class F felony grade 
(here, a Class 8 felony).  However, proposed Subsection (b)(1) does not retain certain grade 
aggravations that appear in current § 1312(c)-(d).  First, the current grade aggravations for 
causing physical injury are not retained because causing physical injury constitutes assault, 
which is punishable under proposed Section 1202.  Second, the current grade aggravations for 
victims over the age of 62 are not retained because aggravations for vulnerable victims are 
covered by a general grade adjustment in proposed Section 804.  Third, the Class 5 felony 
aggravation for possessing a deadly weapon is not retained because it ensures disproportionate 
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punishment, considering that the weapon need not be displayed or used.  If the person displays a 
deadly weapon, that menacing conduct would be separately punishable under Section 1207(a)(2), 
but only as a Class 8 felony.  Fourth, the grade aggravations for threat of death or serious 
physical injury in § 1312(c)(4) are not retained, as that conduct would also be separately 
punishable under Section 1207(a).  Current § 1312(c)(1)-(2)’s aggravation relating to violating 
orders prohibiting contact with the victim and to persons 21 or older and victims under 14 are 
incorporated into proposed Subsection (b)(1)(B).  Subsection (b)(1) also differs from current 
§ 1312 in three other minor ways.  First, it simplifies the current provision’s definition of “course 
of conduct” by incorporating it into the grade definition itself, rather than relying on a defined 
term.  Second, the minimum sentencing provisions have not been retained because all minimum 
sentencing provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802.  Third, § 1312(j) has not 
been retained because its exception is already covered by Section 303’s justification defense for 
execution of public duty.  Subsection (b)(2) corresponds to § 1311(b) and maintains the same 
grade (Class A misdemeanor) as current law.  
No Defense for Lack of Notice.  Section 4103 does not incorporate 11 Del.C. § 1312(h), 
which provides that it shall not be a defense to a stalking prosecution that the defendant was not 
given actual notice that the course of conduct was unwanted or that the defendant did not intend 
to cause the victim fear or other emotional distress.  Such a defense is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the culpability requirement of the offense, which is that the defendant “knowingly engage” 
in the course of conduct.  Retaining the current provision would make stalking a strict liability 
offense as to the resulting fear or alarm. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4104.  Public Intoxication 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 1315; see also 11 Del.C. § 1330 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes public intoxication.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4104 corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 1315.  The 
offense language of Section 4104(a) is incorporated verbatim from § 1315.  The grading in 
Section 4104(b) is also incorporated verbatim from § 1315.  Note that § 1315’s provision relating 
to repeat offenders has not been retained because all repeat offense grade aggravations are dealt 
with by a general adjustment in Section 804.  
Smoking on Trolleys.  11 Del.C. § 1330, the prohibition on smoking on trolleys or buses, 
has not been included.  The offense is more akin to an administrative regulation because the 
penalty is a fine between $5 and $25.  As such, the offense should be relocated to a regulatory 
title, rather than remain in the criminal Code. 
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Comment on Section 4105.  Loitering 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 787, 1320, 1321 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section defines an offense that penalizes persons who remain in one 
place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens, under circumstances that 
warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the area.   
The offense’s potentially wide scope is limited in two ways.  First, Section 4105(b) 
requires, when practical, that peace officers ask the person to identify herself and explain her 
presence and conduct.  Second, Section 4105(c) prevents the person from being convicted where 
the officer did not comply with Section 4105(b), or where it appears that the defendant’s 
explanation was true and, if believed by the peace officer at the time, would have dispelled the 
alarm. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4105 corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 1320 and 
1321.  Instead of enumerating specific situations where one can be convicted of loitering, as is 
done in § 1321(1)–(5), Section 4105 simplifies offense by restructuring it around the catch-all 
provision in § 1321(6).  This provision includes each of the specific situations enumerated before 
it in § 1321.  Under Subsection (a), a person commits an offense if he or she (1) loiters, 
congregates with others, or prowls, (2) in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-
abiding individuals, and (3) under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or 
property in the vicinity.  Section 4105 combines current 11 Del.C. § 1321 and § 1320 by 
implicitly including “state-supported school, college or university” in the ambit of Subsection 
(a)(2) and (a)(3).   
Section 4105(b) corresponds to the exception provision currently found in 11 Del.C. 
§ 1321(6), which mandates that, unless circumstances make it impracticable, a peace officer shall 
afford the defendant an opportunity to dispel any alarm that would otherwise be warranted, by 
requesting identification and an explanation of the person’s presence and conduct.  Subsection 
(b) incorporates this exception to liability and makes it applicable to the entire loitering offense. 
Section 4105(c) also corresponds to the exception provision in 11 Del.C. § 1321(6), 
which mandates that no person shall be convicted of an offense under this Section if the peace 
officer did not afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm, or if it appears at trial that 
the explanation given by the defendant was true and, if believed by the peace officer at the time, 
would have dispelled the alarm.  Like Subsection (b), Subsection (c) incorporates this exception 
to liability and makes it applicable to the entire loitering offense. 
Section 4105(d) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 787(h), providing a defense to prosecution 
under this Section when the defendant committed the act as a direct result of being a victim of 
human trafficking.   
Section 4105(e) sets the grading level of the offense as a violation and corresponds 
directly with the levels set by 11 Del.C. §§ 1320 and 1321. 
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Comment on Section 4106.  Obstructing Public Ways 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1323, 1324; see also 11 Del.C. § 1322; 31 
Del.C. § 2117 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes the obstruction of public ways.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4106 corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 1323 and 
1324.  Current § 1323 criminalizes the obstruction of public passages, while current § 1324 
criminalizes the obstruction of an ingress to or egress from a public building.     
Section 4106(a) corresponds to 11 Del.C § 1323, with several minor changes.  First, the 
language “alone or with other persons” from § 1323 has not been included.  Since Subsection (a) 
already prohibits the obstruction of public ways without lawful authorization, it should not 
matter whether the offense is committed by one or more persons.  Second, in Subsection (a)(1), 
the base culpability level has been adjusted to “recklessly” and the “intentional[]” culpability of 
§ 1323 has not been included, although it is included in Subsection (a)(2).  Since proposed 
Section 205 provides that a higher culpability proven will satisfy a lower culpability level, 
Section 4106 need only specify the lowest culpability that generates liability.  Third, the 
proposed provision incorporates § 1324’s prohibition on blocking ingress or egress by 
incorporating it into the definition of “public passage.”  
Section 4106(b) maintains 11 Del.C. § 1324’s defense for lawful picketing.  
Section 4106(c) sets the grading level of the offense as a Class D misdemeanor.  As a 
violation of 11 Del.C. § 1323 is a violation and a violation of § 1324 is an unclassified 
misdemeanor, setting the baseline grading level at a Class D misdemeanor will ensure uniformity 
to the greatest extent possible, since a Class D misdemeanor is the lowest misdemeanor available 
under the proposed grading scheme.   
Other Provisions Not Incorporated.  31 Del.C. § 2117, pertaining to seeing-eye dogs and 
disabled persons, has not been included in Section 4106.  Among other prohibited conduct, the 
provision criminalizes the deprivation of disabled individuals from bringing guide animals into 
any establishment.  The offense has not been included in this Section because § 2117 works in 
tandem with other provisions in current Title 31 and should remain in that Title.   
11 Del.C. § 1322 has also not been included in this Section because reckless 
endangerment is already prohibited by proposed Section 1204. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4107.  Desecration 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1331, 1340 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes the desecration of any object of veneration by the 
public.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4107 directly corresponds to current 11 
Del.C. §§ 1331 and 1340, maintaining the language of the offense definition of § 1331 and 
culpability requirement of intentionality from both current provisions.  Current § 1340 does not 
require the offender to “know” her actions “will outrage the sensibilities of persons likely to 
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observe or discover [her] actions.”  However, since both current offenses have the same grade 
(Class A misdemeanor), and given the great similarities between them in other respects, it is 
appropriate to unify the offenses’ elements.  Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine a situation 
where a person intentionally desecrating a burial place could fail to know what effect her actions 
would have upon persons likely to observe the desecration.   
The potential objects of desecration enumerated in Subsection (2) have been incorporated 
from 11 Del.C. §§ 1331 and 1340, apart from the national flag.  A blanket prohibition on 
desecration of the national flag raises constitutional concerns under the First Amendment.14   
 
 
Comment on Section 4108.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1320, 1321, 1324, 1337 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4108(a) introduces a new definition of 
“loiter[ing]” based on the offense language in 11 Del.C. §§ 1320 and 1321.  The term is not 
specifically defined in current Delaware law. 
Section 4108(b) broadens the scope of “public passage” by incorporating 11 Del.C. 
§ 1324, which prohibits knowingly obstructing “ingress to or egress from public buildings.”  
Because Section 4106(a)(1) already criminalizes the reckless obstruction of any public passage, 
the ingress to or egress from a public building has simply been added to the definition of “public 
passage,” such that these obstruction offenses can be easily consolidated.  The proposed 
definition also incorporates 11 Del.C. § 1301(1)d.’s prohibition on obstructing vehicular or 
pedestrian traffic. 
Section 4108(c) incorporates the definition of “public place” found in 11 Del.C. 
§ 1337(b).  Because the definition applies to areas where “the public or a substantial group of 
persons has access,” it is consistent with the defined term “place open to public view” in Section 
4208. 
  
                                                             
14 If, for example, the desecration of the national flag is accompanied by a communicative aspect, then the 
criminalization of such desecration violates the First Amendment.  In Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that a Texas statute criminalizing the desecration of the national flag violated the 
First Amendment when a defendant burned the flag during a political demonstration in protest of certain policies of 
the Reagan administration.  But, if there is no expressive aspect to the desecration of the flag (if perhaps the flag was 
desecrated when no one was present), then such desecration may properly be criminalized. 
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CHAPTER 4200.  PUBLIC INDECENCY AND OBSCENITY OFFENSES 
 
Section 4201.  Public Indecency 
Section 4202.  Prostitution; Patronizing a Prostitute 
Section 4203.  Promoting or Permitting Prostitution 
Section 4204.  Distribution and Possession of Obscene Material and Child Pornography 
Section 4205.  Unauthorized Combat Event 
Section 4206.  Abuse of Human Remains or Associated Funerary Objects 
Section 4207.  Cruelty to Animals 
Section 4208.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 4201.  Public Indecency 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 764, 765, 778A, 1341 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines an offense prohibiting sexual intercourse, sexual 
conduct, or other indecent exposures of the body in places open to public view. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4201(a) combines 11 Del.C. §§ 765 and 1341.  
The language of Subsection (a) has been generalized to cover the slightly different behavior 
described in each offense.  The current offense definition in § 1341 (lewdness) is problematic 
because: (a) the current code fails to define “lewd”; and (b) it focuses primarily on the actual 
location where the act occurs—“public place”, defined poorly in § 1337, which says the 
definition applies only to disorderly conduct offenses.  Both offenses are drawn too narrowly, 
because they each require the offender’s knowledge that his likely observers would be “affronted 
or alarmed.”  The subjectivity of the offender’s mental state in the current formulation seems 
unnecessarily difficult to prove.  Instead, Section 4201(a) reformulates the offense according to 
objective behavior, visibility of that behavior, and lack of prior consent/knowledge of likely 
observers.  Note that the term “lewd”, in both the title and definition of the offense, has been 
abandoned to avoid ambiguity. 
Section 4201(b) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 764, but specifies that defecation also 
satisfies the offense definition. Note that the current offense is most often used to prosecute 
public urination; however, a person could urinate or defecate in public without actually exposing 
his or her genitals to anyone.  Such conduct constitutes an offense under this Section. 
Section 4201(c) adds an exception to make clear that exposure of a breast for the purpose 
of feeding an infant child is not indecent. 
Section 4201(d) maintains the grades of §§ 764, 765, which aggravates indecent exposure 
where the observer is a person less than 16 years of age, and 1341. Subsection (d)(1)(A) 
incorporates the grades of § 778A(2) and (4)b., where the victim is a child under whom the 
offender stands in a position of trust, authority, or supervision. 
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Comment on Section 4202.  Prostitution; Patronizing a Prostitute 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1342, 1343, 1345, 1356(4); see also 1344 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision criminalizes the act of exchanging sexual conduct or 
intercourse for anything of value. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4202(a) corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§§ 1342(a)(1) and 1343(a).  The offense definitions for prostitution and patronizing prostitutes 
are combined into a single, simpler definition that prohibits both offenses.  Note that use of the 
term “offer” is not intended to punish an attempt to patronize a prostitute.  Attempt liability is 
only punished through the inchoate offense in Section 701.  Here, the “john” would need to 
engage in the sexual act paid for in order to commit the offense.  The term “offer” is only used so 
that the single offense definition can accommodate both sides of a prostitution transaction.  
Additionally, the definition for offer and acceptance in Subsection (e) makes it clear that the 
actors involved in the sexual conduct can be convicted even if money does not pass directly into 
or out of their hands, i.e., it accounts for the involvement of pimps, third-party brokers, or escort 
agencies.  Additionally, by adding the language “he or she” to the offense definition, the current 
§ 1344 is made unnecessary, as the sex of the actors is irrelevant.  Finally, the term “sexual 
contact” has been substituted for “sexual conduct” in order to clarify that there must be some 
form of touch between the parties for prostitution to differ from other sexualized conduct, such 
as exotic dance. 
Section 4202(b) grades the offense, which depends in part on the status of the prostitute 
involved.  Subsection (b)(1) incorporates the patronage aspect of the current offense for human 
trafficking and sexual servitude, 11 Del.C. § 787(b)(4).  If the patron knows the prostitute is a 
victim of sexual servitude, the grade for the patron’s offense is raised dramatically to a Class 6 
felony, following current law.  The grade is raised to a Class 5 felony if the trafficking victim is 
less than 18 years of age.  Note that the issue of the victim’s ineffective consent found in 
§ 787(b)(4) need not be addressed here because it is already addressed generally in Section 208 
of the Proposed Code.  In all other cases, Subsection (b)(2) maintains the grade for the current 
prostitution offense in § 1342(a)(2).  Yet, currently, patronizing a prostitute is only classified as 
“a misdemeanor” in § 1343(b).  Since the two offenses are treated identically in all other 
respects, patronage is also treated as a Class B misdemeanor in Section 4202.  §§ 1342(b)(1) and 
1343(e)(1) increase the grade of the offense and impose a mandatory fine when the offense is 
committed in a protected zone.  Section 4202 does not include these provisions for two reasons.  
First, all minimum penalty provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802.  Second, 
the grade adjustment to a Class A misdemeanor goes into effect any time the offense is 
committed within 1,000 feet of a residence, among other places.  In an area of average 
population density, this provision is likely to increase the grade of the offense in every instance.  
This creates a false distinction, whereby the true grade of the offense is effectively heightened 
without considering whether it is deserved.  It seems unlikely that the General Assembly 
intended this consequence, and so that provision has not been retained in Section 4202.  
Consequently, §§ 1342(b)(2) and 1343(e)(2) – stipulating that a person’s unawareness that the 
offense is committed in a protected zone is not a defense – have also not been retained.   
Section 4202(c) incorporates the affirmative defense for prostituted victims of human 
trafficking found in 11 Del.C. § 787(h).  Note that although Section 4202 combines the offenses 
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of prostitution and patronizing a prostitute, the defense is only intended to apply—and only 
logically applies—to trafficked prostitutes, not their patrons. 
Section 4202(d) incorporates § 1345, which requires any person convicted under Section 
4202 to be tested for sexually transmitted diseases. 
Seizure and Forfeiture of Vehicles.  The vehicle seizure provisions found in 11 Del.C. 
§ 1343(c)–(d) have not been incorporated into Section 4202.  The current provision provides that 
vehicles of patrons of prostitutes may be seized by law enforcement.  Delaware has a general 
asset seizure and forfeiture provision dealing with instruments of crime that makes reference to 
§ 1343.  It is only one of two non-felonies in Title 11 subject to forfeiture.  Singling out lesser 
misdemeanors for additional punishment, absent specific justification, creates inconsistencies 
that damage the law’s moral credibility.  For that reason, the forfeiture provisions relating to 
patronizing a prostitute have not been included. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4203.  Promoting or Permitting Prostitution 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1351, 1352, 1353, 1355, 1356; see also 
787, 1354 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines an offense to create liability for persons who promote 
prostitution, or who permit prostitution to take place on their property. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4203(a) combines the offense definitions of 
11 Del.C. §§ 1351, 1352, 1353, and 1355, and converts the definitions upon which those 
offenses rely, § 1356(1)–(2), into actual offense definition language.  Although this is a 
substantial organizational change, the substance of the current law is intact.  Subsection (a)(1) is 
broad enough to capture causing or aiding someone to engage in prostitution, though without the 
problem of having to prove causation—a problem under § 1356(1).  It is also broad enough to 
cover soliciting patrons for prostitution, and a host of other activities.  However, note that 
inchoate liability for solicitation and conspiracy, as well as accomplice liability, help expand the 
reach of this offense.  Subsection (a)(2) covers any situation where a person provides premises 
for prostitution purposes, including the offense of “permitting prostitution” in § 1355.  No 
special grading provisions have been made for that offense, because it is not meaningfully 
different from “advancing prostitution” under § 1356(1) and is graded much more leniently than 
promoting prostitution in the third degree.  A person who has control of premises and knows 
they are being used for prostitution, yet fails to abate the activity, has provided premises for 
prostitution.  Subsection (a)(3) more simply articulates the meaning of “profit from prostitution” 
in § 1356(2).   
Section 4203(b) retains the clarifications in the current § 1356(1)–(2) that prostitutes and 
patrons of prostitution are not the intended targets of the offense under Section 4203.  Rather, 
they ought to be prosecuted under Section 4202 alone. 
Section 4203(c)(3)–(4) retains the grading scheme of the offenses consolidated in Section 
4203(a).  As previously mentioned, the offense definitions of §§ 1351–53 have been converted 
into grading provisions, since they all rely upon the definitions of “advance prostitution” and 
“profit from prostitution” in § 1356(1)–(2) that provide the functional offense definition for all 
three statutes.  However, some of the consolidated activities and grading provisions overlap with 
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provisions related to human trafficking in 11 Del.C. § 787.  Promoting prostitution under 
compulsion by force or intimidation is covered in more detail in Section 1402(a)(2), so it is not 
included here.  Additionally, § 787(b) grades prostitution of minors much more harshly than the 
consolidated offenses for promoting prostitution.  Subsections (c)(1)–(2) reflect those grades. 
Evidentiary Provision Not Retained.  The evidentiary restrictions in 11 Del.C. § 1354 
(promoting prostitution; attempt to promote prostitution; corroboration) have not been included.  
The provision overrides a key role of the fact finder—weighing the credibility of witnesses and 
testimony.  The current law reflects a value judgment that prostitutes are always complicit in the 
crimes of those who profit from their prostitution, rather than acknowledging that prostitutes 
could be victims of such crimes.  11 Del.C. § 1354 would not even permit a pimp to be convicted 
solely by the testimony of minors who have been prostituted by the defendant.  It is better to let 
the court system to do its job, rather than make credibility determinations ex ante in substantive 
law. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4204.  Dissemination and Possession of Obscene Material and Child 
Pornography 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1108, 1109, 1111, 1361, 1362, 1363; see 
also 1110, 1365, 1366. 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision covers a wide range of conduct related to the dissemination 
and possession of obscene material, including child pornography. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4204 merges several offenses dealing with 
obscenity, creation of and dealing in child pornography, exploitation of children, and possession 
of child pornography.  The core offenses—possessing and disseminating either obscenity or 
child pornography—are each separately defined in Subsection (a), and organized in order of 
decreasing seriousness.  Subsection (a)(1) prohibits all forms of creation or distribution of child 
pornography, and along with the definition of “child pornography” in Subsection (f)(2) is 
intended to capture all the behavior currently prohibited by 11 Del.C. § 1108–09.  Generalizing 
that behavior will ensure that no conduct deserving of punishment will fail to be punished 
because of its non-inclusion in a list of specific acts.  The current offenses also punish conduct 
that is already punished through accomplice liability and inchoate offenses, which will further 
expand the reach of Subsection (a)(1).  The territorial applicability provision in § 1109(4) has not 
been preserved in Section 4204 because the general provision on territorial applicability and 
jurisdiction in Section 105 is broad enough to cover digital transmissions through the state.  
Subsection (a)(1) does not specify that the offense can be committed through digital means, as 
the phrase “otherwise makes available” is broad enough to capture any means of distribution.  
The remaining offenses in Subsection (a) are all broad enough to make that specific language 
unnecessary.  Also, the rebuttable presumption provision in § 1109(3) has not been retained 
because possession of child pornography is already punishable as a felony, and ownership is not 
a necessary element of Section 4204.  Finally, note that although Subsection (a)(1)(B) is 
intentionally constructed broadly, it should not include children victimized through the creation 
of child pornography. 
 
 503 
Subsection 4204(a)(2) directly corresponds to the provision punishing possession of child 
pornography in § 1111.  Subsection (a)(3) combines and generalizes the various aspects of the 
current obscenity offense in § 1361(a)(1)–(3), while Subsection (a)(4) corresponds to 
§ 1361(a)(4). 
Note that the culpability requirement “knowingly” is used throughout most of Subsection 
(a).  “Knowingly” only applies to the offender’s conduct, however.  As is the case under current 
Delaware law, no culpability requirement is specified as to the material in question being 
pornographic or obscene.  Under Section 205, the requirement of recklessness should be read 
into that circumstance element.  An offender under Subsection (a)(2), then, would need only be 
reckless as whether the material he possesses depicts a child less than 16 years of age in order to 
be found guilty of the offense. 
Section 4204(b) incorporates and maintains all the grades of the offenses that currently 
exist.  However, the “subsequent conviction” grade increases in § 1110 have not been included 
here, because all grade adjustments for repeat offenders are treated together in Section 804. Note 
that Subsection (b)(1)(A)–(B) split the offense under Subsection (a)(1) into two different grades, 
depending on whether the offense is committed for gain.  Current law does not make this 
distinction.  The legislation authorizing this Proposed Code mandates that “disproportionate” 
statutes be identified and rectified.  The proportionality of an offense’s authorized punishment is 
directly tied to the grade assigned to that offense.  An offense’s grade could be either 
disproportionately high or low.  The nonpartisan consultative group supervising the drafting 
process for this Proposed Code has scrutinized the relative grading of all offenses, and has 
decided whether this offense is committed for gain is a significant factor that affects the 
offender’s blameworthiness, and therefore that the offense’s grade must account for it to avoid 
disproportional punishment.  Note also that Subsection (b)(2)(A) sets the grade of possession 
with intent to commercially disseminate child pornography at roughly one grade lower than it is 
under current law (a Class B felony).  This is because “possession with intent” is a specially 
codified form of attempt liability.  Its centrality to certain areas of modern law enforcement 
makes it indispensible to this Section.  But the grade of possession with intent has been set at one 
grade lower than the offense would be if completed.  This maintains consistency with the way 
attempts are graded for all other offenses is the Proposed Code.  See proposed Section 707 and 
corresponding Commentary.   
Section 4204(b)(5) proposes a new, much lower grade with no corresponding provision 
in current law.  The new grade is intended to limit liability in cases of teenage “sexting,” an 
increasingly common activity that technically satisfies the definition of child pornography but 
was not contemplated by General Assembly when creating the current child pornography 
offenses.  Internet-enabled devices with cameras have made it common for young people in 
dating relationships to take and send nude and sexually explicit images of each other.  If at least 
one of the parties involved is less than 16 years of age, one of the parties could be liable for a 
serious felony under Section 4204.  The general consent defense in Section 208 would arguably 
cover these situations; however, Section 208(c)(2) contains an exception for “ineffective 
consent” that could also apply due to the young age of the parties involved.  Therefore, 
Subsection (b)(5) is proposed to ensure that young people in relationships sending explicit 
images consensually will not be exposed to serious felony liability.   
Note that Section 4204(b)(5) is drawn narrowly to address a very specific scenario.  First, 
the parties must both be 18 years of age or less (or 19 years of age and enrolled in high school), 
denying a defense to anyone older than a high school senior.  Second, the parties must be no 
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more than 3 years apart in age, preventing application of the lower grade in materially more 
blameworthy situations (e.g., an 18-year-old high school senior trading nude pictures with a 12-
year-old).  Third, only images of the parties themselves are covered.  And finally, if the 
defendant is the sender of the depiction, the sender must reasonably believe that the recipient 
would have consented to receiving the image if he or she had been asked in advance.  This 
requirement is intended to cover dating relationships, or relationships similar enough that the 
sender could reasonably believe that consent would not be withheld.  The requirement is written 
in this way (rather than requiring a dating relationship outright) so that courts will not have to 
decide what qualifies as “dating.”  Images possessed by a recipient in this relationship are also 
covered by the lower grade.   
This formulation does not protect a person from circulating images of a partner to other 
people, or circulating images of himself or herself to strangers or mere acquaintances.  However, 
note that the provisions pertaining to the treatment of minors – addressed outside of the Proposed 
Code, in Title 10 – might be applicable.  Additionally, Section 4204(b)(5)(E) explicitly provides 
that if a party to consensual “sexting” chooses to distribute a depiction of the other person 
without that person’s consent, liability would not come under Section 4204, but instead under 
Section 4305 for unlawful dissemination of personal pornography.  Given that the parties 
involved are of the same, young peer group, the offense in that case is one of privacy, rather than 
of the social ill contemplated by Section 4204.   
Section 4204(c) directly corresponds to the penalty for businesses in § 1361(b).  
Although that penalty currently only appears to apply to conduct involving adults, and not 
children, it seems appropriate that the penalty should apply to both. 
Section 4204(d) directly corresponds to the presumption in § 1363. 
Section 4204(e)(1) directly corresponds to the current § 1362; however, language has 
been added to make clear that persons under 18 are excluded, to maintain consistency with 
Subsection (b)(3)(A).  Subsection (e)(2) is a proposed defense for actors involved in the creation 
of obscenity or child pornography who are victims of human trafficking, including sexual 
servitude, under Section 1402.  11 Del.C. § 787(h) contains such a defense, but applies it only to 
prostitution and loitering.  On the other hand, § 787(j) provides expungement and pardon 
procedures for victims of human trafficking who are convicted of prostitution, loitering, or 
obscenity.  Since all three offenses have similar potential to stem from human trafficking, the 
defense ought to be extended to Section 4204.   
Section 4204(e)(3) proposes an explicit defense for victims of child pornography 
creation.  Subsection (a)(1)(B), on its face, could be interpreted to include child-victims who 
“participate[] in the creation of child pornography.”  However, this result is clearly not what the 
General Assembly intended when it enacted the child pornography offenses on which Section 
4204(a)–(b) is based.  Subsection (e)(3) eliminates any possibility of the offense being applied to 
child-victims. 
Related Provisions Concerning Minors Not Retained.  Current §§ 1361(a)(5), 1365 
(obscene literature harmful to minors), and 1366 (outdoor motion picture theaters) have not been 
retained in the proposed Chapter 4200, for three reasons.  First, these provisions are graded lower 
than Section 4204—Class A misdemeanors—even though prohibiting obscene material from 
entering the hands of minors is more constitutionally defensible than a general obscenity offense.  
Second, these provisions have almost never been used as the basis of prosecution.  11 Del.C. 
§ 1365 contains numerous procedural steps the Attorney General must go through to declare a 
particular material to be “harmful to minors.”  Only after a potential defendant has been put on 
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notice regarding the Attorney General’s finding, and violates an injunction prohibiting the 
material, can a defendant be prosecuted, let alone convicted; all of which is predicate to a Class 
A misdemeanor conviction.  Additionally, § 1366’s lack of use is evidenced by the fact that it 
has not been updated since the Motion Picture Association of America created “PG-13” and 
“NC-17” ratings.  Third, the definition of what is “harmful to minors,” though intended to be 
something short of obscenity, is not meaningfully distinct from obscenity such that a separate set 
of offenses is justified.  In addition, § 1361(d) have not been retained.  Insofar as this provision 
refers to § 1361(a)(5), it is unnecessary, as § 1361(a)(5) itself has not been retained.  The 
remainder of § 1361(d) imposes strict liability as to knowledge that the age of the person to 
whom pornographic materials are disseminated in under 18.  Strict liability as to age may be 
justified in certain circumstances, and provided that genuine mistakes as to age are unlikely to 
occur.  For instance, the Proposed Code imposes strict liability as to the age of victims younger 
than 14 years in Section 1301 [Rape and Sexual Assault].  However, general principles of 
criminal liability ordinarily eschew the use of strict liability, and neither the nature of the 
predicate offense nor the 18 years of age threshold in § 1361(d), justifies deviation from these 
principles. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4205.  Unauthorized Combat Event 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1367, 1368 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision punishes participation in or promotion of unlawful boxing 
matches and other forms of combat events and entertainment.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4205(a) combines two nearly identical 
offenses.  11 Del.C. §§ 1367 and 1368 are the same in all respects, except that one prohibits 
participation in unauthorized combat, and the other deals with promotion, advertisement, and 
facilitation.  Both are Class A misdemeanors, so consolidation makes sense. 
Note that a “knowing” culpability requirement has been created for Section 4205.  The 
current offenses set no culpability, but only require that the combat event itself violated Chapter 
1 of Title 28.  It seems appropriate to punish offenders under Section 4205 only if they know the 
combat event is unauthorized, but recklessness could be substituted instead. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4206.  Abuse of Human Remains or Associate Funerary Objects 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1332, 1333; 7 Del.C. §§ 5407, 5409 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision creates an offense covering persons to treat human remains 
and objects associated with interment in a variety of objectionable ways.  The offense covers the 
more commonly codified offense for abuse of a corpse, which punishes sexual indecency, 
physical abuse, mutilation, gross neglect, and other outrageous treatment of corpses.  However, 
the offense also prohibits dealing in human remains that are of archaeological interest, as well as 
the exhibition of human remains.  The exception for treatment authorized by law excludes from 
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the offense all the lawful acts that may be done to human remains, such as embalming, autopsy, 
scientific research, medical examination, normal operations of cemeteries, and authorized 
archaeological activities. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4206(a) combines the offense definitions of 
the current 11 Del.C. §§ 1332 (abuse of corpse) and 1333 (trading in human remains & 
associated funerary objects), as well as 7 Del.C. § 5407 (prohibitions regarding excavated 
archaeological remains).  Subsection (a)(1) is the common “abuse of corpse” offense; however, 
the current §1332 only requires that a “reasonable person” know that the act is outrageous, which 
makes the culpability requirement something close to negligence.  Negligence alone would be 
too slight to support a Class A misdemeanor, so recklessness has been substituted.  To 
accommodate all three offenses, the more inclusive term “human remains” is borrowed from 
Title 7, rather than the undefined term “corpse” used in § 1332.  This allows the exhibition of 
human remains in 7 Del.C. § 5407(3) and the acquisition and sale of human remains in § 1333(b) 
to be captured under Subsection (a)(1).  This alters the grade of those consolidated offenses, 
which vary from a Class F felony to a Class B misdemeanor.   
Given how similar they are, however, the average grade of Class A misdemeanor has 
been used in Subsection (b)(1).  Otherwise, the grades of the current offenses have been kept 
intact.  Note that the enumerated exceptions for lawful activities have been substituted with the 
phrase “except as authorized by law” in Subsection (a).  Finally, human remains removed from 
“marked” burials have been added to “unmarked” burials to support liability for the sale of 
human remains under Subsection (a)(2)(B).  The current regulatory offense in 7 Del.C. § 5407 
only deals with remains from unmarked burials, but it is equally blameworthy for a person to sell 
remains taken from beneath a grave marker.  Failure to criminalize the latter activity makes 
felony-level punishment for the former activity seem arbitrary, undermining the moral credibility 
of the law. 
Section 4206(b) imports the remaining grades from the current offenses. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4207.  Cruelty to Animals 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1325, 1326; see 1325A, 1327 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision punishes the unlawful killing of another’s animal and the cruel 
mistreatment or neglect of animal, except in cases where the person followed accepted veterinary 
practices or carried on the activities for lawful scientific research. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4207 endeavors to combine two sprawling, 
yet in some ways similar, animal abuse statutes.  It retains all salient differences in grading and 
penalties between the various old offenses, but organizes them together with careful headings.  
The most significant substantive difference is the simplification of the offense definition 
language, despite there being four ways to commit animal cruelty.  
Note that the animal rescue provision from 11 Del.C. § 1325(b)(6) is maintained as a 
special justification defense in Section 4207(e).  It is written in purely objective terms to keep it 
consistent with the approach taken for all general justification defenses in Chapter 300.  For that 
reason, Section 4207(e)(2) provides that the general excuse defense for a mistake as to a 
justification in proposed Section 410 also applies to Subsection (e)(1). 
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11 Del.C § 1326(c) prohibits gambling on animal fighting.  That Subsection will be 
addressed in Chapter 4500 [Offenses Involving Gambling]. 
Many definitions currently found in § 1325 have not been included because the offense 
definition here is broad enough to make use of those terms unnecessary.  Furthermore, many of 
those terms are redundant, filled with examples rather than definitions, or have readily apparent 
meanings.   
Maintaining a Dangerous Animal.  11 Del.C. § 1327 has not been included in Chapter 
4200.  Although it involves animals, and deals to a certain extent with animals trained to fight, it 
more properly belongs with offenses dealing with danger or injury to person or property.  If the 
animal’s owner has the proper culpability as to causation, the owner could be guilty of homicide, 
endangerment, or property damage offenses, since animals count as property.  Additionally, 
exposing another’s animal to one’s own dangerous animal could be prosecuted as animal cruelty 
under Section 4207 without the need to specifically incorporate § 1327. 
Unlawful Trade in Dog or Cat By-Products.  11 Del.C. § 1325A has not been included in 
Chapter 4200.  That provision punishes selling or bartering of fur, flesh, or by-products of 
domestic dogs and cats.  11 Del.C. § 1325A has nothing to do with the treatment of cats or dogs 
during their lives, so it does not fit comfortably within Section 4207.  Rather, the offense is a 
prohibition on certain kinds of commercial activities, thereby performing a purely regulatory 
function.  If it must be retained at all, § 1325A ought to be moved out of the criminal code 
altogether, and into a regulatory title dealing with trade. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4208.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1325, 1333, 1356, 1364, 1367, 1368; 7 
Del.C. § 5402 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4208(a) defines “child pornography,” a term 
the current code does not specifically define.  The phrase “person less than 16 years of age” has 
been added because the current child pornography offenses fail to define the term “child.”  The 
term “prohibited sexual act,” used throughout the current offenses dealing with child 
pornography, has been replaced with “sexual conduct” for simplicity and completeness.  This 
way, no acts deserving of punishment will be overlooked by use of a list.  Additionally, using the 
phrase “any visual depiction” captures any form of pornography involving children, including 
live performances. 
The prohibition against child pornography is based, in part, on how the pornography is 
made, rather than what the product purports to depict.  For instance, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a federal statute that banned child pornography produced through “the use of 
youthful-looking adults or computer-imaging technology,” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 
U.S. 234, 234 (2002),” instead of using real children, was overbroad as it could necessarily cover 
expressions protected by the First Amendment.  Thus, the term “child pornography” should be 
interpreted to involve pornography involving real children, whether they are actually engaged in 
sexual conduct or are merely play-acting.  Therefore, the term “simulate” in Subsection (a)(1) 
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should be interpreted to refer to pretend sexual conduct performed by real children—not, for 
example, computer-generated depictions of “children” engaged in sexual conduct. 
Finally, the phrase “visual depiction or depictions of a person or persons” is intended to 
avoid the possibility of a defendant being charged with multiple counts of child pornography 
offenses based upon every photograph or video involved, or every child depicted in an offender’s 
collection.  However, the term should also be interpreted flexibly to allow multiple charges of 
the offense where the total amount of pornography involved can and should be logically 
divided—for example, where a person oversees different sessions of child pornography creation, 
or where a person possesses multiple collections of child pornography over a period of time. 
Section 4208(b) defines “combat event” so as to make the offense definition as simple as 
possible.  The offense definitions in 11 Del.C. §§ 1367 and 1368 include this language, so it is 
not a change from current law. 
Section 4208(c) provides a definition of “commercial animals.”  The defined term is 
newly created, but its definition corresponds directly to the language contained in the 11 Del.C. 
§ 1325(c) and (d) offense definitions. 
Section 4208(d)’s definition of “cruel” is taken verbatim from 11 Del.C. § 1325(a)(3). 
Section 4208(e) provides a definition of “funerary object associated with interment” that 
corresponds to the definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 1333(a)(1).  
Section 4208(f)’s definition of “human remains” is taken verbatim from 7 Del.C. § 5402. 
Section 4208(g) defines when any material or performance is “obscene.”  The definition 
directly corresponds to the definition currently found in to 11 Del.C. § 1364. 
Section 4208(h) creates a definition of “place open to public view” in order to clarify the 
new formulation of the public indecency offense.  Note that since the definition focuses on the 
reasonable expectations of members of the public, the places included in the definition will vary 
depending on the particular conduct at issue in a particular case.  For instance, at a protest 
supporting certain causes, one might reasonably expect to see nudity, but not intercourse.  This 
approach allows the court to make a standards-based evaluation of propriety to ensure just 
outcomes in the greatest number of cases.   
Section 4208(i) provides a definition of “sexual conduct” that corresponds to the 
definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 1356(4).  The binary definition of “sexual conduct,” 
however, has been replaced with the more general “any person.”  This recognizes situations 
where two or more persons may engage in sexual conduct for the sexual gratification of a 
nonparticipant. 
Section 4208(j) provides a definition of “unmarked burial” that corresponds to the 
definition currently found in 7 Del.C. § 5402. 
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CHAPTER 4300.  INVASION OF PRIVACY OFFENSES 
 
Section 4301.  Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance 
Section 4302.  Voyeurism 
Section 4303.  Interception of Private Information 
Section 4304.  Unlawful Use of Information 
Section 4305.  Unlawful Dissemination of Personal Pornography 
Section 4306.  Unlawful Access to Information 
Section 4307.  Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 4301.  Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1335, 1337 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of unlawful eavesdropping or surveillance, 
prohibiting improper intrusions made for the purpose of hearing or seeing things within private 
places.  Section 4301 is similar to proposed Section 4303, but covers improper intrusions into 
private physical spaces rather than improper interceptions of private communications.  Where 
conduct constitutes a violation of both Section 4301 and 4303—that is, if it included physical 
intrusion and interception of private communication—both offenses could be charged.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4301(a) corresponds to the current invasion of 
privacy provisions found in 11 Del.C. §§ 1335 and 1337.  The purpose and function of 
§§ 1335(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(8) are maintained here, but are simplified into a single 
Subsection.  Section 4301(a)(1) directly incorporates 11 Del.C. § 1335(a)(1) and Section 
4301(a)(3) directly incorporates 11 Del.C. § 1335(a)(3), with no substantive differences between 
the proposed and current provisions.  
 Sections 4301(a)(2)-(3) directly correspond to 11 Del. C. § 1335(a)(2)-(3), with one 
minor change.  § 1335(a)(3) prohibits both installing and use of surveillance devices.  However 
the use of these devices is covered by Section 4303 [Interception of Private Information].   Note 
that Subsection (a)(2) does not specify what kinds of events or images could be observed or 
recorded, so the offense definition is broad enough to include body heat scans, for example.   
Section 4301(a)(4) incorporates 11 Del.C. § 1335(a)(8), with two minor simplifications.  
First, the current provision contains an exception noting that the provision shall not apply “to the 
lawful use of an electronic tracking device by a law enforcement officer, nor shall it apply to a 
parent or legal guardian who installs such a device for the purpose of tracking the location of a 
minor child thereof.”  The proposed provision deletes that specification not to delete the 
exception from the law, but rather for simplicity because the exception need not be explicitly 
stated.  The beginning of Section 4301(a) includes the phrase “except as authorized by law,” 
which includes the right of law enforcement officers to use electronic tracking devices pursuant 
to valid warrants.  Moreover, conduct involving a parent’s tracking of a motor vehicle when 
(1) the parent is the registered owner of the motor vehicle, and (2) the vehicle is driven by the 
parent’s minor child, is already exempted by the offense definition.  Note that the phrase “except 
as authorized by law” makes unnecessary the exceptions in § 1335(b)(2)-(3) concerning acts 
done by telephone company or subscribers for enforcement of regulations or system 
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maintenance.  Note also that the exceptions in § 1335(b)(4)-(5) are not retained.  § 1335(b)(4) 
addressing information disclosure in a response to a subpoena is covered by the justification 
provided in Section 303 [Execution of Public Duty]. § 1335(b)(5) refers to acts done by police 
officers according to 11. Del. C. §§ 1336 and 1431; however the former provision has been 
repealed by past legislation, and the latter is not retained by the Proposed Code (see Commentary 
to Chapter 4500).  Second, the proposed provision removes the reference to “electronic or 
mechanical” tracking devices, which are included in the general term “location tracking device.” 
Section 4301(a) as a whole differs from 11 Del.C. § 1335 in that it establishes 
“knowingly” as the culpability requirement applying to all offenses in the Section.  The only 
current provision that contains a culpability requirement is 11 Del.C. § 1335(a)(8), which uses 
“knowingly.”  The proposed provision applies the “knowingly” requirement to each offense in 
Section 4301(a).  The offense conduct in Subsections (a)(1)–(4) are so similar to each other that 
“knowingly” seems to be the minimal level of culpability for the conduct covered by Section 
4301(a).  Note also that “consent” in Subsection (a) is intended to require only single party 
consent.  Current § 1335 requires that certain privacy offenses be committed “without the 
consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy there,” but this requirement places an 
irrationally heavy burden on the defendant in order to avoid liability.  The defendant could not 
reasonably be expected to know the identities of every person entitled to privacy in a given 
location.  Receiving consent from one person with authority to give it should be sufficient.  This 
would not, however, allow one authorized person’s consent to override another authorized 
person’s withheld consent, as long as the defendant knew about the conflict. 
Section 4301(b) maintains the grade from 11 Del.C. § 1335(c).  
 
 
Comment on Section 4302.  Voyeurism 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. § 1335; see also § 820 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of voyeurism, which prohibits 
photographing, videotaping, or otherwise recording the image of another person in the process of 
getting dressed or undressed, under or through the person’s clothes, or while the other person is 
nude, partially nude, or engaging in sexual conduct.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4302(a) corresponds with 11 Del.C. 
§ 1335(a)(6), (a)(7), and (a)(9), but significantly streamlines the current provisions.  Section 
4302(a)(1) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 1335(a)(6), but with two minor differences.  11 Del.C. 
§ 1335(a)(6) includes an illustrative list of places where persons normally disrobe, and notes that 
the provision does not apply to acts done by a parent or guardian inside of that person’s dwelling 
when the “victim” is the parent’s child under 18 and the acts were not intended for sexual 
gratification.  Section 4302(a)(1) removes the illustrative list.  However, the exemption for 
parents is retained in simpler form in Subsection (b).   
Section 4302(a)(2) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1335(a)(7), but with one minor difference.  
The current provision specifies that the provision only applies when the recording of the image 
of another person under or through the person’s clothes is done “for the purpose of viewing the 
body of or the undergarments worn by that other person.”  The proposed provision removes that 
clause because recording the image of another person under or though that person’s clothes 
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should be criminally punishable whether the recording was done to view the person’s body or 
undergarments, or for another purpose, as long as it was done knowingly and without the 
subject’s consent.    
Section 4302(a)(3) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1335(a)(9), but with two differences.  
First, the current provision defines a number of terms, such as “nude” and “sexual conduct.”  The 
definitions are not reproduced in the proposed provision because “nude” needs no definition in 
the context of “nude, partially nude, or engaging in sexual conduct,” and “sexual conduct” is 
already defined in Chapter 1300 of the Proposed Code.  Second, the proposed provision 
eliminates for clarity a long list of aggravating factors and a large number of exceptions.  Those 
provisions are no long necessary either because of the way Section 4302 is graded, as discussed 
below; or because they amount to situations where consent is lacking, in which case the offense 
definition covers those situations already.   
Section 4302(c) corresponds to the grade provision in 11 Del.C. § 1335(c).  The 
provisions corresponding with Section 4302(a)(1) and (a)(2) are currently Class G felonies, 
while the provision corresponding to Section 4302(a)(3) is currently a Class A misdemeanor, 
unless an aggravating circumstance applies, in which case it is a Class G felony.  Section 4302(c) 
grades all the offenses as Class 8 felonies, which reflects the seriousness of the offenses.  The 
offense under Section 4302(a)(3) is just as intrusive a violation of privacy as under Subsections 
(a)(1) and (a)(2), even without aggravating circumstances, and are treated as such by utilizing a 
single grade for Section 4302. 
Peeping Trespass.  11 Del.C. § 820, which prohibits trespassing with intent to peer or 
peep into a window or door of another, also relates to invasion of privacy.  The offense is not 
reproduced here because it is already contained in proposed Section 2402, which deals with 
criminal trespass. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4303.  Interception of Private Information  
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. § 1335 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of interception of private information, 
prohibiting both the unlawful interception of any private electronic, written, or oral 
communication, as well as divulging the contents of unlawfully intercepted communications or 
communications intercepted due to one’s lawful employment with an agency or common carrier 
that transmits communications. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4303(a)(1) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 1335(a)(4), but with two minor differences.  First, the proposed offense replaces the current 
provision’s “message by telephone, telegraph, letter, or other means of communicating privately, 
including private conversations” with “any private electronic, written, or oral communication.”  
Second, the proposed offense includes the culpability requirement of “knowingly” because, like 
in Section 4301, it seems to be the minimal level of culpability needed for the conduct covered 
by this Subsection.  
Section 4303(a)(2) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1335(a)(5), but with two minor 
differences.  The proposed provision replaces the current provision’s “existence or contents” of 
any communication intercepted under Subsection (a)(1) with “contents.”  The term “existence” is 
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unnecessary because it is included in the definition of “contents.”  Second, the proposed 
provision replaces the current provision’s “any message by telegraph, letter, or other means of 
communicating privately” with “a communication intercepted under Subsection (a)(1).”  Note 
that like in Section 4301(a), the beginning of Section 4303(a) includes the phrase “except as 
authorized by law.”  The use of this phrase makes unnecessary the exceptions in §§ 1335(b)(2)-
(3) concerning acts done by telephone company or subscribers for enforcement of regulations or 
system maintenance. Note also that the exceptions in §§ 1335(b)(4)-(5) are not retained (see 
Commentary to Section 4301). 
Section 4303(b)’s exception for overhearing messages through a regularly installed 
devises corresponds directly to 11 Del. C. § 1335(b)(1).  Note that while technically § 1335(b)(1) 
applies to all violations of privacy listed in § 1335, due to the Proposed Code’s reformulation of 
these offenses it is appropriately located in Section 4304.  
Section 4303(b) maintains the grading provision found in 11 Del.C. § 1335(c). 
 
 
Comment on Section 4304.  Unlawful Use of Information 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 925, 935, 937, 938, 939, 1335; 31 Del.C. 
§ 3912 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of unlawful use of information.  The 
offense prohibits a person from disclosing or using information that the person knows was 
obtained in a manner prohibited by Section 4301, 4302, or 4303.  The offense also prohibits the 
computer-related offenses of misuse of computer system information and misuse of electronic 
mail. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4304(a) is based upon the portion of 11 
Del.C. § 1335(a)(9) that deals with reproduction and dissemination of photographs, videotapes, 
or other recordings of the image of another person who is nude, partially nude, or engaging in 
sexual conduct.  Other prohibited conduct in § 1335(a) is not extended to disclosure.  However, 
the same logic, that disclosing or using illegally obtained private information is a blameworthy 
invasion of privacy, applies equally well to the other offenses in Sections 4301–03.  Breaking off 
the offense of unlawfully using information into its own Section, rather than combining it with 
the offense definitions in Sections 4301–03, improves clarity because the offense conduct in each 
case is fundamentally different.   
11 Del.C. § 1335(a)(9) punishes a person when the person “knows or should have 
known” that the image was taken without consent, which reflects a culpability similar to 
negligence.  The proposed Section 4304(a)(1) sets the culpability level at “knowing” because it 
seems to be the minimal level of culpability needed for the conduct covered by this Subsection.  
This new provision makes § 1335(a)(9)b. (which states that a person who has consented to the 
capture or possession of a visual depiction of herself when nude or engaging in sexual conduct 
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to dissemination of that depiction) 
unnecessary because Section 4304(a)(1) makes the use of information obtained in a manner 
prohibited by Section 4301, 4302, or 4303 explicitly unlawful.  Section 4304(a)(2) is a catch-all 
provision that covers a number of regulatory offenses based on disclosure of confidential 
information, such as 16 Del.C. § 4798(r) (unauthorized disclosure of prescription drug 
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monitoring information) and 31 Del. C. § 3912(b) (unlawful disclosure of Adult Protective 
Service records).  The part of 31 Del. C. § 3912(b) establishing a special jurisdictional rule is 
also not retained.  Normal rules of jurisdiction should govern offenses in Subsection (a)(2), and 
creating a special carve-out for 31 Del. C. § 3912(b) undermines the goal of reducing 
inconsistencies in the law.  Note, however that the regulatory provisions in § 3912(a) and (c) 
should be retained in Title 31.   
Section 4304(b) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 935, but with two minor differences.  
First, the proposed provision replaces the current provision’s culpability requirements of 
“intentionally” and “intentionally or recklessly” with “knowingly” for consistency with other 
offenses in this Chapter.  Second, the proposed provision deletes the current provision’s offense 
of knowingly receiving or retaining data obtained in violation of this Section.  The current 
Delaware code does not punish receipt of any other kind of information, only its use or 
disclosure, as is done in Subsection (a).  As there is no reason to treat computer system 
information differently from other kinds of information, “receipt” would have to apply to all 
kinds of information and recordings if retained.  “Receipt” was removed from Subsection (b), 
rather than added to Subsection (a), to prevent Section 4304 from capturing far more behavior 
than is contemplated by current law.   
Section 4304(c)(1) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 937, but with several differences.  First, 
the current provision includes several sentences noting that the provision does not apply to email 
sent between people when the individual has requested the information or to email sent from an 
organization to its members where there is a preexisting business relationship.  The current 
provision also exempts internet service providers from liability for transmitting or attempting to 
block information covered by the provision.  The proposed provision eliminates those exceptions 
because they are unnecessary given the language of the proposed provision requiring that 
distribution be unauthorized.  Second, the proposed provision changes the current provision’s 
culpability level from “intentionally or recklessly” to “knowingly,” for the reasons given above.  
Third, the conduct elements of this offense have been broadened to include “distribut[ing] or 
caus[ing] to be distributed” any unsolicited bulk commercial emails; whereas current § 937(1) 
only criminalizes “intentionally or recklessly distribut[ing] any unsolicited bulk commercial 
electronic mail.”  This expansion of conduct is meant to capture increasingly common instances 
in sending unsolicited bulk commercial emails: where an individual would write a computer 
program that can create and send unsolicited commercial emails.  The individual has not directly 
participated in the distribution of any unsolicited emails, but has directly caused them to be sent.  
Section 4304(c)(2) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 938, but with several differences.  First, 
the current provision includes a sentence stating that all commercial email must include 
information telling the recipient how to unsubscribe.  The proposed provision eliminates that 
language because it is in the nature of a commercial regulation, which should be located in a 
different title of the Delaware code.  Second, the proposed provision eliminates the language in 
§ 938 specifying that conduct occurring outside of Delaware is sufficient to constitute an offense 
if the receiver was located in Delaware and the defendant was aware of circumstances which 
rendered the presence of such user in Delaware a reasonable probability.  Section 105 of the 
Proposed Code contains a general provision for territorial applicability of offenses that explicitly 
covers electronic communications and would cover this conduct.  Third, the proposed provision 
changes the current provision’s culpability level from “intentionally, recklessly, or negligently” 
to “knowingly” for the reason stated above.  Fourth, current § 938(a) requires that a defendant 
“fail[] to stop sending commercial electronic mail” after a legitimate request to do so.  However, 
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Subsection 4304(c)(2) alters the language to require that defendants “fail[] to prevent 
commercial electronic mail from being sent.”  Increasingly, commercial electronic mails are sent 
by third-party organizations who have access to the contact information of individuals; thus, the 
defendant organization that is subject to a §938(a) may not have necessarily “fail[ed] to stop 
sending commercial electronic mail[s]” since they have not sent any in the first place.  11 Del.C. 
§ 938(a).  Instead, formulating the offense to cover instances where a defendant “fails to prevent 
commercial electronic mail from being sent” is meant to capture situations, inter alia, where a 
defendant organization may have granted a third party access to consumer contact information, 
thereby facilitating the sending of commercial electronic mail; or where a third party acts as an 
agent of the organization and sends commercial electronic mail.  
Section 4304(d)’s corresponding grading provision is found in 11 Del.C. § 939.  The 
proposed provision alters the grading from its current state.  Currently, the Code grades the 
offenses covered by Section 4304 (except for Subsection (a), which is newly created) according 
to the value of the property or computer services affected.  The grades range from a Class 6 
felony to a Class A misdemeanor.  The proposed provision eliminates the valuation method 
because, for the computer-related offenses in this Section, it is unlikely that any value will be 
lost.  Section 4304(d) grades the offense under Subsection (a) as a Class A misdemeanor.  
However, a Class A misdemeanor is too high for the computer-specific offenses, where the 
nature of the data disclosed or affected is not necessarily as personally intrusive as information 
or recordings acquired under Subsection (a).  Therefore, the offenses under Subsections (b) and 
(c) are graded lower.  Note, however, that if computer-related conduct violates any other 
provision of Chapter 4300, those offenses are available to provide higher punishment. 
Video Privacy Protection and Adult Protective Service Records.  Section 4304 does not 
include 11 Del.C. § 925.  11 Del.C. § 925 relates to video privacy protection and states that “A 
videotape distributor may not wrongfully disclose an individual or summary listing of any 
videotapes purchased or rented by a protected individual from the videotape distributor.”   This 
provision is overly specific and outdated in the internet era.  Note however, that Section 
4304(a)(2) does prohibit disclosure of information that is required by law to be kept confidential.  
Therefore, if the General Assembly will decide in the future to impose limitations on the 
disclosure of information by videotape distributors, internet providers, or other business entities, 
such disclosure would be prohibited by Subsection (a)(2). 
 
 
Comment on Section 4305.  Unlawful Dissemination of Personal Pornography 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. § 1335(a)(9) & (a)(9)b. 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section prohibits disseminating personal pornography depicting another 
person without that person’s consent, even if the defendant obtained the pornography lawfully 
and with the victim’s consent.  It excludes commercially created depictions so that this offense 
cannot be used improperly to prosecute people who illegally share commercial pornography (that 
should instead be charged as the unlawful distribution of protected works under proposed 
Section 2108).  Subsection (c)(1) provides that the defendant’s appearance in the pornography is 
immaterial.  This makes it so that the defendant’s “consent” to sharing the pornography due to 
his or her participation in it does not override the victim’s expectation of privacy. 
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Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4305 directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 1335(a)(9) and (a)(9)b.  However, Section 4305 defines the offense more concretely than 
current law, which punishes situations where “the visual depiction was created or provided to the 
[defendant] under circumstances in which the person depicted has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”  Rather than rely upon this additional subjective standard, Section 4305 states the 
offense objectively, depending entirely upon whether or not the person depicted has consented to 
the distribution.  Subsection (a)(1) explicitly carves out the most obvious situation where a 
person depicted pornographically would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, which is 
depiction in commercial pornography.  Other situations where a person would not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy are situations where a person implicitly gives consent to 
distribution, making the additional “reasonable expectation” standard unnecessary.  For example, 
a person who strips off his clothes and “streaks” nude at a professional baseball game has, under 
the circumstances, consented to both being filmed and having that film distributed because he 
knows that the game is being broadcast on national television. 
Note that Section 4305 provides lesser punishment in some situations that would 
otherwise be subject to disproportionately high sentences.  Note the interaction between Section 
4305 and Section 4204(b)(5).  Section 4204(b)(5) excludes school-age peers who send 
homemade pornography to each other—commonly known as “sexting”—from liability for 
serious child pornography offenses.  Section 4204(b)(5) makes it a Class C misdemeanor for two 
people in a relationship to send such pornography to each other and possess it afterwards.  
However, if one of the parties then sends the pornography, depicting the other party, to other 
people, Section 4204(b)(5) requires that any liability be governed by Section 4305—a Class A 
misdemeanor—instead.  This redirection keeps young people from being subjected to significant 
felony liability for conduct that was not contemplated by the General Assembly when 
establishing child pornography offenses.   
 
 
Comment on Section 4306.  Unlawful Access to Information 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 932, 939; 21 Del.C. 305(m); see also 11 
Del.C. § 933 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of unlawful access to information.  The 
offense prohibits a person from accessing or causing to be accessed information, electronic 
programs, or data when the person is not authorized to do so.  The offense recognizes that even if 
a person does not steal or alter information, unauthorized access to information is, by itself, an 
invasion of privacy that the law ought to punish, much like a criminal trespass that results in no 
harm to the property. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4306(a) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 932, 
with minor changes.  The current provision frames the offense in terms of “the computer crime 
of unauthorized access to computer systems,” which prohibits access to “any computer system 
without authorization.”  The proposed provision broadens the offense because the harm is the 
same whether someone unlawfully accesses information in a computer file or a paper file.   
The proposed provision does not include 11 Del.C. § 933 (theft of computer services), 
which prohibits the accessing or use of “a computer system with the intent to obtain authorized 
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computer services, computer software, or data.”  Theft of computer services and software are 
covered in Chapter 2100 of the Proposed Code, and data is included in Section 4306(a).  
Section 4306(b)’s corresponding grading provision is found in 11 Del.C. § 939. As above 
in the Comment on Section 4304, the proposed provision alters the grading from its current use 
of valuation to determine the offense’s grade. Section 4306(b) sets the grading level for Section 
4306(a) at Class C misdemeanor in consideration of the relative blameworthiness between 
intruding into private spaces to gather information, disclosing such information, or merely 
accessing information to maintain consistency with the grades of other offenses in Chapter 4300. 
Motor Vehicle Records.  21 Del.C. § 305(m) prohibits knowingly obtaining or disclosing 
personal information from a motor vehicle record for any use not permitted under Title 21 and 
making false representations to obtain any personal information from an individual’s motor 
vehicle record.  While that provision relates to unlawful access to information, Section 4306 does 
not specifically address it because the offense is adequately captured by this Section, as well as 
by Section 4304(a)(2) [Unlawful Use of Information] and potentially Section 2209 [Identity 
Theft].  It is however retained in Title 21 for regulatory purposes.  Similarly, 21 Del. C. § 305(n), 
prohibiting misrepresenting one’s identity or making false statement to obtained access to 
restricted information, is adequately captured by this Section, and in the appropriate cases by 
Sections 2209 [Identity Theft], or 2212 [Unauthorized Impersonation].  Note that the Class A 
misdemeanor grade in § 305(n), technically pertains to violations of both the criminal 
prohibitions and the purely regulatory provisions listed in Chapter 3 of Title 21.  However, the 
criminal punishments authorized by § 305(n), appear to be relevant only to the criminal 
prohibitions that are incorporated into the Proposed Code.  Therefore, this part of § 305(n), is not 
retained in Title 21.  
 
 
Comment on Section 4307.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 931, 1337  
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4307(a) provides a definition of “commercial 
electronic mail” that is substantially similar to the definition currently found in 11 Del.C. 
§ 931(2). 
Section 4307(b) provides a definition of “computer system” that is substantially similar to 
the definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 931(8).  Throughout this Section, the proposed 
provisions do not define “computer” because the term’s meaning is apparent.  The proposed 
provisions also eliminate clauses such as “and includes computer networks” and “including 
computer software” because the proposed provisions do not use and the proposed Code does not 
retain the defined terms currently found in 11 Del.C. § 931(4), (5) and (7): “computer network,” 
“computer program” or “computer software.”  
Section 4307(c) provides a definition of “contents of a communication.”  The definition 
is newly created; the current provisions do not contain a definition for this term. 
Section 4307(d) provides a definition of “data” that is substantially similar to the 
definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 931(9).   
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Section 4307(e) provides a definition of “electronic communication.”  The definition is 
newly created; the current provisions do not contain a definition for this term. 
Section 4307(f) provides a definition of “electronic mail” that is substantially similar to 
the definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 931(10).  Note, however, that the definition for 
“electronic mail service provider” in 11 Del. C. § 931(11) is not retained because it is not used in 
the Proposed Code.  Note also that the definition for the “Internet” currently found in 11 Del. C. 
§ 931(12) is not retained as well.  It is unnecessary in light of the common meaning of the term. 
Section 4307(g) provides a definition of “intercepts.”  The definition is newly created; the 
current provisions do not contain a definition for this term. 
Section 4307(h) provides a definition of “originating address” or “originating account” 
that is substantially similar to the definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 931(8).  The proposed 
provision uses the term “sequence” instead of “string” and eliminates an example of an 
originating address, such as company@sender.com.  
Section 4307(i) provides a definition of “private communication.”  The definition is 
newly created; the current provisions do not contain a definition for this term. 
Section 4307(j) provides a definition of “private place” that corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 1337(a), but with three minor changes.  First, the proposed definition replaces the current 
definition’s “may reasonably expect to be safe . . .” with “would reasonably expect to be safe . . . 
.”  Second, the proposed definition replaces the current definition’s “casual or hostile intrusion or 
surveillance” with “unauthorized intrusion or surveillance,” in order to both maintain consistency 
with the offense definition in Section 4301(a), and to avoid having to further define the terms 
“casual” and “hostile.”  Third, the proposed definition removes the phrase “‘Private place’ does 
not include an area to which the public or a substantial group thereof has access,” since the 
accessibility of a location is already factored into whether the victim’s expectation of privacy is 
reasonable.  Additionally, it avoids the possibility of accidentally excluding areas accessible to 
the public where a person nevertheless has a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as fitting 
rooms, bathrooms, or locker rooms.   
Section 4307(k) provides a definition of “receiving address” or “receiving account” that 
is substantially similar to the definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 931(17).  The proposed 
provision uses the term “sequence” instead of “string” and eliminates an example of a receiving 
address, such as person@receiver.com.  
Section 4307(l) provides a definition of “trespass on real property.”  The definition is 
new, but it is merely a cross-reference that allows the offense definition to be read more cleanly.  
It does not change the meaning of current law.  
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CHAPTER 4400.  OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY 
 
Section 4401.  Incest 
Section 4402.  Bigamy 
Section 4403.  Child Abandonment 
Section 4404.  Interference with Custody 
Section 4405.  Assisting a Runaway 
Section 4406.  Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor 
Section 4407.  Persistent Non-Support 
Section 4408.  Definitions 
 
 
General Comment on Chapter 4400 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1004, 1102; see also 13 Del.C. § 728 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  A number of current provisions in Title 11 and elsewhere that might have 
been included in Chapter 4400 have not, for various reasons.  This Comment explains each of 
those decisions. 
Advertising Marriage in Another State.  11 Del.C. § 1004 prohibits, within Delaware, the 
advertising of any information relative to the performance of marriage in another state.   11 
Del.C. § 1004 is punished as a violation.  This offense has not been retained in Chapter 4400 
because of its obscurity, lack of use as a basis of prosecution—to the drafters’ knowledge, it has 
never been used—and minor punishment.   
Violation of Custody.  13 Del.C. § 728 applies only to parents, and punishes a parent who 
“has violated, interfered with, impaired or impeded the rights of a parent or a child with respect 
to the exercise of . . . custodial authority, residence, visitation or other contact with the 
child . . . .”  13 Del.C. § 728(b).  The only time a sentence of imprisonment is authorized under 
§ 728(b)(5), however, is when the offending parent “is found to be in contempt of prior orders of 
the Court.”  Since criminal contempt is a separate offense subject to its own punishment in 
proposed Chapter 3300, there is no need to create another criminal offense punishing violation of 
custody orders.  13 Del.C. § 728 should remain unchanged in Title 13. 
Endangering the Welfare of a Child.  11 Del.C. § 1102 punishes, in a variety of ways, 
situations that endanger the physical, moral, or psychological well being of children.  
Functionally, it contains several separate offenses.  Only a few portions of § 1102 are 
incorporated into Sections 4405 and 4406; the remainder of the offense is not retained in the 
Proposed Code.15  11 Del.C. § 1102(a)(1), condemning a parent, guardian or any other person 
with responsibility over a child who “[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly” “acts in a manner 
likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of the child” or “does or fails to do 
                                                             
15 Note, however, that 11 Del.C. § 1104, establishing a defense to endangering the welfare of a child for 
treating an ill child with prayer, is retained as a defense to reckless endangerment in proposed Section 1204.  Under 
current law, this defense only applies where a child’s physical welfare is recklessly endangered, not knowingly or 
recklessly caused, by the parent’s refusal to seek medical care or treatment.  So although current § 1102 is not 
retained (since it is coextensive with other offenses), the defense still ought to apply to the same situations under the 
Proposed Code that would instead be prosecuted under reckless endangerment. 
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any act, including failing to report a missing child, with the result that the child becomes a 
neglected or abused child,” is vague, failing to meaningfully define prohibited activity that 
would put a person on notice that the person is violating the law.16  11 Del.C. §§ 1102(a)(1)a., b. 
11 Del.C. §§ 1102(a)(4)-(6) are better considered as sentencing considerations rather than 
separate offenses.  Those provisions make it an additional offense to commit certain offenses in 
the aural or visual presence of a minor.  While exposure to crime certainly could traumatize a 
minor, there is no appropriate way to punish that harm in the Proposed Code.  For consistency, a 
general grade adjustment could be added to Section 804 increasing the grade of any offense 
committed in the presence of a minor; however, that would double the available punishment for 
the underlying offense—a substantial and unjustifiable escalation.  If left as a separate offense, 
the offender would not be exposed to any additional punishment for the additional harm, since 
the offender would already have been convicted of a more serious offense.  If the offense 
resulted in the kinds of harm to the minor found in the grading provisions of § 1102(b), the 
offender would be guilty of those more serious offenses, making this offense unnecessary yet 
again.   
11 Del.C. § 1102(a)(7) will be addressed in Chapter 5200, which deals with all drug 
offenses.  Finally, 11 Del.C. §§ 1102(b) and (c) have not been retained at all because they are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the Proposed Code, but more importantly, are also 
unconstitutional.  11 Del.C. § 1102(c) creates an impermissible, irrebuttable presumption of 
culpability as to causation where any of the offenses enumerated in § 1102(a) result in some kind 
of injury to the child.  Without that presumption, the result-based grading scheme in § 1102(b) 
becomes moot, because it is coextensive with other preexisting offenses, namely homicide, 
aggravated assault, and a variety of sexual offenses. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4401.  Incest 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 766 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision prohibits sexual relations between certain family members. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4401 is substantively similar to the current 
§ 766, but with a number of changes for simplicity and clarity.  First, Section 4401(a)(1) expands 
upon the current offense to prohibit “oral or object penetration” between family members, in 
addition to “sexual intercourse.”  Such conduct merits inclusion because it addresses invasive 
sexual acts not encompassed within the definition of sexual intercourse, such as oral sex and 
                                                             
16 A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that the 
person’s contemplated behavior is forbidden by the State, or if it encourages arbitrary or erratic enforcement.  State 
v. Baker, 720 A.2d 1139, 1147 (Del. 1998).  “[T]he terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be 
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its 
penalties . . . ; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due 
process.”  State v. J.K., 383 A.2d 283, 291 (Del. 1977) (citation omitted).  In this instance, 11 Del.C. § 1102(a)(1) is 
vague because a prohibition on acting “in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental, or moral welfare of 
[a] child” or in a way that results in a child becoming neglected or abused is not sufficiently explicit to put a person 
on notice that the person is violating the law.  In addition, the prohibition is not sufficiently explicit to prevent 
arbitrary or erratic enforcement.  
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vaginal or anal penetration with sexual devices.  Second, Subsection (a)(2) adds a culpability 
requirement of knowledge as to the relationship between the parties.  The current offense does 
not have a culpability requirement, so “recklessness” would be read into the provision under 11 
Del.C. § 251(b).  It seems, though, that only a person who knows the relationship is illicit could 
be deserving of a sentence of imprisonment.  Third, Subsection (a)(2)(A) specifies that any of the 
relationships in Subsection (a)(2)(B) could be by blood, marriage, or adoption.  By using the 
word “blood” alone, without exception, the term should include illegitimate children and both 
half- and full-blooded relatives.  Fourth, Subsection (a)(2)(B) simplifies the list of enumerated 
relationships in § 766(a) by distilling them without reference to the relative genders of the 
persons involved. 
Section 4401(b) retains the grade of § 766. 
Family Court Jurisdiction.  11 Del.C. § 766, stating that incest is “an offense within the 
original jurisdiction of the Family Court,” has not been retained.  10 Del.C. § 922, the general 
grant of jurisdiction for the Family Court, already gives the court original jurisdiction over incest 
cases, making 11 Del.C. § 766 unnecessary. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4402.  Bigamy 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1001–03 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision prohibits marriage by persons already married. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4402(a) directly corresponds to the offense 
definition in 11 Del.C. § 1001.  The definition has been separated by Subsection into constituent 
elements to make clear that either party to a subsequent marriage can be guilty of the offense.  
Note that since no culpability requirement is specified, recklessness applies to all the elements of 
the offense—including whether the defendant already has a spouse—under proposed Section 
205.  Additionally, the provision in § 1003 that a person can be guilty of bigamy even if the 
second marriage took place in another state, has not been retained.  There, the specific harm is 
not that the couple has committed a harm distinct from bigamy, but that Delaware acquires 
jurisdiction over the offense once the couple moves to the state.  The general jurisdictional 
provision in Section 105 is broad enough to cover this situation. 
Section 4402(b) directly corresponds to the defense in § 1002(2) for a spouse who has 
been separated for at least 7 years and has no knowledge whether the other spouse is living.  The 
defenses in § 1002(1), (3), and (4) have not been retained as the defenses yield an identical result 
to a situation where the defendant is less than reckless as to the element of already having a 
spouse.  Under the proposed Section, in order to be liable for bigamy, a defendant must be 
reckless as to the fact that he was already married.  If the defendant does not have this reckless 
belief—in other words, if he is negligent as to the belief, or reasonably believes he is not 
married—then he does not satisfy the offense definition.  The current defense provisions would 
only be useful if they provided a defense to a defendant whose culpability is equal to or greater 
culpability than that required by the offense itself.    Thus, if the provisions provide a defense for 
non-negligent belief, the provisions are unnecessary as the defendant would not satisfy the 
offense definition in the first place.  However, under Section 4402(a)(1), the defendant could be 
negligent as to already having a spouse and not be guilty of bigamy.  For this same reason, the 
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phrase “did not know” in Section 4402(b) has been substituted for “had no reasonable grounds to 
believe” in § 1002(2) because of the discrepancy between the culpability requirement in the 
current law and the defense’s inherent usefulness.  It allows the defendant to be reckless as to 
whether he still has a spouse—which would generally expose the person to liability under 
Section 4402—and still receive a defense.  The defense’s value lies in the time that has passed, 
which justifies giving a defense to a defendant with a higher culpability level.  Otherwise, the 
defense would have no effect.   
Section 4402(c) retains the current grade for bigamy. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4403.  Child Abandonment 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1101, 1102A 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines an offense penalizing parents or legal guardians who 
leave a child without adequate supervision for an extended period of time, thereby jeopardizing 
the child’s welfare. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4403(a) is substantively similar to the offense 
in 11 Del.C. § 1101, but amends current law with a few linguistic changes to improve clarity.  
Subsection (a)(2) substitutes the word “leaves” for “deserts,” because desertion is a more specific 
term that might require definition.  The subjective elements of the offense are sufficiently 
specific that the particular objective act need not be.  Additionally, Subsection (a)(3) refers to 
intentionally ending care or custody, rather than “intending to permanently abandon the child.”  
Using the word “abandon,” without more, to define child abandonment is tautological as under 
current law, a defendant is guilty of the abandonment of a child when “the person deserts the 
child in any place intending permanently to abandon the child.”  11 Del.C. § 1101.  The change 
in language effectively defines abandonment by consistent reference to the defendant’s unique 
position of responsibility for the child.   
Section 4403(b) directly corresponds to current § 1102A, but breaks the defense into its 
elements for easier reading and application. 
Section 4403(c) preserves the grading distinctions in § 1101, based upon the age of the 
abandoned child.  However, each grade is set at one grade lower than current law provides for 
the same conduct.  The legislation authorizing this Proposed Code mandates that 
“disproportionate” statutes be identified and rectified.  The proportionality of an offense’s 
authorized punishment is directly tied to the grade assigned to that offense.  An offense’s grade 
could be either disproportionately high or low.  The nonpartisan consultative group supervising 
the drafting process for this Proposed Code has scrutinized the relative grading of all offenses, 
and has decided that this offense’s grade is disproportionately high when compared to other 
offenses of the same grade in current law.  The grade of this offense has been changed to reflect 
that judgment. 
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Comment on Section 4404.  Interference with Custody 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 785 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 4404 defines and grades the offense of interference with custody.  
This offense prohibits a person from either: (1) taking a child younger than sixteen years of age 
from his or her lawful guardian if they are a relative of that child, or (2) taking anyone entrusted 
by law to the custody of another or an institution, when that person knows the person has no 
legal right to do so.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4404 corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 785, but 
breaks § 785 into subsections for clarity; Section 4404(a) defines the offense and Section 
4404(b) grades the offense in accordance with the grading scheme in § 785.  Section 4404(a) 
corresponds to the offense definition in § 785, but slightly rewords it for clarity and separates the 
offense conduct into its elements for easier reading and application. Note that the proposed 
Subsection (a)(1)(2) removes the outdated phrase “incompetent person” and replaces it with “a 
person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or an institution,” as it is 
described in § 785(b).  
Note that current law organizes Interference with Custody alongside the offenses of 
Kidnapping and Unlawful Imprisonment.  All those offenses have similar conduct elements; 
however, the harm involved is quite different.  Interference with Custody is a harm to the family 
arrangement that the courts have recognized as best for the person whose custody is at issue, 
rather than a harm to the liberty and autonomy of that person.  This harm aligns more closely 
with other offenses against the family; therefore, Interference with Custody has been placed in 
Chapter 4400 instead of Chapter 1400. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4405.  Harboring or Assisting a Runaway 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1102(a)(3), (b)(4) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision creates an offense penalizing adults who harbor or assist a 
child in running away from home without parental consent. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4405(a) corresponds to 11 Del.C. 1102(a)(3).  
The two provisions are materially the same, except for Subsection (a)(2).  11 Del.C. § 1102(a)(3) 
simply prohibits “knowingly and illegally harbor[ing] a child who has run away from home;” 
however, the word “harbor” requires definition.  On its face, a person who shelters a child 
temporarily while notifying law enforcement of the child’s location and safety would still be 
subject to liability under § 1102(a)(3).  Subsection (a)(2)(A) suggests a minimum amount of time 
that the defendant must have sheltered the child before it becomes illegal harboring.  
Additionally, Subsection (a) contains the phrase “except as authorized by law” to exempt 
emergency youth shelters and other similar institutions from prosecution under Section 4405. 
Section 4405(b) retains the grade given in § 1102(b)(4). 
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Comment on Section 4406.  Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1100(3), 1102(a)(2), 1102(b)(4), 1106 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision covers conduct by an adult that contributes to the delinquency 
of a minor by knowingly inducing the minor to participate in criminal activity. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4406(a)(1) corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 1102(a)(2), but defines the offense with greater specificity in several ways.  First, Subsection 
(a) adds a requirement the offense only apply to defendants who are at least 4 years older than 
the child whose delinquency is encouraged.  This ensures a sufficient gap in age between the 
offender and the victim to justify liability for a failure to act.  Technically, this makes it possible 
for minors to be defendants (e.g., the parties are 13 and 17 years of age).  But note that the  
provisions pertaining to the treatment of minors – addressed outside of the Proposed Code, in 
Title 10 – are available in appropriate cases to prevent criminal liability where the defendant is a 
minor.  Second, Subsection (a)(1) makes the offense’s focus on causation more explicit, which 
makes in unnecessary to include language specifying that the defendant’s act or failure to act 
may be only one of several factors leading to the child’s delinquency.  Third, Subsection (a)(1) 
avoids use of the word “delinquent” by including in the offense definition the result that the child 
actually engages in an offense.  That way, delinquency need not be separately defined, as it is in 
§ 1100(3).   
Subsection (a)(2) corresponds to § 1106, which prohibits permitting a child under 18 to 
be in a place where specified unlawful activities are taking place.  That offense is preserved in 
Section 4406(a)(2), but in a generalized form to capture any risk to a child’s delinquency, 
beyond those enumerated in § 1106. 
Section 4406(b) retains the grades given in §§ 1102(b)(4) and 1106. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4407.  Persistent Non-Support 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 1113 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision creates liability for persons who habitually fail to provide 
financial support for their children. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4407(a) corresponds to the definitions of 
criminal nonsupport and aggravated criminal nonsupport in 11 Del.C. §§ 1113(a)–(b).  The 
distinctions between those offenses have, in part, been preserved in the grading provisions in 
Subsection (b).  The offense incorporates § 1113(e), which specifies it is not a defense that the 
child was receiving support from other sources.  Additionally, provision of medical care has been 
added to Subsection (a)(2)(A) in order to more comprehensively cover the kinds of support a 
parent is expected to provide for his or her children. 
Section 4407(b) grades the offense depending on whether there is an outstanding, 
unsatisfied support order, and if so, also depends on the amount in arrears and how long it has 
been in arrears.    Subsection (b)(1) corresponds to the grading scheme currently in place for 
aggravated criminal nonsupport, while Subsection (b)(2) corresponds to that for ordinary 
 
 524 
criminal nonsupport.  The grade aggravations for repeat offenders have not been retained 
because they have been incorporated into the general grade adjustment in Section 804. 
Section 4407(c) corresponds to § 1113(i), which allows a court to allocate fines paid to 
the court to support for the child who needs it.  It also requires that if a support order is in effect, 
the fine paid to the court must be used to satisfy the court order.  Section 4407(c) slightly alters 
those provisions, however, by making clear that any money paid out by the court is not counted 
as satisfying the fine owed to the court.  If that were the case, then the offender’s payment would 
be double counted, satisfying both his fine and any support owed.  That result would both dilute 
the fine’s value as punishment and reward the offender for waiting as long as possible to pay 
support. 
Section 4407(d) retains two defenses from current law.  Subsection (d)(1) retains the 
defense in § 1113(c) by giving the defendant an opportunity to cure the failure to meet the 
support obligation.  This makes sense if the purpose of the offense is to stimulate payment of 
support obligations.  Subsection (d)(2) retains the defense in § 1113(d) for defendants who are 
unable to make support payments due to circumstances outside their control.   
Section 4407(e) directly corresponds to evidentiary provisions in § 1113(f)–(g). 
Civil Liability.  11 Del.C. § 1113(h), which specifies that civil or administrative 
proceedings on the same support issues do not bar criminal liability, has not been retained, 
because Section 104 articulates the same policy more generally. 
Restitution.  11 Del.C. § 1113(j)’s restitution requirement has not been incorporated 
because restitution is already generally required where applicable by Section 803. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4408.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 1113(k)(2) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4408 provides a definition of “dependent 
child” that corresponds to the definition currently found in 11 Del.C. § 1113(k)(2).  The 
definition includes all persons less than 18 years of age, and also incorporates the policy of 11 
Del.C. § 1113(k)(2), requiring a parent to continue supporting his or her child who is 18 years of 
age and still enrolled in high school.  However, § 1113(k)(2) further requires that it be likely that 
the 18 year old child will graduate from high school.  It is unnecessary to put judges in the 
position of evaluating a child’s academic standing to determine the child’s likely graduation.  
Therefore, Section 4408 does not include that requirement.  Instead, the definition only requires 
that the 18 year old child be enrolled in school.  Note also that the additional definitions of 
“child” and “support order” in 11 Del. C. §§ 1113(k)(1) and (3) are unnecessary.  The former 
term is used in the definition of “support order,” indicating that a support order can apply to a 
child who is not a “dependent child.”  The Proposed Code reaches the same result by leaving the 
term “support order” undefined, ensuring that that term would have its commonly accepted 
meaning and the prohibition in Section 4407(a)(1) would apply to any support order, whether it 
refers to a “dependent child” or not. 
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CHAPTER 4500.  GAMBLING OFFENSES 
 
Section 4501.  Unlawful Gambling and Betting Practices 
Section 4502.  Cheating and Related Practices 
Section 4503.  Definitions 
 
 
General Comment on Chapter 4500 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1409, 1412, 1428, 1431; see also §§ 1421, 
1422, 1423, 1424, 1425, 1426, 1427, 1428 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  A number of current provisions in Title 11 and elsewhere that might have 
been included in Chapter 4500 have not been included, for various reasons.   
Obstructing Law Enforcement Investigations of Illegal Gambling Operations.  11 Del.C. 
§ 1428 prohibits individuals from obstructing law enforcement investigation of illegal gambling 
operations by maintaining a physical barrier.  This provision has not been retained in Chapter 
4500 because it is redundant with two proposed offenses: Sections 3302 (Resisting or 
Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer) and 3304 (Obstructing Administration of Law or Other 
Government Function).  Thus, the obstruction covered by § 1428 and its procedural requirements 
in 11 Del.C. §§ 1421–27 would be a violation of the Code without these individual provisions.  If 
this lesser obstruction offense and all of its accompanying procedures are nonetheless deemed 
necessary, they should be moved to an administrative title where they are not duplicative of other 
offenses. 
Revoking or Denying Service Contract Where Used for Gambling.  11 Del.C. § 1412 has 
not been retained in Chapter 4500 because it is purely administrative in nature and affects public 
utilities.  It is more appropriately suited for a regulatory title dealing with gambling or public 
utilities. 
Execution of Public Duty Justification Defense.  11 Del.C. § 1409 provides for a 
justification defense where the conduct in question was an exercise of law enforcement authority.  
This provision has not been retained in Chapter 4500 because there is already a defense for the 
execution of public duty in Section 303 of the General Part. 
Telephone Evidence.  11 Del.C. § 1431 contains a provision dealing with telephone 
evidence.  This provision has not been retained in Chapter 4500.  If this provision is inconsistent 
with Delaware’s general Rules of Evidence, then it leads to disproportionate punishment of 
persons accused of gambling due to different rules of admissibility.  On the other hand, if this 
provision is consistent with the Rules of Evidence, then it is unnecessary to separately codify the 
rule in the gambling context. 
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Comment on Section 4501.  Unlawful Gambling and Betting Practices 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1326, 1401, 1402, 1403, 1404, 1405, 
1406, 1407, 1408, 1411, 1413 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 4501 prohibits unlawful gambling or betting and providing premises 
for gambling.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Subsection 4501(a) defines the offense of unlawful 
gambling or betting by synthesizing conduct found in various gambling provisions throughout 
Delaware’s current criminal code.  The “except as authorized by law” clause in Section 4501(a) 
covers the exceptions found in both 11 Del.C. § 1403 (for licensed horse racing or betting) and 
11 Del.C. § 1405(c)(2) (for certain authorized gambling devices).   
Section 4501(a)(1) covers the conduct defined in 11 Del.C. § 1401 to the extent this 
conduct is not already covered by the definition of a “lottery ticket” in Section 4503(b) or the 
catch-all provision for acts committed for financial benefit in Section 4501(a)(6).  Two 
provisions from § 1401 have not been retained in Subsection (a)(1).  First, the “possession with 
intent to” conduct in § 1401(1) has not been retained because the inchoate offense in proposed 
Section 708 (Possessing Instruments of Crime) is broad enough to include that situation.  
Second, the “lottery policy writing” conduct in § 1401(3)-(4) has not been retained because the 
catch-all provision in Subsection (a)(6) covers “participation” in gambling activities generally, 
meaning that the creation of lottery tickets that will be sold is prohibited.  Since the proposed 
scheme prohibits creating lottery tickets only when those tickets will be sold, 11 Del.C. § 1408 
(“Merchandising plans are not gambling”) is unnecessary; free chances to win prizes are not 
prohibited.  The only aspect of § 1408 that has been retained in Subsection (a)(1) is the exception 
clause, which allows lottery tickets to be sold to raise funds for a charitable purpose.  
Section 4501(a)(2) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1403(3), but makes a few minor changes.  
First, Subsection (a)(2) adds the term “receives” to the conduct defined to reflect the fact that 
receiving a bet includes not only recording information about the amount of bets and debts, but 
also collecting the money.  Second, Subsection (a)(2) uses only the term “bet” to refer to both 
bets and wagers.  “Wagers” should be included in “bets” throughout Section 4501.  Finally, 
Subsection (a)(2) does not cover simple “agreement” or receipt of money “with the intent to bet 
or wager” because those acts are already covered by the inchoate offenses in proposed Sections 
701 (Criminal Attempt) and 703 (Criminal Conspiracy). 
Section 4501(a)(3) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1403(4).  Subsection (a)(3) includes the 
phrase “on behalf of any person” to indicate that it applies to both direct and indirect betting.  
Note that rather than defining the term “trial or contest” within the offense definition itself, it is 
defined in Section 4503 with the rest of the relevant terms used in this Chapter. 
Section 4501(a)(4) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1411.  The specific provision in § 1411(1) 
about public utilities furnishing a private wire for use in disseminating information in furtherance 
of gambling has not been explicitly retained in Subsection (a)(4) because the conduct is already 
covered by the “catch-all” in Subsection (a)(6).  If a public utility installed a private wire, 
knowing it would be used for gambling activities, it would satisfy the “financial benefit” 
requirement of Subsection (a)(6) because it would be paid for this service, and it would satisfy 
the knowledge requirement of Subsection (a)(6).   
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Section 4501(a)(5) covers the conduct in 11 Del.C. §§ 1405(a) and 1406(a)(1)–(2).  Note 
that the conduct described in the other subsections of §§ 1405 and 1406 has not been included in 
Subsection (a)(5) because it is either already covered by either the inchoate offense of attempt, or 
complicity, or is redundant with other provisions in the Proposed Code.  Although the term “slot 
machine” is currently defined with the other gambling definition in 11 Del.C. § 1432(h), it is not 
defined in Subsection (a)(5) or otherwise in Chapter 4500 because its meaning is self-evident.  
The final clause of Subsection (a)(5), stating that the gambling device must be “less than 25 
years old” to be covered by this Section, accounts for the “antique slot machine” exception in 
§ 1406(c).  
Section 4501(a)(6) is a “catch-all” provision for other persons who benefit financially 
from the conduct described in Subsections (a)(1)–(5), but may not directly engage in the offense 
conduct.  Subsection (a)(6) covers the “concerned in interest” features of 11 Del.C. §§ 1401 and 
1403, as well as various other forms of conduct not specifically enumerated in Subsections 
(a)(1)–(5) (noted in the Commentary above for each Subsection).  Subsection (a)(6) both requires 
that the offender benefit financial from investment, participation, or acquiescence in conduct in 
violation of Subsection (a) and establishes a knowledge requirement.  Note that to satisfy the 
knowledge requirement, the offender need not know that the activity is illegal; rather, she need 
only be aware of the qualities and circumstances of the activity that make it illegal under Section 
4501(a).  For example, a defendant who has financially invested in a lottery not run by the State 
knows that the enterprise is a private lottery.  The fact that the lottery is privately run is what 
makes the lottery unlawful, but the defendant does not have to know that private lotteries are 
unlawful to be prosecuted under Subsection (a)(6).    
Section 4501(a)(7) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1407’s offense for playing craps, but with 
some minor changes.  First, Subsection (a)(7) removes the reference to “crap games” in the 
offense definition and, instead, simply describes the term.  Second, Subsection (a)(7) removes 
the provision in § 1407 that penalizes being “knowingly present” at a crap game.  One cannot be 
criminally liable without in some way furthering the illicit activity.  To the extent someone who 
is “knowingly present” at a crap game is also actively supporting the activity, accomplice 
liability in proposed Section 211 will cover the conduct.   
Section 4501(b) defines the offense of providing premises for gambling.  Subsection (b) 
corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1404, but with some changes to the language and structure for easier 
reading and application.  Subsection (b) also incorporates portions of 11 Del.C. § 1403(2) that 
have not been retained as separate provisions because they are redundant with this offense.  Note 
that because the grading of §§ 1403(2) and 1404 conflict, this Section maintains the grade of the 
offense dealing primarily with premises used for gambling, § 1404.  The grade aggravation in 
§ 1404, increasing the grade for repeat offenders, has not been retained in this Section because 
the general grade adjustment in Section 804 covers all such situations. 
Section 4501(c) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1413 to provide an exception to liability 
under Section 4501 for engaging in gambling or lottery activities under the State’s control.  Note 
that since Section 4501(c) establishes that the only exception to the prohibition on selling lottery 
tickets is when those lottery tickets are under Delaware control, the separate provision in 11 
Del.C. § 1402 prohibiting the sale of foreign lottery tickets is unnecessary.  Foreign lotteries are 
necessarily not under State control, and thus fall into the general prohibition on the sale of lottery 
tickets in Section 4501(a)(1).  
Section 4501(d) grades the offenses in Sections 4501(a)–(b).  Subsection (d)(1) grades 
the offense defined in Section 4501(a)(1)–(6).  Subsection (d)(1)(A) corresponds to the grade in 
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11 Del.C. § 1326(c) to make all gambling activity a Class F felony where it occurs in the context 
of animal fighting.  Subsection (d)(1)(B) corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 1401, 1403, 1405, and 
1411 to make gambling activity a Class A misdemeanor in all other cases.  Subsection (d)(2) 
grades playing craps as a violation.  Subsection (d)(3) grades the offense defined in Section 
4501(b) as a Class D misdemeanor. 
Section 4501(e) lists terms defined in Section 4503.  Refer to the commentary for Section 
4503 for an explanation of how each of the defined terms relates to current Delaware law. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4502.  Cheating and Related Practices   
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 1470, 1471, 1472; see also 1474 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 4502 creates an offense prohibiting cheating and related practices.  
The offenses that make up this Section currently fall under a subpart in Delaware law for 
“Offenses Involving Video Lottery Machines.”  However, several of the offenses actually cover 
more conduct than that relating to video lottery machines.  Therefore, this proposed Section 4502 
unifies these provisions based on a different common theme among them: cheating. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4502(a) defines the offense of cheating.  
Subsection (a)(1) is based on the definition of “cheat” in 11 Del.C. § 1470(a).  The specific 
offenses related to cheating in 11 Del.C. § 1471(a) and (d) are subsumed by this broader offense 
definition.  The cheating offense in 11 Del.C. § 1471(b) is not included in this Subsection 
because it is already covered by the proposed inchoate offense of Possessing Instruments of 
Crime in Section 708.  Subsection (a)(2) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1471(l), except to the extent 
it deals with possession, as that conduct is covered by Section 708 (Possessing Instruments of 
Crime).   
Section 4502(b) defines the offense of contest rigging.  This Section corresponds to 
11 Del.C. § 1471(k), but breaks it into its constituent elements for easier reading and application.  
Section 4502(c) defines the offense of unfair wagering, corresponding to 11 Del.C. 
§ 1471(f), (i), and (j).   
Section 4502(d) grades the offenses in Sections 4502(a)-(c).  Note that the grading 
scheme in Section 4502(d) does not include the mandatory restitution provided for in 11 Del.C. 
§ 1472(e) because mandatory restitution is already provided by Section 803 of the General Part.  
Subsection (d)(1) grades the offense defined in Section 4502(a) as a Class A misdemeanor, 
preserving the grade in 11 Del.C. § 1472(a).  Subsection (d)(2) grades the offense defined in 
Section 4502(b) as a Class 8 felony, corresponding to the maximum sentence provided for in 
11 Del.C. § 1472(c).  Subsection (d)(3) grades the offense defined in Section 4502(c) based upon 
the current scheme in 11 Del.C. § 1472(b), which matches the value thresholds for unfair 
wagering to the value thresholds for theft offenses.  Subsection (d)(3) retains this scheme, but 
alters the value thresholds to match the proposed value thresholds in Section 2101 of the 
proposed Chapter on theft.  The aggregation provision in Subsection (d)(3)(H) corresponds to 
11 Del.C. § 1472(d).  
Section 4502(e) contains a forfeiture provision, corresponding to 11 Del.C § 1472(f).  
Unlike § 1472(f), Subsection (e) directly incorporates the definitions of “cheating device” and 
“paraphernalia” within the text, instead of relying upon the terms themselves.   For instance, 
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“paraphernalia” is defined by 11 Del.C. § 1470(c) as “ . . . [the] materials that are intended for 
use or designed for use in [the production of] . . . a counterfeit facsimile of the chips, tokens, 
debit instruments or other wagering devices approved by the State Lottery Office.”  Subsection 
4502(e)(a) incorporates the current Delaware definition into the text by providing that defendants 
forfeit “materials intended to be used to manufacture devices for cheating.” 
Section 4502(f) lists terms defined in Section 4503.  Refer to the commentary for Section 
4503 for an explanation of how each of the defined terms relates to current Delaware law. 
Provisions Covered by Theft Offenses Not Retained.  11 Del.C. § 1471(c), (g), and (h) 
have not been included in Section 4502 because they are covered by either Section 2102 (Theft 
by Taking) or Section 2103 (Theft by Deception).  The various parts of § 1471(e) are covered by 
either Section 2103 (Theft by Deception), Section 211 (Complicity), or Section 708 (Possessing 
Instruments of Crime).   
11 Del.C. § 1473 has not been retained because proposed Section 210 governs the issue 
of when multiple prosecutions or convictions are allowed.  
Detention of Suspected Cheaters.  11 Del.C. § 1474 has not been incorporated into 
Chapter 4500 because it is preserved as a form of the defense of property justification defense in 
Section 307. 
Jurisdiction.  Section 4502 does not incorporate 11 Del.C. § 1472(f), which provides that 
“The Courts of the Justices of the Peace shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of 
Common Pleas for misdemeanor offenses under this subpart and the Superior Court shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction for felony offenses under this subchapter.”  The Superior Court already has 
exclusive jurisdiction for felony criminal offenses, making that part of the provision unnecessary.  
The misdemeanor provision should be incorporated into general provision setting forth the 
jurisdiction of the Courts of the Justices of the Peace. 
 
 
Comment on Section 4503.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 1401(1)-(2), 1403(1), 1432(c), 1432(e), 
1470(d)–(e) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This section collects all defined terms used in Chapter 4500. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 4503(a) defines “gambling device,” 
corresponding directly to 11 Del.C. § 1432(c).  Section 4503(b) defines “lottery ticket,” 
summarizing the situations described in 11 Del.C. § 1401(1)-(2).  Section 4503(c) defines 
“private wire,” corresponding to, but simplifying the definition in 11 Del.C. § 1432(e).  Section 
4503(d) defines “table game,” corresponding directly to 11 Del.C. § 1470(d).  Section 4503(e) is 
a new definition for “trial or contest” based upon 11 Del.C. § 1403(1).  Section 4503(f) defines 
“video lottery machine,” corresponding to, but simplifying the definition in 11 Del.C. § 1470(e).  
  
 
 530 
CRIME CONTROL OFFENSES 
 
CHAPTER 5100.  OFFENSES INVOLVING FIREARMS AND OTHER DEADLY WEAPONS 
 
Section 5101.  Possessing a Firearm or Deadly Weapon During Commission of an Offense; 
Supplying a Firearm for Felonious Possession 
Section 5102.  Dealing in Unlawful Weapons 
Section 5103.  Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon or Dangerous Instrument 
Section 5104.  Possessing or Purchasing Deadly Weapons by Persons Prohibited 
Section 5105.  Providing Weapons to Disqualified Persons 
Section 5106.  Possessing a Firearm While Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol 
Section 5107.  Offenses Related to Background Checks for Firearm Sales 
Section 5108.  Grade Adjustment for Offenses Committed in a Safe School and Recreation Zone 
Section 5109.  Definitions 
 
 
General Comment on Chapter 5100: 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1441A, 1441B, 1450, 1451, 1461 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  A number of current provisions in Title 11 and elsewhere that might have 
been included in Chapter 5100 have not been included, for various reasons.  This Comment 
explains each of those choices. 
Reporting Requirement.  11 Del.C. § 1461 makes it a crime to fail to report the loss or 
theft of a firearm to the appropriate law enforcement agency within 7 days of the discovery of 
the loss or theft.  This offense has not been retained in Chapter 5100 because reporting is 
primarily a regulatory requirement of ownership and would be more appropriately placed in a 
corresponding regulatory title.  Moreover, the current punishment for the offense in § 1461(b) is 
very low (fines from $75-250); the only significant punishment authorized is for a third or 
subsequent repeat offense (Class G felony).  Because this particular provision (§ 1461(b)) 
drastically raises the grade of the offense from a violation to a felony, and is inconsistent with 
both Section 802(b)(2)(A), and the general grade adjustment for repeat offenders in Section 804, 
it cannot be retained in Title 11. 
Theft of or Receiving a Stolen Firearm.  11 Del.C. § 1450 and 1451 specifically prohibit 
the taking of a firearm or the receipt of a stolen firearm.  These offenses have not been retained 
in Chapter 5100 because they are already covered by proposed theft offenses in Chapter 2100.  
Implementation of federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004. 11 Del. C. 
§§ 1441A and 1441B implement a federal law authorizing qualifying law enforcement officers, 
both active and retired, to carry concealed firearms.  This authorization is not connected to 
substantive criminal law or punishment, and is therefore not incorporated into Chapter 5200.  
These sections should be relocated to a more appropriate regulatory Title of the Delaware Code. 
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Comment on Section 5101.  Possessing a Firearm or Deadly Weapon During Commission 
of an Offense; Supplying a Firearm for Felonious Possession 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1445, 1447, 1447A  
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5101 combines two separate provisions in current Delaware law to 
create an offense prohibiting individuals from possessing a firearm or deadly weapon during the 
commission of a felony and supplying a firearm to another for use in other offenses.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5101(a) defines the offense of possession of a 
firearm or deadly weapon during a felony, corresponding closely to 11 Del.C. §§ 1447(a) and 
1447A(a).  Section 5101(a) retains the basic language of the offense definitions in §§ 1447(a) 
and 1447A(a).  
Section 5101(b) defines the offense of supplying a firearm for use during certain 
offenses, corresponding closely to 11 Del.C. § 1445(5).  Section 5101(b) retains the language of 
the offense definition in § 1445(5), but separates it into its elements for easier reading and 
application.  
Section 5101(c) grades the offenses in Section 5101(a) and (b), retaining the current 
grades for the corresponding offenses in §§ 1447(a), 1447A(a), and 1445(5).   
Section 5101(d)–(e) correspond to an additional requirement and limitation established 
by the Delaware Supreme Court.  The requirement in Subsection (d), that the defendant be 
convicted of the underlying felony, is based upon the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in 
Priest v. State.17  The condition in Subsection (e) that, to satisfy the offense conduct, one need 
not use or intend to use the firearm or deadly weapon to further the commission of the offense, is 
based upon the Court’s holding in Poli v. State.18 
Section 5101(f) lists defined terms referenced in the offense definition.  Those terms are 
defined in Section 5109.  Reference the Commentary to Section 5109 for an explanation of how 
each of the defined terms relates to current Delaware law.  
Meaning of “Possession.”  For the purposes of this Section, the meaning of the term 
“possession” is governed by proposed Section 204 of the General Part.19 
Provisions in 11 Del.C. §§ 1447 and 1447A Not Retained.   A number of provisions in 11 
Del.C. § 1447 have not been retained in Section 5101.  First, 11 Del.C. § 1447(b)–(c), which 
cover issues of suspension of sentences, good time, parole and probation, and concurrent versus 
consecutive sentences, have not been retained.   The Proposed Code is not intended to address all 
issues regarding the sentencing and disposition of offenders.  It is anticipated that such issues 
will be more comprehensively dealt with in other statutory chapters on sentencing or in a set of 
sentencing guidelines.  Second, § 1447(d), which covers the issue of minors being tried as adults, 
has not been retained because issues pertaining to the treatment of minors are addressed outside 
of the Proposed Code, in Title 10.  Finally, § 1447(e), which covers the issue of lesser-included 
offenses, has not been retained because that issue is governed by proposed Section 210 
                                                             
17 See Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575 (Del. 2005) (holding that, to be convicted of an offense under 11 Del.C. 
§§ 1447 or 1447A, a defendant must also be convicted of the predicate felony). 
18 See Poli v. State, 418 A.2d 985 (Del. 1980) (holding that neither 11 Del.C. §§ 1447 nor 1447A require 
the weapon be used or intended for use in the felony; mere possession is enough). 
19 Cf. Lecates v. State, 987 A.2d 413 (Del. 2009) (defining “possession” according to the Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act). 
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(conviction when the defendant satisfies the requirements of more than one offense or grade) of 
the General Part.  
A number of provisions in 11 Del.C. § 1447A have also not been retained in Section 
5101.  First, § 1447A(b)–(c), which cover issues of minimum sentencing, have not been retained 
because all minimum sentencing provisions in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802.  
Second, § 1447(d)–(g), which mirror the provisions in § 1447(b)–(e), have not been retained for 
the same reasons as stated above.  Issues of suspension, good time, parole, and probation, and 
concurrent and consecutive sentences should be covered by sentencing principles generally 
applicable to all offenses in Delaware law.  Issues of minors being tried as adults are addressed 
outside of the Proposed Code, in Title 10, and issues of lesser-included offenses are governed by 
proposed Section 210 of the General Part.  Note however that while § 1447(d) stipulates that 
minors over 16 years should be tried as adults if convicted of possession of a deadly weapon 
during commission of a felony § 1447A(f) referring to the possession of a firearm sets the 
threshold at 15 years.  Section 5101(a) does not distinguish between the possession of a firearm 
or deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, and therefore a single threshold must be set 
in both § 1447(d) and § 1447A(f) to avoid inconsistency.  Because no other provision in Title 11 
sets the age for minors being tried as adults at 15, while 16 years of age is a common threshold, 
the latter threshold should appear in § 1447A(f).    
 
 
Comment on Section 5102.  Dealing in Unlawful Weapons 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1444(b), 1445, 1446, 1446A, 1452, 1453, 
1459 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5102 provides two conceptually related offenses prohibiting dealing 
in unlawful weapons, which includes such acts as: trafficking a firearm with an altered serial 
number; selling, buying, or possessing certain dangerous weapons; and supplying undetectable 
knives to specific categories of individuals.  This Section consolidates a number of a distinct 
provisions in current Delaware law to create one, cohesive Section.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5102(a) defines the offense of trafficking a 
firearm with an altered serial number, corresponding directly to 11 Del.C. § 1459.  Section 
5102(a) retains the language of § 1459, but separates the offense definition into its elements for 
easier reading and application.  Note that the year 1973 is incorporated from the exception for 
antique firearms contained in § 1459(b). 
Section 5102(b) defines the offense of dealing in unlawful weapons.  Generally, this 
Subsection covers the offense conduct in 11 Del.C. §§ 1444(a), 1445(1), 1446A(a), 1446, 1452, 
and 1453. Note that the “except as authorized by law” provision in Section 5102(b) covers the 
various exceptions enumerated in § 1444(b) because each of the exceptions are pursuant to a 
separate authorization under law.   
Section 5102(b)(1) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1444(a), prohibiting the sale, purchase, or 
possession of a destructive weapon.  Note that to the extent this offense covers bombs, it is 
distinguishable from Section 2303 (unlawful incendiary devices) because this offense has no 
requirement of intent to cause injury, which is why it carries a lesser grade than Section 2303.   
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Section 5102(b)(2) corresponds to 11 Del.C. §§ 1446A(a), 1446, and 1452.  Subsection 
(b)(2)(A) corresponds to § 1446A(a), but simplifies the description of an undetectable knife by 
removing much of the detail about what constitutes a knife.  Note that since § 1446A(b) is purely 
regulatory and is irrelevant to the offense itself, it has not been retained in this Section and 
should instead be moved to regulatory title dealing with the manufacture of knives.  In addition, 
note that Subsection (b)(2)(A) does not include the language in § 1446A(a) regarding 
commercial manufacture and import of undetectable knives because that conduct is captured by 
accomplice liability for the underlying offense.  Subsection (b)(2)(B)(i) corresponds to § 1446 
and Subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii) corresponds to § 1452.  
Section 5102(b)(3) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1453.  Section 5102(b)(4) corresponds to 
11 Del.C. § 1445(1). 
Section 5102(c) establishes an exception to liability under Subsection (b)(2)(A) where 
weapons are provided to special parties.  This Subsection corresponds to the exceptions provided 
in 11 Del.C. § 1446A(c)–(d), but with two changes.  First, Subsection (c) expands the exception 
to cover any weapons, not just undetectable knives.  There appears to be no special reason for 
only making these exceptions for undetectable knives, so long as: (1) law enforcement or the 
military has proper authorization for stocking the weapons, and (2) historical societies and 
related institutions follow the specified procedures of safety and security.  Second, unlike 
§ 1446A(d), Subsection (c)(2) does not explicitly characterize the historical societies, museums, 
and institutional collections as “federal, state, or local,” because this language necessarily 
encompasses all historical societies, museums, and institutional collections and, thus, is 
superfluous.   
Section 5102(d) grades the offenses in the preceding Subsections.  Subsection (d)(1) 
grades the offense in Subsection (a), corresponding to the grade in § 1459(c).  Subsection (d)(2) 
grades the offense in Subsection (b)(1), corresponding to the grade in § 1444(b).  Subsection 
(d)(3) grades the offense in Subsection (b)(2)(A), corresponding to the maximum punishment 
allowed in § 1446A(a), but assigning a different grade letter to reflect the new comprehensive 
grading scheme.  Subsection (d)(4) grades all other offenses as Class B misdemeanors, striking a 
balance between the current grades of the remaining offenses that have been consolidated in this 
Section.  
Section 5102(d)(5) provides for an upward grade adjustment where the offenses in this 
Section are committed within a Safe School or Recreation Zone.  This provision takes into 
account the offense defined in 11 Del.C. § 1457, but treats it only as a grade adjustment for the 
offenses included in this Section, rather than as a separate offense.  This change reflects the idea 
that multiplying convictions without increasing punishment is duplicative, and does not 
meaningfully affect the defendant’s liability under the aggravating circumstances. 
Section 5102(e) references a defined term, “destructive weapon,” used in the Section.  
This term is defined in Section 5109.  Refer to the Commentary to Section 5109 for an 
explanation of how the defined term relates to current Delaware law.  
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Comment on Section 5103. Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon or Dangerous 
Instrument 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 1442, 1443 1445; see also 11 Del.C. 
§ 1441. 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5103 creates an offense for carrying a concealed deadly weapon or 
dangerous instrument, consolidating similar offenses currently codified separately in Delaware 
law.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5103(a) defines the offense, corresponding to 
11 Del.C. §§ 1442 and 1443.  Section 5103(a) retains the language of the current offenses, but 
separates them into their elements for easier reading an application.  The phrase “except as 
authorized by law” allows any independent legal authorization to carry a concealed weapon to 
act as an exception to the offense.  This includes valid licenses to carry concealed weapons, 
making the affirmative defense in 11 Del.C. § 1442 unnecessary. The clause in Subsection 
(a)(1)(B) excepting disabling chemical sprays from the category of dangerous instruments 
corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1443(c).  The requirement in Subsection (a)(3) that the weapon or 
instrument be available and accessible for the person’s immediate use is based upon the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Dubin v. State.20  This requirement would, for example, 
be satisfied if the defendant was driving a car and the concealed weapon was located in the car’s 
glove compartment. 
Section 5103(b) grades the offenses defined in the preceding Subsections.  Subsection 
(c)(1) grades the offense in Subsection (a)(1)(A) as a Class 6 felony where the deadly weapon is 
a firearm and Class 8 felony in all other cases.  The maximum punishments provided for by these 
grades correspond to those provided in 11 Del.C. § 1442, but the actual grade letters differ from 
those used in § 1442 to reflect the new comprehensive grading scheme.  Subsection (c)(2) grades 
the offense in Subsection (a)(1)(B) as a Class A misdemeanor, corresponding directly to the 
grade in 11 Del.C. § 1443(d).  Finally, Subsection (c)(3) provides for an upward grade 
adjustment where the offenses in this Section are committed within a Safe School or Recreation 
Zone.  This provision takes into account the offense defined in 11 Del.C. § 1457, but treats it 
only as an upward grade adjustment for the offenses included in Section 5103, rather than as a 
separate office.  As for other instances of this grade adjustment in Chapter 5100, this change 
reflects the idea that multiplying convictions without increasing punishment is mere duplication, 
not a meaningful addition to ultimate liability.   
Section 5103(c) provides a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(1)(B) 
corresponding to the affirmative defense in § 1443(b). 
Section 5103(d) lists defined terms referenced in the Section.  These terms are defined in 
Section 5109.  Reference the Commentary to Section 5109 for an explanation of how the defined 
terms relate to current Delaware law.  
Note on 11 Del.C. § 1441.  Section 5103 does not incorporate the regulations in 11 Del.C. 
§ 1441 because they belong in an administrative title.  The regulations in § 1441 establish who is 
authorized to carry concealed weapons and how individuals can acquire licenses to carry 
                                                             
20 397 A.2d 132 (Del. 1979) (interpreting language in current law that the weapon is “about the person” to 
mean it is available and accessible for the person’s immediate use).  
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concealed weapons.  These provisions are purely regulatory and have no analogue in the 
proposed revisions to this criminal Code. 
 
 
Comment on Section 5104.  Possessing or Purchasing Deadly Weapons by Persons 
Prohibited 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 1448 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5104 establishes an offense for possession or purchase of deadly 
weapons by specific classes of persons.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Generally, Section 5104 is based upon 11 Del.C. 
§ 1448, the current provision dealing with possession and purchase of deadly weapons by 
persons prohibited.  Section 5104(a) defines the offense, maintaining the general structure of 
§ 1448, but further breaking the offense definition down into its elements.  Subsections 
(a)(1)(A)–(B) correspond to § 1448(a)(1), but do not incorporate the language about jurisdiction 
or whether a weapon was used because this language is unnecessary and included by the 
proposed Subsection’s broader language.  Subsection (a)(1)(C) corresponds to § 1448(a)(3), but 
specifies only the drug offenses that are not already covered by the general provision on felonies 
in Subsection (a)(1)(A).  Subsection (a)(1)(D) corresponds to § 1448(a)(7), but the references to 
specific offenses have been replaced with descriptions of the harms involved in those offenses.  
This has been done to ensure that no offenses in the Proposed Code are accidentally excluded in 
the transition from the current provisions.  Subsection (a)(2) corresponds to § 1448(a)(2).  
Subsection (a)(3) corresponds to § 1448(a)(4).  Subsection (a)(4) corresponds to § 1448(a)(5).  
Subsection (a)(5) corresponds to § 1448(a)(6).  Note that the phrase “subject to” includes the fact 
that the order remains in effect and has not been vacated or otherwise terminated, so this does not 
need to be stated explicitly.  Subsection (a)(6) corresponds to § 1448(a)(8), but simplifies the 
language.  Note that § 1448(a)(9) has not been specifically included because all felony or 
misdemeanor drug offenses, regardless of what type of weapon is simultaneously possessed, are 
already covered by Subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(C).  Note also that the structure of Section 
5104(a) incorporates § 1448(b) into the offense definition.   
Section 5104(b) provides a limitation on the length of the prohibitions under Subsection 
(a), corresponding to 11 Del.C. § 1448(d). 
Section 5104(c) grades the offense in Subsection (a).  Subsection (c)(1) grades the 
offense as a Class 6 felony where the weapon is a destructive weapon, firearm or ammunition for 
a firearm corresponding to 11 Del.C. §§ 1448(c) and 1448(e)(1).  The term “destructive weapon” 
has been incorporated into this grading provision from § 1448(e)(1).  Note, however, that the 
grade adjustment for repeat offenders in § 1448(e)(1) has not been retained in this Subsection 
because all repeat offender grade adjustments are addressed by a general adjustment in Section 
804 of the Proposed Code.  Note also that the definition of “ammunition” has not been retained 
in this grading provision because the meaning of the term is clear on its face.  Subsection (c)(2) 
grades the offense as a Class 8 felony in all other cases, corresponding to § 1448(c).  Note that 
the grading scheme in Section 5105(c) generally does not incorporate § 1448(e)(2), which grades 
the offense in Subsection (a) as a Class 4 felony where the offender causes negligent injuring or 
death as a result of the violation.  This result is covered in the proposed Sections for negligent 
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homicide (Section 1104) and negligent injuring (Section 1203).  In addition, the minimum 
sentencing provisions in § 1448(f)–(g) have not been retained in this Subsection for the reasons 
detailed above.   
Section 5104(c)(3) provides for an upward grade adjustment where the offenses in this 
Section are committed within a Safe School or Recreation Zone.  This provision takes into 
account the offense defined in 11 Del.C. § 1457, but treats it only as a grade adjustment for the 
offenses included in this Section, rather than as a separate office. 
Section 5104(d) provides for the seizure and disposal of deadly weapons or ammunition 
possessed in violation of Subsection (a), corresponding to 11 Del.C. § 1448(a)(10). 
Section 5105(e) lists defined terms referenced in the Section. These terms are defined in 
Section 5109.  Reference the Commentary for Section 5109 for an explanation of how the 
defined terms relate to current Delaware law. 
Provisions in 11 Del.C. § 1448(e)(3)–(4) Not Retained.  The provisions in 11 Del.C. 
§ 1448(e)(3)–(4), which establish sentencing rules, have not been incorporated into Section 5104 
because they are redundant with similar, generally applicable procedural provisions found 
elsewhere in the Proposed Code and in Delaware law.  There is no need to restate those special 
provisions in this Section.  
 
 
Comment on Section 5105. Providing Weapons to Disqualified Persons 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1445, 1454, 1455; 24 Del.C. §§ 903; see 
also 11 Del.C. § 1456 and 24 Del.C. §§ 902, 904, 904A, 
905 
 
Comment:  
Generally.  Section 5105 establishes an offense prohibiting individuals from providing 
weapons to certain classes of people.  This includes providing firearms to persons prohibited, 
providing sporting weapons to underage persons, and providing weapons under improper 
circumstances.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5105(a) defines the offense of providing 
weapons to prohibited persons, corresponding to the offense conduct in 11 Del.C. §§ 1445(2), 
1445(4), 1454, 1455, and 24 Del.C. § 903.  Some of the distinctions between these offenses are 
reserved for grading in Subsection (b), allowing the offense definition to be as broad as possible.  
By doing so, no blameworthy conduct related to the current offense provisions will be 
accidentally left out of the offense.  However, note that Subsection (a)(2)(C) has been broadened 
to include giving any deadly weapon to a person known to be intoxicated, rather than just a self-
defense weapon as provided in 24 Del.C. § 903.   
Section 5105(b) defines the offense of providing B.B., air, or spear guns to children less 
than 16 years of age without parental consent, corresponding to 11 Del.C. § 1445(2). 
Section 5105(c) grades the offense according to its variations.  Subsection (c)(1) and 
(c)(4)(A) grade the offense under Subsections (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(D) as a Class 8 felony, 
corresponding to the grade in §§ 1454 and 1455, and corresponding to the maximum punishment 
allowed in § 1445(4), but assigning a different grade letter to reflect the new grading scheme.  
Note that, while Subsection (c)(1) retains the grades of the current offenses, it does not include 
the grade adjustment for repeat offenders in § 1455.  This provision has not been retained 
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because repeat offenses are governed by the proposed general grade adjustment for repeat 
offenders in Section 804.   
Section 5105(c)(2)(A) grades the offense under Subsection (a)(2)(B) as a Class 8 felony, 
corresponding to the prohibition on the sale of firearms to underage persons in 11 Del. C. 
§ 1445(4).   
Section 5105(c)(2)(B) grades the offense under Subsection (a)(2)(B) as a Class B 
misdemeanor, corresponding to the prohibition on sale of self-defense weapons to underage 
persons in 24 Del.C. § 903 and 905.  Note that the Class B misdemeanor grade in § 905 
technically pertains to violations of both the criminal prohibitions and the purely regulatory 
provisions listed in Chapter 9 of Title 24.  However, the criminal punishments authorized by § 
905 appear to be relevant only to the criminal prohibitions that are incorporated into the 
Proposed Code.  Therefore, § 905 is not retained in Title 24. 
Section 5105(c)(3) grades the offense under Subsection (a)(2)(C) as a Class B 
misdemeanor, corresponding to the prohibition on sale of self-defense weapons to intoxicated 
persons in 24 Del.C. § 903.  Note that the purely regulatory provisions in the collection of 
provisions that make up the proposed offense under Section 5105(c)(2)(B) and (c)(3) from Title 
24, including 24 Del.C. §§ 902, 904, and 904A, should remain in that regulatory title. 
Section 5105(c)(4)(B) grades the offense under Subsection (a)(2)(D) as a Class B 
misdemeanor in all cases of deadly weapons not involving firearms.  This does not correspond to 
any provision of current law.  Current law does not have a general offense for providing weapons 
other than firearms to persons who may be legally disqualified from ownership, outside of the 
provisions incorporated into Section 5104.  However, even if weapons other than firearms are 
less dangerous than firearms, knowingly providing a deadly weapon to a disqualified person still 
creates a substantial risk of harm to the public.  Rather than having no offense, this catchall is 
added at two grades lower than the grade for firearms in Subsection (c)(4)(A). 
Section 5105(c)(5) grades the offense under Subsection (b) as a Class C misdemeanor, 
corresponding to the prohibition on sale of B.B., air, and spear guns to underage persons in 11 
Del.C. § 1445(2).  Note that 11 Del.C. § 1445(3), which prohibits a parent from allowing his or 
her child to have a firearm, B.B. gun, air gun, or spear gun without direct adult supervision, has 
not been retained because it is covered by reckless endangerment in proposed Section 1203. 
Section 5105(d) lists defined terms referenced in the Section.  These terms are defined in 
Section 5109.  Reference the Commentary for Section 5109 for an explanation of how the 
defined terms relate to current Delaware law.  
Permitting a Minor Access to a Firearm.  Section 5105 does not incorporate 11 Del.C. 
§ 1456 because it is redundant with other offenses in the Proposed Code.  Since § 1456 requires 
that the minor actually obtain the firearm and use it to cause death or serious bodily injury, a 
firearm owner who meets the requirements of § 1456 through his or her reckless or negligent 
action in allowing the minor access to the weapon could also be charged under manslaughter in 
proposed Section 1103, negligent homicide in proposed Section 1104, or reckless or negligent 
injuring in proposed Section 1203, notwithstanding this specific offense.  Moreover, the offenses 
in Sections 1103, 1104, and 1203 are lesser-included in each other, so there is still the 
opportunity for a defendant to plead down to a Class A misdemeanor, the grade currently 
assigned to conduct done in violation of § 1456.   
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Comment on Section 5106.  Possessing a Firearm While Under the Influence of Drugs or 
Alcohol 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 1460 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5106 establishes an offense for possession of a firearm while 
chemically impaired.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5106(a) defines the offense of possessing a 
firearm while chemically impaired, corresponding closely to 11 Del.C. § 1460(a).  The proposed 
offense definition used the phrase “chemically impaired” to describe the offender’s condition, 
rather than “under the influence of alcohol or drugs” used in § 1460(a).  Note that this change 
makes the definition of “under the influence of alcohol or drugs” in § 1460(b)(4) unnecessary.  
Section 5106(b) provides a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a) where the firearm 
was inoperable for various reasons, corresponding to the affirmative defense provided in 
§ 1460(a).  Rather than defining “not readily operable” in a separate section, as in § 1460(b)(1), 
the proposed Section incorporates the definition into the defense definition itself.  
Section 5106(c) grades the offense defined in Subsection (a) as a Class A misdemeanor, 
corresponding to the grade in § 1460(d).  The proposed Section, however, does not include the 
repeat offense grading provision provided in § 1460(d) because these situations are governed by 
the proposed general grade adjustment for repeat offenders in Section 804. 
Section 5106(d) lists defined terms referenced in the Section.  These terms are defined 
elsewhere, as noted in the text.  Reference the Commentary to the applicable Section for an 
explanation of how the defined terms relate to current Delaware law.  
11 Del.C. § 1460(c) Not Retained.  Section 5106 does not include 11 Del.C. § 1460(c), 
which covers law enforcement investigatory authorization to take certain evidence from an 
individual believed to have violated § 1460.  This provision would be more appropriately placed 
in a regulatory title dealing with weapons because it does not have any bearing on the liability of 
the offender and, as such, is not relevant to the offense itself. 
 
 
Comment on Section 5107.  Offenses Related to Background Checks for Firearm Sales  
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 1448A, 1448B,  
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5107 consolidates all current offenses related to background checks 
for firearms sales into one, comprehensive section.  Specifically, this Section prohibits the sale of 
a firearm without conducting the required check and the misuse of criminal records by licensed 
firearms dealers, importers, or manufacturers.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5107(a) defines the offense of sale of a 
firearm without conducting the required check, corresponding to the offense conduct in 
11 Del.C. §§ 1448A(h) and 1448B(e).  Note that in the proposed offense definition, “person” 
includes any corporate entity, partnership, or individual.  The meaning given to the term 
“person” is broad enough to encompass licensed dealers, importers, and manufacturers so these 
entities do not need to be explicitly enumerated in the text.  Additionally, Section 5107 does not 
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retain the grade adjustments in § 1448A and 1448B for subsequent violations because those 
adjustments are covered by the proposed general adjustment for repeat offenders in Section 804.  
Subsection (a)(3) provides that the criminal history background check need only comply with the 
regulatory requirements of  11 Del.C. §§ 1448A and 1448B.  This provision incorporates by 
reference all of the regulatory exceptions to when a background check is necessary, rather than 
including each exception within the text of the Code.  .   
Section 5107(b) defines the offense of misuse of criminal records by licensed firearms 
dealers, importers, and manufacturers, corresponding to 11 Del.C. § 1448A(f).  Note that Section 
5107(b) does not retain the portion of the offense in § 1448A covering unlawful disclosure of 
criminal history record information because that conduct is already covered by proposed Section 
4304(a)(2) (unlawful use of information).  The part of § 1448A(f) establishing a special 
jurisdictional rule is also not retained.  Normal rules of jurisdiction should govern offenses in 
Section 5107, and 4304, and creating a special carve-out for this provision undermines the goal 
of reducing inconsistencies in the law.  The grade of the offense under Section 4304(a)(2) is 
consistent with the grade of the offense in § 1448A(e). 
Section 5107(c) grades the offenses in the preceding Subsections.  The proposed grades 
correspond directly to the current grades in 11 Del.C. §§ 1448A(f), 1448A(h), and 1448B(e). 
Section 5107(d) lists a defined term referenced in the Section.  This term is defined in 
Section 5109.  Refer to the Commentary for Section 5109 for an explanation of how the defined 
terms relate to current Delaware law.  
Provisions in 11 Del.C. §§ 1448A and 1448B Not Retained.  A number of provisions in 
11 Del.C. §§ 1448A and 1448B have not been retained in Section 5107.  First, Section 5107 does 
not include the offense in § 1448A(g) of providing false statements or identification to subvert a 
background check.  This offense is covered by the proposed theft by deception offense in Section 
2103 because of the broad definitions of both “obtain” and “deception” in Section 2103.  
Although the grading scheme in Section 2101 increases the grade of the offense in § 1448A(g) to 
a Class 7 felony if the offender actually obtains the firearm, the attempt to obtain a firearm by 
fraudulent misidentification—governed by Section 701—would be graded lower as a Class 8 
felony, which carries the same maximum punishment as authorized in § 1448A(g).   
In addition, Section 5107 does not incorporate various regulatory provisions in §§ 1448A 
and 1448B, including §§ 1448A(a), (b), (c), (i), (j), (k) (l), and (m), and 1448B(a), (b), (c), (d) 
and (f).  These important regulations govern when background checks are necessary, the 
procedures for conducting them, and what can or cannot be done with the information learned 
through a background check.  These provisions should be preserved, but moved out of the 
criminal Code and into a regulatory title dealing with sales of firearms. 
Finally, 11 Del.C. § 1448A(d), a bar to civil liability, should be retained with the other 
provisions to be moved to a regulatory title because it does not speak to criminal liability. 
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Comment on Section 5108.  Grade Adjustment for Offenses Committed in a Safe School 
and Recreation Zone  
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 1457 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5108 establishes a general grade adjustment applicable to a number 
of offenses in this Chapter, including:  Section 5102, 5103, and 5104.  This grade increase is 
triggered when the offenses under Section 5102, 5103, or 5104 are committed in a Safe School 
and Recreation Zone. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5108 is based upon 11 Del.C. § 1457, but 
transforms it from a provision that creates a unique offense and increases the maximum 
punishment allowed for certain underlying offenses, into a pure grade adjustment 
Note that the beginning of Section 5108(a) includes language corresponding to § 1457(f), 
exempting possession of weapon for the purpose of engaging in any school-authorized activity 
from the application of grade adjustment. The remainder of Section 5108(a) defines the grade 
adjustment.  Subsection (a)(1) is based upon the definition of a “Safe School and Recreation 
Zone” in 11 Del.C. § 1457(c), but simplifies the phrasing, removes redundant language, and 
separates the definition into its various elements, for easier reading and application.  For 
example, Subsection (a)(1)(B) discusses the recreation centers, athletic fields, or stadiums 
covered in § 1457(c)(3), but removes the confusing language about private or public ownership 
because the crux of the provision is the use of the structure or property, not its ownership.  The 
upper grade limited established in Subsection (a)(2), restricting applicability of Section 5108(a) 
to offenses graded as a Class 7 felony or lower, is based on the maximum grades of the offenses 
enumerated in § 1457(b).  In restructuring the offense in § 1457 into a grade adjustment, it was 
necessary to include this upper limit to ensure that the grade aggravation would not apply to 
offenses with higher unadjusted grades than the Delaware General Assembly originally intended 
in enacting § 1457.  The provision in Subsection (a)(2) helps preserve those policy judgments. 
Section 5108(b) provides a defense to the application of the grade adjustment in 
Subsection (a).  This defense corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 1457(g), but with some minor changes.  
First, the language in § 1457(g) about the defendant’s burden of proof has been removed because 
the General Part deals generally with the burdens attached to all defenses.  Second, the defense in 
§ 1457(f) has not been retained because it only applies to the juvenile possession aspect of the 
offense, which this Proposed Code suggests should be moved to a regulatory title.  
Section 5108(c) lists defined terms referenced in the offense definition.  These terms are 
defined in Section 5109.  Reference the Commentary to Section 5109 for an explanation of how 
the defined terms relate to current Delaware law. 
Provisions in 11 Del.C. § 1457 Not Retained.  Note that a number of subsections in 11 
Del.C. § 1457, including § 1457(d), (e) (h), (i), and (j), have not been retained in Section 5108.  
First, § 1457(d), which explicitly allows prosecution for both the underlying offense and the 
hybrid offense in § 1457(a), is not included.  By transforming § 1457 from a hybrid offense into 
a pure grade adjustment, there is no longer a need to specify whether prosecution for the 
underlying offense is limited.  Under the proposed grade adjustment provision, there will only be 
one offense, so multiple prosecutions for the same underlying conduct is no longer an issue.  
Second, the “no defense for mistake of fact” provision in § 1457(e) is not included because the 
situation it addresses is governed by mistake principles in proposed Section 206 of the General 
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Part.  Third, § 1457(h), establishing non-application of the offense to law enforcement or 
security officers, is no longer necessary also as a result of § 1457 being transformed from a 
hybrid offense into a grade adjustment.  Since the offenses to which proposed Section 5108 is 
applicable already provide for exceptions such as, “except as authorized by law,” or defenses for 
having a license to concealed carry, those exceptions should cover any authorized possession of 
weapons by the persons excluded in § 1457(h) and a separate provision would be superfluous.  
Fourth, § 1457(i), providing an offense-specific definition of the term “deadly weapon,” is not 
retained.  Having different definitions of this term for the underlying offenses and the grade 
adjustment in Section 5108 would introduce inconsistency into the Proposed Code.  Finally, 
§ 1457(j) is not retained.  The specific grading provisions in § 1457(j)(1)-(4) are no longer 
necessary due to the conversion of the offense into a grade adjustment. Note also that § 1457(j), 
regarding juvenile possession of weapons is not retained in the Proposed Code because the only 
authorized penalty for those offenses is mandatory expulsion from school.  Delaware’s Criminal 
Code need not get entangled in the policies of schools and these provisions should instead be 
transferred to a regulatory title dealing with schools and education. 
 
 
Comment on Section 5109.  Definitions  
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 222, 1444, 1448; 24 Del.C. § 901 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This section collects all defined terms used in Chapter 5100. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5109(a) defines “dangerous instrument,” 
corresponding to the current definition in 11 Del.C. § 222(4).  As in current law, the definition 
includes “disabling sprays” (formerly “disabling chemical sprays), but the term is not defined.  
Instead, the term is given a single, commonly-understood example in the text—pepper spray—in 
order to avoid having to construe a highly technical definition.  However, the term should be 
interpreted to include everything in the current definition in 11 Del.C. § 222(7): “mace, tear gas, 
pepper spray or any other mixture containing quantities thereof, or any other aerosol spray or any 
liquid, gaseous or solid substance capable of producing temporary physical discomfort, disability 
or injury through being vaporized or otherwise dispersed in the air, or any cannister [sic], 
container or device designed or intended to carry, store or disperse such aerosol spray or such 
gas or solid.”   
Section 5109(b) defines “deadly weapon,” corresponding to the current definition in 
11 Del.C. § 222(5).  The proposed structure of the definition helpfully clarifies that the “us[ed] to 
cause death or serious physical injury” requirement only applies to dangerous instruments in 
Subsection (b)(2), not the inherently deadly weapons enumerated in Subsection (b)(1).21  Note 
that Subsection (b)(1) includes the definition of an “ordinary pocket knife” directly in the text to 
avoid having an additional defined term. 
                                                             
21 See Robinson v. State, 984 A.2d 1198  (Del. 2009) (holding that, to convict the defendant of possession 
of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited under 11 Del.C. § 1448(a), the State did not need to prove that the 
defendant used or attempted to use a steak knife to cause death or serious physical injury because the steak knife 
was inherently a “dangerous weapon”).  
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Section 5109(c) defines a “deadly weapon designed for the defense of one’s person,” 
corresponding to the description of deadly weapons made especially for the defense of one’s 
person in 24 Del.C. § 901. 
Section 5109(d) defines “destructive weapon,” corresponding to the current description 
of the term in 11 Del.C. § 1444(a) and (c).  Section 5109(d) separates the definition into its 
various elements for easier reading and application.  Note that even though the definition of 
“destructive weapon” in Subsection (d)(1) include “bomb or bomb shell,” the offenses in this 
Chapter do not conflict with proposed Section 2303 because, unlike proposed Section 2303, here 
there is no “intent to cause injury” requirement associated with the use of a “bomb or bomb 
shell.”  
Section 5109(e) defines “firearm,” corresponding to the current definition in 11 Del.C. 
§ 222(12). 
Section 5109(f) defines “handgun,” corresponding to the current definition in 11 Del.C. 
§ 1448(a)(5).   
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CHAPTER 5200.  DRUG AND RELATED OFFENSES 
 
Section 5201.  Possession of Controlled and Noncontrolled Substances 
Section 5202.  Manufacture or Delivery of Controlled and Noncontrolled Substances 
Section 5203.  Aggravating Factors Providing Grade Increase for Offenses in Sections 5201–02 
Section 5204.  Drug Paraphernalia Offenses 
Section 5205.  Prescription Drug Registrant Offenses 
Section 5206.  Unlawful Possession of a Prescription Form 
Section 5207.  Internet Pharmacy Offenses 
Section 5208.  Immunity in Life-Threatening Emergency 
Section 5209.  Court Having Jurisdiction 
Section 5210.  Definitions 
 
 
General Comment on Chapter 5200: 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 627, 1115–27; 16 Del.C. §§ 4765, 4740, 
4919A, 4798, 4767, 4768, 4769; 21 Del.C. §§ 4177, 
4177M, 2613 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Note that Chapter 5200 is built out of material from regulatory titles of the 
Delaware Code.  As a result, a number of current provisions that may have been included in 
Chapter 5200 have not been included, for various reasons.  This Comment explains each of those 
choices. 
Provisions Not Included.   A number of current provisions have not been included in this 
Chapter or anywhere else in Delaware’s Code because they are unnecessary for various reasons:   
16 Del.C. § 4765, which provides for the preservation of civil and administrative 
remedies, is unnecessary because proposed Section 104 of the General Part generally preserves 
those remedies.   
16 Del.C. § 4740(g), which covers the failure to maintain records required by law, is 
unnecessary because proposed Section 3203 [Tampering With Public Records] covers this 
conduct.   
16 Del.C. § 4919A(s) covers a variety of conduct that is already covered by other 
offenses in the Code:  selling marijuana to an individual not permitted by the medicine marijuana 
laws is covered by proposed Section 5201(b)(2) [Delivering a Controlled Substance], failing to 
maintain records if covered by proposed Section 3203 [Tampering with Public Records], and 
fraudulent maintenance of records is covered by proposed Section 2202 [Fraudulent Tampering 
with Public Records].   
16 Del.C. § 4919A(v), which covers the fraudulent representation to a law-enforcement 
officer of any circumstances relating to the medical use of marijuana to avoid arrest or 
prosecution, is unnecessary because proposed Section 3301(a)(2)(A) [Obstruction of Justice] 
covers virtually identical conduct.   
16 Del.C. § 4798(r), which covers knowing disclosure of prescription monitoring 
information, is unnecessary because proposed Section 4304(a) [Unlawful Disclosure of 
Confidential Information] already covers this conduct.   
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16 Del.C. § 4798(s) is unnecessary because, if an individual uses information to further 
his own crime, or the crime of another, he will be liable either under attempt, complicity, or 
conspiracy for the underlying offense.   
16 Del.C. 4798(t), which covers the fraudulent obtaining of prescription monitoring 
information, is unnecessary, because the conduct is already covered by either proposed Section 
4305 [Unlawful Access to Information], or, to the extent it amounts to a different kind fraud, 
proposed Section 2103 [Theft by Deception].   
Finally, 11 Del.C. § 627, a drug offense based on “huffing,” has not been retained 
because it is incompatible with the highly specialized, highly regulated field Chapter 5200 
operates within.  To the extent that the drugs contemplated in 11 Del.C. § 627 are controlled 
substances, the offense conduct is covered by proposed Sections 5201 and 5202. 
Provisions Retained in Other Chapters or Regulatory Titles.  A number of current 
provisions have not been included in this Chapter because they should either remain in separate 
regulatory titles or be moved to other parts of the Code.  11 Del. C. §§ 1115–27 define a number 
of offenses related to sale of tobacco, as well as regulations aimed at discouraging such sales.  
These offenses are graded at most as violations, which may only be punished by a fine.  Given 
the low levels of punishment and regulatory nature of these Sections, they ought to be relocated 
to another Title of the Delaware Code dealing with tobacco regulation.  16 Del.C. § 4767, which 
covers first offenders controlled substances diversion programs, should remain in a regulatory 
title or be incorporated into Chapter 500 as a non-exculpatory defense.  16 Del.C. § 4768, which 
covers the ability of the court to order a defendant to submit to a medical or psychiatric 
examination or treatment, should remain in a regulatory title.  21 Del.C. § 4177, which 
establishes a DUI offense, is variously covered by the assault, reckless endangerment, and 
homicide offenses (when read in conjunction with the reckless culpability read-in provision in 
Section 205(d)), or by proposed Section 1205 [Operating a Vehicle While Chemically Impaired].  
Finally, any minor, specialized regulatory offenses should remain in their regulatory titles, 
including, but not limited to, 21 Del.C. §§ 2613 and 4177M.  These minor offenses are really just 
regulatory enforcement and are best kept within their respective provisions.  
 
 
Comment on Section 5201.  Possession of Controlled and Noncontrolled Substances 
 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 16 Del.C. §§ 4752, 4755, 4756, 4763, 4764, 4761, 
4751D ; see also 16 Del.C. §§ 4762, 4766, 4751B  
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5201 establishes an offense prohibiting the possession of controlled 
and noncontrolled substances, by consolidating a number of separate offenses present in current 
Delaware law.  This offense includes such sub-offenses as: possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of marijuana, and unlawful possession of noncontrolled prescription drugs.  Section 
5201 also includes upward grade adjustments where aggravating factors are present. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5201(a) defines the offense of possession of a 
controlled substance, consolidating the most basic offense definitions from 16 Del.C. §§ 4752-
56, and 4763.  Note that the various grading distinctions in the current offense definitions are 
reserved for Section 5201(d), where all grading is addressed.  The “except as authorized by law” 
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provision in Subsection (a) is meant to incorporate the portions of § 4763 that exempt certain 
persons from prosecution.  Since the remaining provisions § 4763, specifying which categories 
of persons, are exempt are regulatory in nature, they should remain where they are currently in 
Title 16.  However, that portion of § 4763 should be reworded into an authorization, rather than 
an exception to liability, which is consistent with § 4763(a)(3)’s catch-all for other 
authorizations.   
The “as provided in Subsection (b)” provision in Subsection (a) preserves the 
parenthetical from § 4763(a) and is intended to make it clear that a prosecution under Subsection 
(b) for simple possession of marijuana precludes prosecution under Subsection (a) for more 
serious drug possession.  Note that this new structure, together with the consolidation of multiple 
current offenses under Section 5201 generally, makes the explicit provision for lesser-included 
offenses in 16 Del.C. § 4766 unnecessary.  The general principles covering lesser-included 
offenses in proposed Section 211 governs all such situations.  Finally, note that the “knowing” 
culpability required in Subsection (a)(1), while present in the current simple marijuana 
possession offense, is not present in the current offenses that make up the offense defined in 
Subsection (a).  This minimum culpability requirement has been added to justify the potentially 
very high liability an individual could face if convicted under Subsection (a). 
Note that 11 Del.C. § 4762, making it an offense to provide a hypodermic syringe or 
needle to another person except in proper medical circumstances, is covered by the interaction 
between proposed Sections 5201(a) and 211 (accomplice liability).  A person who aids another 
person to use a controlled substance in violation of Section 5201 by providing a hypodermic 
syringe under the terms of Section 211 would be equally liable for the drug offense. 
Section 5201(b) defines the offense of possession of marijuana, consolidating the 
offenses defined in 16 Del.C. § 4764(a)-(b).  Note that the provisions in § 4764(c)-(i) have not 
been included in Section 5201(b) or elsewhere in this Chapter, because they are purely 
regulatory and, as such, do not belong in the Criminal Code.  Specifically, the offense conduct in 
§ 4764(c)-(d) has not been included in the offense definition in Subsection (b) and should instead 
remain in Title 16 because it is punished solely by civil fines.  Additionally, the phrase “except 
as authorized by law” in Subsection (b) maintains current law’s exception from liability for 
medical marijuana possessed under a valid prescription. 
Section 5201(c) defines the offense of unlawful possession of noncontrolled prescription 
drugs, consolidating the offenses defined in 16 Del.C. § 4761(a), (c), and (d).  The grading 
distinctions in the current offense definitions are reserved for Section 5201(d), where all grading 
is addressed, including the application of the grade adjustment for an aggravating factor.  The 
phrase “possesses for personal use” excludes common-sense situations not contemplated by the 
General Assembly to be an offense, but more simply than the current affirmative defenses in 
§ 4761(e).  Note that there are a number of provisions in § 4761 that have not been incorporated 
into Subsection (c) because they either are unnecessary, or are purely regulatory and should 
remain in Title 16.  First, § 4761(f), which provides special evidentiary rules, is unnecessary 
because general evidentiary rules are sufficiently broad and flexible to ensure proper outcomes, 
and judges do not need special guidance with respect to these particular offenses.  Additionally, 
§ 4761(a)(2), which establishes specific exceptions from criminal liability for possession without 
a prescription, should remain in Title 16.  However, to fit together with the proposed offense 
definition in Section 5201(c), which only prohibits the possession of noncontrolled drugs for 
which a prescription is “required by law,” the exceptions should be reworked into affirmative 
authorizations for possession without a prescription. 
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Section 5201(d) grades the offenses in the preceding Subsections.  Subsection (d)(1) 
provides the grades for an offense under Subsection (a), corresponding directly to the current 
grades in 16 Del.C. §§ 4752-56.  Subsections (d)(1)(B) and (d)(1)(D) include the exceptions for 
prescription drugs found in current law.  Subsection (d)(1)(F), establishing a default grade for all 
other cases under Subsection (a), corresponds to the current grade in 16 Del.C. § 4763(b).  This 
grade applies to offenses involving controlled substances in quantities less than Tier 1, and 
offenses involving counterfeit controlled substances.  Subsection (d)(2) provides the grade for an 
offense under Subsection (b), taking into account the current grading scheme in 16 Del.C. 
§ 4764.  Currently, § 4764 grades a baseline marijuana possession offense as an “unclassified 
misdemeanor.”  Current § 4764 goes on to authorize a maximum sentence of three months for 
the version of the offense upon which proposed Subsection (b)(1) is based, but does not specify 
the maximum punishment authorized for the versions of the offense upon which proposed 
Subsection (b)(2) is based.  However, § 4764 elevates both versions of the offense to Class B 
misdemeanors if an aggravating factor is present.  To reconcile this discrepancy, Subsection 
(d)(2) grades both versions of the offense in Subsection (b) as a Class C misdemeanor.  
Subsection (d)(3) provides the grade for an offense under Subsection (c), taking into account the 
current grading scheme in 16 Del.C. § 4761(a).  Currently, § 4761(a) grades simple 
noncontrolled substances possession as an “unclassified misdemeanor” and the aggravated form 
as a Class B misdemeanor.  Since the proposed grading scheme does not include the 
“unclassified misdemeanor” grade, to make this aggravation work under the proposed scheme, it 
was necessary either to raise the grade of simple possession to a Class C misdemeanor, or to 
lower the grade of aggravated possession to a Class C misdemeanor.  The latter option has been 
adopted in light of the fact that the drugs involved in this offense are noncontrolled substances 
and presumably less severe than those involved in other offenses under Section 5201. 
Section 5201(d)(4) establishes upward grade adjustments for certain offenses if 
aggravating factors under proposed Section 5203 are present.  Subsection (d)(4)(A) permits an 
upward grade adjustment of up to two grades for certain offenses under Subsection (a) if 
aggravating factors are present, one grade per factor.  This provision accomplishes a similar 
effect to the grade aggravations in the underlying current offenses, but is also different in some 
important ways.  In the current underlying offenses, up to two factors can cause an upward 
adjustment in grade, and the highest available grade for aggravation is a Class 4 felony.  
However, the current law allows the first aggravating factor to increase the grade of the offense 
by two grades, and the second aggravating factor adds a third grade.  The two-grade increase for 
one aggravating factor has not been retained in Subsection (d)(4)(A); instead, Subsection 
(d)(4)(A) takes a “one grade per factor” approach.  This approach is desirable for two reasons.  
First, it is consistent with the grade aggravation approach for the manufacture/dealing offense, 
which is treated in all other respects as more serious than mere possession.  Second, it is 
consistent with the practice throughout the Proposed Code and current Delaware law, which 
nearly always equates one aggravating factor with a single grade increase.  Since every grade 
increase doubles the available maximum punishment, the proposed grading scheme is designed 
so that a single increase in grade always represents a significant, but incremental increase in 
available punishment.  The threat of doubled punishment should be a sufficient incentive for an 
offender against making her crime worse through the commission of aggravating factors.  
Subsection (d)(4)(B) permits an upward grade adjustment of one grade for certain offenses under 
Subsections (a)-(c) if an aggravating factor is present.  This provision, coupled with the 
limitation on raising the penalty above a Class 4 felony, accomplishes the precise effect that the 
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underlying current offenses do.  The only underlying offense that is not currently subject to 
aggravation is 16 Del.C. § 4758 (unlawful dealing in counterfeit or purported controlled 
substance).  However, for consistency, the aggravation in proposed Subsection (d)(4)(B) has 
been extended to cover that offense as well. 
Note that the grade adjustment provision in Section 5201(d)(4) does not include an 
adjustment based on 16 Del.C. § 4751B for prior felony drug convictions.  The Proposed Code 
deals with all repeat offender grade adjustments in Section 804 of the General Part, so this basis 
for aggravation has not been incorporated in Subsection (d)(4). 
Section 5201(d)(5) provides that knowledge of weight or quantity of a substance is not an 
element of the offense, incorporating salient portions of 16 Del.C. § 4751D(a) that apply to the 
proposed structure of the offenses in this Chapter.  The remaining provisions in § 4751D are 
evidentiary in nature and should remain in Title 16. 
Section 5201(e) lists defined terms referenced in Section 5201.  The terms in Subsections 
(f)(1) and (f)(3) are defined in Section 5109.  See the Commentary to Section 5109 for an 
explanation of how the defined terms relate to current Delaware law.  The remaining terms listed 
are defined outside of the Criminal Code in Title 16.  
 
 
Comment on Section 5202.  Manufacture and Delivery of Controlled and Noncontrolled 
Substances 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 16 Del.C. §§ 4752, 4753, 4754 4755, 4756, 4758, 4759, 
4761, 4751D; see also 16 Del.C. § 4760, 4760A 
 
Comment: 
Generally. Section 5202 establishes an offense prohibiting the manufacture and delivery 
of controlled and noncontrolled substances, by consolidating a number of separate offenses 
present in current Delaware law.  This offense includes such sub-offenses as: manufacture or 
delivery of a controlled substance, and unlawful delivery of noncontrolled prescription drugs.  
Section 5202 also includes upward grade adjustments where aggravating factors are present and 
defenses to liability for offenses under the Section.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5202(a) defines the offense of manufacture or 
delivery of a controlled substance, consolidating the most basic offense definitions from 16 
Del.C. §§ 4752-56 and 4758–59.  The various grading distinctions in the current offense 
definitions are reserved for Subsection (c) of proposed Section 5202, where all grading is 
addressed.  Note that the offense definition in Section 5202(a), plus accomplice liability in 
Section 211 and attempt liability in Section 701, work together to make 16 Del.C. §§ 4760 and 
4760A unnecessary.  Current § 4760 is unnecessary because, if a person intentionally aids 
another by providing a property for the activities prohibited under Section 5202(a), that person is 
an accomplice and can be liable for the underlying offense.  Accomplice liability may even, in 
some cases, result in greater liability than that provided under § 4760.  Similarly, the offense 
definition in § 4760A is unnecessary because it describes conduct that amounts to attempt or 
complicity liability for manufacturing a controlled substance.  Note also that the “possesses with 
intent to manufacture” language in the current offense definitions has not been retained in the 
proposed offense definition in Subsection (a)(3).  This is because the situation contemplated by 
the current language is factually impossible; if something has not yet been manufactured, it 
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cannot presently be possessed.  However, to the extent the current offense definitions are trying 
use this language to capture possession of precursor materials with intent to manufacture them 
into a controlled substance, that situation would be akin to attempted manufacture and be 
governed by Section 701 [Attempt] coupled with the underlying offense in Section 5202(a). 
Section 5202(b) defines the offense of unlawful delivery of noncontrolled prescription 
drugs, consolidating the offense definitions in 16 Del.C. §§ 4761(a), (c), and (d).  The various 
grading distinctions in the current offense definitions are reserved for Section 5202(c), where all 
grading is addressed, including application of the grade adjustments for an aggravating factor.  
Note that there are a number of provisions in § 4761 that have not been incorporated into 
Subsection (b) because they either are unnecessary, or are purely regulatory and should remain in 
Title 16.  First, § 4761(f), which provides special evidentiary rules, is unnecessary because 
general evidentiary rules are sufficiently broad and flexible to ensure proper outcomes, and 
judges do not need special guidance with respect to these particular offenses.  Second, 
§ 4761(a)(2), which establishes specific exceptions to criminal liability for possession without a 
prescription, should remain in Title 16, but be reworked into an affirmative authorization, rather 
than list of individual exceptions.  However, to fit together with the proposed offense definition 
in Section 5202(b), which only prohibits the possession of noncontrolled drugs for which a 
prescription is “required by law,” the exceptions should be reworked into affirmative 
authorizations for possession without a prescription. 
Section 5202(c) grades the offenses in Subsections (a) and (b).  Subsection (c)(1) 
provides the grades for various levels of an offense under Subsection (a), corresponding to the 
grades in 16 Del.C. §§ 4752-56 and 4758.  However, Subsection (c)(1) creates a grading 
distinction between completed delivery and manufacture, and possession with intent to deliver.  
Possession with intent to deliver is a specially codified form of attempt liability.  Its centrality to 
modern drug enforcement makes it indispensible to this Section.  But the grade of possession 
with intent has been set at one grade lower than the offense would be if completed.  This 
maintains consistency with the way attempts are graded for all other offenses is the Proposed 
Code.  See proposed Section 707 and corresponding Commentary.  The default grade in 
Subsection (c)(1)(B)(iv) (increased by one grade under Subsection (c)(1)(A)) covers offenses 
under Subsection (a) involving counterfeit or purported controlled substances.  Subsection (c)(2) 
provides the grades for an offense under Subsection (b).  The grade for completed delivery has 
been lowered to a Class A misdemeanor from the current grade of a Class G felony in 16 Del.C. 
§ 4761(c) to reflect the changes in the proposed grading scheme.  The grade was not changed to 
a Class 8 felony—its corresponding punishment level in the proposed grading scheme—because 
that would have allowed an aggravating factor to increase the punishment beyond what was 
intended in the current code.  Note also that Subsection (c)(2)(B) sets the grade of possession 
with intent to deliver at one grade lower than the completed offense, for the same reasons given 
above. 
Section 5202(c)(3) establishes an upward grade adjustment of one grade for the offenses 
in Section 5202 if an aggravating factor under Section 5203 is present.  This provision, coupled 
with the limitation on raising the penalty above a Class 4 felony, accomplishes the precise effect 
of the underlying current offense grades.  The only underlying offense that is not currently 
subject to aggravation is 16 Del.C. § 4758 (unlawful dealing in counterfeit or purported 
controlled substance).  However, for consistency, the aggravation in Subsection (c)(3) has been 
extended to cover that offense as well.  Note that the grade adjustment provision in Subsection 
(c)(3) does not include an adjustment based on 16 Del.C. § 4751B for prior felony drug 
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convictions.  The Proposed Code deals with all repeat offender grade adjustments in Section 804 
of the General Part, so this basis for aggravation has not been incorporated in Subsection (d)(4) 
Section 5202(c)(4) provides that knowledge of weight or quantity of a substance is not an 
element of the offense, incorporating salient portions of 16 Del.C. § 4751D(a) that apply to the 
proposed structure of the offenses in this Chapter.  The remaining provisions in § 4751D are 
evidentiary in nature and should remain in Title 16. 
Section 5202(d) provides a defense to criminal liability for an offense under Subsection 
(b), corresponding directly to 16 Del.C. § 4761(e). 
Section 5202(e) requires remediation and cleanup costs to be paid by any person 
convicted under Subsection (a)(1), corresponding to 16 Del.C. § 4760A(b).  Subsection (e) has 
simplified the language in § 4760A(b) and separated it into its elements for easier reading.  
Subsection (e) has also substituted the language about manufacture for language regarding 
“clandestine laboratories.”  Also unlike § 4760A(b), Subsection (e) does not define “cleanup” or 
“remediation” because their meanings are apparent.  Finally, the requirement in Subsection (e) 
that the costs be “reasonable” is a valuable addition to the provisions because it will provide a 
flexible standard to determine which costs a defendant should cover.  
Section 5202(f) lists defined terms referenced in Section 5202.  The terms in Subsections 
(f)(1) and (3) are defined in Section 5109.  See the Commentary to Section 5109 for an 
explanation of how the defined terms relate to current Delaware law.  The terms in Subsections 
(f)(2) and (4)-(6) are defined outside of the Criminal Code in Title 16. 
 
 
Comment on Section 5203.  Aggravating Factors for Grade Adjustments in Sections 5201–
02 
  
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 16 Del.C. § 4751A 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5203 establishes the aggravating factors applicable to the grade 
adjustments for all underlying offenses in Sections 5201-02.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5203(a) lists the four exclusive aggravating 
factors for grade adjustments in Sections 5201-02.  Subsection (a)(1) combines the two factors 
currently in 16 Del.C. § 4751A(1)a. and b.  By combining these two into a single factor, the 
provision in § 4751A(2) is rendered unnecessary because, no matter what the State may prove 
about the offense, it would still only add up to one factor.  For example, if the offense was 
committed within 300 feet of both a school and a church, there would still only be one 
aggravating factor under the proposed scheme in Subsection (a)(1).  Subsection (a)(1) also 
incorporates and simplifies the definitions from 16 Del.C. § 4701(41) and (42) for “protected 
park” and “protected school.”  Note that all references to ownership of the “park or recreation 
area, including parkland” in the current definition have not been retained in Subsection (a)(1)(B) 
because the crux of the factor is what the land is used for (i.e., children’s recreation), not who 
owns it.  Furthermore, the language about ownership makes the definition difficult to understand.  
Note also that Subsection (a)(1) incorporates a “private places” exception into the aggravating 
factor, rather than using the structure in 16 Del.C. § 4701(41) and (42), which enumerates each 
of the specific “areas accessible to the public” that are covered under the aggravating factor.  
This change makes it unnecessary to include the language about “parked vehicles” from 
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§ 4701(41)b. in proposed Subsection (a)(1).  A parked vehicle would clearly not be considered a 
“private place” subject to the exception in Subsection (a)(1) because it would be unreasonable 
for anyone to expect to be free of surveillance while in a parked car on a public road.    
Section 5203(a)(2) lists another aggravating factor, corresponding to 16 Del.C. 
§ 4751A(1)c.  Note that the word “vehicle” in § 4751A(1)c. has been changed to “motor vehicle” 
in proposed Subsection (a)(2) for consistency with definitions that are already being used in the 
Proposed Code.  Since “vehicle” has been used to mean more than automobiles elsewhere in the 
Code, it is necessary to be more specific when referencing automobiles only. 
Section 5203(a)(3) lists another aggravating factor, corresponding to 16 Del.C. 
§ 4751A(1)d., but separating into its elements for easier reading and application. 
Note that Section 5203(a) omits a final aggravating factor, corresponding to 16 Del.C. 
§ 4751A(1)e., for resisting arrest by means of force, or fleeing from an officer and recklessly 
endangering other persons by fleeing from a law enforcement officer in a vehicle.  This factor 
has been omitted because it describes offense conduct that may be separately charged as one or 
more other offenses under either proposed Section 3302(b)(2), or Sections 3302 and 
1203(b)(2)(A). 
Section 5203(b) lists defined terms referenced in the aggravating factors.  The terms in 
Subsections (b)(1)-(3) are defined in Section 5109.  Reference the Commentary to Section 5109 
for an explanation of how the defined terms relate to current Delaware law.  The terms in 
Subsections (b)(4), (5), and (7) are defined elsewhere in the Proposed Code.  Reference the 
Commentary to those Sections for an explanation of how the defined terms relate to current 
Delaware law.  Finally, the defined term in Subsection (b)(6) is defined outside of the Criminal 
Code in Title 9.  
 
 
Comment on Section 5204.  Drug Paraphernalia Offenses   
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 16 Del.C. §§ 4771, 4772, 4773, 4774  
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5204 combines a number of offenses in current law related to drug 
paraphernalia, including: the use, manufacture and sale, and advertising of drug paraphernalia.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5204(a) defines the offense for use of drug 
paraphernalia, corresponding to 16 Del.C. §§ 4771(a) and 4774(a).  The addition of the “except 
as authorized by law” language to the offense definition covers the exemptions in 16 Del.C. 
§ 4773(1) where a person is authorized by law to possess items of drug paraphernalia.  The 
phrase, “or as provided in 16 Del.C. § 4774(b)” is included because that subsection describes a 
civil penalty for possession of drug paraphernalia related to a personal use quantity.  That 
provision is not an authorization for possession, but would prohibit parallel criminal proceedings 
for the same paraphernalia. 
Section 5204(b) defines the offense for manufacture and sale of drug paraphernalia, 
corresponding to 16 Del.C. §§ 4771(b) and 4774(c)-(d), but separates the offense definition into 
its elements.  Note that Subsection (b) also covers the offense language in 16 Del.C § 4757(c) 
because it is redundant with the other offenses.  Accordingly, § 4757(c) should be removed from 
Title 16.  As in Subsection (a), the addition of the “except as authorized by law” language to the 
offense definition covers the exemptions in 16 Del.C. § 4773(1) where a person is authorized by 
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law to manufacture or distribute items of drug paraphernalia.  Subsection (b)(2) provides that an 
offender must be reckless as to whether the item will be used as drug paraphernalia in violation 
of Subsection (a).  This provision is different from current law.  First, the “knowing or under 
circumstances where one reasonably should know” culpability requirement in § 4771(b) has been 
replaced with the “reckless” culpability requirement.  The current language appears to describe 
negligence, which is too slight a culpability level to support the level of punishment invoked by 
this non-violent offense.  Assuming that a “negligence” culpability level was not the General 
Assembly’s intent—given that the word “negligence” never actually appears in the text—but 
taking into account that the language itself clearly intends to soften the culpability requirement of 
“knowing,” it is most appropriate to use a “reckless” culpability requirement instead.  Second, 
the list of possible uses of the paraphernalia (e.g., “used to plant, propagate, cultivate, etc.”) in 
§ 4771(b) has been removed because it is redundant of the definition of “drug paraphernalia.”  
The reader is able to cross-reference the provision here with the extensive definition of “drug 
paraphernalia” in Title 16, so it is unnecessary to include language from the definition in 
Subsection (b)(2). 
Section 5204(c) defines the offense for advertising drug paraphernalia, corresponding to 
16 Del.C. § 4774(e).  Subsection (c)(2) provides that an offender must be reckless as to whether 
the advertisement is intended to promoted the sale of drug paraphernalia.  As in Subsection 
(b)(2) above, the “knowing or under circumstances where one reasonably should know” 
culpability requirement currently in § 4774(e) has been replaced with a “reckless” culpability 
requirement in this Subsection.  The current language appears to describe negligence, which is 
too slight a culpability level to support the level of punishment invoked by this non-violent 
offense.  Assuming that a “negligence” culpability level was not the General Assembly’s 
intent—given that the word “negligence” never actually appears in the text—but taking into 
account that the language itself clearly intends to soften the culpability requirement of 
“knowing,” it is most appropriate to use a “reckless” culpability requirement instead. 
Section 5204(d) establishes that a person may not be charged under both Section 5201(b) 
and Section 5204(a) for possession of drug paraphernalia pertaining to the use of marijuana.  
This corresponds to 16 Del.C. § 4771(a), preserving the exception in the second sentence of that 
provision.  Insofar as the exception in § 4771(a) applies to the civil penalties for marijuana 
possession that have not been relocated to the Proposed Code, however, the language of 
§ 4771(a) must be preserved in Title 16.  
Section 5204(e) grades the offenses in Subsections (a)-(c).  Generally, the grades reflect 
the same penalties established in 16 Del.C. §§ 4771 and 4774, but have been translated to fit 
within the proposed grading scheme.  However, the grades in Subsection (e)(2) have been set at 
one grade lower than current law provides for the same conduct.  The legislation authorizing this 
Proposed Code mandates that “disproportionate” statutes be identified and rectified.  The 
proportionality of an offense’s authorized punishment is directly tied to the grade assigned to that 
offense.  An offense’s grade could be either disproportionately high or low.  The nonpartisan 
consultative group supervising the drafting process for this Proposed Code has scrutinized the 
relative grading of all offenses, and has decided that this offense’s grade is disproportionately 
high when compared to other offenses of the same grade in current law.  The grade of this 
offense has been changed to reflect that judgment.  Subsection (e)(4) corresponds to the grading 
provision in 16 Del.C. § 4774(d) specifically, but separates it into its elements for easier reading 
and application.  Note that Subsection (e)(2)(A) sets the grade of possession with intent to 
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deliver drug paraphernalia at one grade lower than the completed offense, for the reasons given 
above.  See the Commentary to proposed Section 5202(c)(2). 
Section 5204(f) lists defined terms referenced in Section 5204.  The terms in Subsections 
(f)(1) and (2) are defined in Section 5109.  See the Commentary to Section 5109 for an 
explanation of how the defined terms relate to current Delaware law.  The term in Subsection 
(f)(3) is defined outside of the Criminal Code in Title 16.  
Factors for Determination Not Included.  Section 5204 does not include 16 Del.C. 
§ 4772, which sets forth a non-exclusive list of factors a court should consider in determining 
whether an object is drug paraphernalia.  It is unnecessary to list any factors for the Court in this 
provision because judges have the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence, logic, and experience 
to guide them, in addition to a very specific definition of “drug paraphernalia” in Title 16.  
 
 
Comment on Section 5205.  Prescription Drug Registrant Offenses 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 16 Del.C. §§ 4739, 4757, 4759 
 
Comment:  
Generally.  Section 5205 combines current Delaware offenses related to prescription drug 
registrants: unlawfully distributing prescription drugs, and administering performance-enhancing 
steroids 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5205(a) defines the offense of unlawfully 
distributing prescription drugs, corresponding to 16 Del.C. § 4759(a)(1) and incorporating the 
necessary features of the prohibitions found in 16 Del.C. § 4739.  The “except as authorized by 
law” provision in Subsection (a) covers the exceptions and authorizations of certain behavior 
found throughout § 4739.  The offense definition in Subsection (a)(3) adds a “knowing” 
culpability requirement that is present in other, similar offenses in the current statute.  See 16 
Del.C. § 4757(a)(1).  Note that Subsection (a)(5) specifically corresponds to the portion of 
§ 4759(a)(2) dealing with distribution and dispensing of prescription drugs.   
Section 5205(b) defines the offense of administering performance enhancing steroids, 
corresponding to 16 Del.C. § 4757(a)(7), but separating it into its elements for easier reading and 
application.  
Note that the offenses in Subsections (a)–(b), coupled with the inchoate offense of 
solicitation in Section 702, covers the conduct defined in 16 Del.C § 4757(c).  Accordingly, 
§ 4757(c) should be removed from Title 16. 
Section 5205(c) grades the offenses in Subsections (a)–(b) corresponding to the current 
grades in 16 Del.C. §§ 4757(b) and 4759(b). 
Section 5205(d) lists defined terms referenced in Section 5205.  The terms in Subsections 
(d)(2) and (5) are defined in Section 5109.  Reference the Commentary to Section 5109 for an 
explanation of how the defined terms relate to current Delaware law.  The term in Subsection 
(c)(3) is defined elsewhere in the Proposed Code.  Reference the Commentary to the applicable 
Section for an explanation of how the defined term relates to current Delaware law.  The terms in 
Subsections (c)(1), (4), and (6) are defined outside of the Criminal Code in Title 16.  
Provisions in 16 Del.C. § 4757 Not Retained.  A number of provisions in 16 Del.C. 
§ 4757 have not been included in Section 5205, for various reasons.  First, § 4757(a)(2) has not 
been retained because it is redundant with other offenses in the Proposed Code.  Since 
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registrations to deal in prescription drugs are issued biannually by the appropriate agency, the 
use of a “fictitious, revoked, suspended, or expired” registration number, or one given to another 
person, could constitute a number of other offenses, including: Forgery/Counterfeiting under 
proposed Section 2201, Theft by Deception under proposed Section 2103, Tampering with 
Public Records under proposed Section 3203, Fraudulent Tampering with Public Records under 
proposed Section 2202, or, even Obstruction of the Administration of Justice under proposed 
Section 3304, if done directly to a law enforcement body.   
Second, 16 Del.C. § 4757(a)(3), which covers the acquisition or attempt to obtain 
possession of a controlled substance or prescription drug by “misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, 
deception, or subterfuge,” has not been retained because it is redundant with other offenses in the 
Proposed Code. Current § 4757(a)(3) essentially amounts to a basic fraud or forgery offense.  
Various frauds are already covered under Section 2103 [Theft by Deception] and forgery is 
covered under Section 2201. 
Third, 16 Del.C. § 4757(a)(4), which covers the provision of false or fraudulent material 
information or the omission of material information from any required application, report, 
record, or document, has not been retained because it is redundant with other offenses in the 
Proposed Code.  The conduct defined in § 4757(a)(4) is virtually identical to that in proposed 
Section 3203 [Tampering with Public Records] or, if done with intent to defraud, to proposed 
Section 2202 [Fraudulent Tampering with Public Records]. 
Fourth, 16 Del.C. § 4757(a)(5), which covers the manufacture, distribution, or possession 
of any device designed to reproduce a “trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark,” onto 
any drug, drug container, or label so as to render the drug a counterfeit, has not been retained 
because it is redundant with other offenses in the Proposed Code.  The conduct defined in 
§ 4757(a)(5) amounts to trademark counterfeiting, which is covered in proposed Section 2201 
[Forgery and Counterfeiting]. 
Fifth, 16 Del.C. § 4757(a)(6), which covers the acquisition or attempt to obtain 
possession of a controlled substance by theft, has not been retained because it is redundant with 
any of the consolidated offenses treated as “theft” in proposed Section 2102-07. 
Finally, § 4757(c), which covers the solicitation of multiple prescription drug crimes, has 
not been retained because it amounts to a repeat offender grade adjustment.  [The situations 
provided in § 4757(c) are covered by the general grade adjustment in Section 804 of the 
Proposed Code.] 
Provisions in 16 Del.C. § 4759 Not Retained.  A number of provisions in 16 Del.C. 
§ 4759 have not been included in Section 5205 for various reasons.  First, § 4759(a)(3), which 
covers the refusal or failure to make, keep, or furnish any record required by law, has not been 
retained.  Since § 4759(a)(3) involved the violation of a duty specified by law, it is covered by 
proposed Section 3304 [Obstructing the Administration of Justice].  
Second, § 4759(a)(4), which covers the refusal of entry into premises for inspection 
authorized by law, has not been retained.  Like § 4759(a)(3), § 4759(a)(4) is covered by Section 
3304 [Obstructing the Administration of Justice] and has been specifically incorporated into the 
grading scheme there. 
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Comment on Section 5206.  Unlawful Possession of a Prescription Form  
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. § 841C 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5206 creates an offense prohibiting the unlawful possession of a 
prescription form.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5206 corresponds directly to 11 Del.C. 
§ 841C(a).  Note that the theft offense in § 841C(b) is covered by various offenses in Chapter 
2100 [Theft].  Additionally, unlike § 841C(a), Section 5206 does not include a definition of 
“possession” specifically for this offense because proposed Section 204 defines “possession” 
generally for the entire Proposed Code. 
 
 
Comment on Section 5207.  Internet Pharmacy Offenses  
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 16 Del.C. §§ 4743, 4744  
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5207 combines a number of offenses in current Delaware law related 
to internet pharmacies, including: distributing or prescribing drugs through, patronizing, and 
advertising an internet pharmacy.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5207(a) defines the offense of distributing or 
prescribing drugs through an internet pharmacy.  Subsection (a)(1) covers the offense conduct in 
16 Del.C. § 4744(a)(1), but simplifies it by dividing it into its elements for easier reading and 
application.  Subsection (a)(1) also incorporates the definition of a “Delaware patient” found in 
16 Del.C. § 4743(2) directly into the offense definition, rather than referencing the defined term.  
In adapting the definition of “Delaware patient” for inclusion in the offense definition, only the 
key elements of the definition were retained.  This includes the language about a request being 
made by the person and a delivery of the prescription drugs being within Delaware.  Note that 
the offense definition in Subsection (a)(1), coupled with accomplice liability in proposed Section 
211, also covers the offense conduct in § 4744(d).  The exception in Section 5207(d)(1) for 
practitioner-patient relationships extends to cases of purported accomplice liability under 
proposed Section 211.  Subsection (a)(2) corresponds to 16 Del.C. § 4744(c)(1), but simplifies it 
by dividing it into its elements for easier reading and application.  Subsection (a)(2)(B) clarifies 
what “knowingly” means as to the offender’s state of mind in § 4744 (c)(2) by incorporating the 
standard into the offense definition. 
Section 5207(b) defines the offense of patronizing an internet pharmacy, corresponding 
to 16 Del.C. § 4744(e)(1).  Section 5207(b) simplifies the offense definition in § 4744(e)(1) by 
dividing it into its elements for easier reading and application.  The “what the person knows to 
be” language in Subsection (b)(2) achieves the effect of incorporating the “knowing” culpability 
requirement from § 4744(e)(1) directly into the offense definition. 
Note that the offenses in Section 5207(a)–(b) each include an element that the drugs 
ordered not fill an “authorized prescription.”  This term stands in the place of the lengthy 
exceptions to liability in current law, where “the practitioner issuing the prescription drug order 
to be filled or dispensed by the Internet pharmacy is a licensed practitioner who has a patient-
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practitioner relationship with the Delaware patient.”  See 16 Del.C. § 4744(a)(1), (c)(1), (e)(1).  
Instead, those clauses have been incorporated as the definition of an “authorized prescription” in 
Section 5210. 
Section 5207(c) defines the offense of advertising an internet pharmacy, corresponding to 
16 Del.C. § 4744(b)(1).  Section 5207(c) simplifies the offense definition in § 4744(b)(1) by 
dividing it into its elements for easier reading and application.   
Section 5207(d) provides an exception to criminal liability under Subsections (a)-(c). 
Subsection (d) establishes an exception to liability under Subsection (c) where Delaware delivery 
of prescription drugs is clearly excluded from an advertisement, corresponding to the exception 
in 16 Del.C. § 4744(b)(1).  Note that the exception in Subsection (d) has been reworded to make 
it unnecessary to define the terms “link” or “internet site” by removing the term “link” altogether 
and replacing the term “internet site” with “website.”  
Section 5207(e) grades the offenses in Subsections (a)-(c).  Note that none of the 
minimum fine provisions found throughout 16 Del.C. § 4744 have been included because all 
minimum penalties in the Proposed Code are set forth in Section 802.  Subsection (e)(1) grades 
the offense under Subsection (a).  Subsections (e)(1)(A) and (1)(C) maintain the current grading 
schemes in § 4744(a)(2) and (c)(2).  However, unlike the current grading schemes in 
§ 4744(a)(2) and (c)(2), which aggravate both conduct that causes death and serious physical 
injury by two grade levels, the proposed grading scheme only aggravates conduct that causes 
death by two grade levels.  Throughout the Proposed Code, the lack of resulting death normally 
generates lesser punishment and the presence of an aggravating factor normally only generates a 
single grade increase.  Accordingly, conduct that causes only serious physical injury is dealt with 
in Subsection (e)(1)(B) and aggravated with only a single grade increase.  This decision is 
consistent with the grading approaches throughout the Proposed Code and allows the Class 4 
felony grade to be reserved for only the worst cases.   
Section 5207(e)(1) grades the offense under Subsection (b), corresponding to the current 
grade in 16 Del.C. § 4744(e)(2). 
Section 5207(e)(2) grades the offense under Subsection (c), corresponding to the current 
grade in 16 Del.C. § 4744(b)(2).  
Section 5207(f) lists defined terms referenced in Section 5207.  The term in Subsection 
(f)(1) is defined in Section 5109.  See the Commentary to Section 5109 for an explanation of 
how the defined term relates to current Delaware law.  The terms in Subsections (f)(3) and (5) 
are defined elsewhere in the Proposed Code.  Reference the Commentary to the applicable 
Sections for an explanation of how the defined terms relate to current Delaware Law.  Finally, 
the terms in Subsections (f)(2) and (4) are defined outside of the Criminal Code in Title 16.  
Provisions in 16 Del.C. § 4744 Not Retained.  The provisions in 16 Del.C. § 4744(f)-(h) 
have not been included, for various reasons.  First, § 4744(f), which establishes a special 
jurisdictional rule for offenses under § 4744, is unnecessary.  Normal rules of jurisdiction for 
Superior Court and Court of Common Pleas will suffice for the proposed offenses under Section 
5207.  Second, § 4744(g), which establishes that it is not a defense to prosecution that any 
recipient of a prescription drug order is not prosecuted, convicted, or punished upon the same act 
or transaction, is unnecessary; because the proposed offenses in Section 5207 are defined so as to 
prohibit the pharmacy’s conduct; the pharmacy’s liability is not at all dependent on the intended 
recipient’s criminal conduct, or lack thereof.  Even if this “no defense” provision were necessary, 
proposed Section 211 already has a general provision dealing with this situation that achieves the 
same effect.  Finally, § 4744(h), which covers the preservation of civil and administrative 
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remedies, is already covered by proposed Section 104.  Generally, civil and administrative are 
always preserved under proposed Section 104. 
 
 
Comment on Section 5208.  Immunity in Life-Threatening Emergency 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 16 Del.C. § 4769 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5208 establishes immunity from the use of evidence gathered as a 
result of summoning law enforcement or emergency medical services due to an overdose or other 
life-threatening emergency situation.  The immunity extends to both the person suffering the 
medical emergency and the person summoning assistance.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5208 corresponds to 16 Del.C. § 4769, but is 
different in many ways.  Section 5208 seeks to simplify the elements of the grant of immunity 
found in § 4769, while clarifying an ambiguity in the current provisions.  Current § 4769 does 
not explicitly require that the immunized drug offense be connected in any way to the 
circumstances surrounding the overdose.  Section 5208(a)(2), instead, requires that the evidence 
against which the defendant is immunized be obtained as a direct result of the offender 
summoning law enforcement or emergency medical services.  Furthermore, § 4769 provides a 
broad grant of immunity against arrest, charge, or prosecution for a drug offense.  Since the grant 
of immunity is so sweeping, § 4769 has very specific elements that must be satisfied before an 
offender can receive immunity.  Summoning medical assistance in a life-threatening emergency 
is noble, but absolute immunity for a vaguely defined collection of drug offenses is potentially a 
disproportionate windfall for the offender.   
Instead, Section 5208 proposes a more modest grant of use immunity for evidence 
gathered as a result of the offender’s summoning law enforcement or emergency medical 
personnel, rather than absolute immunity from arrest, charge, or prosecution.  Since the 
immunity is restricted to use of evidence, rather than prosecution for offenses, no nexus between 
the evidence and a particular offense need be specified.  And since the immunity is more 
narrowly tailored to the circumstances, there is no need to elaborate highly specific elements that 
must be satisfied before the immunity becomes effective.  Additionally, since Section 5208 does 
not contain a grant of absolute immunity, it is not necessary to restrict the grade of the offense to 
which the grant of immunity can apply, as is done in § 4769(c). 
Note that Section 5208(a) requires only that the person “reasonably believes” an overdose 
or medical emergency is taking place.  This language is taken from the definition of “overdose” 
in 16 Del.C. § 4769(a)(2), which currently defines an overdose to include reasonable belief that 
an overdose is occurring.  It is more precise to define “overdose” in purely objective terms—
which is done in Section 5210(i)—and instead define the immunity according to the defendant’s 
subjective actions and beliefs.   
Application to Title 4 Offenses for Underage Drinking.  16 Del.C. § 4769(d) applies the 
grant of immunity to offenses in Title 4 dealing with underage drinking.  As those are minor 
regulatory offenses not incorporated into Chapter 5200, or anywhere else in the Proposed Code, 
it does not make sense for their immunity provision to appear in Title 11.  Therefore, Section 
5208 does not include those offenses.  However, an immunity provision similar to Section 5208 
should be added to the relevant Title 4 offenses to ensure the effect of current law is maintained. 
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Comment on Section 5209.  Court Having Jurisdiction  
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 16 Del.C. § 4795 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  Section 5209 establishes the jurisdictional rules for all violations of proposed 
Chapter 5200.  Section 5209 also provides an exception to those rules.   
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5209 corresponds directly to 16 Del.C. 
§ 4795.  Note, however, that the proposed Section does not include the provisions from § 4795 
relating to civil punishments because they are purely regulatory.  The rules regarding Justice of 
the Peace Court jurisdiction over civil punishments and Court of Common Pleas jurisdiction over 
violations of 16 Del.C. § 4764(d), which authorizes a maximum of five days imprisonment, 
should remain in Title 16.  Subsection (b) provides an exception to the jurisdictional rules in 
Subsection (a), also corresponding to § 4795.  Note that, to the extent the translation of the 
offenses in the proposed Chapter allows, the Sections covered under the exception in proposed 
Subsection (b) are the same as those covered by the exception in the current law.  
 
 
Comment on Section 5210.  Definitions  
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11 Del.C. §§ 222(2), 271, 511, 512, 513, 522; 16 Del.C. 
§§ 4701, 4773, 4743, 4751C, 4769(a)(2) 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This section collects and defines all defined terms used in Chapter 5100.  
Section 5210 notes that additional definitions can be found in 16 Del.C. § 4701, the definitions 
provisions in the current law for all drug offenses and regulations. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5210(a) defines “accomplice,” corresponding 
to the definition in proposed Section 211, which is based on 11 Del.C. § 271. 
Section 5210(b) defines “authorized prescription,” a term not specifically defined in 
current law.  However, the definition is based upon the final clauses of 16 Del.C. § 4744(a)(1), 
(c)(1), and (e)(1), which create an exception to prosecution for certain internet pharmacy 
offenses based on a “patient-practitioner relationship.”  The term is useful in other contexts to 
specify what sort of prescription precludes criminal liability for possession of prescription drugs.  
Specifically, it focuses on the relationship between the parties: a prescription made out by a 
doctor who has no clinical relationship with the recipient of the drugs is not a valid prescription 
for the purposes of criminal liability.   
Section 5210(c) defines “co-conspirator,” corresponding to the definition in proposed 
Section 703, which is based on 11 Del.C. §§ 511-13 and 522. 
Section 5210(d) defines “controlled substance,” cross-referencing the schedules of 
controlled drugs in Chapter 47 of Title 16 in the same way as current 11 Del. C. § 222(2). 
Section 5210(e) defines “deliver” or “delivery,” corresponding to 16 Del.C. § 4701(8), 
but with a few changes.  First, the definition in Section 5210(d) does not include the “attempt” 
language since attempted delivery is covered by attempt liability under proposed Section 701.  
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Second, the definition in Section 5210(d) does not include the specific reference to controlled 
substances because the Proposed Code only uses generally applicable definitions.  
Section 5210(f) defines “drug paraphernalia,” cross-referencing the definition in 16 
Del.C. § 4701(17).  Subsection (f) also incorporates the exception in 16 Del.C. § 4773(2) for 
items intended for use with tobacco products. 
Section 5210(g) defines “internet pharmacy,” corresponding to the definition in 16 Del.C. 
§ 4743(5).  For simplicity, the proposed definition rewords the current definition in a few places.  
First, “person” in the proposed definition is inclusive of entities, so the definition no longer 
needs to specify “person or entity.”  Moreover, the term “Internet site” is replaced with the term 
“website,” to avoid having to further define the term “Internet site” separately, as is done in the 
current law.  Finally, the proposed definition specifies only that the orders be delivered to 
Delaware patients, rather than “patients, including Delaware patients,” as in the current law.  
Note that this specification of Delaware patients does not imply that the pharmacy exclusively 
serves Delaware patients. 
Section 5210(h) defines “leaf marijuana,” corresponding to the definition of “leaf 
marijuana” within the definition of “personal use quantity” in 16 Del.C. § 4701(33).  
Section 5210(i) defines “overdose,” corresponding to the current definition in 16 Del.C. 
§ 4769(a)(2).  However, the language of reasonable belief has been omitted.  Instead, that 
language is used to define the conditions of the immunity in proposed Section 5208(a)(1)(A). 
Section 5210(j) defines “registrant,” creating a new definition based on the terminology 
currently used in Title 16.  
Section 5210(k) defines a “Tier 1 quantity” of a controlled substance, corresponding to 
16 Del.C. § 4751C(1). 
Section 5210(l) defines a “Tier 2 quantity” of a controlled substance, corresponding to 16 
Del.C. § 4751C(2). 
Section 5210(m) defines a “Tier 3 quantity” of a controlled substance, corresponding to 
16 Del.C. § 4751C(3). 
Section 5210(n) defines a “Tier 4 quantity” of a controlled substance, corresponding to 
16 Del.C. § 4751C(4). 
Section 5210(o) defines a “Tier 5 quantity” of a controlled substance, corresponding to 
16 Del.C. § 4751C(5). 
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CHAPTER 5300.  OFFENSES INVOLVING ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING 
 
Section 5301. Organized Crime and Racketeering 
Section 5302. Gang Participation 
Section 5303. Money Laundering 
Section 5404. Definitions 
 
 
Comment on Section 5301.  Organized Crime and Racketeering 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 476, 477, 1503, 1504; see also 1501, 1505, 
1506, 1507, 1508, 1509, 1510, 1511 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of organized crime and racketeering, which 
is intended to punish and prevent: (1) the infiltration and acquisition of legitimate economic 
enterprises by racketeering practices, and (2) the use and exploitation of both legal and illegal 
enterprises to further criminal activities.  
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5301(a) generally corresponds to 11 Del.C. 
§ 1503.  However, Subsection (a) specifies that the offense must be committed “knowingly,” 
whereas § 1503 fails to specify a required level of culpability.  Under proposed Section 205, 
“recklessness” would be read in by default.  However, given the high grade of this offense and 
the offense conduct required, it seems unlikely that the General Assembly intended for mere 
recklessness to support liability for racketeering.  Therefore, “knowingly” has been specified 
instead.  Subsection (a)(1) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 1503(a), but with one minor difference.  
The proposed provision replaces the current clause “employed by, or associated with, any 
enterprise to conduct or participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity . . . .” with “conducts or participates in the affairs of an enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .”  The proposed change is simpler but keeps the 
original provision’s breadth by removing the “employed” and “associated” language altogether 
and simply focusing on the offense conduct.  
Section 5301(a)(2) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 1503(b).  The proposed 
provision replaces the current provision’s “real property or personal property of any nature, 
including money” with “property.”  The term “property” is sufficient to include all types of 
property, including money, because of its broad definition in Section 805(d)(3) of the Proposed 
Code. 
Section 5301(a)(3) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 1503(c), but with two minor changes.  
First, the proposed provision eliminates the current clause “in which such person has 
participated” after “pattern of racketeering activity” because the clause does not appear 
elsewhere in § 1503, and because using racketeering proceeds to establish an enterprise should 
be punishable regardless of whether the person participated in the racketeering activity that 
generated the proceeds.  Second, the proposed provision eliminates the clause “any part of such 
proceeds or any proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof” because “directly or 
indirectly” is broad enough that use of indirect proceeds such as investment proceeds will fall 
under the provision.  Third, the proposed provision uses the term “property” instead of “real 
property or personal property.” 
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Section 5301(a) does not include 11 Del.C. § 1503(d), which prohibits conspiring to 
violate or attempting to violate any of the organized crime and racketeering provisions, because 
conspiracy and attempt are covered by the inchoate offenses in Sections 701 and 703.   
The current provisions do not specify a culpability requirement for this offense, meaning 
that “reckless” would be read in based on Section 205(d) of the Proposed Code.  However, 
knowing, not reckless, may be a more appropriate culpability requirement for this offense. The 
draft text includes a footnote raising this issue. 
Section 5301(b) maintains the grading provision found in 11 Del.C. § 1504(a).  
Section 5301(c) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 1504(b), with three minor changes.  
First, the proposed provision replaces the phrase “any real or personal property” with “any 
property or other benefit” because referenced items like positions, offices, appointments, and the 
like are not “real or personal property,” but are nevertheless subject to forfeiture under this 
Subsection.  Second, the proposed provision streamlines and summarizes the current provision’s 
language.  Third, the proposed provision does not include 11 Del.C. § 1504(b)(3) and (4) 
because the forfeitable benefits discussed in those provisions are adequately covered by the 
proposed provision and do not need to be separately addressed.   
Section 5301(d) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 1504(c), with streamlined wording.  
Section 5301(e) corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 477, establishing a defense and a sentencing 
mitigation for voluntary and complete renunciation of a racketeering offense.  The renunciation 
defense in § 477(a) is very similar to the renunciation defense for the inchoate offenses of 
attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation in proposed Section 706.  This makes sense because 
racketeering has an aspect of group criminality that is conceptually very similar to conspiracy 
liability.  Therefore, Subsection (e)(1) defines the defense by reference to Section 706, rather 
than setting forth its elements independently.  This signals that the defenses’ elements are 
effectively identical: the defendant must make a “voluntary and complete renunciation,” as 
defined in Section 706(b), and must take further steps that prevent commission of the offense 
originally intended.  Subsection (e)(2) provides a sentencing mitigation, rather than a defense, 
where the defendant’s efforts do not actually prevent the offense, but the defendant’s efforts to 
prevent it were substantial.  By making reference to Subsection (e)(1)’s defense, Subsection 
(e)(2) is intended to incorporate its elements except as to prevention of the offense.  So, under 
Subsection (e)(2), the defendant’s substantial efforts to prevent commission of the offense must 
still be made “under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his or 
her criminal purpose.”  See Section 706(a)(2).   
Section 5301(f) directly corresponds to 11 Del.C. § 476, specifying certain defenses that 
defendants alleged to commit racketeering as a part of a group or organization are not permitted 
to raise.  Subsection (f)(1) preserves Delaware’s rejection of the “unconvictable confederate” 
defense to group liability, which is a concept borrowed from inchoate offenses of conspiracy and 
solicitation.  Since those provisions are identical in substance, Subsection (f)(1) explicitly utilizes 
the same elements as those in Section 704.  This ensures consistent interpretation and application 
of this provision, and prevents two separate, but identical, provisions from evolving differently 
through future case law.  Subsection (f)(2) preserve’s Delaware’s rejection of a defense based 
upon non-membership in a racketeering organization where membership in the organization has 
changed over time, but at least two original members remain. 
Current Provisions Not Retained.  Section 5301 does not incorporate several provisions 
from the current code.  The first is 11 Del.C. § 1501, which states the purpose of the racketeering 
provisions.  This Commentary provides a general statement of purpose in the “Generally” 
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paragraph above.  Second, the proposed Section does not include 11 Del.C. §§ 1505, 1506, 1507, 
1508, 1509, 1510, and 1511.  Each of those provisions relates to matters that do not belong in the 
criminal code, such as civil remedies, forfeiture proceedings, liens, investigative powers of the 
Attorney General, registration of foreign corporations, and use of forfeited funds for law 
enforcement purposes.  It appears that the Delaware Code does not currently contain robust, 
general provisions for forfeiture proceedings.  The procedural forfeiture provisions found in 
these sections should be eliminated in favor of new, general provisions elsewhere in the 
Delaware Code, and the provision relating to registration of foreign corporations should be 
moved to a part of the code dealing with corporate regulation.  Failure of a foreign corporation to 
register as required may or may not be evidence of racketeering, and it is not a racketeering 
offense in and of itself.  
 
 
Comment on Section 5302.  Gang Participation 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 616, 617 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offense of gang participation, prohibiting active 
participation in a criminal street gang and recruitment of juveniles into a criminal street gang. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5302(a) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 616(b), 
with one minor change.  The proposed provision replaces the phrase “actively participates in any 
criminal street gang” with “performs any role that benefits a criminal street gang.”  The change 
is due to the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Taylor v. State, 76 A.3d 761 (Del. 2013) that 
“actively participates in any criminal street gang” means “performs some role to benefit a 
criminal street gang.”   
Section 5302(b) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 617(b)(1), with four minor changes.  First, 
the proposed provision replaces “juvenile or student” with “juvenile.”  Second, the proposed 
provision eliminates the concept of “criminal youth gangs” and refers to all types of gangs as 
criminal street gangs.  Third, the proposed provision eliminates § 617(b)(2), which additionally 
punishes any person who threatens or harms a juvenile in order to encourage the juvenile to join, 
remain in, or submit to a demand by a criminal street gang, because threatening and committing 
criminal conduct resulting in harm are already punishable under Sections 1101 (Aggravated 
murder), 1202 (Assault), 1206 (Terroristic threats), 1404 (Coercion), and 2304 (Criminal 
damage) of the Proposed Code  Fourth, the proposed provision adds the culpability requirement 
“knowingly” because it is the minimal appropriate level of culpability needed for the conduct 
covered by this Section to be criminally punishable.  
Section 5302(b) is necessary because the inchoate offense of solicitation would not reach 
the conduct prohibited by this offense.  One must actively participate or perform some role to 
benefit the gang to be guilty of gang participation.  Therefore, merely soliciting a juvenile to join 
a gang, without specifically soliciting the juvenile to join a gang to perform some act to benefit 
the gang, would not be punishable by the inchoate offense of solicitation.  The proposed 
provision does eliminate “attempts to cause” because attempts to recruit a juvenile would be 
covered by the inchoate offense of attempt in Section 701 of the Proposed Code.  
Section 5302(c)(1) maintains the grading provision found in 11 Del.C. § 616(b).  The 
proposed provision removes the sentencing enhancements found in 11 Del.C. § 616(c) because 
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those enhancements are covered by the general grade adjustment in Section 804 of the Proposed 
Code.   
Section 5302(c)(2) maintains the grading provision found in 11 Del.C. § 617(b)(1).  
 
 
Comment on Section 5303.  Money Laundering  
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. § 951 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This provision defines the offenses of money laundering and structuring. 
Relation to current Delaware law.  Section 5303(a)(1) and (2) are substantially similar to 
11 Del.C. § 951(a)(1) and (2).  
Section 5303(a)(3) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 951(a)(3), with one minor difference.  
The proposed provision eliminates the current provision’s phrase “or funds that the person 
believes are the proceeds of criminal activity” because mistake of fact is covered by Section 206 
of the Proposed Code.  
Section 5303(a)(4) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 951(a)(4), with three minor differences.  
First, the proposed provision replaces “finance or invest” with “provides, holds, or invests.”  In 
the context of “knowingly finance[ing] or invest[ing] or intend[ing] to finance or invest funds 
that the person believes are intended to further the commission of criminal activity,” 11 Del.C. 
§ 951(a)(4), the phrase “finance funds” is problematic because one cannot “finance funds” based 
on any common usage of the words. Second, the proposed provision removes “believes” in the 
context of funds intended to further the commission of criminal activity because mistake of fact 
is covered by the general part.  Third, the proposed provision removes “or intends to use or 
invest” because intention without conduct cannot be punishable. 
Section 5303(a)(5) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 951(a)(5).  
Section 5303(b) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 951(f), with one minor change.  The 
proposed provision summarizes the current provision’s “or of 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq. or 31 
C.F.R. § 103 et seq., or any rules or regulations adopted under those chapters and sections” with 
“or the United States.”   
Section 5303(b)(1) corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 951(f)(1) and (2), with two minor 
changes.  First, the proposed provision eliminates entities such as video lottery facilities from the 
illustrative list of entities required to file reports.  If such entities are required to file reports, they 
are included in the clause “or any other individual or identity required by law to file a report 
regarding currency transactions or suspicious transactions.”  Second, the proposed provision 
eliminates the current provision’s “attempt to cause” language because an attempt to structure is 
punishable under the inchoate offense of attempt in Section 701 of the Proposed Code. 
Section 5303(b)(2) corresponds with 11 Del.C. 951(f)(3), with two minor changes.  First, 
the proposed provision eliminates the attempt language found in the current provision because 
attempt is punishable under the inchoate offense of attempt in Section 701 of the Proposed Code.  
Second, the proposed provision incorporates the definition of “structuring” into the offense 
definition itself.  
While some offenses already prohibit fraud regarding public records and reports, 
structuring is a sufficiently different and serious offense to warrant its own provision.  
Structuring involves executing financial transactions in a specific pattern calculated to avoid the 
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creation of certain records and reports required by law.  For instance, in the context of bank 
deposits, a defendant might intentionally parcel one large sum of money into a series of smaller 
transactions to avoid scrutiny.  The current fraud provisions found in Chapter 2200 and Chapter 
3200 do not directly address the conduct prohibited by this Section.  While Sections 2202 and 
3203 address “tampering” with public documents, instances of structuring would not necessarily 
fall under those provisions. 
Section 5303(c) maintains the grading provisions found in 11 Del.C. § 951(e) and (g). 
Section 5303(d) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 951(b).  
Section 5303(e) is substantially similar to 11 Del.C. § 951(d).  
Definitions omitted.  The proposed provision eliminates currently defined terms such as 
“criminal activity” and “funds” because they do not require a definition.  The proposed provision 
also eliminates the currently defined term “funds that the person believes are the proceeds of 
criminal activity,” which defines the term so as to include funds that are not the proceeds of 
criminal activity, because the reference to “believe” was already eliminated in Subsection (a) for 
the reasons given above.  
 
 
Comment on Section 5304.  Definitions 
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  11 Del.C. §§ 616, 951, 1502 
 
Comment: 
Generally.  This Section provides definitions of key terms used in this Chapter. 
Relation to current Delaware law.   Section 5304(a) provides a definition of “criminal 
street gang” that corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 616(a)(1), with one minor change.  Whereas 
proposed Section 5304(a)(3) uses the phrase “the commission of criminal offenses,” current 
§ 616(a)(1)uses the phrase “the commission of 1 or more” listed predicate acts.  The predicate 
acts are numerous and varied.  Streamlining the offense to include all criminal offenses is 
simpler. 
Section 5304(b) provides a definition of “enterprise” that corresponds with 11 Del.C. 
§ 1502(3), with two minor changes.  First, the proposed provision eliminates the word 
“individual” from the current provision’s list of entities that may constitute an enterprise because 
a sole proprietorship is the only individual that can also be an enterprise.  Second, the proposed 
provision eliminates the current provision’s phrase “whether in relation to an illicit or licit 
enterprise or . . . other entity.”  “Governmental” is retained as part of the proposed definition. 
Section 5304(c) provides a definition of “pattern of criminal gang activity” that 
corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 616(a)(2), with three changes.  First, the proposed provision 
eliminates “attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, solicitation of, or conviction of” 
because most are already covered by the inchoate provisions found in proposed Section 700 and 
“or conviction” is unnecessary.  Second, the proposed provision eliminates the now unnecessary 
jurisdictional requirements that one of the offenses must have occurred after July 1, 2003.  Third, 
the proposed provision eliminates a statutory list of predicate offenses, each of which deals with 
a certain type of gang-related crime, and replaces it with any incidents of conduct that “constitute 
felony violations of offenses involving violence, coercion, sexual activity, controlled substances, 
property damage, or deadly weapons.” 
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Section 5304(d) provides a definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” that 
corresponds with 11 Del.C. § 1502(5) and (9), with four minor changes.  First, the proposed 
provision eliminates the current provision’s jurisdictional requirement that at least one of the 
incidents of conduct must have occurred after July 9, 1986 because this provision is no longer 
necessary.  Second, the proposed provision eliminates the current clause “to attempt to engage 
in, to conspire to engage in or to solicit, coerce or intimidate another person to engage in” 
because such conduct is covered by the inchoate offense provisions in Sections 701-03 of the 
Proposed Code.  Third, as discussed below, proposed Section 5304(d)(3) alters 11 Del.C. 
§ 1502(9)’s definition of what it means to constitute racketeering.  Fourth, while the current 
Code separately defines “pattern of racketeering activity” and “racketeering,” the proposed 
provision combines the two terms into one definition of “pattern of racketeering activity.” 
Section 5304(d)(3)(A) maintains the current provision’s reference to 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1961(1)(A), (1)(B), (1)(C), and (1)(D) because, by incorporating the federal definition of 
“racketeering activity,” the Delaware General Assembly evidenced an intent to track the federal 
list of offenses that constitute racketeering activities, which may be amended from time to time.  
If the United States Congress adds or removes an offense from the federal definition of 
racketeering activity, that change will automatically be incorporated into Section 5301(e)(2).   
The proposed Section 5304(d)(3)(B) replaces the current provision’s list of state offenses 
that constitute racketeering activity, which are “any activity constituting a felony which is 
chargeable under the Delaware Code or any activity constituting a misdemeanor” under certain 
listed provisions of the Delaware Code with the simpler phrase “a felony under this Code.”  The 
proposed provision eliminates misdemeanors from offenses that may constitute racketeering 
activity for two reasons.  First, the current definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” found 
in 11 Del.C. § 1502(5) stipulates that for conduct to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity 
at least one of the incidents of conduct must constitute “a felony under the Delaware Criminal 
Code, or if committed subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or any state of the United 
States, would constitute a felony under the Delaware Criminal Code if committed in the State.”  
That clause indicates that a number of misdemeanors alone cannot constitute predicate acts for a 
racketeering offense.  Second, punishing conduct under the Class 4 felony of racketeering, 
maximum punishment for which is 25 years, would be grossly disproportionate if the conduct is 
normally punished as a misdemeanor, which is punishable by one year of imprisonment, at most.  
Further, many of the “misdemeanors” enumerated in the current provision, such as forgery and 
counterfeiting, are already felonies.  
When interpreting and applying Subsections (d)(1)–(2), consider Stroik v. State, 671 
A.2d 1335 (Del. 1996), which discussed the relationship of underlying predicate offenses in a 
pattern of racketeering activity.  Stroik cited with approval H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 
U.S. 229 (1989), where the United States Supreme Court considered the relational nexus of 
predicate acts to satisfy a conviction under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, and held that predicate acts are related if they “have the same or similar 
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated 
by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.”   H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 
U.S. 229, 240 (1989). 
Section 5304(e) provides a definition of “proceeds” that is identical to 11 Del.C. 
§ 951(c)(4).  
Section 5304(f) provides a definition of “unlawful debt” that is substantially similar to 11 
Del.C. § 1502(12).  
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CONFORMING AMENDMENTS GENERAL COMMENT   
 
During the conforming amendment process, additional current law provisions, beyond those 
specifically mentioned in this Commentary or the Conversion Tables in Volume 1 of this 
Preliminary Report, had to be modified or deleted.  Some provisions provided references to 
provisions that no longer exist.  (See, e.g., 11 Del. C. §§ 615, 1312A).  Other provisions 
contained definitions no longer in use or redundant in their respective titles following the 
changes introduced by the Proposed Code.  (See, e.g., Del. C. §§ 222(10), (24); 617(a); 762(b); 
787(2), (4), (5), (7), (8), (9), (11), (12); 829(a), (g), (h); 837(a); 857(1), (6), (9); 1100(2), (5), (8), 
(10), (11); 926(b)(2); 1213; 1235(e); 1258(5); 1274(1), (2); 1313(a); 1356(3); 1432(a), (d), (g), 
(h); 1460(b)(2), (3); 1502(6), (8); 3531(1); 4205A(b)).  In contrast, many definitional provisions 
were retained in their respective titles because they are essential for the provisions that will 
remain in these Titles after the enactment of the Proposed Code.  (See, e.g., §§ 222(1), (8), (11), 
(14), (16), (17), (19), (22), (27), (29), and (30)).  Note also that certain current law provisions 
establishing grading were not explicitly referred to by the Commentary, even though such 
grading was incorporated or substituted by the arrangement in the Proposed Code.  (See, e.g., 11 
Del. C. §§ 613(c), 612(d), 836(b), 840A(b), and the last sentences in §§ 1262, 1321 and 1445).  
These and additional provisions that had to be partially modified to address similar issues are all 
accounted for by means of the “conforming amendments” bill to be enacted by the General 
Assembly contemporaneously with the Proposed Code. 
 
 
